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RESUMO 
O que motiva as pessoas para se coordenarem socialmente? Tendo como base a teoria dos 
modelos relacionais, e perspetivas filosóficas e psicológicas da ação conjunta, proponho que 
todas as formas de coordenação social requerem que os participantes produzam ações 
congruentes com as ações dos parceiros, de acordo com modelos relacionais cognitivos 
partilhados. Quando as ações de todos os participantes em interação se ajustam, criam um 
padrão de Complementaridade Relacional (CompRel). Assim, a CompRel é o objetivo 
intrínseco a todas as formas de coordenação. Partindo desta conceptualização, esta tese 
apresenta duas hipóteses teóricas. Primeiro, a CompRel é inerentemente gratificante; a 
perspetiva de CompRel é suficiente para motivar o comportamento, na ausência de 
recompensas ulteriores à coordenação. Quatro estudos testaram se os participantes primados 
com o objetivo de CompRel (vs. não primados) ficariam mais motivados para seguirem as 
instruções de um experimentador e, por isso, fariam mais esforço para completarem as tarefas 
pedidas durante a sessão experimental. Os resultados não suportaram a hipótese de que a 
CompRel motiva o comportamento social. Contudo, uma outra linha de cinco estudos 
demonstrou que a CompRel é gratificante, revelando que os participantes experimentaram 
mais afeto positivo em interações complementares (vs. não-complementares). A segunda 
hipótese teórica propõe que, sendo a CompRel intrínseca à coordenação, é suficiente para 
satisfazer os motivos que têm sido propostos para explicar o comportamento coordenado. 
Cinco estudos demonstraram que os participantes experimentaram mais controlo, pertença e 
confiança em interações complementares (vs. não-complementares), e que estes efeitos não 
puderam ser explicados pelas expectativas em relação à ação do parceiro nem pelos benefícios 
da coordenação. 
Palavras-chave: coordenação social, interação social, modelos relacionais, 
complementaridade relacional, motivação, controlo, pertença, confiança 
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ABSTRACT 
What motivates people to engage in coordinated social interactions? Building on relational 
models theory, and on philosophical and psychological accounts of joint action, I propose that 
all forms of coordination require participants to generate actions that are congruent with the 
actions of the partners, according to shared cognitive relational models. When the actions of 
all interacting participants fit together, they create a pattern of Relational Complementarity 
(RelComp). Hence, RelComp is the goal intrinsic to all forms of coordination. Building on 
this conceptualization, this thesis addresses two theoretical hypotheses. First, RelComp is 
inherently satisfying; the prospect of RelComp is sufficient to motivate behavior in the 
absence of rewards ulterior to coordination. Four studies tested whether participants primed 
with RelComp as a goal (vs. non-primed) would be more motivated to follow the instructions 
of an experimenter, and therefore, would spend more effort to complete the tasks requested 
during the experimental session. The results did not support the hypothesis that RelComp 
motivates social behavior. However, a second unrelated line of five studies demonstrated that 
RelComp is satisfying, by showing that participants experienced more positive affect in 
complementary (vs. non-complementary) interactions. The second theoretical hypothesis 
states that, since RelComp is intrinsic to coordination, it is sufficient to fulfill the motives that 
have been proposed to explain coordinated behavior. Five studies showed that participants 
experienced higher control, belonging and trust in complementary (vs. non-complementary) 
interactions, and that these effects could not be explained by expectations about the partner’s 
actions, nor by the benefits of coordination. 
 
Keywords: Social coordination, social interactions, relational models, relational 
complementarity, motivation, belonging, control, trust. 
Classification Codes by American Psychological Association (PsychINFO Classification 
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3000 Social Psychology  
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Relational Complementarity 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
Motivations for Social Relationships 
 
Coordinated interactions between individuals, groups, institutions or nations are the 
prevalent condition of human relationships. From opening a door to a stranger to making an 
online purchase, from handshaking to negotiating national debt payments, from nursing a 
baby to managing an organization, from fighting in a boxing match to engaging in armed 
conflict conducted with some reference to international laws, people usually relate in an 
orderly fashion with one another. What motivates them to do so? The assumption behind this 
question is that human beings are anticipatory agents (Veroff & Veroff, 1980) with desires, 
needs, whishes, hopes, and intentions (Pittman, 1998) – sometimes unconscious (McClelland, 
1987; Bargh, 1990) or irrational, whose behaviors are often more flexible than reflexive 
reactions or fixed action patterns (Park & Buunk, 2011). If people frequently produce 
structured interactions with different degrees of complexity and flexibility, and in a broad 
variety of contexts, then, it is not unreasonable to assume that, for some reason, they want to 
do so. 
The goal of this thesis is to present a motivational account of social relationships, in 
particular, coordinated social interactions. Relying on anthropological, philosophical and 
psychological approaches to social coordination and joint action, I propose that when relating 
to each other people engage in interaction patterns of Relational Complementarity. These 
patterns are constituted by actions by each agent that are complementary, or mutually 
congruent, according to subjectively shared cognitive models or prototypes of social 
relationships that inform which actions by each agent fit together in specific situations (A. 
Fiske, 1991, 1992). Some examples of such patterns are two individuals shaking hands, a 
buyer and a seller trading money for a service, a couple dancing, a subordinate following 
orders from the boss, or rival gangs engaging in tit-for-tat retribution. Hence, all coordination 
that is not accidental (e.g., two strangers travelling on the same bus) requires Relational 
Complementarity, and social relationships are initiated and sustained to the extent that people 
are able to engage in relational patterns of complementarity with one another. My proposal is 
that Relational Complementarity is a motivating end-state in the sense that it energizes and 
directs participants to perform their parts of the pattern (e.g., I hold my right hand out to you) 
on concrete situations, while expecting, hoping, or inducing the partners to perform their part 
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(e.g., you grasp my hand) until the pattern is completed (e.g., a handshake). In other words, 
Relational Complementarity motivates humans to relate to one another in coordinate ways.  
To be sure, this proposal does not exclude the fact that humans have additional motives to 
relate—motives that can, occasionally, be more pressing than Relational Complementarity. 
Instead, it implies that coordinated interactions are intrinsically motivating even when 
individuals lack ulterior goals. On the other hand, I argue that many psychological needs and 
non-relational goals that may motivate people to engage in social interaction in the first place 
are usually fulfilled by means of Relational Complementarity. Furthermore, it is also possible 
that individual differences in other motivations can shape preferences for particular kinds of 
relational patterns. 
Before presenting my proposal in detail, I justify the relevance of a new account by 
briefly discussing some limitations of two common approaches to the study of social 
motivation. 
1.1. Setting-based Approaches 
It is widely accepted among social scientists, and intuitive to the lay person, that 
relationships allow human beings to achieve outcomes that are important for survival and 
well-being (e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Blau, 1964). By means of group memberships, 
coalitions, pair bonds, and kin relationships, humans, like most animals, increase their 
chances of survival and reproduction. Social collectives offer protection against diseases, 
predators, and rivals; and cooperative alliances bring about outcomes that are beyond the 
reach of individual efforts, such as buildings and infrastructures. In fact, social interactions 
allow individuals to exchange all kinds of desirable resources, such as, money, goods, 
services, information (Turner, Foa & Foa, 1971). In addition to fulfilling survival needs, and 
offering objective material resources, social interactions also yield subjective psychological 
incentives, for instance, love, intimacy, emotional support  (e.g., Hill, 1987; McAdams, 1980; 
Murray, 1938; Turner, et al., 1971),  praise, respect (e.g., Buss, 1983), dominance, power 
(e.g., Murray, 1938; Veroff, 1957), approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), self-esteem and 
sense of identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), to name a few. 
Given the wide variety of possible objective and subjective consequences of social 
interactions, one common approach to the study of social behavior is to describe behavior in 
specific settings, and interpret results based on the assumption that people want a particular 
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incentive (Veroff & Veroff, 1980). To illustrate, ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation 
have been explained by assuming that individuals seek positive self-esteem from their social 
identities (Oakes & Turner, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1979); it has been shown that 
experiencing high anxiety motivates people to seek the company of strangers (Schachter, 
1959); a need for approval has been suggested to describe why people conform to social 
norms (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955); a control motive has been proposed to explain 
obedience to authorities, compliance with requests (e.g., Fennis & Aarts, 2012), and the 
seeking of power positions (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996); it has been argued that people join 
social groups in order to reduce their uncertainty about themselves and the environment 
(Hogg, 2000); and prosocial behavior is thought to be motivated by mood maintenance 
(Cialdini, Darby & Vincent, 1973) or by trust in the other’s good intentions (Dunning, 
Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014; Dunning, & Fletchenhauer 2011).  
These examples should make clear that one drawback of setting-based approaches is that 
commonalities between apparently distinct phenomena are disregarded (Veroff & Veroff, 
1980). As they offer disconnected accounts of particular kinds of relationships (e.g., romantic 
relationships, power relationships), levels of analysis (e.g., interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships), or social phenomena (e.g., social influence, aggression, altruism, conflict, 
interpersonal attraction), different psychological theories have to be employed as researchers 
switch their attention from one setting to another (Veroff & Veroff, 1980). Only at the 
expense of great effort and imagination can these theories be applied to relationships, levels-
of analysis, or phenomena other than those they were meant to explain in the first place. To be 
sure, each context and level of analysis has its own specificities, but to fully understand social 
motivation, it is also necessary to describe the processes and motives that cut across social 
relationships at all levels, and contexts. 
1.2. Need-based Approaches 
An alternative approach to describing particular behaviors is to focus on how universal 
human dispositions energize and direct behavior across settings (e.g., Freud, 1914/ 1953; 
Maslow, 1943; McDougall, 1908; Murray, 1938). To date, several human needs at different 
levels of analysis have been proposed as fundamental drives behind action and cognition (cf. 
Pittman & Ziegler, 2007, for review). Some examples are safety (Maslow, 1943) or self-
preservation (Pyszcsynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997) needs, at the biological level; needs 
for autonomy, competence (Deci & Ryan, 2000), self-esteem (Pyszcsynski, et al., 1997), 
Relational Complementarity 
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understanding (Stevens & S. Fiske, 1995), or controlling (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995), at the 
individual level; or relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995) needs, at the social level (see also S. Fiske, 2004, 2008).  
Even though, such theories have generated a considerable amount of research about the 
impact of fundamental needs on social behavior, they are still limited explanations of 
coordinated social interactions. If descriptions of motivated behavior in particular settings are 
too specific to be generalized to other contexts, fundamental human needs are too broad to 
predict behavior in specific settings. Need-based accounts successfully explain what energizes 
behavior, but are not so effective in describing what directs it in particular social interactions. 
Usually, need-based theories require context-specific assumptions and moderators, which are 
usually more informative about social behavior than the need itself. I illustrate that next with 
two examples. 
There is evidence that a need to maintain a sense of control motivates individuals (under 
control deprivation) to comply with requests and follow orders (Fennis & Aarts, 2012). 
However, such explanation assumes that coordinating is a more effective strategy to restore 
personal control than refusing to comply or doing something else, instead. It is not difficult to 
imagine the great sense of personal control that one experiences when refusing to do what 
others want; toddlers, children, teenagers, or anyone resisting authority gains control. In 
addition, it is known that frustration (i.e., lack of control) also motivates people to engage in 
aggressive behavior towards others (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Geen, 
1968), who are sometimes innocent third parties (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & 
Miller, 2000). Hence, further processes are required to describe the conditions under which 
people fulfill their need for control by relinquishing control to external agents or by 
attempting to aggressively dominate other people.  
The second example is related to the need to belong. It has been shown that individuals 
deprived of belonging (through social exclusion) show increased prosocial behavior towards 
new interaction partners as means of gaining acceptance (e.g., Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, 
Schaller, 2007). However, such an effect seems to be moderated by the kind of relationship 
with the new partner. Prosocial behavior is increased by social exclusion when the interaction 
partner is a peer, i.e., a potential friend (Maner, et al., 2007), but is decreased when the partner 
is the experimenter (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, Bartels, 2007, study 3), i.e., a 
stranger or a hierarchical superior. On the other hand, social exclusion also motivates 
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antisocial behavior towards those who rejected the individual (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & 
Stucke, 2001). This probably depends on perceptions of unfairness of the rejection, 
expectations of relationship repair, possibility of alternatives, etc., as suggested by Richman 
and Leary (2009; for reviews on prosocial and antisocial effects of social exclusion cf. 
Baumeister, Brewer, Tice & Twenge, 2007; and DeWall & Richman, 2011). Hence, 
additional processes of relational cognition are necessary to explain how the need to belong 
directs social behavior in particular settings. 
Furthermore, the need to belong has been defined as a human “pervasive drive to form 
and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting positive and significant interpersonal 
relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 497). However, humans frequently engage in 
coordinated interactions which are trivial and offer no opportunity for lasting connections 
(e.g., helping a tourist, or making an online donation). Thus, to explain such types of 
interactions in terms of a need to belong requires the assumption that people expect that a 
lasting and positive relationship can be formed in any interaction. Such an assumptions is 
deemed implausible 
An additional limitation of need-based theories is that they rely on assumptions about the 
nature of individual human beings, while neglecting the nature of social relationships as 
natural kinds. In other words, they focus on particular human motives and describe all sorts of 
actions employed to fulfill them, but they do not acknowledge the distinction between social 
and non-social actions. What is the difference between using a tool or consuming a resource 
and acting together with another agent? Do they feel the same even if they are motivated by 
the same need? Not acknowledging the nature of social relationships and the properties that 
make them uniquely and intrinsically appealing to human beings is to miss an important part 
of the story of social motivation. As a rough comparison, it is one thing to say that humans eat 
to experience pleasure or to avoid the distress of low blood sugar levels; it is another thing to 
say that food has nutrients, taste, aroma and texture that provide humans the pleasure and 
relief they seek. Any account of the hunger motive that is based exclusively on a description 
of the human organism can explain why humans seek something to eat, but not why they 
choose to eat vegetables instead of hay, cooked instead of raw meat, combined instead of 
single ingredients, or why they keep eating after their stomach is full. 
In summary, neither of the two approaches addresses motivation for coordinated social 
relationships, as such. Setting-based approaches describe what motivates social behavior in 
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particular contexts, and can hardly be generalized to all contexts. Need-based approaches 
describe how basic needs affect behavior in general, and cannot explain specific behavior 
without context-specific assumptions. While the former neglect what is common to all kinds 
of relationships and social interactions, the latter disregard the uniqueness of social relational 
behavior and its fundamental differences from non-social action. My proposal seeks to 
overcome these limitations by focusing on the properties of coordinated interactions, namely, 
on universal and basic structures of social relations. 
1.3. A Relational-structure-based Approach 
According to Relational Models Theory (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992), all human relationships 
across cultures are structured according to four cognitive models: Communal Sharing, 
Authority Ranking, Equality Matching and Market Pricing. Communal Sharing relations are 
based on what people have in common (e.g., group membership); Authority Ranking 
relationships rely on how individuals are ordered on a relevant dimension (e.g., military rank); 
Equality Matching relations consist of maintaining even balance by adding and subtracting 
the contributions of each participant (e.g., turn-taking); and Market Pricing relations are about 
proportionality through the use of ratios and rates (e.g., money). Relational models (RM) are 
schemas or prototypes of elementary social relationships that people use to understand, 
anticipate and evaluate the actions of others, as well as to plan and generate their own actions. 
These models are innate but their implementation is culturally informed. The cultural 
implementations allow individuals to represent when, with whom, in respect to what aspects 
of the interaction, and how each participant proceeds in a specific cultural context. In this 
sense, they inform (in the descriptive and prescriptive sense) which part each participant has 
to play, and how the actions of both actions must be combined for the model to be fulfilled. 
Whether individuals are helping a friend or cuddling, following orders or leading others, 
exchanging favors, or making business, the fulfillment of any RM requires that participants 
complement each other’s actions, according to a shared representation of their relationship. In 
other words, Relational Complementarity is the necessary condition for any RM to be 
fulfilled, and, thus, for any interaction to be successfully coordinated.  
Such a premise has some important implications. First, interacting in a relational way – 
usually with human beings, but also with animals, supernatural beings, and sometimes with 
objects – is essentially distinct from non-relational interactions, such as going around an 
obstacle or using a tool to achieve a goal (and as I will discuss in the next chapter, sometimes 
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people treat each other as mere obstacles or tools). Engaging in a social relationship implies 
shared agency, acting together, or doing something with another agent. It means to share a 
goal that is intrinsically collective in the sense that no agent can fulfill a RM or achieve 
Relational Complementarity by himself. There is no leadership without a leader and a 
follower, there is no business without a seller and a buyer, and there is no handshake without 
two participants—both reaching out at the same time, to the other’s hand. Hence, the actions 
by each participant presuppose fitting actions by the other, and are only meaningful and 
complete with reference to one another. When pursuing Relational Complementarity, each 
participant assumes, hopes, or wishes that her goal is shared by the other (“it is our goal”, “we 
are pursuing it together”). In non-relational interactions, on the other hand, individuals act 
alone and, at most, do something to other people or objects. They wear clothes, they use a 
coffee maker, or they avoid objects and individuals who stand in their way, and the goal is 
owned by the individual alone (“it is my goal”). 
A second implication is that Relational Complementarity can be conceptualized as a goal, 
the content of which is common to all coordinated interactions, and essentially different from 
other kinds of goals. Relational Complementarity can take the form of different relational 
patterns depending on which RM is applied and how it is implemented on particular 
interactions. Hence, when coordinating, people seek to fulfill a relational pattern. The adopted 
relational pattern informs, in a descriptive and prescriptive sense, which actions by each 
participant are relevant for coordination, and which are not, and which actions by one 
individual should precede, follow, or be performed simultaneously with which actions by the 
other. In this sense, the relational pattern is the goal energizing and directing the actions of 
each participant towards the other, as well as their evaluations about previous actions by the 
other, their expectations about future actions by the other, and their attention to and 
monitoring of the relevant actions by the other. In other words, by understanding the 
relational patterns that participants apply to their interactions, it is possible to make 
predictions about their actions and cognitions in particular situations1. 
                                                 
1 To say that Relational Complementarity is the goal common to all coordinated social interactions does not 
mean that it is the only goal or even the main goal of social coordination. In the extreme case of a sociopath, 
individuals use social coordination to exploit the partner in order to achieve their individual goals. In this case, 
they do not pursue Relational Complementarity per se. However, in order to effectively manipulate the partner 
through coordination, they still have to perform their part of the relational model to some extent, even if while 
doing so they hide or simulate the true intentions behind their actions. 
Relational Complementarity 
8 
1.4. Theoretical Hypotheses 
If Relational Complementarity is the goal of all coordinated interactions, then, at least 
two theoretical hypotheses can be raised. First, Relational Complementarity is inherently 
satisfying. In addition to goals ulterior to social coordination, Relational Complementarity is 
affectively rewarding in itself. If that is the case, then the goal of Relational Complementarity 
should be sufficient to energize and direct social behavior in the absence of other motives. 
Second, if social coordination offers opportunities for human beings to fulfill their basic 
needs, as suggested by many authors, then Relational Complementarity should, somehow, 
increase basic needs fulfillment. 
The two hypotheses are addressed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. More 
specifically, in line with the first hypothesis, Chapter 3 presents four experiments testing the 
effects of priming the goal of Relational Complementarity on participants’ effort to comply 
with a request by the experimenter. In Chapter 4, five experiments investigate the second 
hypothesis by testing whether people who engage in complementary interactions experience 
more sense of Control, sense of Belonging, Trust, and Positive Affect, than those who 
participate in non-complementary interactions. 
Before the empirical chapters, Chapter 2 presents a detailed description and discussion of 
the concept of Relational Complementarity in light of philosophical and psychological 
accounts of joint action. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Social Relating is the Pursuit of Relational Complementarity 
 
The term ‘social relationship’ has been used in many different ways by social scientists in 
general and social psychologists in particular. It usually refers to something static that people 
‘have’, are ‘in’ or ‘get out of’, a bond or association between two or more individuals that is 
more or less stable in time. In contrast, I use the term, ‘to relate’ or ‘relating’ to refer to 
something people do with someone else; an ongoing, dynamic and subjectively joint process 
individuals actively participate in, and by which social relationships are created, sustained, 
adjusted, redressed, and, sometimes ended. 
As a pre-analytical definition, to relate is to pursue an interaction pattern that is 
constituted by actions by each participant that are complementary according to a subjectively 
shared relational model. In other words, when relating to each other, each participant intends 
his action to fit previous actions by the other(s) and/or to induce, invite, evoke, or pull fitting 
actions by the other(s), with the purpose of fulfilling a pattern in which the actions of each are 
perceived to be completed by the actions of the other(s) (A. Fiske & Rai, 2015). Two lovers 
kissing, someone commanding and another following, doing a favor for someone who later 
reciprocates, a business transaction between a seller and a buyer are examples of intuitive 
patterns of Relational Complementarity (RelComp) that people pursue when they relate.  
To pursue RelComp implies that one’s action presupposes an action by the other so that 
the action of each is only meaningful with reference to the expected or desired action of the 
other. In order to know which action by one agent presupposes and completes which action by 
the other agent, participants apply cognitive relational models, i.e., schemas or prototypes of 
social relations that inform, in the descriptive and prescriptive sense, which actions belong 
together on a specific cultural context (and which do not). Such models mediate social 
interactions by allowing each participant to perform his part, while recognizing previous 
actions by the other as the other’s part, or presuming, expecting, wishing or hoping that the 
other will do her part appropriately.  
Saying that to relate is to pursue RelComp, means that relating is motivated action 
towards RelComp. RelComp is a goal about a dynamic collective state that participants aim 
at, and which can only be achieved by means of each doing his part of the relational pattern. 
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Therefore, one participant is relating only if his or her actions are intended as part of a pattern 
of complementary actions. Although there are many coordinated human interactions in which 
the actions of participants do not presuppose complementary actions by the other, I will 
explain why those actions do not qualify as relating.  
The term ‘complementarity’ has already been applied to dyadic interactions within 
distinct research traditions, yet with slightly different meanings than the one I use here (cf. 
Keisler, 1983, and Sadler, Ethier & Woody, 2011, for reviews on the use of the term 
complementarity). Both the interactional communication literature (e.g., Bateson, 1958; 
Berne, 1964; Goffman, 1967; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1977) and the romantic 
relationships literature (e.g., Beach, Whitaker, Jones & Tesser, 2001; Pilkington, Tesser & 
Stephens, 1991) use the term complementary to characterize dissimilar behaviors between 
interactants (e.g., dominance pulling for submission,) and the term symmetrical to 
characterize behaviors that are similar (e.g., friendliness pulling for friendliness; hostility 
pulling for hostility). On the other hand, interpersonal theory uses interpersonal 
complementarity to describe the “ways in which the interactional behavior of pairs of people 
may fit together and influence each other” (Sadler, Ethier & Woody, 2011, p. 123). This latter 
definition encompasses both similarity and dissimilarity of behavior across partners, with 
similar behaviors defined as corresponding, and dissimilar as reciprocal (e.g., Keisler, 1983). 
In line with the latter definition, RelComp is not just about similarity (e.g., two people 
hugging each other) or dissimilarity (e.g., command and obedience) of behavior, but rather 
about actions by two or more individuals ‘fitting together’. 
The operationalization of interpersonal complementarity has been limited to individual 
differences in traits as measured by the interpersonal circumplex, characterized by the two 
dimensions of affiliation and dominance (e.g., Keisler, 1983). The underlying assumption is 
that whether actions fit together depends on qualities of individuals, and how the qualities of 
one actor relate to the qualities of another actor. Hence, someone with a highly dominant 
interpersonal style would easily achieve complementarity if he interacted with an individual 
with a submissive style, but not with another dominant person. In contrast, RelComp refers to 
qualities of social interactions and relationships, not traits of individuals. Building on the 
assumption that people structure their social relationships according to a limited set of basic 
models (A. Fiske, 1991), the fitting together of participants’ actions is determined by the 
structure of the relationship itself or, to be more precise, by the relational model that they 
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apply to structure their interaction. For example, quite apart from personality traits some 
interactions are structured according to a role model of dominance or asymmetry, e.g., boss – 
subordinate, police officer – citizen, student – teacher. In such cases, the complementarity 
between dominance and submission, command and obedience, leading and following, 
protection and loyalty behaviors depends less on interpersonal styles than on common 
knowledge about relationships and the parts of each individual in them. Thus, RelComp is the 
quality of any interaction pattern that is constituted by actions of each participant that are 
mutually congruent and completing with reference to some relational model. I will use the 
term “relational pattern” to refer to interactions patterns with this quality.  
I use the word “action” in a broad and relaxed sense to refer not only to overt behavior 
but also to the underlying mental states (A. Fiske & Rai, 2015), which each participant can 
assume to be experienced by the other or attribute to the observed behavior by the other. 
Thus, ‘Complementarity’ depicts the mutual correspondence of each participant’s behaviors, 
intentions, beliefs, evaluations, judgments, or emotions with reference to a shared model. It 
“means that the [behaviors], thoughts, or affects of two or more participants are each oriented 
to the other person's [behaviors], thoughts, or affects in such a way that they make sense only 
in conjunction with each other” (A. Fiske & Haslam, 1996, p. 143).  
RelComp is also the subjective experience by each participant that the actions of each (as 
well as corresponding mental states) are perceived to fit together in a way that is consistent 
with the relational model that he or she applies. Hence, it is possible that one participant 
perceives the actions of both to be mutually congruent according to the model she applies, 
while the other does not because he is using a different model, or implementing the same 
model differently. In such cases only the first participant experiences RelComp. In this sense, 
when I say that actions are complementary according to a relational model that is shared 
among participants I mean subjectively shared. 
The term “Relational” refers not only to the intrinsic structures of relationships but also to 
the function of complementarity, which is to allow people to create, sustain, adjust and 
sometimes terminate social interactions and relationships. I propose that RelComp is the 
necessary condition for social coordination and for the construction of psychologically and 
culturally meaningful, predictable, and moral bonds between human beings. Relational 
behavior by one person is only understood and predictable with reference to previous or 
following actions by the other. Social bonds emerge to the extent that individuals succeed in 
Relational Complementarity 
12 
complementing one another; bonds are sustained as long as participants are able to keep on 
complementing one another or successfully repair previous failures to complement; and they 
terminate as the result of participants completing certain patterns (e.g., as the end of a contract 
or soccer game), not initiating new patterns (e.g., ceasing to invite a friend) or not performing 
one’s part (e.g., not returning the money borrowed from someone). Moreover, to the extent 
that specific patterns of complementarity are reproduced by individuals across time, they 
become part of the cultural norms and moral prescriptions that sustain social relationships on 
a particular collectivity. 
2.1. Four kinds of Relational Complementarity 
In order to know which action by one presupposes and completes which action by the 
other, participants apply cognitive relational models – schemas of social relations that inform, 
in the descriptive and prescriptive sense, which actions belong together (and which do not) in 
a specific cultural context. I rely on Relational Models Theory (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992, 2004a) 
to illustrate the idea that virtually all kinds of complementary social interactions can be 
constituted by a finite set of universal models. 
Relational Models Theory (RMT) claims that people in all cultures use a variety of 
implementations of only four models, or combinations thereof, to generate and coordinate 
most kinds of their social interactions: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality 
Matching and Market Pricing. This theory is built upon the conceptual convergence in Max 
Weber’s (1978) typology of forms of authority, Piaget’s (1965) stages of moral development, 
Paul Ricoeur’s (1967) account of the history of Christain theodicy, and other theoretical 
accounts and ethnographic descriptions2 (for a detailed review see A. Fiske, 1991).  
Relational models (RMs) are specialized faculties consisting of distinct forms of 
representation of social relations, which are used for integrating and interpreting experience of 
social interactions, as well as to guide one’s own participation (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992; cf. also 
Jackendoff, 1991). In other words, RMs are cognitive representations, schemas, prototypes, or 
grammars that people use (usually without explicit cognition or lexicalization) to understand, 
                                                 
2 Other converging theories include, for example, Durkheim’s (1933) concepts of mechanical and organic 
solidarity; Tönies’s (1988) gemeinschaft and gesellschaft; Clark and Mills’ (1979) communal and exchange 
relationships; Polanyi’s (1957) and Blau’s (1964) basic modes of social exchange; or Etzioni’s (1975) 
explanations of social order. 
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anticipate, plan, generate, and evaluate their social interactions (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992). In 
contrast with dimensional representation accounts (e.g., Wiggins, 1979; Wish, Deutsch, & 
Kaplan, 1976), empirical evidence shows that RMs are discrete implicit cognitive categories 
that people use to represent their social relationships (e.g., Haslam, 1994a; Haslam, 1994b; 
Haslam & A. Fiske, 1992; Haslam & A. Fiske, 1999), as well as to formulate their social 
intentions (A. Fiske & Haslam, 1997), and to think and remember about other people (A. 
Fiske, 1993; A. Fiske, 1995; A. Fiske, Haslam & S. Fiske, 1991). Each relational model has a 
distinct mathematical structure that defines which discrete relations and operations are 
meaningful; there are no intermediate structures between them (A. Fiske, 1991). 
Communal Sharing (CS) relations are based on what people perceive that they have 
essentially in common. It takes the form of a nominal scale of measurement, which 
discriminates between individuals who belong to the same category or group and those who 
do not. In CS interaction participants treat one another as being equivalent or undifferentiated 
in some socially relevant aspect. Typical examples are lovers cuddling or dancing; mothers 
breast-feeding their babies; friends hugging, sharing food or wearing each other’s clothes; 
soldiers drilling in synchrony; and team members wearing the same uniforms or adornments. 
Authority Ranking (AR) is transitive and linearly ordered. It is based on asymmetrical 
differences between participants along relevant hierarchical dimensions, such as seniority, 
strength, size, competence, age, date of commissioning, caste, etc. AR resembles an ordinal 
scale which ranks social agents, such as bosses and employees, teachers and students, seniors 
and juniors, first and third world countries. The high-ranked are not only entitled to privileges 
but also have obligations to offer pastoral protection and guidance to the subordinates, 
whereas the low-ranked give their respect and loyalty to the superiors. 
Equality Matching (EM) is about keeping even balance and is based on one-to-one 
correspondence and additive interval differences. It corresponds to an interval scale that 
allows participants to create and restore imbalances, of which they keep track by adding and 
subtracting each other’s contributions. Typical examples are citizens having the right to one 
vote each, a couple taking turns doing the house chores, children dividing a cake in equal 
shares, coworkers evenly distributing tasks, colleagues reciprocating favors in-kind, 
competitors starting a match at the same time, or using lotteries to give people equal 
opportunities.  
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Market Pricing (MP) relations are based on proportionality. MP is homologous to a ratio 
scale that enables people to structure their transactions by using rates or ratios, such as prices, 
wages, interests, or taxes. MP is not only applied to market exchanges, but also to legal 
penalties which are proportional to the violation (e.g., fines or prison sentences), decisions 
based on cost-benefit analysis, or meritocratic equity.  
Relational models mediate social interactions by allowing each participant to perform 
their respective parts while recognizing previous actions by the other as the other’s part, or 
while presuming, expecting or wishing that the other will do her part in the future. When two 
spouses kiss they apply CS. Both spouses understand that the part of kissing by one 
presupposes the part of sharing one’s body by the other, either through kissing back, leaning 
towards the kiss, hugging the kisser or appreciating the kiss in any other way. Likewise, when 
a police officer asks a driver for his driving license he is using AR. The officer treats the 
driver as a subordinate and the driver treats the officer as a superior. Hence, both the officer 
and the driver know that the part of commanding by the first presupposes the part of obeying 
by the second. When people apply EM they treat each other as equals. Therefore, the part of 
doing a favor to a colleague presupposes the colleague’s part of the returning the favor in the 
future. Finally, when a seller and a buyer use MP to negotiate prices and service conditions, 
they presuppose that whatever one pays will be proportional to whatever the other provides.  
Exactly what future action by the other is presupposed by one’s action, and whether a 
previous action by the other is recognized as part of a pattern to be completed by one’s action, 
is contingent on the RM that each participant applies to structure the interaction. For that 
reason, if someone applies CS with his friend by inviting him for a homemade dinner, she is 
presupposing an action by the friend that is different from him paying his share of the dinner, 
according to MP. If he were to offer to pay, she would be unlikely to recognize her friend’s 
action as a ‘part’ that she is willing to complement with the MP-fitting action of selling the 
dinner.  
At this point it should be clear that participants achieve RelComp whenever they apply 
the same RM in the same way to their interaction. Hence, if the two participants do not share 
the RM that each one is applying, they will not achieve RelComp, and will fail to coordinate. 
Consequently, their interaction may be experienced as awkward, uncomfortable, confusing, 
crazy, or offensive. Nonetheless, if relating is the pursuit of RelComp, then, insofar as one 
participant intends her action to be a part of a particular implementation of one RM, which 
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presupposes a fitting action by the other, she is relating, even if she and the partner 
subsequently fail to achieve complementarity. 
Relational Models Theory also states that some kinds of interactions do not require that 
participants share one RM. In such Null interactions (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992) the action by one 
actor does not presuppose or make reference to a completing action by the other. The action is 
complete when it achieves its (non-relational) goal. In other words, the actor is not relating, 
according to my definition, because her actions are not aimed at RelComp with the other. 
Instead, she disregards the social intentions, values, or needs of the other, as well any shared 
structures, standards, or goals. As a consequence, she adjusts her actions to the other no more 
than she would if the other was an inanimate object. Typical examples are people avoiding 
collisions with each other while walking in the street; strangers sitting on the same bus, or 
using the same public restroom. 
The four RMs are used to generate structured interactions in a wide variety of social 
domains. These domains include, but are not restricted to (for a complete account see A. 
Fiske, 1991, 1992): reciprocal exchange, distribution of resources, work, decision making, 
social influence, moral judgments, aggression, and conflict.  Hence, RMs do not define a 
relationship people are in, but different ways people can coordinate in particular domains, 
even within the same dyad. One friend can sell (MP) a car to the other, they can evenly split 
(EM) the expenses of a party, follow the other’s expert guidance and obey instructions in 
performing a statistical analysis (AR), and seek consensus (CS) about where to spend New 
Year’s Eve. Thus, RMs correspond to four discrete structures people use to achieve RelComp 
within and across contexts and domains, within and across dyadic relationships. In this sense, 
virtually all kinds of RelComp correspond to one of the four RMs. 
Finally, RMs are also combined and nested hierarchically to constitute complex systems 
of relationships, from interpersonal and intergroup relations to institutions and societies. 
Then, signing a job contract with a private company (MP) implies that one accepts the formal 
authority of one’s boss (AR), follows the same market regulations as rival companies (EM), 
and pays taxes to the government (MP). In turn, getting married may lead, depending on 
cultural paradigms, to physical expressions of love (CS), taking turns in doing the house 
shores (EM), feeding (CS) and protecting (AR) one’s children, or obeying to the patriarch or 
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matriarch (AR)3. The implication of such constellations of relationship is that successful 
patterns of RelComp sometimes presuppose and often lead to subsequent patterns, which 
makes relating an intrinsically dynamic process. 
2.2. Social interactions are structured by universal models of relationships 
In order to coordinate their actions and produce internally consistent, predictable, and 
meaningful interactions, people must know which actions fit together and which do not. 
Actions fit together when they are part of an organizing structure. A structure is a particular 
arrangement of the elements of something complex. Social relations are constituted by actions 
by different agents which are arranged according to an organizing pattern. Such pattern or 
structure specifies which actions belong together and which do not. For example, the actions 
of two spouses dancing the waltz go well together, but a police officer dancing the waltz and a 
driver showing him his driving license do not. Here, such organizing structures are 
conceptualized as Relational Models: specialized modules or faculties for representing, 
learning and producing social relations of equivalence (CS), linear ordering (AR), additive 
intervals (EM), or proportionality (MP). 
Gestalt psychologists’ (e.g., Wertheimer, 1923/2001) proposed that we perceive sensory 
stimuli (e.g., black dots in a row; musical notes; contracting facial muscles) as meaningful 
whole-configurations (e.g., a black line; a melody; a smiling face, respectively) and not as 
independent, unconnected parts. Such an idea was based on the assumption that pre-existing 
brain configurations accommodate sensory stimulation and imbue perception with a structure 
that the stimuli do not have in any necessary, intrinsic, or absolute sense (Hergenhahn, 2005). 
For example, they showed that visual perception is structured by a natural tendency to 
recognize configurations of continuity, proximity, symmetry, contrast, etcetera, between 
visual stimuli (e.g., Köhler, 1969). The same way as perceptual laws organize visual stimuli, 
RMs organize social interactions by discriminating, in a descriptive and prescriptive sense, 
which actions by different agents belong together to fulfill a whole pattern or “relational 
gestalt”.  
                                                 
3 For a more complete description about configurations of social relationships see Fiske’s (2012) work on meta-
relational models. 
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Conceiving relational acts as parts of a ‘whole’ pattern or relational gestalt implies that 
the actions by each participant are mutually completing. In other words, the actions by each 
are only complete and meaningful with reference to one another. For example, taking a bow is 
more than one person bending his back. Bending one’s back can mean many things: than one 
is feeling sick, stretching, etc. A “true” bow requires a second person (real or imagined, when 
practicing or playing) towards whom the bow is performed. Furthermore, a bow is not the 
same as one person standing and another bending; not if the latter is bending to examine 
damage to the floor boards. Hence, a relational pattern cannot be reduced to the actions of 
each individual. It requires not only that each performs his action, but also that the actions by 
each interlock in a particular manner by presupposing one another. Therefore, when 
participants perform mutually completing or fitting actions they produce a whole that is 
something else than the sums of its parts (Koffka, 1935/1999, p.176).  
2.2.1. The need for a cognitive coordination device specialized in social relations 
To say that social relations are structured means that their constitutive actions are 
arranged according to an organizing model that specifies which actions belong together and 
which do not. Since most coordinated interactions unfold in the absence of any verbal 
communication between participants that explicitly indicates which actions complement one 
another, more basic processes must be recruited. The perceptual, cognitive and neural 
processes suggested, so far, to support social coordination and joint action explain how 
participants know (a) what others are attending to, (b) what others are doing, and (c) what 
others will or (d) should do on a given context (for reviews see Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; 
Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006; Knoblich, Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011). However, these 
processes treat all actions as equal. They do not distinguish between purely individual actions 
and actions that are part of a relational pattern, and, therefore, afford complementary actions 
by other agents. For this reason, none of these processes explain which actions by the other 
one has to attend to, understand, and predict in order to realize a structured interaction.  
Social agents are able to know what others attend to by following their gaze (Tomasello 
& Carpenter, 2007). This ability allows them to include whatever the other perceives into 
their own representation of the other’s task (Knoblich, et al., 2011), and, consequently, to 
make predictions about future actions by the other, as well as to plan one’s own actions 
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accordingly (e.g., Brennan, Chen, Dickinson, Neider, & Zelinsky, 2007)4. Social agents are 
able to know what others are doing because one action performed by another agent and a 
similar action performed by oneself share common codes or representations in the observer’s 
action system (James, 1890; Prinz, 1997; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). When an action by 
another agent is mapped onto the observer’s own action repertoire it automatically activates 
the corresponding action representation that the observer uses to generate similar actions 
oneself. Such activation leads to the observer’s immediate recognition of the goals underlying 
the observed action (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). Furthermore, social agents know what 
other’s will do because such common representations also allow the observer to predict or 
simulate5 how, when and where that action will unfold, as if he were the one performing it6 
(see also Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Action understanding and prediction is also supported 
by explicit or high-level processes such as mindreading. People explain and predict the 
actions of intelligent agents, including oneself, by ascribing mental states to them, such as 
intentions, beliefs, feelings, etc. (Carruthers, & Smith, 1996). They can do so by relying on 
folk psychological theories7 (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) or by 
explicitly using their own minds as models to apprehend their mental states8 (e.g., Gordon, 
1986). Finally, social agents know what others should do by cognitively representing, not 
only the features of the co-actor’s action but also the stimulus condition under which that 
action is performed (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2005). Hence, participants in an experiment 
can predict the co-actor’s finger movements based on the appearance of the corresponding 
colored shape in a screen (e.g., Ramnani & Mial, 2004). These representations of stimulus-
action links allows them to integrate the co-actor’s responses, in a rather automatic way, into 
their own action plans, as if both actions were at their own command (Sebanz, et al., 2003, 
2005). 
                                                 
4 In this experiment, when co-actors know where each one is looking at, they spontaneously and without 
communicating divide a common search space in order to more quickly find an object. 
5 This process is often called implicit or low-level simulation, according to the simulation theory of Theory of 
Mind (cf. Goldman, 2012). 
6 The higher the similarity between the perceived action and the way oneself would do it, the higher the accuracy 
of one’s predictions (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). For instance, pianists playing one part of a duet, synchronize 
better when they play together with a recording of themselves playing the other part than when the recording is 
performed by another pianist (Keller, Knoblich & Repp, 2007).  
7 According to the theory theory version of Theory of Mind (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). 
8 This is high-level simulation, according to the simulation theory of Theory of Mind (cf. Goldman, 2012). 
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I argue that none of the processes described allow participants to know whether an action 
by the other is a part of a relational pattern, and which actions by oneself should follow in 
order to complete that pattern. In other words, knowing what the other is attending to, is 
doing, will do or should do is different from knowing whether his actions are relevant for 
social coordination. For example, the fact that one child sees an adult pointing at an object 
will not necessarily lead her to coordinate with the adult. In fact, the child tends to perform 
the complementary action of throwing the object into a basket only when she and the adult 
have previously engaged in a cleaning-up activity together (Liebal, Behne, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2009). This suggests that the child uses the relational pattern shared with the adult 
as a source of information about what aspects of the environment are relevant for 
coordination. Likewise, using one’s own motor representations to understand the intentions 
underlying another agent’s grasping movement towards a cup (Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, 
Gallese, et al. 2005), or to predict the landing position of a dart thrown by oneself or other 
agents (Knoblich & Flach, 2001), is not informative of whether one can produce any 
following action, and if so, which one, that fits with the grasping or throwing actions by the 
other. The same argument applies to any inferences and predictions about other’s actions 
accomplished through mental state ascription.  
Furthermore, even the relatively automatic process of representing stimulus-action links 
governing the action of the other is insufficient to determine whether the action represented is 
relevant to be integrated into one’s action plans. For example, several experiments (Sebanz, et 
al., 2003, 2005) have shown a joint Simon effect9, suggesting that individuals tend to 
represent a co-actor’s task and take it into account while performing their own task.  
However, another experiment showed that if participants perform the joint Simon task 
alongside a higher-ranked co-actor (a “researcher”) who provides negative feedback about the 
agent’s performance (“you have to respond quicker”, “you are too slow”), the joint effect 
disappears completely, suggesting that whether the task of the other is taken into account by 
the agent depends on the relationship between them (Hommel, Colzato & Wildenberg, 2009). 
Indeed, if we assume that the participant and the co-actor applied an AR model to their 
                                                 
9 When participants do a Simon task together with a co-actor (joint Simon task), each by responding to one 
stimulus, individual performance shows the same incompatibility effect (called the Simon effect) that is usually 
observed when participants perform the Simon task alone by responding to both stimuli. The evidence that the 
task of the co-actor is represented and integrated in the participant’s action plans lies in the fact that there is no 
incompatibility effect when participants respond only to one stimulus, as in the joint condition but without a co-
actor (Sebanz, et al., 2003, 2005). 
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interaction, then, the superior was entitled to monitor and guide the task of the subordinate 
and not the other way around. The results, then, show that the co-actor’s action that was taken 
into account by the participant was the one required to constitute AR, i.e., the authority’s 
instructions about one’s performance and not the authority’s task itself. 
I want to highlight that none of the processes addressed so far in the literature to support 
joint action allows participants to detect and produce actions that fit together (are related) with 
the actions of other agents. I propose that such function is supported by Relational Models, 
which are specialized devices for learning and constituting universal, innate, socially 
meaningful and internally consistent configurations of actions10. Of course, RMs must be 
shared among participants so that their actions fit together accordingly. By specifying which 
actions belong together and which do not, and under the assumption that they are shared, RMs 
allow the agents to narrow down the infinite number of possible relational actions and 
intentions a human can have to only a few possibilities that are congruent with a given action 
by another agent. For instance, if someone holds out his hand to someone else when they 
                                                 
10 Notice that some forms of coordinated actions have been explained by perception-action coupling processes. 
The agents’ actions become entrained as results of them perceiving the same visual, auditory or haptic 
information. For example, audiences tend to applaud in unison (Néda, Ravasz, Brechte, et al., 2000), and 
participants sitting side by side in rocking chairs unintentionally synchronize their rocking frequencies when 
they visually attend to the co-actor’s movements (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007). 
On the other hand, common codes explain how individuals mimic their partner’s behavior without being aware 
of doing so while observing the partner’s gestures during a conversation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Finally, 
some forms of coordination can also be explained in terms of  two or more agents attending to a common object 
or environmental stimuli affording, i.e., offering the opportunity for (Gibson, 1977) simultaneous actions by 
each. For example, a two-seat bus bench affords two individuals’ sitting next to each other.  
However, neither common affordances, common codes nor common perceptual information determine 
whether the actions by each agent fit together in social-relational sense. If, for instance, one black passenger sits 
next to a white one, their actions fit together if the two-seat chair is in a contemporary western bus, but not if it is 
in an apartheid bus. In an apartheid bus the passengers would use CS to discriminate between those who belong 
to the category or group entitled to that particular seat and those who do not. Likewise, children synchronize 
their drumming with higher accuracy when they play with another person than with a mechanical device 
producing the same sound (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2009). This suggests that rhythmic entrainment cannot be 
explained by perceptual couplings alone. It seems that top-down processes inform who can synchronize with 
whom. In fact synchronous movements are one way to constitute CS relations by communicating who belongs to 
the same group (Fiske, 2004b; Schubert, Waldzus & Seibt, 2008). Hence, it is plausible to hypothesize that one 
is more likely to synchronize with those who are perceived to share the same essence (which is definitely not the 
case of a drumming device). Consistently, since imitation is another way to constitute CS (Schubert, et al., 2008) 
people tend to mimic outgroup members less (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Furthermore, individuals also inhibit 
mimicking the other when they engage in joint complementary tasks (Van Schie, Waterschoot, & Bekkering, 
2008). Finally, participants performing a joint task with a confederate tend to display an expansive bodily 
posture when the partner’s (a confederate) posture is submissive, and a submissive posture when the partner 
behaves dominantly (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Altogether, these findings suggest that the agents use cognitive 
models to determine whether mimicry, synchrony and the actions afforded by the environment are the responses 
that best fits the actions performed by the other.  
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meet, the number of possible following and fitting actions by the other are extremely 
restricted.  
In addition, I will argue below that RMs also serve the functions of understanding, and 
monitoring the others’ and one’s own actions. Actions that fit together to constitute a 
relational pattern are only meaningful and complete with reference to one another. If RMs 
allow individuals to know what actions belong together, then, they also allow participants to 
know in advance what actions are missing to complete a relational pattern initiated by one of 
the agents. Hence, by sharing relational models participants can understand and predict the 
actions of others, as well as plan and generate their own actions in order to make themselves 
understandable and predictable to others. They can also use relational models to monitor and 
evaluate the actions of each by using that structure as reference.  
2.2.2. Innate primitives and cultural paradigms for coordination 
The claim that people use RMs to structure their interactions is built on the assumption 
that such models are “prior” to the interaction or are “brought” by the participant to the social 
interaction to make sense of the relational aspects of each other’s actions. Technically, RMs 
are determined by the conjunction between mods and preos (A. Fiske, 2000, 2004a). Mods are 
cognitive, modular and innate proclivities for learning and producing a set of specialized 
structuring operations, corresponding to the four kinds of relations. The mods are 
indeterminate and, therefore, must be completed by preos to constitute a specific coordination 
device. Preos are the culturally transmitted and shared paradigms, specifying with whom, how, 
when, and with regard to what each mod operates to coordinate a given aspect of the social 
domain. Due to such indeterminacy a finite set of mods have the potential to combine with an 
infinite set of preos and, hence, to generate uncountable ways of social coordination across 
cultures (A. Fiske, 2000).  Indeed, there is extensive evidence of the use of each RM in 
different (non-western) cultures, as for example, among the Moose in Burkina Faso (A. Fiske, 
1990; see also A. Fiske, 2004b for a review).  
On the one hand, participants bring the mods to the interaction, in the form of innate 
faculties for learning and producing social relationships, and use them to accommodate the 
actions of each agent, learn cultural paradigms and structure the interaction. In other words, 
the mods are externalized and not internalized during the interaction (A. Fiske, 1992). On the 
other hand, preos emerge during the interaction, and are learned, internalized, transmitted, 
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negotiated and changed across time within the same relationship and culture. For this reason, 
preos are also carried by the participant from one interaction to another in the form of cultural 
knowledge about social relations. 
We can say that mods and preos correspond loosely to Hinde’s (1976) distinction 
between abstract and concrete levels of social interactions, where the “concrete” real-life 
interactions are instantiations of “abstract” relationships (cf. Kauffman & Clément, 2014). In 
RMT, concrete interactions, as specified by preos, are instantiations of the innate specialized 
modules for learning and producing abstract relations of equivalence (CS), linear ordering 
(AR), additive intervals (EM) or proportionality (MP). Hence, RMs are the ontological 
primitives, foundational concepts and core principles of a “naïve sociology” that operates the 
relational parsing of the world by allowing individuals to understand one’s own and the 
other’s actions as instantiations of particular abstract types of relationships (Kauffman & 
Clément, 2014). Social agents use RMs to extract the abstract relational properties of ongoing 
interactions and to organize them into basic knowledge that allows them to understand social 
behavior in terms of underlying structures (cf. Kauffman & Clément, 2014). Hence, when 
interacting in a new culture, individuals do not need to learn from scratch how to relate in that 
culture and which relations are possible. What they need to learn are the preos specifying who 
is equivalent to whom and what is shared (for CS); how people are ranked and in which 
domains (for AR); what counts as equal interval units and what procedures are used for 
matching and balancing (for EM); what ratios are applied in that culture and to which 
attributes (for MP); and how are equivalence, rank, equality and proportionality marked and 
constituted, when and with whom. Once learned, knowledge about such preos will be used by 
participants in further interactions to produce actions that complement the actions of others. 
Learning such preos is cognitively parsimonious because each mod is represented, 
communicated, constituted and culturally transmitted in conformation with a distinctive 
semiotic medium (A. Fiske, 2004b; A. Fiske & Schubert, 2012). Such media allow 
individuals in specific cultural contexts to intuitively understand and create behaviors and 
artifacts that successfully embody each RM (Schubert, Waldzus & Seibt, 2008). For instance, 
AR is constituted and communicated through iconic social physics (A. Fiske, 2004b; A. Fiske 
& Schubert, 2012). Participants rely on physical dimensions of time, space, magnitude and 
force to communicate and constitute rank. For example, 10 to 13 months-old infants use the 
agents’ relative size to predict the outcome of a dominance contest between two agents with 
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conflicting goals (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith & Carey, 2011). Being bigger-
smaller, stronger-weaker, earlier-later, in front-behind, more-fewer, above-below are 
cognitive universal representations of social asymmetries; and standing while someone bows, 
having larger offices, sitting in higher chairs are cultural realizations of such representations. 
Likewise, CS is culturally constituted and communicated through consubstantial assimilation, 
in which social equivalence is marked by the connection of one’s material bodies (A. Fiske, 
2004b; A. Fiske & Schubert, 2012). Hence, children and adults can rely on physical touch, 
synchronous movements or physical appearance (e.g., skin color, uniforms or adornments) as 
cues of equivalence (cf. A. Fiske, 2004b, and A. Fiske & Schubert, 2012, for the semiotic 
mediums of EM and MP). 
Evidence that infants apply social rules that they were not explicitly taught to novel 
contexts and tasks supports the primitive and innate11 nature of RMs (Thomsen & Carey, 
2013; see also Tomasello, 2014, for a review). For instance, preverbal infants spontaneously 
help the experimenter (Warnecken & Tomasello, 2007), especially when primed with touch 
(Over & Carpenter, 2009; both helping and touching are instantiations of CS, cf. Schubert, 
Waldzus & Seibt, 2008); they also represent social dominance (an instantiation of AR) as a 
property of the relationship and not of the agents (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Thomsen, et al., 
2011); they spontaneously take turns (an implementation of EM) with the experimenter as 
soon as the experimenter switches roles and in the absence of any instructions (Carpenter, 
Tomasello & Striano, 2005); and when dyads of 3 year-olds collaborate with equal 
contributions to get food, they, unlike chimpanzees, tend to evenly split (another 
implementation of EM) the reward among them, even if one child luckily obtains three times 
more food than the other (Warneken, Lohse, Melis & Tomasello, 2011). 
2.2.3. Intrinsically motivating normative and moral structures 
Each RM specifies one distinct kind of interaction pattern that is constituted by mutually 
completing actions. Once an action A that is part of a relational pattern takes place, the agents 
can expect that the complementary action B, that is necessary to complete the same pattern, 
either should have preceded A or will follow A (Kauffman & Clèment, 2015). In the case that 
                                                 
11 For a discussion about the innateness of MP see Fiske (2004). Fiske hypothesis that MP is currently being 
“assimilated into cognitive and motivational proclivities: it is becoming a mod” (p.15).  
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action B does not occur the relational structure is not fulfilled and this creates a state of 
incompleteness in the relationship.  
Some social psychologists influenced by Gestalt principles have suggested that people 
have a preference for states of coherence (Heider, 1946, 1958) or consistency (Festinger, 
1954) between objects of cognition. Unbalance or dissonance causes a sense of discomfort or 
tension (Lewin, 1951) that people are motivated to reduce or avoid (Heider, 1946, 1958; 
Festinger, 1954). Similarly, I posit that an incomplete relational pattern creates a state of 
tension that the agents are motivated to avoid, escape, or reduce. Hence, RMs have 
motivational properties intrinsic to their structure. When participants recognize one agent’s 
action as part of a RM, they expect, whish or hope that the complementary action will follow; 
and, therefore, they are motivated to invite, evoke, pull or perform the missing part in order to 
complete the RM.  
Hence, RMs are also “deontic in the sense that [they enable individuals] to expect, in a 
relational-specific way, what should happen next” (Kauffman & Clèment, 2015, p. 164). Any 
action by one participant, when recognized as part of a RM, is not only an opportunity for 
what others can do, but also a constraint for what they should do next – deontic affordance 
(Kauffman & Clèment, 2015). Therefore, RMs have a motivational, normative, and moral 
character (see Rai & A. Fiske, 2011 for a RMT account of moral psychology). They convey 
joint goals (i.e. goals about a joint state), mutual expectations and obligations between 
participants (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992). Since RMs allow participants to detect any behavior that 
is inconsistent with, and therefore violates, the structure implied by the RM applied, they are 
also used as standards to monitor (and evaluate) social interactions, to repair and modulate 
relationships, including to regulate the punishment of transgressions. I will come back to this 
issue on section 3.4. 
2.3. Relational Complementarity is a goal about a collective state 
Relational Complementarity refers to a kind of pattern (earlier referred to as relational 
gestalt, relational pattern, or whole pattern) in social interactions that is constituted by actions 
by each participant that are mutually congruent and completing with reference to a 
subjectively shared RM. For this reason, the actions of each participant are parts of a “whole” 
that none of them can bring off alone. Cuddling is not possible unless there is someone to be 
cuddled. An order is not an order unless someone could obey. Taking turns on a task requires 
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that someone else takes a turn. Selling is pointless without someone who buys. RelComp is a 
phenomenon that occurs between individuals, to the extent that each does his part of the 
relational pattern. In this sense, RelComp is essentially interpersonal or collective. 
Motivationally, to relate is to pursue RelComp. Therefore, when relating, people are 
pursuing one particular type of goal-state that does not refer to outcomes of individual actions 
(e.g., ‘I want the report written’; or ‘I want the car’), but to the actual actions by each 
participant and to the particular fittings among them (e.g., I want him to follow my command 
to write the report; or ‘I want her to sell me the car for a reasonable price’). Hence, when 
relating, according to the current definition, the actions by each participant are not means to 
an end; instead, they are parts or elements inherent in the end itself. This, of course, does not 
exclude the coexistence of goals that are ulterior to the social interaction and which may even 
have motivated the interaction in the first place (e.g., the motivation to own a car or to get the 
report written). Such ulterior goals, however, are not what defines individual behavior as 
relational, since they could often be achieved by means other than RelComp (e.g., writing the 
report oneself, or stealing the car). 
One implication of conceiving individual relational behavior as constitutive of part of a 
collective-state goal is that the fit between participants’ actions to produce a whole pattern of 
RelComp is not accidental. Instead, the parts of each participant are derived from the intended 
collective-state in such way that they presuppose one another, and can only be intelligible, 
meaningful, and complete with reference to each other. For instance, one individual raising 
his right hand to the level of his waist is only understood or meant as a handshake if one 
presupposes that there is, will be, or should be someone else to shake his hand back. Such 
presupposition implies that the participant knows beforehand, and often implicitly, what a 
handshake is and what actions are necessary to constitute it. Hence, a pattern of RelComp is 
an end-state that each participant intuitively (pre)conceives and pursues by performing actions 
that can only be generated and terminated, as well as understood, anticipated, and evaluated 
with reference to presupposed fitting actions by the other. 
If RelComp is a collective-state goal that is fulfilled by mutually corresponding actions 
by each participant, then, presupposing the corresponding action by the other is a necessary 
condition for one’s own action to be performed. In other words, since each participant aims at 
an interaction pattern that is constituted by the parts of each, one participant is only motivated 
to perform her part (as her part) of the intended pattern if she believes, assumes, expects, or 
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wishes that the other is likely to do his part (when she is the initiator of the interaction); or if 
she understands and validates that the other did his part (when she is responding to a previous 
action by the other). There is no point in holding one’s hand out to someone else if one knows 
that the other will definitely not shake one’s hand back, or if one evaluates the other’s attempt 
to shake one’s hand as absolutely unacceptable, and much less if one does not understand that 
the other’s hand movement is meant as part of a handshake.  
Notice that conceiving RelComp as a goal-state does not mean that RelComp is a static 
phenomenon. Instead, if RelComp is action, then it is dynamic in at least two ways. First, the 
actions by each participant that constitute the relational pattern unfold through time. Such 
actions can last a few seconds, such as a handshake, or be extended for a life time. Take the 
example of a life debt where someone whose life was saved by another is obligated to 
dedicate his life to serve and protect his savior, or a mortgage that requires monthly payments 
for years. Second, as illustrated before, RMs are combined and nested hierarchically to 
constitute complex systems of relationships. Such constellations of relationship imply that the 
successful fulfillment of one relational pattern presupposes and often leads to subsequent 
patterns. Hence, when one participant aims at a collective-state goal, he usually also intends 
the subsequent relational patterns, and presupposes that the other will participate in them.  
2.3.1. RelComp is “intentionally joint” joint action 
The concept ‘joint action’ has been applied in the literature to different kinds of social 
coordination. According to minimalist views (Pacherie, 2011), actions qualify as joint when 
there is an outcome or effect that results from the actions of several agents (e.g., a bus filled 
with passengers; the noise of an audience applauding in unison); and when the actions 
producing the common effect are intentional12 (e.g., I intend to use the bus, or I intend to 
applaud). Nevertheless, the two previous conditions are insufficient to differentiate between 
two agents acting/intending separately or in parallel, each to produce different tokens of the 
same action, versus acting/intending together to produce a common outcome that requires the 
other’s participation. For example, what is the difference between John and Mary, each 
intending to sit on the same two seater bus bench (as two strangers who have similar seating 
                                                 
12 This second requirement, from a philosophy of action perspective, rules out genuine actions from accidental 
behaviors or mere doings, since any behavior must be intentional in order to qualify as action (cf. Davidson, 
1980). 
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preferences or face similar constraints on seat-availability), and John and Mary intending to 
sit together by sharing the same bus bench (as friends)? On both cases, John and Mary intend 
to sit on the same bus bench and the effect of both occupying the bench can only be achieved 
if the two of them occupy adjacent seats. However, doing something with someone else is 
different from several people doing the same thing individually or in parallel. Hence, 
maximalist views (e.g., Bratman, 1992; Gilbert, 2009; Tuomela & Miller, 1988; cf. Pacherie, 
2011) attempt to conceptualize such difference by establishing that the agents must intend the 
joint activity ‘as joint’ and share such intentions with one another (Pacherie, 2011; Butterfill 
& Sebanz, 2011).  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for two or more agents to share an intention to act 
jointly are still object of debate (for reviews, see Roth, 2010; Schweikard & Schmid, 2013; 
Tollefsen, 2015). Since my goal is to conceptualize ‘to relate’ and RelComp, rather than 
offering an account of joint action or shared intentions, I will not address such discussion. 
Instead, I want to highlight that proponents of such views generally agree that intending the 
joint action together cannot be reduced to the respective participants’ separately intending 
their own action (Tollefsen, 2015). Tuomela and Miller (1988) propose that two or more 
agents jointly intend a joint action when they collectively accept that “we together will do X”, 
and collectively commit to doing X jointly, by each expressing his we-intention to X (X 
corresponding to “our joint action”). An agent’s we-intention13 consists of his (a) intention to 
do his part of X (as his part of X)14, (b) beliefs that others we-intend X, and (c) beliefs about 
mutual beliefs that all agents we-intend X and that the opportunities for achieving X will 
likely be available (see also Tuomela, 2005). According to Bratman (1992, 1993, 2009), 
sharing intentions about a joint action requires (a) intentions on the part of each participant in 
favor of the joint activity, J: “I intend that we J and you intend that we J”; (b) that each 
intends J because each believes that both intend J, and (c) that this is common knowledge 
                                                 
13 For a different account on we-intentions see Searle (1990). Tuomela and Miller conceive we-intentions as 
ordinary individual intentions to perform one’s part of the joint action, plus beliefs about favorable attitudes by 
the other. In contrast, Searle proposes that we-intentions are a special kind of mental state or psychological mode 
which cannot be reduced to ordinary I-intentions. 
14 Searle (1990) criticized Tuomela and Miller’s (1988) definition for failing to distinguish cooperative joint 
action from parallel actions. However, doing one’s part of X, as one’s part of X, is different from doing one’s 
part regardless of X. Tuomela (2006) clarifies this distinction by contrasting we-mode intentions (we will do X) 
to I-mode intentions (I will do X). In the we-mode, one agent aims at X, and intends to perform his part of X, 
where X can only be obtained by means of all agents’ being committed as a group to doing their respective parts 
of X and mutually believing that each will do his part. In the I-mode, one agent aims at X and intends to act in 
order to X, where X can be obtained by means of the agent’s commitment to perform his own action alone. 
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among them. Gilbert (2009) argues that intentions to act jointly are shared if, and only if, the 
participants are “jointly committed to intend as a body to do A” (p. 179). Acting as a body 
means that the agents emulate a single body, a plural subject, with one intention. A joint 
commitment implies mutual obligations to the joint action, and occurs when a decision to act 
together is created by each agent openly expressing his readiness to commit to the joint 
activity, so that such commitments are common knowledge among all agents. At least in 
Bratman’s and Tuomela and Miller’s accounts sharing intentions requires that participants 
include the beliefs of others in their own intentions. Such views have been criticized for 
demanding too much sophistication to allow children to engage in joint action (Tollefsen, 
2005). Therefore, Butterfill (2011) proposes that some forms of joint action rely on shared 
goals instead of shared intentions. Hence, and along the same lines, a shared goal requires: (a) 
a single goal, G, towards which individual actions by two or more agents (a plural activity) 
are or will be directed; (b) expectations on the part of each agent that the others will perform 
actions directed to G, and (c) that G will occur as the common effect of all the agent’s goal-
directed actions. 
The four accounts described agree that ‘genuine’ joint action must be intended as ‘joint’ 
by each individual. Be it in the form of a (we-) intention to X together, an intention that we J, 
a commitment to do A as one body, or the single goal of a plural activity, each participant 
pursues not the outcome of his own action taken singly, but the joint activity, relational 
pattern or collective state, as a ‘whole’. In other words, what each participant aims at, intends, 
commits himself to or pursues is a goal the content of which is collective, in the sense that it 
requires congruent actions and intentions by two or more agents in order to be fulfilled. 
Consequently, individual actions, commitments or intentions to do one’s part necessarily 
require that there is a collective activity to be fulfilled and from which individual 
contributions are derived. The four approaches also establish as condition for sharing 
intentions or goals that each participant makes assumptions or presuppositions, in the form of 
beliefs or expectations, about the other agent’s intentions, commitments or goals to fulfill the 
same joint activity. Hence, in line with maximalist accounts, RelComp is one kind of joint 
action that is intentionally joint, because each participant aims at a collective-state goal or 
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relational pattern, by performing his part (intended as his part) and presupposing that the 
other will perform her part (intended as her part)15. 
Next I will clarify the use of the word “intention”, the meaning of participant’s 
“presupposing each other’s actions”, and what exactly has to be common knowledge among 
them, in my definition of relating and RelComp. 
2.3.2. Relating is goal-directed/intentional action 
Intentions have been conceived by philosophers as a combination of beliefs and desires 
(e.g., Davidson, 1980), or as a special kind of belief (Velleman, 1989). Bratman (1987) offers 
an influential conception of intentions as a distinct kind of mental state involving motivational 
commitment and commitment to norms of rationality, such as consistency between the 
agent’s intentions, means-ends coherence and consistency with the agent’s beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the words “intention” and “goal” are sometimes used interchangeably. 
By ‘intention’ I mean goals, purposes, aims or end states that guide behavior; and I use 
‘intentional’ or ‘intended’ to refer to motivated, purposeful or goal-directed action16. In my 
using of the word ‘intention’ has features of the goal construct in social psychology. More 
specifically, I think of intention as a psychological state of commitment to approach or avoid 
a cognitively represented entity, state, event or experience (cf. Elliot & Fryer’s, 2009 
definition of goal). Relational Complementarity is an experience or state that constitutes an 
                                                 
15 At this point it is also important to make the distinction between RelComp and commonly studied forms of 
social coordination, such as entrainment, mimicry, or responding to common affordances. For instance, 
individuals can coordinate spontaneously by responding to common environmental affordances (e.g., people 
using the same public restroom at the same time; two strangers sitting in the same bus seat); they can fall into 
synchrony (or become entrained) with one another by perceiving the same visual, auditory or haptic information 
(e.g., applauding audiences clapping in unison, Néda, et al., 2000); or they can mimic each other’s gestures, due 
to the automatic activation of their own action repertoire by a matching observed action (e.g., Chartand & Bargh, 
1999). These three kinds of coordination may emerge (Knoblich, Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011) accidentally as a 
byproduct of more than one individual pursuing similar but non-collective or non-relational outcomes. They may 
not require goals about joint actions, shared intentions, not even that their actions are intentional (cf. Richardson, 
et al., 2007). Insofar as participants do not have the goal to synchronize with one another, sit together at the bus 
or mimic one another’s gestures, such actions do not qualify as joint action from a maximalist view, nor as 
“relating” from my view. 
16 Notice that it is not my ambition to propose a formal definition of intention, nor to solve all the conceptual 
complexities associated to the concept (cf. Setiya, 2015). I limit myself to clarifying my use of the word, which I 
choose for convenience of speech and ease of thought. 
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object17 of participant’s intentions or goals; and relating is any action (or sequence thereof) 
that is generated with the intention, goal or commitment to approach (in the motivational 
sense) states of RelComp and avoid non-complementary states. In other words, actions count 
as relating if they are performed with the goal, intention, aim or purpose of achieving 
Relational Complementarity18.  
Saying that individuals have the intention, goal or are committed to achieve RelComp, 
implies that their intention is not only about their own action but also makes reference to 
action of the other. Formally, ‘my intending our (joint) action’ violates the own-action 
condition and the control condition postulating, respectively, that one agent can only intend 
one’s own action, and not what is beyond one’s control (e.g., Sellars, 1980). However, I use 
the word ‘intention’ loosely to refer to goal-directed behavior, regardless of whether the agent 
expects that his actions alone will bring about the desired goal. For example, a farmer intends 
to produce wine in the next season, even though he knows that his intention will only be 
accomplished if certain weather conditions occur that are beyond his control. Similarly, a 
salesman’s goal is to sell, but no sale is complete as result of the salesman’s prospecting 
efforts and persuasiveness alone; the buyer must be willing and able to make the purchase. 
Tuomela (2005) deals with this problem by distinguishing between aim-intentions and action-
intentions. In contrast to action-intentions, aim-intentions do not require that the agent 
believes that her action alone can bring about the desired result. Therefore, Tuomela 
conceives intentions to do one’s part as action-intentions, and intentions to do X together (we-
intentions) as aim-intentions. In other words, the agent can be aim-committed (or we-intend) 
to the joint activity, but action-committed (or intend) to do his own part of the joint activity 
(Tuomela, 2006). Notice that according to Tuomela and Miller’s concept of we-intention, 
intentions to do one’s part presuppose that others perform their parts19. Along these lines, 
                                                 
17 By ‘object’ I mean what the intention is about or directed at (according to Searle’s, 1983, definition of 
intentional object, p. 4) or to the regulatory focal point of the goal (in line with Elliot & Niesta’s, 2009, 
definition of goal object).  
18 Conceiving relating as intentional/goal-directed action implies that the agents act with autonomy. This issue is 
crucial to distinguish between authentic and coerced complementary actions. In authentic cases participants are 
free to choose whether to perform their part, even if their main motivation is to avoid social reprimands. 
However, in the case of coercion, they do not have such freedom (e.g., slavery, rape, blackmail). Coercive 
interactions are degenerate cases of authentic relationships, but do not qualify as relating. They are asocial 
relations (Fiske, 1992). 
19 Likewise, Bratman (e.g., 2009) suggests that it is possible to intend something that is beyond one’s own 
actions and control insofar as one can predict that the relevant remaining conditions will occur, or that the 
relevant others will act appropriately. Hence, Bratman shifts from action-referential intentions (intentions to J) to 
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“relating” is goal-directed/ intentional action in the sense that individuals aim at (we-intend, 
are committed to approach) a collective goal or relational pattern, by means of intending their 
own action as their part of the pattern (and presupposing the part of the other). 
The word ‘intention’ has also been used by some motivation psychologists to distinguish 
conscious and deliberate from non-conscious goal-pursuit (e.g., Bargh & Huang, 2009), while 
others propose that the goal construct is restricted to conscious commitments (Elliot & Niesta, 
2009). My use of ‘intention’ and ‘goal’ is more relaxed. I do not make a distinction between 
goals/intentions which are set and pursued through thoughtful deliberation and planning, and 
goals/intentions which one cannot lexicalize or consciously cognize. First, people can have 
the intention/goal to initiate or complete a relational pattern by performing their part now or 
in the future. Intentions for the future (Anscombe, 1963), future-directed intentions (Bratman, 
1987; Pacherie, 2006), or long-term goals are formed and/or cognitively activated a certain 
amount of time before they are fulfilled; and their fulfillment demands deliberation, long-term 
planning and explicit commitment, as is the case of someone borrowing money from a friend 
with the intention to pay him back next month. On the other hand, intentions to act now, 
intentions in action (Anscombe, 1963), present-directed intentions (Bratman, 1987; Pacherie, 
2006), or short-term goals do not imply temporal distance between their formation or 
cognitive activation and their fulfillment, as for example, giving money to a beggar at a traffic 
light, shaking someone’s hand, or opening a door for someone whose hands are full. Such 
relational intentions/goals do not require planning and deliberation from the participant, and 
may or may not be consciously activated (e.g., Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). The idea that 
present-directed intentions can be nonconsciously activated is not new (Mele, 2009). There is 
evidence showing that both non-social (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, et al., 2001) and 
social (e.g., Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003) goals can be activated outside conscious awareness 
by social stimuli, and still operate in ways and produce results similar to consciously pursued 
goals, without individuals being able to report intentional goal-pursuit.  
                                                                                                                                                        
propositional intentions (intentions that we J, cf. Schweikard & Schmid, 2013). He argues that it is possible to 
conceive “intentions that we J” as ordinary intentions if further assumptions are made the about the intentions of 
the other agents to J together. I will argue below that (aligned) RMs allow participants to make such assumptions 
and predict that the others will do their part.  
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2.3.3. RelComp requires common knowledge about relationships (not minds)  
Relational Complementarity is achieved when the actions of two or more participants fit 
together in a particular context. So far, no process has been suggested that allows the agents to 
know which actions belong together to produce an internally consistent relational pattern. I 
claim that the joint construction of this relational gestalt depends on RMs, which are 
coordination devices specialized in learning, detecting, and constituting social relations. 
Hence, actions by two or more agents fit together when they apply the same RM in the same 
way to their interaction. To that end, participants must share the RM they apply. By “share” I 
mean that each co-actor has his own cognitive representations of the joint activity which 
happen to be aligned with the representation of the other (Pezzulo, 2011). Holding aligned 
individual representations (Pezzulo, 2011) of the relational pattern, is sufficient for each 
participant to accurately understand, predict, monitor, or presuppose further actions by the 
other; to make one’s actions understandable and predictable to the other; and, thus, to 
smoothly and effectively fulfill the collective state or relational pattern. 
The advantage of aligned or shared RMs is that participants can understand and anticipate 
each other’s actions without engaging in the cognitively demanding process of recursive 
mindreading (Bohl, 2015; Pezzulo, 2011). Theory of Mind assumes that people ascribe 
mental states to other agents in order to explain and predict their actions (Carruthers, & 
Smith, 1996). However, relying on mindreading to solve everyday coordination problems 
would require that each participant maintained separate models of their own and the other’s 
minds and actions (Pezzulo, 2011). If this were the case, in order to predict and influence 
what the other will do one would have to take into account what the other thinks she will do, 
what the other thinks one thinks one will do, what the other thinks one thinks she will do, but 
also what the other will think about what one will do in the future, and so forth. From a 
computational point of view such recursive mindreading would be extremely demanding if 
not intractable (Bermúdez, 2003, Morton, 1996; Pezzulo, 2011).  
On the other hand, by relying on RMs, participants are able to explain and predict each 
other’s actions without having to know each other’s minds (cf. Haslam & A. Fiske, 2004). 
Relational mods together with corresponding cultural preos are grammars for understanding 
and producing distinct kinds of relational patterns; they allow participants to identify which 
actions in specific contexts are elements of a relational pattern and which actions are missing 
to complete that pattern. Hence, representations of what actions fit together in particular 
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contexts is sufficient to enable participants to make explanations and predictions about what 
others are doing and will do. All they have to do is to assume that others share the same RMs, 
as we do when we assume that strangers give the same meaning to words and follow the same 
syntax as we do when we talk to them. By assuming aligned RMs by default individuals can 
easily make assumptions about each other’s actions without using meta-representations of 
what is shared (Pezzulo, 2011), or even explicitly cognizing or being aware of what they are 
assuming. Hence, relying on RMs to make implicit top-down presuppositions about future 
actions by the other is something different and more parsimonious than making bottom-up 
predictions based on imputations of individual mental states. Unlike Tuomela and Miller’s 
(1988) and Bratman’s (1992) accounts of shared intentions, which require that participants 
have common knowledge about each other’s beliefs about each other’s intentions in favor of 
the joint action, RelComp requires only that participant have common knowledge about their 
relationship (cf. Haslam & A. Fiske, 2004). In other words, it requires that participants share 
common ground about the RM to be applied to their interaction. Sharing RMs allows 
participants to accurately presuppose the other’s intentions, goals or commitments to do their 
part in favor of the joint pattern. 
Notice that in some cases participants may make false assumptions about the alignment 
of their RMs (or may not make assumptions at all). In such cases where the RMs and 
respective implementations of each are not actually aligned participants may rely on other 
processes to align them in the course of the interaction. Although a thorough discussion of 
such processes is beyond the scope of this thesis I can briefly mention at least four ways by 
which such alignment can occur (for a proposal of how representations align in the course of 
an interaction see Pezzulo, 2011). First, participants can spontaneously switch between 
relational patterns (perhaps more easily within the same RM) which are equally acceptable in 
that particular context. For instance, one holds his hand out to shake his friend’s hand but the 
other responds by opening his arms for a hug (both implementations of CS). Second, they can 
engage in explicit mindreading to understand and predict the actions of the other (Pezzulo, 
2011). Bohl (2015) has suggested, that ascribing psychological states to others has the 
function of shaping relationships. Hence, mindreading may be especially useful when 
interactions fail, are uncertain or ambiguous, when participants want to change the current 
relationship, when they have concerns about third parties, or in morally ambiguous contexts 
where intentions are relevant for moral judgments  (Bohl, 2015). Third, they can verbally 
negotiate (Pezzulo, 2011) the RM that they will apply; e.g., a couple deciding whether they 
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have separate – MP – or joint – CS – bank accounts, or two friends deciding whether they 
split the dinner bill 50/50 (EM), or one offers the dinner to the other (which is CS if it is not 
expected that the other reciprocates by offering the next dinner). Finally, when people apply 
different RMs it is possible that the actions by one are perceived as a transgression by the 
other (e.g., when one sees an alleged authority as an equal and therefore does not follow his 
orders). In such cases, punishment and retribution may also be used, as elements of the 
negotiation process, to motivate the other to adjust the RM applied and repair his 
transgression by performing his part. 
2.3.4. Using relational models to presuppose the part of the other 
Relational models allow participants to know each other’s parts in the intended relational 
pattern. In addition, RMs have intrinsic motivational properties. When participants recognize 
an action performed by themselves or someone else as a part of a RM, they are motivated to 
complete the model by inviting, evoking, pulling or performing the missing parts. Hence, the 
motivational nature of RMs allows individuals to predict, expect, wish or hope that, once they 
perform their part, the others will perform theirs.  
By assuming aligned RMs, each participant also makes assumptions about the other’s 
intentions, goals or motivation to fulfill the relational pattern by performing her part. In other 
words, each participant also presupposes the commitment of the other to complete the RM. 
Participants’ common knowledge or mutual assumptions about each other’s commitments to 
act jointly is one requirement for intending jointly (Tuomela and Miller, 1988; Bratman, 
1992; Gilbert, 2009). Such knowledge about each other’s commitments can result, on the one 
hand, from participants’ openly expressing their own commitments (Gilbert, 2009) or making 
explicit and public agreements (Tuomela, 2005) to performing the joint action together. For 
instance, one can invite the other to participate in a relational pattern, e.g., “will you marry 
me?”, “will you sell me your iPhone for €50?”; or they can verbally negotiate the RM to be 
applied, e.g., “shall we split the dinner bill in equal shares (EM) or shall each pay for what he 
ate (MP)?”. On the other hand, participants can also rely on implicit agreements or mutual 
beliefs about each other’s commitments to the joint action (Tuomela, 2005). Along these 
lines, I propose that by applying RMs (with corresponding cultural paradigms), participants 
can immediately understand the relational intentions of each other and presuppose mutual 
commitments, in the absence of explicit communication. All they need is to assume that they 
share the same RM with the corresponding cultural paradigms specifying when, how, with 
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whom, and to what aspects that RM is applied. For example, when an individual enters into a 
supermarket or restaurant, he does not have to openly express his commitment to pay for the 
food he will take, nor does the shop assistant or waiter need to ask about commitments to pay. 
Insofar as participants assume that it is common knowledge that anyone (with whom) who 
enters a restaurant or supermarket (when) and orders a meal or takes any groceries (what 
aspects) has to pay for it (how), Market Pricing is implied and commitments to the model are 
presupposed.  
It has been proposed that co-created joint commitments impose on each agent the 
obligation to act on a certain way (Tuomela, 2005; Gilbert, 2009). I suggest that when 
assuming aligned RMs and mutual commitments, participants also assume obligations the part 
of each to perform their part and entitlements to expect or demand that the others perform 
theirs. Relational models have a deontic nature (Kauffman & Clèment, 2015). They are 
relational standards because they allow participants to know that once one part of the 
relational pattern has taken place, the complementary parts should (in a relational sense) 
either follow or have preceded it. Hence, in addition to informing predictions, in the 
descriptive sense, RMs also motivate expectations in the normative and moral sense. For 
instance, if a boss gives an order to an employee concerning his work, or if she does a favor to 
a colleague, not only does she expect the employee to obey, and expect the colleague to 
reciprocate the favor, but she also feels entitled to demand that they do so. Insofar as the 
employee and the colleague share the same RM, they will feel obligated to obey and 
reciprocate.  Failure on their side to do their part would likely be considered “wrong” by the 
boss, the employee, the colleague, and disinterested third parties, based on the models of AR 
and EM respectively. Thus, such deontic force motivates each agent to expect and perform the 
parts of each according to the relational standard applied. 
Tuomela (2005) claims that the normative thickness of commitments varies depending on 
whether the agreements to act jointly result from explicit and public expressions of 
commitment to the joint action (thick normative contexts), or from participants’ implicit, 
mutual beliefs about each other’s commitments (weakly normative contexts). I suggest that 
the deontic force of each RM (or corresponding relational patterns) may also vary in strength 
depending on the cultural preos, which are reflected on social conventions about obligations 
and entitlements, regardless of whether agreements are explicit or implicit. Take the example 
of a couple who agreed to implement CS by verbally expressing their commitment to “dance 
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together next Saturday”. If one of them, after their agreement, informs the other that he will 
not come dance after all, his opting out will be evaluated as stronger violation of their 
obligation to dance together if they committed to dance at a competition than to dance at a 
disco, just for fun. In fact, western social conventions about “dancing for fun at a disco” 
dictate that no one should be obliged to dance for fun.  
On the other hand, and in contrast with Tuomela’s claim, some implicit agreements, 
based on mutual assumptions about each other’s commitments, may even entail stronger 
obligations than explicit, verbal agreements. As illustrated previously, the customer who picks 
up groceries at a supermarket is implicitly communicating his commitment to do his part of 
MP by paying for what he takes, just as much as the cashier is implicitly communicating his 
commitment to accept and demand payment. In this case, the customer would more likely be 
committed to paying than to going dancing, just for fun, despite his explicit commitment to 
dancing. Failing to go dancing for fun may be undesirable, but failing to pay for what one 
takes is stealing, and this is assumed to be common knowledge within most cultures. Hence, 
by relying on RMs (with corresponding cultural paradigms) as social grammars, participants 
can make accurate presuppositions about each other’s commitments, and discriminate when 
explicit agreements are required in order to form a joint commitment to a relational pattern. 
Furthermore, the deontic force of the RMs seems to be used to engage people in 
relational patterns to which they have absolutely no commitments and obligations, according 
to cultural paradigms and social conventions. For instance, someone ordering a drink for a 
stranger at a bar, a squeegee man whipping windshields of cars stopped in traffic, or a 
charitable volunteer distributing food and blankets to the homeless, are attempts to commit 
the other to a relational pattern by performing one’s part. These are examples of “weakly” 
normative contexts, in which participant communicate their commitment to the joint activity 
by performing their part (Tuomela, 2005). The participant’s assumption is that once one’s part 
is out there the other will (at least with some probability) feel obligated to perform his or her 
part of having a drink together (CS), paying the squeegee man (MP), or expressing gratitude 
towards the charitable volunteer (CS). In such cases, the deontic nature of the models is 
sometimes strong enough to motivate people to perform their part even if they “think” they 
are “not entirely obligated” to do it; or to make them feel entitled to demand that the other 
complement their action when he fails. In fact, offering something to the other in order to 
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motivate compliance has been described under the more general label of “reciprocation” as 
one effective influence strategy (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  
Although RMs allow participants to make assumptions about commitments, not all 
relational acts depend on such assumptions in order to qualify as relating. Notice that relating 
is any action directed at RelComp, regardless of whether intentions about the relational 
pattern are shared. Hence, we can distinguish between two kinds of relational acts: (a) 
explicitly inviting the other to participate in a relational pattern, and (b) initiating the 
relational pattern, as such, by performing one’s part. The difference between the two is that in 
the first case none of the participants has performed one’s part of the intended pattern, yet. 
For example, asking “will you marry me?”, “can I borrow some money from you?”, “would 
you sell me your iPhone for €50?” is not actually showing up at the altar, picking up the 
money or making the payment. (In “explicit invitations” we can also include explicit 
negotiations about the RM to be used). Both types of actions aim at constituting a pattern of 
RelComp. However, according to Kauffman and Clèment (2015), the RMs only allow 
participants to have deontic expectations about an action B of a relational pattern once action 
A has taken place, i.e., in the second case. Hence, leaving the other at the altar, not returning 
the borrowed money or taking the €50 without delivering the iPhone is likely to be perceived 
as a violation of a relational norm, moral standard or obligation (see Rai & A. Fiske, 2011). In 
contrast, the other’s responding “No” to one’s proposal, request for money or purchase offer 
is certainly undesirable, but unlikely to be considered as something the other ought not to do. 
When explicitly inviting the other to a relational pattern, the assumption is that the other is not 
obligated and, thus, not committed to it (yet), hence, the invitation for an explicit expression 
of commitment. Nevertheless, an invitation for a relational pattern still presupposes a 
response from the other person, and it is only meaningful and rational if it aims to evoke a 
response in favor of the intended pattern. Although, the man need not think she should (in a 
normative sense) accept the marriage proposal, he certainly whishes or hopes she will, for the 
sake of the intended CS pattern of marriage. Hence, by “presupposing” the action of the other 
I mean expecting, in the descriptive and normative sense, but also hoping or wishing, in a 
non-normative motivational sense, that the other will do her part. 
As deontic structures, RMs also enable participants to monitor their own and the other’s 
actions. By using RMs (with corresponding cultural paradigms) as standards, participants can 
understand the action by the other in terms of which actions he expects them to perform next, 
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as well as evaluate whether the other’s action fits a particular relational structure. For 
instance, shaking the other’s hand in the beginning of a job interview is part of a relational 
pattern that is acceptable and desirable, at least in the average western culture. However, 
attempts to hug or kiss the interviewer would likely be evaluated as inappropriate, awkward, 
and undesirable according to most western relational paradigms. If the other’s action does not 
fit the relational structure(s) that one can possibly (in a cultural sense) apply to the interaction, 
it is not evaluated as an action to which one ought to respond by performing a corresponding 
action. Instead, it may be followed by attempts to discourage it in order to constitute 
alternative culturally valid patterns (e.g., by ignoring, criticizing, or punishing the misfitting 
action) and thereby repair the relationship. In this sense, RMs allow one to understand and 
evaluate whether the previous action by the other is part of a culturally congruent relational 
pattern, and to identify which following action by oneself is the other presupposing 
(expecting, hoping or whishing) by means of his own action. 
2.3.5. The collective-state goal is the relational pattern (not its effects) 
Some approaches define joint action in terms of the effects observed resulting from the 
actions of two or more agents (e.g., the noise of several cars in traffic), regardless of whether 
those effects are intended as joint. Relational Complementarity, on the other hand, is one 
specific type of intentional joint action, which is defined by participants’ actions being 
mutually congruent according to a shared RM. If RelComp is constituted by the actions of 
each participant and the particular fit among them – the action gestalt – then RelComp is 
action, regardless of any outcomes that may result from its constitutive actions being 
performed. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the relational acts, per se, and the 
asocial outcomes that are consequent to them. For example, John helps Peter to paint Peter’s 
apartment. The freshly painted apartment results from the actions of both. However, what 
makes their joint activity relational is not that the apartment is painted or that each has the 
goal of painting it, but that they intentionally paint it together. The goal “painting together” is 
different in content from the goal of painting the whole apartment within a given time period. 
The content of the second goal is asocial, i.e., not relational, since, by definition, it does not 
specify congruent actions by two or more agents. The content of the first goal, however, is a 
pattern of RelComp, and, insofar as each agent performs his action, it can be fulfilled 
regardless of the second (i.e. they can paint together, but, for some reason, they may not finish 
the job). 
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This distinction introduces a nuance in my account, which is the possibility that 
participants intend to do fulfill a relational pattern and, at the same time, hope that the 
expected outcome of the relational pattern does not obtain. Kutz (2000) presents the example 
of a famous neurologist living in a country ruled by a dictator for whom he has secret political 
antipathies. The dictator has a stroke and the neurologist is called by the dictator’s aides to 
administer the medication. Kutz argues that the neurologist may intend to do his part of 
saving the dictators’ life without intending that the dictator survive. Likewise, a pacifist may 
take a job on a nuclear weapons plant because it is the only job available. He may intend to do 
his part of performing his task without intending to produce nuclear weapons. Kutz (2000) 
proposes the concept of participatory intentions as intentions to do one’s part in group act. 
The author argues that participatory intentions are sufficient to define joint action, even in the 
absence of participants’ intending the collective end of the group act. I argue that if we take as 
the collective end the relational pattern itself, then Kutz’s specification does not apply to 
RelComp. Both the neurologist and the alienated pacifist intend the relational pattern of doing 
their jobs and getting paid for it according to MP. In addition, the neurologist may also intend 
to fulfill his ethical duty to provide medical care to those in need, according to CS. In any 
case, participants can intend and fulfill the relational pattern itself while hoping that RelComp 
is not (or regretting that it is) sufficient to produce the consequent undesirable asocial 
outcomes of the dictator’s survival or the nuclear weapons production. Thus, the overall claim 
that RelComp is a collective goal refers to the motivational force of the RMs that structure, 
enable and are intrinsic to the process of relating, and not to the joint but asocial outcomes 
that are extrinsic to it.  
2.4. Relational Complementarity is the subjective experience of fulfilling a relational 
pattern 
So far, I have described RelComp from the conceptual third-person perspective of the 
scientist. However, RelComp is also phenomenological experience that must be understood 
from the perspective of the participant. On the one hand, RelComp is achieved when the 
participants’ actions are mutually congruent according to a shared RM. On the other hand, 
RelComp is only experienced by each participant when the actions by all are perceived to fit 
together in a way that is consistent with the RM that each one applies. Relational models are 
not necessarily shared in the literal sense of participants explicitly agreeing about the RM to 
be applied and the relational pattern to be pursued. In the simplest cases, each participant 
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applies his own RM, and pursues a corresponding relational pattern, which he assumes is 
aligned with the relational pattern of the other. In such cases, RMs are, at best, only 
subjectively shared. Hence, RelComp is experienced with reference to the RM used and to 
relational pattern pursued by each participant. In other words, if RMs are cognitive structures, 
the locus of RelComp is also cognitive (cf. A. Fiske, 1991). In order to define whether one 
participant experiences RelComp one must look into the RM and corresponding relational 
pattern that he or she has in mind. It is, thus, possible that, in an interaction between two 
individuals, only one of them experiences RelComp. This means that RelComp is the 
subjective individual experience of a collective state, which may or may not be objectively 
shared among all participants involved. 
2.4.1. The constitutive elements of relational patterns 
People use RMs to detect and produce actions that fit together. Relational models result 
from the conjunction of innate specialized proclivities for learning and producing structuring 
operations, with cultural paradigms (A. Fiske, 2000, 2004a). The cultural paradigms (called 
preos) specify how, with whom, when, in regard to what aspects each proclivity (called mods) 
is implemented or externalized. Hence, the relational patterns, that constitute the collective-
state goal for the interaction are, more precisely, cultural implementations of a mod. Hence, 
one participant will experience RelComp if her actions and the actions of the other 
participants fit together according to the specification of her intended relational pattern 
regarding how, who, when, and what. To be precise, it is not only the overt behavioral 
expressions of each participant that must fit together; the remaining elements concerning what 
aspects of their interaction, when they are interacting, and who they are must also be 
internally consistent according to the culturally specific relational pattern. For example, the 
elements of John and Mary (who) seeking consensus (how) about their upcoming baby's name 
(what) in front of close relatives at a family dinner (when) are internally consistent, at least 
within most western cultures. But John and Mary (who) seeking consensus (how) about their 
upcoming baby's name (what) in front of colleagues at a business meeting (when) are not 
internally consistent; it would in many cultures be seen as inappropriate, unprofessional 
behavior. John and Mary can seek consensus about the baby's name in another context other 
than the business meeting, or they can reach consensus at the business meeting about many 
issues other than their baby's name. The aspects (what), contexts (when), participants (who) 
and procedures (how) are mutually constraining within a specific culture. Once one of these 
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elements is recognized as part of cultural paradigm, it constrains the possibilities for the 
remaining elements, just as the business meeting constraints the variety of topics and 
decisions that can be discussed, how they can be discussed, and who can participate. When 
one of these elements is perceived as incongruent with the others, according to the cognitively 
represented relational pattern of one participant, that participant will not experience RelComp 
until the incongruent elements are repaired.  
Notice that although in most contexts there is implicit consensus among people within the 
same culture about the RM to be applied, some contexts are relationally ambiguous because 
they involve elements of different RMs. For example, one employee meets his boss at a party 
of a common acquaintance. Party is a context (when) typical of CS, but boss is a co-actor 
(who) typical of AR. Such situations are disambiguated by participants recognizing and 
selecting the elements they perceive as the most relevant. In other words, whether the boss 
and the employee experience RelComp by doing something together at the party will depend 
on the social cues that each picks up as more relevant (party vs. boss) to constituting a 
relational pattern, and whether they manage to align their respective relational expectations. 
Suppose the boss applies a relational pattern of AR, which implies treating each other with 
formality and restraining their interaction to a polite, vague and short conversation, but the 
employee applies CS, by informally approaching the boss with friendly touches on the 
shoulder and talking about his personal life. It is possible that the employee experiences 
RelComp by naively interpreting the boss’s silence as a sign of interest in the employee’s talk, 
while the boss interprets the employee’s approach as inappropriate and thus does not 
experience RelComp. 
Furthermore, specifications about how each participant must act can be more or less 
general depending on the representational level of the action. If, in line with current 
neuroscientific models (e.g., Pacherie, 2008; Wolpert, Doya & Kawato, 2003), we consider 
that action is hierarchically organized into intentions (e.g., drinking water), action 
representations (e.g., grabbing a cup of water) and motor primitives (e.g., arm trajectory, hand 
grasp, speed of motion, etc., cf. Pezzulo, 2011), then relational patterns may specify different 
levels of the hierarchy from the more general response (intention: we will dance together at 
the competition vs. we will dance for fun), to an intermediate (action representation: we will 
dance the tango vs. salsa together, I will lead and she will follow) or to the more specific level 
(motor primitives: a specific choreography specifying, speed, trajectory and so forth of the 
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motions). Therefore, Complementarity is experienced to the extent that the intended relational 
pattern is completed on the representation level of the actions it specifies. The more specific 
the representation of one participant the more detailed the actual actions have to be for 
RelComp to be experienced. For example, a couple uses EM to implement turn taking for 
cleaning the apartment, but while the husband represents the part of each more generally, e.g., 
each cleans the apartment in their turn, the wife’s representations is more specific, e.g., each 
cleans the apartment in their turn, by cleaning the dust from the furniture first and vacuuming 
the floor after. In such case, the husband will experience RelComp however the wife 
proceeds, as long as she cleans the apartment in her turn; but the wife will not experience it 
unless the husband cleans it in his turn and in the way her relational pattern specifies (e.g., by 
vacuuming, not sweeping, and after cleaning the furniture, not before). 
2.4.2. RelComp is for overt behavior and psychological states 
In my definition of RelComp the word “action” encompasses not only overt behavior, but 
also the corresponding covert psychological states, such as intentions, emotions, evaluations, 
beliefs and so forth (A. Fiske & Rai, 2015). Such use of the word may seem odd from a 
conceptual point of view. Although mentally solving arithmetic or creating a story can be 
considered “mental acts”, other psychological states such as fears, beliefs, desires or hopes are 
not necessarily actions. Therefore, from a conceptual perspective it makes sense to distinguish 
“action” from “psychological states”. However, from the practical perspective of the social 
actor facing everyday coordination problems, psychological states and overt behaviors are 
often perceived, by default, as inextricable parts of the each agent’s actions, and hence, of the 
relational pattern.  
By assuming that the co-actors share the same RM, each participant also makes 
assumptions about the other’s corresponding intentions to fulfill the relational pattern by 
performing her part. Hence, when participants presuppose complementary actions by the 
other they may also presuppose the corresponding psychological states such as intentions, 
emotions, evaluations and so forth. In other words, each participant assumes not only that the 
others intend the same relational pattern as she does, but also that they understand, evaluate, 
desire, and – in a way – experience the same pattern that she does.  
I have established before that action representations are hierarchically organized in 
different levels of description. In addition to observable behavioral expressions, intentions 
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may also be parts of one’s action representations. If we assume that other mental states related 
to intentions, such as emotions, beliefs, etc., may also be represented as components of 
“action”, then such psychological states are perceived, expected and expressed as inextricable 
parts of one agent’s action, to which the other should respond, or which should be 
experienced in response to a previous action by the other. If such mental states are component 
of one’s representation of the parts of each of the relational pattern, then they must be 
congruent with the remaining elements of the pattern for RelComp to be experienced. 
Otherwise, complementary behaviors accompanied with perceived non-complementary 
feelings, beliefs or intentions, will cause participants to experience awkwardness, discomfort, 
confusion, suspicion, anger or harm. In other words, all elements of a relational gestalt must 
belong together according to an organizing model in order for each participant to avoid the 
tension (Lewin, 1951), unbalance (Heider, 1946, 1958) or dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
characteristic of non-complementary states.  
Just as not all actions are relevant for social coordination (see section 2.1), not all 
psychological states are relevant for RelComp either. The actions that are relevant for 
coordination are those that are recognized as parts or qualities of relational patterns or RMs, 
and which, for that reason, make reference to complementary actions by another agent. 
Similarly, the relevant psychological states are those that make reference to the actions that 
are recognized as parts of the relational pattern (e.g., intending, enjoying, or believing that 
one should do one’s part). If John agrees to help his friend Peter paint his apartment 
(according to CS), it is John’s part to paint the best he can and it is Peter’s part to paint 
together and accept John’s contribution20. Hence, John’s feelings of enjoyment for helping 
Peter and Peter’s feelings of gratitude towards John make reference to the parts of each and 
are consistent with its overt performance. On the other hand, John’s distaste for Peter’s color 
choice, Peter’s judgment that John’s is too well dressed for painting, or the fact that John’s 
finds painting boring, refer to actions that are associated, but peripheral to the relational 
pattern of CS. Perceiving how the other feels about the paint color, about one’s outfit, or 
about the act of painting itself is unlikely to undermine one’s experience of RelComp, as long 
as one assumes or perceives that the other enjoys helping and appreciates one’s contribution. 
Furthermore, different RMs entail different psychological states. If, instead of asking a friend 
                                                 
20 In the CS organization of work and contribution each does what one can without anyone keeping track of 
inputs. No one is assigned specific jobs or duties. Work is a collective responsibility (Fiske, 1991, 1992). 
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for help, Peter hires a professional painter, Mike, according to MP, then, Mike’s part is to get 
the job done and Peter’s part is to pay a proportional price. In this case, Peter’s feelings of 
gratitude towards Mike may be irrelevant for Mike’s experience of RelComp. Instead, it is 
crucial that Peter feels satisfied with the job and believes Mike deserves his payment.  
Notice that including mental states as possible parts of the relational pattern does not 
imply that all relational patterns include mental states nor does it require that participants 
engage in mindreading. Some relational patterns may, in fact, not specify any particular 
mental state. When two drivers arrive at a roundabout they apply a relational pattern 
specifying that the first arriving at the roundabout has priority of the others (AR). RelComp is 
experienced as long as each one drives according to (perceived) precedence. Whatever mental 
states each driver experiences are not necessarily components of the represented relational 
pattern. On the other hand, when a romantic naïve teenager kisses and cuddles (CS) with her 
date at the prom, the intended relational pattern specifies not only that he kisses and cuddles 
back, but also that he “has feelings for her”. In this case, the unexperienced teenager does not 
have to read the mind of her date in order to figure out whether he truly likes her. Instead, she 
may simply assume that kissing and cuddling (how) is something that only people who have 
feelings for each other (who) do; hence, if he kisses and cuddles with her, then he must have 
feelings for her. By assuming that they are both implementing the same RM in the same way, 
each participant makes default top-down-wise assumptions about each other’s psychological 
states. Such subjective assumptions allow them to experience RelComp even if their 
emotions, intentions, or beliefs do not objectively complement one another.  
Besides, some relational patterns overlap in their overt manifestations, such that the 
underlying relational intentions and emotions of each participant are crucial to distinguish 
between them. For example the physical act of sex, per se, is not sufficient to define the 
particular relational pattern that is being constituted. The underlying psychological states 
specify which RM is being implemented and with how much intensity. Depending on how he 
or she thinks, expects and feels about the sex, they may having casual sex (a less intense CS 
relation), initiating a romantic relationship (a more intense CS relation); engaging in 
prostitution (MP); taking revenge against a cheating partner (EM); or conforming to a wife’s 
duty to satisfy her husband’s desires (AR)21. In order to complement one another and 
                                                 
21 For an account on relational motivations underlying rape see Fiske & Rai, 2015. 
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determine whether the actions by each agent actually fit together according to a shared 
relational pattern, each participant must understand what is going on between the two having 
sex by considering the psychological states of each other.  
I have mentioned that, by default, people make assumptions about each other’s mental 
states by assuming shared RMs. However, when interactions fail, are uncertain or ambiguous, 
due to misaligned RMs, people may also engage in mindreading (Bohl, 2015, section 3.3). 
Cultural experience informs participants that the same relational behavior can sometimes 
express different underlying psychological states, which, in turn correspond to different RMs. 
In fact, participants can even rely on such cultural knowledge to deliberately use ambiguous 
relational acts to hide their true intentions or suggest alternative RMs without violating the 
current one, e.g., a veiled bribery to a police officer, or flirting with a colleague (cf. Lee & 
Pinker, 2010). Cultural knowledge about the RMs allow participants to know that some 
behaviors can be parts of either one or another RM, but does not inform which particular RM 
is intended with that particular behavior. In such cases, explicit (Bohl, 2015) or implicit 
mindreading can be used to disambiguate behavior. For instance, after some disappointments 
the teenager loses innocence by learning that boys can kiss and cuddle for several reasons 
other than being in love. Thus, instead of making assumptions about their relationship she 
starts using her mindreading abilities to understand the true intentions and emotions behind 
their kissing and cuddling. To the extent that psychological states that she ascribes to the boy 
are congruent with the intended relational pattern, she experiences RelComp. 
In summary, mental states are not necessarily constitutive element of relational patterns 
but in some cases they can be. Whenever they are represented as components of each agent’s 
part, in addition to complementary over behaviors, participants also intend that each other’s 
intentions, sentiments, evaluations, levels of commitment, beliefs, understandings (and 
whatever psychological states that are represented as elements of the parts of each) fit 
together. Therefore, Relational Complementarity is achieved to the extent that the 
psychological states of each participant during joint action are congruent with one another, in 
addition to corresponding overt behaviors. Otherwise, as in the example of sex, either 
participant may feel that each acted with disparate intentions, despite their intentions to act 
jointly. Realizing that the other did not experience the emotions, intentions, and evaluations 
that are congruent with one’s own is enough for each participant to experience non-
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complementarity.  Then one feels awkward, confused, suspicious, hurt, disappointed, 
deceived, ashamed, guilty, insulted or angry about the interaction and the other. 
2.4.3. Degrees of RelComp 
 The subjective experience of fulfilling a relational pattern depends on the pattern and 
constitutive actions that each participant represents. Since relational patterns are constituted 
by several elements it is possible that only some elements of each other’s actions are 
congruent with the intended pattern. Hence, RelComp can be experience to a higher or lower 
degree of intensity depending on the extent to which the perceived elements of each agent’s 
actions fit together. I will briefly illustrate this idea by addressing the external manifestations 
and mental states of the agents. 
The lowest degree of RelComp is constituted by perceived non-complementary actions 
and non-complementary psychological states. The intermediate levels of RelComp are, at 
least two. The first consists of perceived fitting behaviors but incongruent psychological 
states. For example, John helps Peter paint his apartment but during the job he expresses 
annoyance at having to do it. Or two participants meet and each intends a pattern about 
greeting that may be defined by cheek kissing in the first case and handshaking in the second. 
The first surprises the second with two kisses on the cheek and the second complies although 
displaying signs of embarrassment. In the second case, the psychological states of 
participant’s fit together, but their actions do not. Suppose John agreed to help Peter but he 
gets sick, goes to the hospital and tells Peter he cannot show up. Peter knows that although 
John did not show up, he intended to, and would have if he could. In such cases where people 
fail to complement, attributing intentions in favor of one’s part may be crucial to judging (cf. 
Bohl, 2015) and responding to such failure. For instance, when an employee misses a 
deadline the boss may respond by consoling him if he believes the employee made a high 
effort, but reprimand him if he attributes failure to low effort (Struthers, Weiner, Allred, 
1998). 
In the highest degree of RelComp both overt behaviors and psychological states of 
participants complement are perceived to be mutually congruent. This level includes the cases 
where there is no objective RelComp, for instance, when people do not realize that they are 
applying different RMs with overlapping overt behaviors. For example, one person doing 
something for another can be a responsible implementation of AR, a friendly expression of 
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CS, or an exchange of favors according to EM. Since the immediate overt behavior of the two 
participants is the same, each one can experience RelComp if he assumes that the other is 
implementing the same RM and experiencing the corresponding psychological states. Of 
course, in the long run, participants may realize that they misunderstood what the other was 
doing and experience non-complementarity instead. This will generate retrospective 
embarrassment, hurt feelings, or anger. This level also includes the cases where only one 
participant experiences RelComp. For instance, a beneficiary applying CS may understand 
that he is being patronized or treated as inferior and, although accepting the benefit, he 
perceives the action of the benefactor as not entirely complementary to his, whereas the 
benefactor may perceive the beneficiary’s acceptance as fully complementary to his 
dominance. 
2.5. The scope of the current definition of relating 
The current definition is comprehensive. First, it applies to different kinds of 
relationships. Whether someone asks a stranger or a friend for help, gives an order to a 
subordinate, does a favor to a colleague or pays for an online purchase, she is presupposing or 
inducing fitting actions by the other (e.g., that the other offers help, obeys the authority, 
reciprocates the favor, or ships the purchased product) that will complete the intended pattern 
of complementary actions. It is also appropriate for interactions with different degrees of 
complexity, be they a simple handshake or a 5-year business partnership between multiple 
players with complementary roles and responsibilities assigned to each across that period of 
time. It allows, as well, that people perceive themselves as relating to different types of 
‘entities’, such as imaginary or supernatural beings (e.g., God or ghosts), deceased persons, a 
person who does not know the participant (e.g., celebrities), inanimate objects (e.g., an 
automobile or a computer), or animate non-human beings (e.g., a pet), as long as the 
participant believes or hopes that the other will complete his or her action with the 
complementary response. 
Second, my definition pertains to different stages of a relationship. People initiate, 
maintain, adjust, and repair relationships by pursuing complementarity, and to the extent that 
they fail to achieve it with a specific participant they sometimes terminate relationship with 
them. Introducing oneself to a stranger at a party presupposes the complementary action by 
the stranger of introducing herself back. Most relationships are maintained to the extent that 
people actually succeed at jointly construing continuing patterns of complementarity in the 
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interactions or aspects that are most vital to the relationship; that is the case of lovers agreeing 
to move in together, and then to get married, and then to have children, and so forth. In 
ambiguous situations participants adjust their actions by negotiating the pattern of 
complementarity to be produced. Such negotiation is often implicit, for example, when 
Portuguese male and female strangers decide whether to greet each other with a handshake or 
a cheek kiss; but can also assume more explicit forms, for instance, two friends having dinner 
at a restaurant deciding who’s turn is it to offer the dinner, or whether each pays for what he 
ate, or they split the bill 50:50. When one participant is accused of transgressing the 
relationship, that is usually because he or she failed (e.g., by cheating on the spouse, 
disobeying an authority, refusing to reciprocate a favor, taking a product without paying) to 
participate in a pattern of complementarity that was being pursued by the other. Therefore, 
attempts to repair the relationship often have the goal of persuading the other to continue to 
participate in the joint construction of patterns of complementarity with oneself. This may be 
done by apologizing, justifying, or compensating the other if one is the transgressor, or by 
confronting or punishing the other if one is the victim, or simply by addressing 
misunderstandings about what each party should do. Finally, some relationships dissolve as 
people naturally stop interacting over time. This is the case when people feel they do not have 
a relationship anymore because they have stopped relating in the sense of jointly construing 
complementary patterns. In order to prevent dissolution people use strategies (e.g., Christmas 
or birthday cards) to induce the other to participate in a complementary interaction (e.g., by 
sending a thank you note), thereby, sustaining the relationship. In other cases, people actually 
terminate their relationships by completing an interaction pattern. For example, the end of a 
job contract marks the completion of a pattern of complementary actions between the 
employer and the employee, and thus, the end of a relationship. Some relationships, however, 
terminate because participants fail to achieve complementarity on aspects critical to the 
relationship (e.g., an employee is fired because he did not accomplish what he was paid to; 
two lovers break up because one of them does not want to move in with the other). 
2.6. Summary 
When relating, people seek to fulfill patterns of complementary actions according to a 
subjectively shared model of the interaction. Individuals use such models as coordination 
devices informing which actions by each participant fit together in a particular situation. 
Across cultures, there are four basic relational models that people apply to structure their 
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interactions: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching and Market Pricing. 
These universal models are implemented in culturally specific ways as standards for 
understanding, evaluating, predicting, and monitoring the actions of others, as well as for 
planning, and generating one’s own actions. Each relational model corresponds to one kind of 
Relational Complementarity and each specific implementation of a relational model 
corresponds to one pattern of relational complementarity.  
Relational Complementarity is a goal about a collective state. The intended relational 
pattern pursued consists of one particular combination of actions by different individuals. In 
this sense, the relational pattern is a “whole” that cannot be accomplished by the actions of 
one single individual. At the same time the actions of each participant are only meaningful 
and complete with reference to that “whole”. Hence, when pursuing Relational 
Complementarity each participant intends his action to be a part of a relational pattern, while 
presupposing, expecting, hoping or wishing that the other intends to perform her part of the 
same pattern. Because relational models are represented in the form of knowledge about 
relationships in specific cultural contexts, they allow individuals to make such assumptions 
without engaging in cognitively demanding processes of mindreading. 
The Relational Complementarity goal is distinct in kind from goals attained by means of 
coordination. Relational Complementarity consists of fitting actions by participants. 
Therefore, it is action and it is coordination. Wanting the outcome of coordination (e.g., 
moving a piano) is different from wanting to coordinate. 
Relational Complementarity is the subjective experience of fulfilling a relational pattern. 
Each participant applies his own cognitive representation of a relational pattern to the 
interaction. These representations include knowledge about the situation, the object of 
coordination, the overt behaviors of each participant, and may also include information about 
their corresponding psychological states, such as emotions, intentions and beliefs. Relational 
Complementarity is experienced insofar as the actions of all participants (and psychological 
states) are congruent with the relational pattern applied. 
Often, due to culturally shared knowledge, the representations of participants are aligned, 
but it may be the case that each applies different representations. In such cases, an action 
misfit may occur in the form of misunderstandings, discomfort, or conflict. Since the 
representations of each may correspond or overlap to a greater or smaller degree, Relational 
Complementarity can also be experienced in different degrees. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Does The Goal To Relationally Complement Motivate Effort In Social Interactions? 
 
Several motives have been presented by social and personality psychologists to describe 
why human beings engage in coordinated social interactions. Most of these motives reflect 
goals that are ulterior to the relationship, in the sense that people use particular ways of 
relating as means to achieve them. For instance, it has been proposed that human beings have 
a universal motive to strive for control over the environment in order to obtain desired 
outcomes (Heckhausen, 2000; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; White, 1959). One way 
individuals can experience control is by cooperating with partners who have an influence over 
one’s needs and desires (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), or by achieving power and influence over 
other people (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Veroff, 1957). Consistently, people also join social 
groups and engage in social interactions as means to achieve psychological outcomes, such as 
positive self-esteem (Oakes & Turner, 1980), distress relief (Schachter, 1959), or certainty 
about themselves and the environment (Hogg, 2000; Festinger, 1954). Such descriptions, 
however, reflect an instrumental approach to social interactions and neglect the class of 
incentives that reside within, rather than outside, the relationship. 
In contrast, other proposals involve goals intrinsic to the relationship, in the sense that 
they are about the qualities of the relationship, as such. For example, the need to belong 
motivates human beings to maintain and establish a certain amount of frequent, pleasant 
interactions occurring within an enduring relationship of affective concern (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). The need to belong has similarities with the affiliation and intimacy motives, 
which are recurrent preferences for “establishing, maintaining, and restoring a positive 
affective relationship” (Atkinson, Heyns & Veroff, 1954, p. 406), and for warm and close 
interactions (McAdams & Constantian, 1983), respectively. Furthermore, the power motive is 
the desire to have impact on other people (McClelland, 1975). These motives are not about 
outcomes consequent to the interaction, but rater about how individuals interact. The needs 
for belonging, affiliation or intimacy, are about relating in a communal way, and the power 
motive is about relating in a hierarchical or dominant way. Despite describing motivational 
qualities of relationships, these approaches, are however focused on particular types of 
relations and, hence, neglect the incentives that are common to all types. 
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My proposal is that all kinds of relationships share a common essential motivational 
form. In the previous chapters I established that human interactions are structured according 
to four universal cognitive models of social relationships: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority 
Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP; A. Fiske, 1991, 1992); and 
that Relational Complementarity (RelComp) is the requirement for any RM to be fulfilled, 
and, thus, for any social interaction to be successfully coordinated. Hence, all kinds of social 
coordination imply that individuals pursue RelComp. In other words, when socially relating 
each participant has the goal of fulfilling a pattern of RelComp with the partner.  
RelComp can take the form of any specific implementation of a RM, i.e., a relational 
pattern. RMs and corresponding relational patterns are cognitive representations of 
knowledge about when, with whom, in respect to what aspects of the interaction, and how 
each participant proceeds on a specific cultural context. Each relational pattern informs in a 
descriptive and prescriptive sense which actions must be performed by each participant in that 
particular interaction, thereby energizing and directing the actions of each, and guiding 
evaluations of the partner’s previous action and expectations about the partner’s subsequent 
actions.  
In this chapter I assume that RelComp is an intrinsically motivating quality of relational 
patterns. To say that RelComp is intrinsically motivating means that it is satisfying or 
rewarding, in the broad sense that people like it for its own sake (for a similarly broad use of 
reward see Vohs & Baumeister, 2008), either because it is pleasant—“feels good”, or because 
it is the right thing to do—“feels right”. On the other hand, non-complementarity is punitive, 
also in a broad sense, i.e., people do not like it, it is unpleasant, and feels wrong. Therefore, 
people are motivated to approach – move toward – complementary states, and to avoid – 
move away from – non-complementary ones (for a review on approach and avoidance 
motivations see Elliot & Covington, 2001). In this sense, all kinds of social interactions that 
offer an opportunity for achieving RelComp are intrinsically appealing, regardless of the 
individuals’ ulterior motives, whereas the prospect of failing to fulfill a relational pattern is 
aversive.  
To be sure, this does not mean that people necessarily find being alone aversive, and have 
a need to go out seeking for RelComp with someone. Instead, it means that when interacting 
with other people, for whatever reasons, people usually find that RelComp is a desirable and 
satisfying state, and feel confused, uncomfortable, upset, guilty, embarrassed, disappointed or 
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angry, when they or the partner, fail to complement each other’s actions. For that reason, 
when RelComp is not immediately achieved, people usually make an effort to mutually adjust 
their actions until they fit; they communicate their intentions and efforts to complement the 
other, by presenting excuses or apologizing for their own failure; or they may engage in forms 
of punishment to make the other feel guilty, ashamed, or to enforce complementary behavior 
on the partner’s side. In some cases, people are motivated to experience the satisfaction of 
RelComp, for instance, when someone offers a drink to a stranger at bar, when friends invite 
each other for dinner, when a new coming leader of a team makes a presentation to establish 
her leadership, when people network at conferences and business meetings. In other cases, 
avoiding the aversive states of non-complementarity may be the main motivation to 
complement. For that reason, people acquiesce to the demands of others, engage in 
uninteresting polite conversations, or perform their obligations towards others, such as paying 
their debts or reciprocating unpleasant favors. The fact that non-complementary states are 
aversive is often used by manipulators to make others feel guilty and embarrassed, and 
persuade them to act as they wish. 
Building on this assumption, I propose that RelComp, i.e., the relational pattern that each 
participant applies to an interaction, is sufficient to energize and guide behavior in that 
interaction, regardless of ulterior motives. In other words, in the absence of other social 
rewards, the goal of RelComp should reflect on individuals’ motivation to perform their part 
of the relational pattern. In this chapter, I present four studies investigating the hypothesis 
that, individuals pursuing the goal of RelComp in a social interaction spend more effort in 
performing their part, than those who do not. 
In what follows I elaborate on the features that make RelComp a kind of goal distinct 
from other goals, and consider two automatic processes by which RelComp can be set as goal 
for the interaction: activation and discrepancy reduction. 
 3.1. The RelComp Goal is a Collective State of Affairs 
Coordinated interactions allow individuals to achieve a great variety of goals that they 
cannot attain on their own. For example, people can gain information about the environment, 
gain support, validation and approval from others, or produce changes in the environment, 
e.g., moving a piano from one place to another (e.g., Jones & Thibaut, 1958). There, is 
however, a fundamental difference between such goals and RelComp. RelComp is a goal 
about a collective-state the ownership of which is subjectively shared.  
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Goals are mental representations of a “desirable future state of affairs one intends to 
attain through action” (Kruglanski, 1996, p. 600; see Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010, 
Elliot & Fryer, 2008, Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, for reviews about the goal concept). The 
state of affairs is the content of the goal. Elliot and Fryer (2008) proposed the concept of goal 
object as the positively or negatively valenced “entity, event, experience, characteristic” the 
individual is motivated to approach or avoid (p. 245). The object or content of the RelComp 
goal is the particular fitting between the actions of two or more participants. Two implications 
follow. First, the RelComp goal is not consequent to coordinated action, as are many other 
goals for coordination (e.g., to move a piano). Instead, the RelComp goal is coordinated 
action, meaning that the actions of each participant are intrinsic to RelComp, i.e., intrinsic to 
the goal state. Second, the RelComp goal is not about an individual state of affairs, (e.g., I feel 
approved by the other; I gained information), but about a collective or joint state (e.g., we are 
doing something together). Hence, at the same time that the actions of each participant are 
intrinsic to the goal (i.e., RelComp), the goal itself is something else than the actions of each 
participant taken singly. 
3.1.1. Shared Ownership of the RelComp Goal 
The goal concept implies ownership over the goal and over the actions necessary to to 
attain it (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Köpetz, 2014; see also Sellars, 1980, about 
the up to the agent’ness quality of an intention). In other words, a goal must be possessed by 
someone – it can be my goal, your goal, our goal, and so forth. And for a desirable end sate to 
become a goal for an agent, it must be attainable by means of the agent’s own actions, since 
one can only commit to pursue a goal that one can attain by means of one’s own actions. 
Interestingly, such requirement has generated discussions among philosophers of joint action 
and shared intentionality about how one agent can intend a joint activity, as joint, if he can 
only intend his own action. Some accounts propose that one agent can intend to do something 
together if he intends his’ own part of a joint activity and presupposes that the others intend to 
do their part (Bratman, 2009; Tuomela, 2006). In line with these proposals, I have established 
that people usually assume that the relational pattern they apply to an interaction is shared by 
the other person. In other words, people assume that the partner wants (i.e., owns) the same 
relational pattern as they do, and such an assumption allows them to expect or hope that the 
other will do her part. Hence, the ownership of the RelComp goal is essentially shared (in the 
subjective sense) between two or more agents. At the same time, each agent owns only his 
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part/ action of the relational pattern, and neither agent owns the totality of the actions 
necessary for goal attainment.  
Collectiveness of the state of affairs and shared ownership are two crucial aspects that 
distinguish RelComp from other social goals. Self-esteem, social approval, belonging, 
etcetera, are examples of goals about individual states of affairs, which are owned by a single 
person (e.g., my self-esteem, my feeling of approval and belonging). Such goals do not 
describe any particular fitting among the actions of different participants. To be sure, they 
cannot be attained by means of the agent’s own actions alone, since they imply certain 
responses by the partner (i.e., the partner’s sign of approval and inclusion). However, at best, 
these goals describe a state of affairs that consists of a desired response by the partner, rather 
than of fitting actions by the partner and the agent. In such cases, the agent’s actions are 
means to an end (i.e., interpersonal strategies to earn the partner’s approval), rather than part 
of the end itself. In addition, in order to pursue such goals, the individual does not have to 
assume that the partner shares the same goal (i.e., that the partner also wants to feel approved 
and to belong). To the extent that they are owned and describe actions by a single individual, 
social goals such as approval, belonging, self-esteem, and the like, reflect an individualist 
psychology. As far as these goals are concerned, social coordination is a means to an end. I 
propose that in addition to such goals, there is one class of goals that reflects a social-
relational psychology: goals describing actions by two or more participants that fit together 
according to some cognitive model of the interaction, and which are assumed by each agent to 
be owned by all participants involved. 
3.2. Activation of the Relational Complementarity Goal  
How do participants set goals for the social interaction? How do humans select, from 
their immense relational repertoire and in real time, the relational patterns that are relevant for 
the interaction? Several approaches to goal setting and goal pursuit behavior have emphasized 
the role of conscious processes of deliberation and reflection (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Gollwitzer, 1990; Locke, & Latham, 1990). However, the dynamic and fluid nature of human 
social interactions requires processes that are quicker and less effortful than conscious 
deliberations (Bargh, 1990). In fact, over the last decades research has shown that goals can 
also be activated and operate outside conscious awareness (Bargh, 1990; see Bargh, et al., 
2010, Chartrand & Bargh, 2002, Custer & Aarts, 2005, Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts, 
2007, for overviews). 
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It is widely accepted that goals are represented in memory as knowledge structures, 
similarly to other cognitive constructs, such as stereotypes or attitudes (Bargh, 1990; 
Kruglanski, 1996). Such conception implies that goals are not discrete representation units, 
but rather complex systems of interconnected memories related to a goal (Fishbach & 
Ferguson, 2007). These memories include not only the desirable outcomes, but also the 
habitual plans often employed to attain them, and the features of the situations in which the 
goals are often pursued (Bargh, 1990; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000). Hence, goal-related 
memories, which are not equally accessible across situations, can be automatically activated 
by any environmental stimulus – including the actions of other people – that is part of the goal 
representation and, thus, linked to its remaining elements. For example, asking participants to 
sit on a professor’s chair (vs. guest’s chair) in a professor’s office while performing a task 
activates power related goals (Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001); and asking participants to 
read about a man picking up women at a bar activates the goal to have casual sex (Aarts, 
Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004). This way, goals are automatically activated and guide behavior 
on specific situations, outside the individuals’ awareness. This assertion has been extensively 
supported by studies demonstrating that goals can be activated through priming manipulations 
– without participants’ being aware of the stimulus, or of the stimulus’ association with the 
goal – and operate similarly to consciously set goals (e.g., Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; 
Fitzsimons, & Bargh, 2003). 
  Building on principles of goal representation and activation, I propose that RMs are 
cognitively represented in the form of relational patterns. The relational patterns are systems 
of knowledge about the when, what, with whom and how of the cultural paradigms for 
implementation of RMs. More specifically, the representation of each relational pattern 
includes information about the context (when) in which certain aspects of the interaction 
(what) are coordinated, with whom they are coordinated, and how each party should proceed. 
Conceptualizing relational patterns as knowledge structures, implies that all it takes for a 
relational pattern to become activated is the perception of an element of the pattern in the 
environment. Such element can be a task requiring coordination (e.g., obtaining food), a 
situational feature (e.g., a restaurant), the other person (e.g., the waiter), or an action by the 
other (e.g., presenting the bill). Whenever an element of a relational pattern – in which one is 
involved as participant – is perceived in the situation, the remaining elements are activated by 
association, and the relational pattern as a whole becomes active to guide behavior, usually 
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automatically (e.g., paying for the dinner). An activated relational pattern is automatically set 
as a goal for the interaction, which is equivalent to saying that when a relational pattern is 
activated RelComp is set as goal. 
3.3. The Role of Discrepancies in the Pursuit of Relational Complementarity 
The mental activation of a goal representation is not sufficient to motivate behavior; the 
activated representation has to be desirable at the moment of activation. In other words, there 
has to be a discrepancy between current state and goal-state (e.g., Custer & Aarts, 2005, 2007; 
Veltkamp, Aarts & Custers, 2009). For example, when the goal to make money was activated 
through priming, primed participants were quicker to and spent more effort in pursuing an 
opportunity to make money than non-primed participants, but only when their need for money 
was high (Aarts, Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004, Study 1). For participants with low need for 
money, the goal activation did not affect behavior. In another study, participants primed with 
the goal of drinking consumed more fluid than non-primed participants, but only under 
conditions of fluid deprivation. At the same time, participants under condition of fluid 
deprivation consumed more fluid than non-deprived participants; and this effect was more 
pronounced when the goal of drinking was activated through priming (Veltkamp, Aarts & 
Custers, 2008). Hence, it seems that activation and discrepancies are both necessary for a 
certain goal-representation to actually be adopted as a goal for action. 
The motivational role of discrepancies in relationships has been emphasized by several 
theories of social psychology (Robins & Boldero, 2003). For example, Interdependence 
theory postulates that whether an individual remains or leaves the relationship is determined 
by perceived discrepancies of the current outcomes of the relationship with the comparison 
levels used to evaluate the relationship and the alternative relationships available (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959). Similarly, Fletcher and Simpson (1999) proposed that individuals are 
motivated to reduce discrepancies between their ideal standards and the current partner and 
relationship. And Relational Discrepancy Theory describes how the roles within a relationship 
and perceptions of trust and intimacy are affected by perceived discrepancies between one’s 
self-aspects and the self-aspects of the partner (Robins & Boldero, 2003).  
What kind of discrepancies is relevant for the RelComp goal? In the current analysis, the 
goal state is the complete relational pattern, and the current state is the absence of RelComp 
on an interaction in which the person is a participant. Whenever a relational pattern is initiated 
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by one participant performing his part, a state of discrepancy emerges and is experienced by 
both participants, provided that the representations of the relational pattern of each are 
aligned. In that case, both the respondent and the initiator are motivated to reduce the 
discrepancy. The motivated behavior by the respondent will usually take the form of him 
performing his part, whereas the motivation of the initiator will be reflected on him 
monitoring the complementary action by the partner, or on actions that aim to evoke, pull, and 
enforce the complementary action by the other. 
Therefore, a powerful way to engage people in coordination is by initiating a relational 
pattern that requires their part to be completed. This is the principle underlying the 
reciprocation strategy of influence that consists of offering something to the other to make 
him feel obligated to do something in return (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). Notice, however, as condition for discrepancy perception, the action of the other 
must be represented as a part of a relational pattern, i.e., it must be coherent with the relational 
pattern that one would apply to that same situation. If this condition is not met, the individual 
may not understand what the other is doing or evaluate the intended pattern as inappropriate 
or wrong, and hence, undesirable. 
3.4. Overview of Studies 1 to 4 
The four studies presented in this chapter investigated whether the activation of the goal 
of RelComp would reflect on participants’ motivation to perform their part of the interaction 
with the experimenter during an experimental session. It was assumed that participants would 
interact with the experimenter in a framework of Authority Ranking (AR) and Market Pricing 
(MP) combined. The AR model would consist of the experimenter instructing the participant, 
and the participant following the instructions of the experimenter. The MP model would 
consist of the experimenter rewarding the participant for taking part in the experiment, and 
the participant performing the tasks corresponding to the reward. Hence, coordination 
between the experimenter and the participant would require the implementation of a pattern of 
RelComp according to AR and MP. RelComp would be achieved when the experimenter and 
the participant performed their respective parts of the relational pattern.  
It was also reasoned that, if the experimenter performed his part before the participant 
performed his, a discrepancy would emerge, thus making the goal of RelComp desirable. 
Building on the principles above stated the discrepancy would motivate participants if the 
goal of RelComp for that interaction was made accessible. Holding discrepancy constant, 
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differences in motivation should be observed by manipulating the accessibility of RelComp. 
In particular, I expected that participants primed with RelComp would have the goal more 
strongly activated, and that this should reflect on higher motivation to do their part. 
One hallmark of motivated behavior is the effort spent to attain the desired goal (Martin 
& Tesser, 2009; Wright, 1996; Wright & Brehm, 1989). The higher the value of a goal, the 
higher the effort expended in pursuing it. Effort was measured indirectly through performance 
on a digit-letter substitution test. Substitution tests consist in matching particular signs to 
other signs within a given period of time (Van der Elst, van Boxtel, van Breukelen, & Jolles, 
2006). Previous studies have shown that substitution tests are sensitive to different levels of 
motivation. For example, individuals with high achievement motivation perform better on 
substitution tests that than those with low achievement motivation (e.g., French, 1955; Patten 
& White, 1977). 
Given that the substitution test was one of the tasks that each participant had to complete 
as his part of the relational pattern with the experimenter in order to achieve RelComp, it was 
predicted that participants primed with RelComp would make more effort, and thus, perform 
better on the substitution test, than those in the control condition.  
Notice that since RelComp is a collective state of affairs, the RelComp goal is distinct 
from the goal “to perform well” or to succeed at the task. Performing the task well 
corresponds to the participant’s part of the relational pattern. For the RelComp goal to be 
attained, it is necessary that both the participant and the experimenter perform well the parts 
of each. When motivated by the RelComp goal, the participant intends her performance as her 
part of the relational pattern, while validating or assuming that the experimenter performed or 
will perform his part. In other words, when pursuing the RelComp goal, individual 
performance is contingent on evaluations and assumptions about the actions of the partner.  
On the other hand, the goal “to perform well” at the task is contingent on the participant’s 
own action only. The participant intends his performance to be as good as possible, regardless 
of previous or subsequent actions by the experimenter. Since the RelComp goal-state is 
something else than the single action by each participant, there is no conceptual overlap 
between the RelComp goal and performing well.  
Furthermore, performance alone can be explained by other motivations, such as doing 
something well, i.e., achievement or mastery (e.g., French, 1955; McClelland, Koestner & 
Weinberger, 1989; Patten & White, 1977). However, provided that there is no semantic or 
Relational Complementarity 
60 
behavioral overlap between the priming stimulus and the achievement concept, any 
differences between participants primed with RelComp and those in the control condition 
cannot be explained by a motive to perform well, as such, but, instead, by a motive to achieve 
RelComp by performing well one’s part of the relational pattern. 
3.5. Study 1 
3.5.1. Methods 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-eight students at a public university institute in Lisbon (64 undergraduate students, 
59 of them Psychology students, 77% female, 89.5% Portuguese nationals) with ages between 
17 and 34 (Mage = 19.46, SD = 3.07) took part in this study. Sixty-one participants were 
recruited as part of a requirement for a class on Social Psychology and earned 0.5 credits for 
participating in a 30-minute experiment. The remaining seven participants were recruited by 
convenience on campus and offered a 5€ voucher.  
Two participants were excluded from the data analyses, leaving a final sample of N = 66. 
The first participant showed awareness of the purpose of the study, by explicitly relating the 
manipulation task to the dependent measure. The second participant carried a physical 
disability that affected his hand writing, thus decreasing his speed in the dependent measure. 
3.5.1.2. Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the priming condition vs. 
two control conditions. In the priming condition participants rated the degree of 
Complementarity of sentences describing social interactions. In the first control condition 
participants counted the number of verbs on sentences describing social interactions, whereas 
in the second control condition participants counted the number of verbs on sentences 
describing individuals performing non-social activities. The sentences used in the priming and 
in the first control condition were the same in order to make sure that any effects on 
performance were not due to the priming of social content as such. We anticipated that the 
content of the sentences in the first control condition could spontaneously activate the concept 
of relational complementarity, but as participants had the task of counting the verbs in the 
sentences they should rather inhibit such social content in order to be able to focus on 
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grammar. The second control condition was used in order to have a base line condition in 
which the idea of social complementarity would not be activated. Dependent variable was the 
motivation for relational complementarity, which was measured as effort in a subsequent task. 
3.5.1.3. Materials 
All materials described below were written and presented to participants in Portuguese 
language. 
Manipulation. This task was performed on a computer in the form of an online 
questionnaire developed with Qualtrics.com software. Participants rated phrases according to 
a given instruction. 
In the priming condition participants read the following instruction: 
“When we relate, we combine our actions with the actions of the other person, in a way 
that the actions of both are complementary.  
For example, when Manuel and José meet, Manuel reaches his hand out to José. José 
reaches his hand out to Manuel and they shake hands.” 
Next, participants were asked to read 20 phrases, and to rate whether each phrase 
described a complementary or non-complementary social interaction, using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 - not at all complementary; 7 - highly complementary). Each phrase consisted of two 
sentences, like the ones in the instructions, describing one interaction between two individuals 
according to one of the four relational models. The phrases were developed so that the four 
models were represented, including the superior and subordinate roles of AR (see Appendix 
A). Ten phrases were complementary (e.g., Joana felt ill and called her husband. The 
husband immediately interrupted his work and took Joana to the hospital.), and ten phrases 
were non- complementary (e.g., The teacher told the student to stop texting during the class. 
The student turned around and continued texting,). Furthermore, in order to avoid 
confounding RelComp with the general valence of the interaction, half the phrases described 
pleasant complementary (e.g., The waiter came and left the bill on the table. The customer 
paid the bill and tipped the waiter for the good service) and non-complementary interactions 
(e.g., The three books Carla ordered online arrived on time. The online bookshop charged her 
credit card for one book only.), whereas the other half described unpleasant complementary 
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(e.g., The police officer saw António using the cellphone while driving and ordered him to 
stop the car. António stopped the car immediately at the roadside) and non-complementary 
interactions (e.g., José’s old and sick father urinated in his trouser and called José for help. 
José in the other room continued watching the football game).  
In the first control condition participants read the instruction:  
“Read the following sentences and indicate the number of verbs in each phrase, using 
the scale below (1 = 1 verb; 7 = 7 verbs).  
For example: “When Manuel and José meet, Manuel reaches his hand out to José. José 
reaches his hand out to Manuel and they shake hands (Number of verbs = 4).” 
Next, they read the same 20 phrases as in the priming condition and rated the number of verbs 
on each one. 
In the second control condition participants read an instruction similar to the first control 
condition, except that an example of a phrase describing a non-social activity was given: “He 
does laundry only when it is sunny. This way he uses natural heat to dry the laundry (Number 
of verbs = 4).” In addition, the sentences to be rated were different from the other two 
conditions in the sense that they described individuals performing non-social activities (see 
Appendix B). 
Measures. The ratings of the phrases of the manipulation task by the participants in the 
control condition was used to assess whether participants were able to differentiate between 
the complementary and non-complementary sentences. This measure was used to validate the 
goal priming. 
Effort was measured indirectly through performance on a digit-letter substitution test. In 
this study the pencil-paper materials used by Van der Elst and colleagues (2006) were used. 
Participants were given a key which consisted of digits from 1 to 9, and each digit was paired 
with a different letter. Their task was to replace a sequence of 135 randomized letters by the 
correct digit as indicated by the key. The dependent measure was the number of correct 
substitutions made in 60 seconds (see Appendix C) 
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After performing the substitution test, for exploratory reasons, participants used a 7-point 
Likert scale to rate their level of agreement (1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – partially 
disagree, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 5 – partially agree, 6 – agree, 7 – strongly agree) with 
eight sentences measuring: self-reported motivation (“I felt motivated to have a good 
performance in this task”), effort (“I didn’t put much effort in this task”; “I did not feel the 
need to put effort in this task in order to earn the 0.5 credit”), concern with evaluation by the 
experimenter (“I tried to get a positive appraisal of my performance”; “The expectations of 
the experimenter did not influence my performance”), sense of duty (“ In a way I felt it was 
my duty to put effort in this task”) and intended affect (“I would feel bad if I did not give my 
best in this task”; “I thought I would feel good if I tried hard in this task”)22.  
Instruments. A chronometer was used to count the 60 seconds of the substitution task, 
and a room divider separated the desk where the participant performed the priming task from 
the desk where the experimenter waited until the priming task was completed. 
3.5.1.4. Procedure 
Each participant took part on an individual session in the presence of the experimenter. 
As a cover story, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to pre-test materials 
that were going to be used in future studies.  
The participant was guided to a desk with a computer. Then the participant read a form 
containing information about the voluntary nature of their participation, the confidentiality 
and anonymity of responses, and the contact of the main investigator for further questions. 
After giving informed consent participants initiated an online questionnaire, which was 
introduced by the experimenter as the first task. The questionnaire included a first page 
                                                 
22 In order to control for effects of covariates that could be expected theoretically to influence performance 
participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire 48 hours before the lab session. Since substitution 
tests have been shown to be sensitive to different levels of achievement motivation (e.g., French, 1955; Patten & 
White, 1977) the questionnaire included a Portuguese translation of the Achievement Motive Scale (Lang & 
Fries, 2006). The achievement motive scale consists of 5 items assessing hope for success (e.g., I am appealed 
by situations allowing me to test my abilities; α=.84) and 5 items measuring fear of failure (e.g., I am afraid of 
failing in somewhat difficult situations, when a lot depends on me; α = .90). The remaining scales included in the 
online questionnaire were the Portuguese translations of the Need to Belong scale (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & 
Schreindorfer, 2013; 10 items, e.g., I want other people to accept me, α=.77); 3 items measuring the sense of 
belonging (adapted from Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall et al., 2007, e.g., There are many people who care about 
me; α = .59); and the Brief Fear of Negative evaluation Scale (Leary, 1983; 12 items, e.g., If I know someone is 
judging me, it has little effect on me; α = .89). Only 56% of participants complete these measures, and for this 
reason they were not included in the analysis. 
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collecting demographic information about the participant, a second page with the 
manipulation task, and a third page instructing the participant to call and wait for the 
experimenter. The online questionnaire was programmed to randomly assign participants to 
either the priming or one of the two control conditions.  
In order to make sure that the experimenter was blind to the experimental condition, a 
room divider was placed between the desk of the participant and the desk where the 
experimenter waited, so that they could not see each other, nor could the experimenter see the 
computer screen of the participant during the task. The experimenter provided all the 
necessary instructions to the participant while the first page was still in the screen. 
Specifically, the experimenter requested the participant to interrupt the task and call him as 
soon the participant saw the instruction in the third screen. Next, before the participant 
completed de first page the experimenter left to his desk behind the room divider and returned 
only after the third page appeared and the participant called him. This way, the experimenter 
could not see the content of the second screen containing the manipulation task. 
When participants called the experimenter, he moved from behind the room divider and 
guided the participant to another desk where he/she would perform the substitution task. 
Before introducing the participant to the task the experimenter said the following, depending 
on whether participants were rewarded with 0.5 credit or a 5€ voucher: 
Before I forget… your participation in this study allows you to get 0.5 credits. I have 
already introduced the credits in the system. I ask you to check it afterwards because 
the system has been making some errors, ok? (To the credit participants)/ Before I 
forget… your participation in this study allows you to get a 5€ voucher and here it is 
(and gave voucher to the participant). 
As you know your participation is voluntary and you can quit at any time, but the idea 
is that the 0.5 credit/ voucher corresponds to three tasks in total within a 25 minute-
time period. You have already finished one task and there are two left. 
Such instruction had the goal to make the Market Pricing aspect of the relationship 
between the experimenter and the participant explicit: the participant performed three tasks in 
exchange for a reward given by the experimenter. It also intended to communicate to the 
participants that the experimenter had already done his part of such relational pattern by 
offering the reward in advance, and that the relational pattern would be completed as soon as 
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the participant completed the three tasks. We assumed such procedure would make the 
opportunity to relationally complement explicit to the participants in the three conditions of 
the manipulation. Moreover, the fact that the reward was offered before the dependent 
measure also made clear that the amount of the reward was not contingent on task 
performance. This was important in order to be able to attribute effort to a motivation that was 
not related to the reward as such, but entirely directed towards relational complementarity. 
After such instruction the experimenter introduced the substitution task to participants by 
saying: “This task is a test of cognitive abilities that the research team was validating for the 
Portuguese population. We are not interested in your individual performance, but only in 
people’s performance in general. However, we will only be able to use your data if they 
reflect your actual abilities.” We used such instruction to assure the participant that we were 
not concerned with individual performance but rather with the overall quality of the data. 
After the experimenter explained the task, the participant substituted the first 10 letters as 
practice to make sure he or she understood the instructions. After practice, when the 
participant indicated that he/she was ready to initiate the test the experimenter instructed the 
participant to do as many substitutions as possible in 60sec on the count to three. The 
participant performed the substitution task while the experimenter counted the time using a 
chronometer.  
After 60 seconds the experimenter stopped the participant and asked him/her to fill in a 
paper and pencil questionnaire including the eight exploratory items described before. After 
that, the participant was guided back to the desk with the computer and completed the third 
and last task, which was another online questionnaire. This questionnaire was a pretest of 
materials for an unrelated study. 
As part of the debriefing the experimenter used a funneled debriefing protocol adapted 
from Chartrand & Bargh (1996) to probe for awareness or suspicion concerning the priming 
task. Specifically we asked participants (a) what they thought was the purpose of the study, 
(b) whether they felt the tasks were related in any way, and in what way they were related, (c) 
whether they though anything they did on one task affected what they did on a following task, 
(d) whether they noticed anything unusual about the sentences in the first task, (e) whether 
they noticed anything unusual about the instructions given to the second task, (f) what were 
they trying to do during the substitution and whether they had any strategy in mind, and (g) 
what factors influenced their performance in the second task. One participant showed 
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awareness of the purpose of the study explicitly relating the first to the second task, and was 
excluded from the analysis. The remaining participants did not show any suspicion that the 
first task was related to the substitution task. 
3.5.2. Results 
3.5.2.1. Validation of the Goal Priming 
As expected participants in the priming condition rated pairs of sentences describing  
complementary interactions closer to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to high 
complementarity (= 7), M = 6.03, SD = 1.11, than those describing non-complementary 
interactions, M = 1.96, SD = 0.47, F(1, 20) = 207.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .91. Thus, it can be 
assumed that participants in the priming condition understood the concept of relational 
complementarity. 
3.5.2.2. Main Analysis 
I predicted that participants in the priming condition would achieve more correct 
substitutions in the digit-letter test compared to participants in the two control conditions. I 
tested this prediction by running a one-way ANOVA. Performance differed significantly 
across conditions, F(2, 63) = 4.89, p = .011, ηp2= .13. A Helmert contrast comparing the 
priming with the two control conditions together supported the hypothesis. Participants in the 
priming condition (n = 21) did more correct substitutions in 60 sec., M = 41.14, SD = 4.39, 
than those in the first (n = 21), M = 36.57, SD = 5.02, and second (n = 24), M = 38.75, SD = 
4.79, control conditions together, t(63) = 2.78, p = .007 (2-tailed), η2 = .03. According to 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction, differences were statistically significant 
between the priming condition and the first control condition (p = .008), but not between the 
priming and the second control condition (p =.288). Performance also did not differ 
significantly between the two control conditions (p = .387). 
3.5.2.3. Analysis with Covariates 
Since age and sex are the most important predictors of performance in the digit-letter 
substitution task (Van der Elst, et al., 2006), I conducted an ANCOVA with sex and age as 
covariates, to explore whether controlling for these predictors would affect the performance 
differences between groups. Non-significant interactions of the manipulation with age, F(2, 
56) = 0.66, p = .520, and sex, F(2, 56) = 1.27, p = .290, showed that homogeneity of the 
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regression slopes could be assumed. A model testing the main effects of priming, age and sex, 
without interactions, showed that the effect of the manipulation was statistically significant, 
F(2, 60) = 3.66, p = .032, ηp2= .11,  the effect of age was marginal, F(2, 60) = 3.62, p = .062, 
and the effects of sex was not significant, F(2, 60) = 0.70, p = .407. The Helmert contrast 
revealed that performance in the priming condition was significantly higher than in the two 
control conditions t(60) = 2.55, p = .013 (2-tailed), η2 = .02. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction showed that differences were statistically significant between the 
priming condition and the first control condition (p = .029), but not between the priming 
condition and the second control condition (p = .260). There were no significant differences 
between the two control conditions (p = .864). 
3.5.2.4. Exploratory Analyses 
A multivariate GLM with the manipulation as predictor was conducted on the eight 
exploratory items presented to participants after the substitution task. There were no 
significant differences on any of the items. This suggests that participants may have not been 
aware of their effort and motivation in the substitution task and, thus, could not reported it. 
Such lack of awareness speaks in favor of a successful non-conscious activation of the 
RelComp goal during the priming task. 
3.5.3. Discussion 
Our hypothesis was supported. Participants primed with RelComp performed better than 
control participants in the substitution test. These results suggest that the priming of RelComp 
increased participant’s motivation to perform their part to the relational pattern with the 
experimenter. In addition, the fact that both the priming and first control groups rated the 
same phrases in the first task, showed that the performance differences were not due to 
reading about social relationships in general, but instead, to thinking about RelComp in 
particular. This effect was not affected when sex and age were controlled as covariates. 
Unexpectedly, mean differences were not large enough to reach statistical significance 
when the priming condition was compared with the second control condition. This might be 
related with the content of the sentences read by these participants. At least five phrases in the 
second control condition were about individuals succeeding in doing something (e.g., 
Whenever she has free time, Ana likes to solve problems of mathematics and logic, see also 
items 5, 11, 12 and 20). Therefore, it is possible that achievement was primed and reflected on 
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participant’s performance (e.g., French, 1955; McClelland, et al., 1989; Patten & White, 
1977).  
One objection to the success of the manipulation and its effect on motivation for 
RelComp is that performance in the priming condition might have been affected by the 
instructions to the task, rather than by the task itself. The instructions were: “When we relate, 
we combine our actions with the actions of the other person, in a way that the actions of both 
are complementary”. Such sentence implies that RelComp is normative, in the descriptive 
sense of what people often do (e.g., Cialdini, Demaine, & Sagarin, 2006). Hence, it is possible 
that the priming motivated participant to achieve RelComp, not because it is motivating in its 
own right, but because it was perceived as normative. The implication of this explanation is 
that similar results would have been observed had any other norm consistent with performing 
well in the second task been activated.  
A second alternative explanation to the results observed is related to the processes by 
which the priming affected behavior. There at least two processes alternative to goal 
activation that may take place when a construct is primed. One of such processes is the 
activation of a particular behavior, instead of a goal (Bargh, et al., 2001). For example, when 
primed with rudeness participants are more likely to interrupt subsequent conversations, than 
when primed with politeness (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996). Since there were no 
descriptions of performance related behaviors among the stimulus phrases, this process seems 
an unlikely explanation of participants’ performance in the substitution task. On the other 
hand, a second process is the activation of a semantic category, which influences the 
perception of subsequent ambiguous events (Bargh, et al., 2001; Förster, Liberman & 
Friedman, 2007). In fact, the concept of Relational Complementarity, being explicitly 
described in the instructions to the priming task (but not to the control task), may have 
activated a semantic category and influenced participants’ perceptions of the experimenter’s 
instructions to the substitution task, or of the overall significance of the task.  
One way to rule out the effects of behavioral and semantic perceptual representations 
from the effects of goal representations has been demonstrated by Bargh and colleagues 
(2001). The authors showed that perceptual representations produce the same behavioral 
effects as goal representations immediately after the priming, but not five minutes later. 
Presumably, whereas perceptual representations decrease in activation over time, motivational 
tendencies increase in strength until the goal is attained (Bargh, et al., 2001). However, such 
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procedure would not rule out the possibility that the priming activated the goal to do what is 
normative, i.e., to act in complementarity.  
Alternatively, study 2 employed a different version of the manipulation task where 
RelComp was not explicitly described. This way the priming of a norm and the activation of a 
semantic category were avoided. 
3.6. Study 2 
3.6.1. Methods 
3.6.1.1. Participants 
Seventy-nine Portuguese participants (81% female, 98.7% undergraduate students, 94.8% 
Portuguese nationals) with ages between 18 and 52 (Mage = 22.01 SD = 4.21) took part in this 
study. Fifty-one students at a public university institute in Lisbon were recruited as part of a 
requirement for a class in Social Psychology and earned 0.5 credit for participating in an 
experiment for 30 minutes. The remaining participants were recruited by e-mail two weeks 
later and were offered one 5€ voucher.  
Three participants were excluded from the data analyses, leaving a final sample of N = 
76. The first had done the same substitution task before in another study and her performance 
(= 61 correct substitutions) was approximately four standard deviations above the mean (M = 
40.29, SD = 5.89) and one standard deviation above the second highest performer (= 55 
correct substitutions). The second excluded participant had participated in Study 1; and the 
third was hearing impaired, and reported to be unable to concentrate on the task for being 
afraid that she would not listen the 60s alarm bell of the chronometer. 
3.6.1.2. Design, Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (priming of RelComp vs. 
control). The procedures, materials and dependent measures were identical to Study 1 with 
three exceptions: the manipulation and the exploratory items that were presented after the 
substitution task were modified; and the third task, which consisted of an online questionnaire 
for an unrelated study was removed. 
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Manipulation. The manipulation was similar to Study 1. However, the instruction 
avoided any mentioning of relational complementarity in order to rule out normative effects. 
In the priming condition participants read:  
We present two categories of phrases.  
The first category is designated Category A:  
When Manuel and José meet, Manuel reaches his hand out to José. José reaches his 
hand out to Peter and they shake hands.” 
“Ana asked the teacher to guide her in preparing for the exam. The teacher scheduled a 
meeting with Ana to support her.” 
 The second category is designated Category B 
 "Artur is moving to a new apartment and asks Raul to help him carrying his stuff. On 
the moving day Raul goes to the beach in the morning and comes back by night.”  
"Claudia provided a cleaning service to Rute for the cost of 80€. Rute never paid for 
the service.” 
Then participants were asked to read the 20 phrases used in Study 1, and to rate on a 7-
point Likert scale whether each phrase fitted better into category A or category B  (Category 
A = 1; Category B = 7).  
In the priming condition, the phrases were organized as disposed above, so that category 
A contained complementary phrases and category B non-complementary phrases.  
In the control condition the materials and instructions were the same as in the priming 
condition except that the four phrases from the two categories were combined differently. 
Category A was illustrated with the two phrases containing male subjects, the first of which 
was complementary (“When Manuel and José meet, Manuel reaches his hand out to José. José 
reaches his hand out to Peter and they shake hands”), whereas the second was non-
complementary (“Artur is moving to a new apartment and asks Raul to help him carrying his 
stuff. On the moving day Raul goes to the beach in the morning and comes back by night”): 
On the other hand, category B had the two sentences with female characters: one 
complementary (“Ana asked the teacher to guide her in preparing for the exam. The teacher 
scheduled a meeting with Ana to support her”) and one non-complementary (“Claudia 
provided a cleaning service to Rute for the cost of 80€. Rute never paid for the service”). This 
way the two categories had one complementary and one non-complementary sentence each 
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and the difference between them was in the sex of the characters, rather than in the type of 
interaction. 
We expected that participants would attempt to understand the difference between 
category A and category B while reading the example sentences, and that they would identify 
relational complementarity as the distinctive characteristic in the priming condition and 
gender of the actors as the distinctive characteristic in the control condition. Thus, when 
trying to categorize the pairs of sentences in the subsequent task, participants in the priming 
condition would search for relational complementarity or non-complementarity, whereas 
participants in the control condition would search for male or female gender. 
The phrases were presented to participants in a different order than in Study 1 and the 
gender of the characters in some sentences were modified to increase the number of female 
phrases relatively to Study 1 (see Appendix D).  
Exploratory items. After the substitution task the participants filled in an online 
questionnaire with exploratory purposes. The questionnaire had two parts. In the first part 
participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale how much effort they made in the substitution 
task (1 – no effort, 4 – moderate effort; 7 – maximum effort) and how much (1 – did not 
influence, 4 – influenced moderately, 7 – influenced completely) each of seven causes 
influenced their effort (e.g., to meet the expectations of the experimenter; see Appendix E for 
a full description of the items). In the second part participants used a 7-point Likert scale (1 – 
strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – partially disagree, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 5 – 
partially agree, 6 – agree, 7 – strongly agree) to rated their level of agreement with sixteen 
items. One item addressed how much they liked the experimenter; five items measured the 
participants’ trust in the experimenter (e.g., I trust the experimenter completely, α = .61), five 
items assessed participants’ sense of control in the interaction with the experimenter (e.g., I 
had control over the outcomes of our interaction, α = .61), and five items about the 
participant’ sense of belonging in the relationship with the experimenter (e.g., I felt rejected 
by the experimenter, α = .64) (see Appendix F). Details about how the scales of belonging and 
trust were developed are presented in Study 1 of Chapter 4. 23 
                                                 
23 Similarly to Study 1, participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire a week before the lab 
session. The questionnaire included measures that could be theoretically related to performance and, therefore, 
included as covariates in the main analysis. The questionnaire included Portuguese translations of the Need to 
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3.6.2. Results 
3.6.2.1. Validation of the Goal Priming 
If participants in the priming condition identified RelComp as the feature distinguishing 
between Category A and Category B, then they should have rated the complementary phrases 
close to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to Category A (= 1) and the non-
complementary phrases close to the other extreme of the scale corresponding to Category B 
(= 7). In other words, participants in the priming condition should rate complementary 
phrases lower than non-complementary phrases but no such difference should be found for 
participants in the control condition. 
I tested this prediction with a Repeated Measures GLM, with the manipulation as 
between-subjects factor. I computed one mean score for the ratings of the complementary 
phrases, and one mean score for the ratings of the non-complementary phrases, and the two 
scores were treated as levels of the within-subjects factor. A main effect of complementarity, 
F(1, 74) = 118.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .62, and a main effect of the manipulation, F(1, 74) = 35.35, 
p < .001, ηp2= .32, were qualified by an interaction, F(1, 74) = 51.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. Post-
hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed, as expected, that in the priming condition the 
non-complementary phrases were rated significantly higher (p < .001), n = 38, M = 4.49, SD = 
0.40, than the complementary phrases, M = 2.25, SD = 0.83. On the other hand, in the control 
condition the non-complementary phrases were also rated significantly higher (p = .011), M = 
4.29, SD = 0.53, than the complementary phrases, M = 3.83, SD = 1.03, even though this 
difference was less pronounced that in the priming condition.  
If participants in the control condition identified the sex of the characters as the feature 
distinguishing between Category A and Category B, then they should have rated the phrases 
with male subjects closer to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to Category A (= 1), 
phrases with male and female characters closer to the midpoint of the scale (= 4), and phrases 
                                                                                                                                                        
Belong scale (α=.82; Leary, et al, 2013); 3 items measuring the sense of belonging (α=.76; adapted from 
Twenge, et al., 2007), the Interpersonal Control scale (Paulhus, 1983; 10 items, e.g., Even when I'm feeling self-
confident about most things, I still seem to lack the ability to control social situations; α=.79); the Personal 
Efficacy scale (Paulhus, 1983; 10 items, e.g., When I get what I want it's usually because I worked hard for it; 
α=.71), and a 5-item trust scale (adapted from Yamagishi, 1986, and Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; e.g., Most 
people can be trusted; α=.63). Only 51% of participants complete these measures, and for this reason they were 
not included in the main analysis. 
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with female characters closer to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to Category B (= 
7). In other words, in the control condition, but not in the priming condition, participants’ 
rating should grow linearly from male-actor phrases to male-and-female-actor phrases to 
female-actor phrases. 
I tested this prediction with a second Repeated Measures GLM, with the manipulation as 
between-subjects factor. I computed one mean score for the ratings of the male-actor phrases, 
one mean score for male-and-female actor phrases, and one mean score for the female-actor 
phrases. The three score were treated as levels of the within-subjects factor in the following 
order: male-actor, male-and-female-actor, female-actor. A main effect of sex, F(2, 73) = 
57.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, and a main effect of the manipulation, F(1, 74) = 17.91, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .19, were qualified by an interaction, F(2, 73) = 11.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Post-hoc tests 
with Bonferroni correction, showed, as expected, that in the control condition male-and-
female-actor phrases, n = 38, M = 3.47, SD = 1.18, were rated significantly lower (p < .001) 
than female-actor phrases, M = 4.15, SD = 0.83. Unexpectedly, however, male-actor phrases, 
M = 4.27, SD = 0.66 were rated significantly higher (p = .003) that male-and-female-actor 
phrases and non-significantly higher (p = 1) than female-actor phrases. In the priming 
condition, a similar pattern was observed. Male-and-female-actor phrases, M = 2.21, SD = 
0.95, were rated significantly lower (p < .001) than female-actor phrases, M = 3.79, SD = 
0.56; and male-actor phrases, M = 4.57, SD = 0.60 were rated significantly higher (p < .001) 
that male-and-female-actor and female-actor phrases.  
3.6.2.2. Main Analysis 
The effect of the manipulation on performance was tested with a GLM. Given that 35% 
of the participants were rewarded with a 5€ voucher instead of 0.5 credit, the type of reward 
was included as predictor in a 2 (manipulation) x 2 (reward) GLM on the number of correct 
substitutions in the letter-digit substitution task. 
The analysis showed no significant main effect of the manipulation, F(1, 72) = 0.70, p = 
.404. There was a statistically significant effect of reward, F(1, 72) = 4.98, p = .029, ηp2 = .07, 
which was, interestingly, qualified by a significant interaction with the manipulation, F(1, 72) 
= 4.04, p = .048, ηp2 = .05). Mean differences and standard deviations are presented in Table 
1. When rewarded with course credits, participants in the priming condition showed a 
tendency to perform better than those in the control condition, but this difference was trivial 
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and statistically not significant, (p = .329). Unexpectedly, when rewarded with a voucher 
participants in the priming condition performed worse than those in the control condition, but 
this difference was marginally significant (p = .080).  
Table 1 - Estimated marginal means and confidence intervals 
in the substitution task on Study 2. 
  0.5 Credit  Voucher  Total 
  n M SD  n M SD  n M SD 
Priming  25 39.80 5.17  13 40.08 3.48  38 39.89 4.61 
Control  24 38.33 5.28  14 43.64 6.40  38 40.29 6.20 
3.6.2.3. Analysis with covariates 
As in Study 1, I ran an ANCOVA with sex and age as covariates, the manipulation and 
type of reward as factors and performance in the substitution task as dependent variable. Non-
significant interactions of the covariates with the manipulation [Sex, F(1, 66) = 0.28, p = .597, 
Age, F(1, 66) = 3.04, p = .086] and with reward [Sex, F(1, 66) = 0.21, p = .651, Age, F(1, 66) 
= 1.77, p = .188], showed that homogeneity of the regression slopes could be assumed. A 
model including the main effects of the manipulation and reward, as well as the interaction 
between the two, and the main effects of sex and age as covariates, showed a significant main 
effect of reward, F(1, 70) = 5.202, p = .026, ηp2 = .069, and a marginal interaction between 
the manipulation and reward, F(1, 70) = 3.416, p = .069, ηp2 = .047. The main effects of the 
manipulation, Sex, and Age were not significant (p > .250). 
3.6.2.4. Exploratory Analyses 
A univariate GLM with the manipulation and reward as predictors was conducted on the 
exploratory item of perceived effort in the substitution task. There were no significant 
differences between conditions. A multivariate GLM with the manipulation and reward as 
predictors was conducted on the seven causes of performance. Multivariate tests revealed that 
the main effects of the manipulation, and reward, as well as the two-way interaction were not 
significant. Finally, a multivariate GLM with the manipulation and reward as predictors was 
conducted on mean scores of Belonging, Control and Trust. Again, multivariate tests showed 
that the main effects of the manipulation, and reward, and the two-way interaction were not 
significant. 
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3.6.3. Discussion 
With or without controlling for the effects of sex and age, the manipulation did not affect 
participants’ motivation to perform their part of the relational pattern. Performance in the 
substitution task did not differ between the priming and control conditions.  
Analyses of phrase ratings in the manipulation task suggest that the instructions were not 
clear enough to allow participants to correctly identify the feature distinguishing between the 
phrases of category A and B. As expected participants in the priming condition rated 
complementary phrases lower, i.e., closer to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to 
Category A (= 1), than non-complementary phrases. However, the fact that non-
complementary phrases were rated closer to the midpoint of the scale (= 4), rather than to the 
extreme point of the scale corresponding to Category B (= 7) casts doubt on whether 
participants clearly identified RelComp as the distinction between the two categories.  
On the other hand, in the control condition, participants unexpectedly rated 
complementary phrases lower than non-complementary phrases, even though these 
differences were less pronounced than in the priming condition. This suggests that, in spite of 
the fact that each category contained complementary and non-complementary sentences, 
either complementarity was salient to participants in the control condition, or the salient 
feature distinguishing between the two categories overlapped with RelComp, to some extent.  
Furthermore, ratings of sex in the control condition showed that male-actor sentences 
were rated higher than female-actor sentences, when it should have been the other way 
around. These results suggest that participants in the control condition did not identify sex of 
the characters as the feature distinguishing between categories A and B. In addition, the fact 
that participants in the priming condition rated male-actor, male-and-female-actor, and 
female-actor phrases similarly to participants in the control condition suggests that the 
manipulation may not have produced motivation differences between participants.  
One explanation for the failure of the manipulation, is that there were several differences 
between the sentences that may have been equally salient to participants in addition to 
complementarity or the sex of the characters. For example, in the priming condition, category 
A included one CS and one AR interaction, whereas category B included one CS and one MP 
interaction. Moreover, the context and aspect being coordinated in each interaction differed 
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between categories. Such noise may have made it more difficult for participants to notice 
complementarity or sex as distinctive features of categories A and B. 
In sum, since there was no evidence that the priming task was effective, the most likely 
explanation for the absence of differences between conditions is that the goal of RelComp 
was not activated differently between conditions, and hence, did not cause performance 
differences. 
3.7. Study 3 
Study 3 was designed to replicate the effects of Study 1 by using a version of the 
manipulation of Study 2 where the difference between category A and category B were less 
ambiguous. To that end, the phrases presented on each category across conditions were 
modified to be similar in terms of RM, context and content of the interaction.  
Furthermore, this study also measured a second indicator of motivation other than effort. 
Motivation is concerned with not only with activation but also with directionality of behavior 
(Braver, Krug, Chiew, et al., 2014; Pittman, 1998; Wright, 2016; Young, 1961). In other 
words, motivation describes why an individual on a given situation selects one action over 
another (Bargh, et al., 2010, p. 268). During social interactions people are often faced with the 
opportunity of satisfying one’s self-interest by disrupting the relational pattern applied, and by 
transgressing the corresponding relational standards. For instance, people cheat or get free 
rides when they believe the relevant partners will not find out. However, if RelComp is 
intrinsically gratifying, insofar as it is activated as a goal, individuals should be more 
motivated to fulfill the relational pattern and, hence, committed to the corresponding 
relational standards, than to act selfishly. As result, when given the opportunity to satisfy their 
immediate self-interest by cheating, they should, instead, select a course of action that leads to 
completion of the relational pattern.  
This hypotheses was tested by asking participants to perform a task in private, and by 
giving them opportunity to cheat. Previous research has shown that when participants are 
motivated to perform well on a task they continue to work on it despite a stop signal had been 
given while the experimenter was physically absent (Bargh, et al., 2001, Study 4). Hence, it 
was reasoned that if chances to win an attractive reward increased with performance on a task, 
participants would continue working on that task for a longer period after a stop signal, the 
more motivated they were to achieve the reward. Conversely, participants would stop working 
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in the task sooner after the stop signal, the more motivated they were to achieve RelComp, by 
following the instructions of the experimenter according to a pattern of AR, even if that meant 
decreasing their chances of winning the reward. In other words, it was predicted that 
participants primed with RelComp interrupt the task sooner after the stop signal than 
participants in the control condition. 
Hence, in addition to performance in the substitution task done in the presence of the 
experimenter, Study 3 included a lexical decision task. This task was performed in the 
absence of the experimenter, who instructed participants that they should stop when an alarm 
sounded. Participants were informed that good performance in the lexical decision task would 
increase their chances of winning a reward.  
3.7.1. Methods 
3.7.1.1. Participants 
Forty-six Portuguese students at a public university in Lisbon, 60.9% female, 95.6% 
undergraduates, 34.8%  Psychology students, 91.3% Portuguese nationals, with ages between 
18 and 29 (Mage = 21.13 SD = 2.16), took part in this study. Participants were recruited by 
students enrolled in a Master program on Social and Organizational Psychology at the 
university who had to run a study as part of a class on research methods. The recruitment was 
done either face-to-face on campus or by e-mail. As compensation, participants were assigned 
to a lottery where they had the chance of winning one out of three 100 € vouchers. 
3.7.1.2. Design and Materials 
As in Study 2 participants were randomly assigned to either a priming or control 
condition. With the exception of the priming task, the additional lexical decision task and one 
additional exploratory item, the substitution task and remaining exploratory items were the 
same as used in Study 2. 
Priming task. The manipulation was similar to Study 2 with the exception of the phrases 
used to illustrate category A and B. In order to make the difference between the two 
categories clearer, the same phrases were used in the two categories, the only differences 
being the sex of the characters and whether the interaction described was complementary or 
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not. Before rating the phrases according to each category participants were also asked to 
describe the difference between the two categories in an open-ended format. 
In the priming condition, participants read complementary versions of two interactions 
between a male and a female character, illustrating category A (“When José and Rita meet, 
José reaches his hand out to Rita. Rita reaches her hand out to José and they shake hands”, 
“Professor Dulce informed Manuel about the deadline to submit the final assignment. Manuel 
submitted the assignment on the date established by Professor Dulce”), and non-
complementary version of the same phrases, illustrating category B (“When José and Rita 
meet, José reaches his hand out to Rita. Rita kept her hand in her pockets”, “Professor Dulce 
informed Manuel about the deadline to submit the final assignment. Manuel submitted the 
assignment two days after the deadline established by Professor Dulce”). 
In the control condition the phrases were combined differently so that in both categories 
there was the complementary version of one phrase and the non-complementary version of 
the other phrases. However, while in category A all characters in the phrases were male 
(“When José and Manuel meet, José reaches his hand out to Manuel. Manuel reaches his 
hand out to José and they shake hands”, “Professor Jorge informed Luis about the deadline to 
submit the final assignment. Luis submitted the assignment two days after the deadline”), in 
category B they were female (“When Silvia and Rita meet, Silvia reaches her hand out to 
Rita. Rita keeps her hand on her pockets”, “Professor Dulce informed Joana about the 
deadline to submit the final assignment. Joana submitted the assignment on the date 
established by Professor Dulce”). 
Lexical decision task. As additional dependent measure participants performed a lexical 
decision task. During 180 sec. participants were presented with a stimulus on a computer 
screen and were asked to decide if the stimulus was a letter or a digit, by pressing the keys ‘K’ 
or ‘D’, respectively. After a 10 item trial, letters and digits were presented randomly in the 
screen. Each stimulus stayed in the screen until the participant pressed one of the two keys 
and was followed by a fixation (+) that appeared for 500ms. Additionally, participants were 
asked to interrupt the task as soon as they heard an alarm bell. The alarm bell was set by the 
experimenter for 120sec after the beginning of the task. Two measures were used: the number 
of correct responses until the sound of the alarm after 120sec and the number responses to 
stimuli after the alarm for the next 60sec. The first was a measure of performance effort, the 
second was a measure of self-control effort. 
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Exploratory item. In addition to their perceived effort in addition to the seven possible 
causes of performance in the substitution task and lexical decision task participants also rated 
how much “winning the 100€ of the lottery” influence their performance in the two tasks (see 
Appendix E for a full description of the items). 
3.7.1.3. Procedure 
The procedures were the same as in Study 2 except that we introduced the Lexical 
Decision task between the Substitution task and the exploratory items task.  
Since the compensation offered to participants was different from studies 1 and 2, the 
instructions to the Substitution task were adapted to the different compensation as follows: 
“Before I forget… your participation in this experiment allows you to participate in a lottery 
to win one of three 100€ vouchers. I have already introduced your name in data base with the 
lottery participants. As you know your participation is voluntary and you can quit at any time, 
but the idea is that for participating in the lottery you complete four tasks in total within a 30 
minute-time period. You have already finished one task and there are three left.  
After completing the Substitution task participants were guided to the desk with the 
computer and introduced to the Lexical Decision task. As in the substitution task, the 
experimenter explained that this task was a measure of cognitive abilities that was currently 
being developed and tested. Participants completed the 10-item trial and the experimenter 
explained that their goal was to respond correctly to as many stimuli as possible in 2 min. The 
experimenter also informed that she would have to leave for a few minutes and that she would 
leave an alarm set in the room so that participants knew when to interrupt the task. Such 
procedure was used to give participants the opportunity to cheat in the absence of overt social 
pressures to follow the instructions. Participants were also told that the ten individuals with 
the highest scores on this task would have their names assigned to the lottery three times, 
thus, increasing the probability of winning the prize. Hence, the reward was made contingent 
on performance to offer participants on both conditions a non-social incentive to perform 
well.  
After instructing the participant to begin the task on the count to three and setting the 
alarm, the experimenter left the room and returned after 180sec. Next, the participants filled in 
the exploratory items and were debriefed according to the procedure used in the previous 
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studies. No participant showed any awareness of the purpose of the study or the relationship 
between the priming task, the substitution task, and the lexical decision task. The 
experimenter also informed participants that they would not have their name assigned three 
times in lottery and that the purpose of such procedure was to motivate them to perform better 
on that task, to test whether they would ignore the instructions to stop at the alarm sound in 
the absence of the experimenter in order to enhance their performance. They were ensured 
that, in case they continued working after the stop signal, the experiment was designed to 
make them do so, and, therefore, was not informative about their character. 
3.7.2. Results 
3.7.2.1. Validation of the Goal Priming 
The ratings of the phrases were analyzed with the same statistical procedures used in 
Study 2. The Repeated Measures GLM with the manipulation as predictor on the mean scores 
of complementary and non-complementary phrases, showed a main effect of 
complementarity, F(1, 44) = 77.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, and a main effect of the manipulation, 
F(1, 44) = 17.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, which were qualified by an interaction, F(1, 44) = 41.72, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .49. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed, as expected, that in the 
priming condition the non-complementary phrases were rated significantly higher (p < .001), 
n = 23, M = 4.51, SD = 0.56, than the complementary phrases, M = 2.10, SD = 0.67. On the 
other hand, in the control condition non-complementary phrases, M = 4.08, SD = 0.60, were 
not rated differently (p = .106) from the complementary phrases, M = 3.71, SD = 0.97. 
The Repeated Measures GLM with the manipulation as predictor on the male-actor, 
male-and-female actor, and female-actor mean scores, showed that homogeneity of variance 
was not ascertained for the three scores. Therefore, and given the similar n per cell, 
significance tests were estimated with Pillai’s criterion (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). The 
results revealed a main effect of character’s sex, F(2, 43) = 47.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .69, and a 
main effect of the manipulation, F(1, 44) = 7.91, p = .007, ηp2 = .15, which were qualified by 
an interaction, F(2, 43) = 10.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .33. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction 
showed, as expected, that in the control condition female-actor phrases, n = 23, M = 4.67, SD 
= 1.33, were rated higher than male-and-female-actor phrases, M = 3.46, SD = 1.41, p < .001, 
and male-actor phrases, M = 3.52, SD = 1.31, p = .014. However, male-and-female actor 
phrases were not rated higher (p = 1) than male-actor actor phrases. In the priming condition, 
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a different pattern was observed. Male-and-female-actor phrases, M = 2.14, SD = 0.68, were 
rated significantly lower than female-actor phrases, M = 3.59, SD = 0.61, p < .001, and male-
actor phrases, M = 4.79, SD = 0.47, p < .001; and male-actor phrases were rated higher than 
female-actor phrases, p = .011.  
Finally, the qualitative information collected when participants were asked to describe the 
differences between categories A and B revealed that some participants in the priming 
condition did not clearly identify complementarity as the distinguishing feature between A 
and B. Some participants wrote “intimacy”, “equality”, “[. . .] I think that in category A 
people know each other and in B not really [. . .]. In category A Manuel is dedicated and 
responsible, in B he seems sloppier”, “trust among people, the ideas they have about each 
other”, “sympathy, responsibility”. These responses suggest that the sentences in the 
instructions might have confounded complementarity with particular relationships, tasks or 
interaction contexts. 
Likewise, 16 participants (more than 50%) in the control condition did not identify the 
sex of the characters as the main difference between categories. In fact, they reported the 
difference to be related to the quality of the interactions described. Some examples are 
answers such as “category A – the event is corresponded, category B – the event is not 
corresponded”, “non-compliance and compliance, respectively, with the action presented by 
both parties”, or “in category A there is a more relaxed and positive interaction, while in 
category B it is more formal or negative.” 
3.7.2.2. Main analysis 
A one-way ANOVA showed that participants in the priming condition, n = 23, M = 
40.13, SD = 6.21, performed slightly, but not significantly better in the substitution task, F(1, 
44) = 2.37, p = .131, than participants in the control condition, n = 23, M = 37.22, SD = 6.61. 
Participants in the priming condition were expected to have less trials after the alarm than 
participants in the control condition. Since participants in both conditions were offered a non-
social incentive to perform in the lexical decision task, no differences on performance within 
the 120sec. were predicted. Descriptive statistics showed that the number of trials after the 
alarm was absolutely the same between conditions. Seven participants in each condition 
responded once after the alarm. If we assume that 1 response after the alarm could have been 
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accidental, these results suggest that all participants followed the instructions of the 
experimenter. Furthermore, a second one-way ANOVA on the number of correct responses in 
the lexical decision task showed no significant differences, F(2, 53) = 3.68, p = .032, between 
participants in the priming, n = 21, M = 69.67, SD = 5.97, and control conditions, n = 22, M = 
70.68, SD = 6.42.  
3.7.2.3. Analysis with covariates 
As in the previous studies I conducted an ANCOVA controlling for the effects of sex and 
age in the substitution task. Non-significant interactions of the manipulation with sex, F(1, 
39) = 1.20, p > .250, and age, F(1, 39) = 0.54, p > .250, showed that the homogeneity of the 
regression slopes could be assumed. A statistical model including the main effect of the 
manipulation, and the main effects of sex and age as covariates, showed a marginally 
significant difference in performance in the substitution task, F(1, 41) = 2.87, p = .098, ηp2 = 
.07, between the priming, n = 23, EMM = 40.01, SE = 1.28, and control conditions, n = 22, 
EMM = 36.85, SE = 1.31. The effect of sex was significant, F(1, 41) = 5.50, p = .024, ηp2 = 
.12, but the effects of age was not, F(1, 41) = 0.90, p > .250. 
3.7.2.4. Exploratory Analyses 
An ANOVA was conducted on the exploratory item of perceived effort in the substitution 
and lexical decision tasks and showed that perceived effort was not affected by the 
manipulation. A MANOVA was conducted on the eight causes of performance. Multivariate 
tests revealed that effect of the manipulation on each possible cause was not significant. 
Finally, a second MANOVA of participant’s sense of Belonging, Control and Trust also 
showed non-significant effects of the manipulation. 
3.7.3. Discussion 
Similarly to study 2, analyses of phrase ratings on the manipulation task suggest that the 
instructions may not have been clear enough to allow participants to correctly identify the 
feature distinguishing between the phrases of category A and B. 
As expected, in the priming condition participants rated complementary phrases lower 
than non-complementary phrases, and, unlike Study 2, no such difference was observed 
among participants in the control condition. However, as in Study 2, non-complementary 
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phrases were rated closer to the midpoint of the scale (= 4), rather than to the extreme point of 
the scale corresponding to non-complementarity (= 7). These results, together with 
information from the open-ended responses raise suspicion over whether participants clearly 
identified RelComp as the feature distinguishing between the two categories.  
Likewise, as expected, participants in the control condition rated female-actor phrases 
higher than male-actor and male-and-female actor phrase, whereas participants in the priming 
condition rated female-actor phrases higher than male-and-female actor phrases, but lower 
than male-actor phrases. Notice that, unlike Study 2, sex ratings by primed participant 
followed a different pattern from ratings by control participants. However, the fact that 
participants in the control condition did not differentiate between male-actor and male-and-
female actor phrases suggests that sex may not have been clearly identified as the feature 
distinguishing between the two categories. Responses by participants in the control condition 
to the open-ended question, reiterate such suspicion by showing that features other than sex, 
and closely related to RelComp (e.g., compliance) were identified. 
Overall, the results on the phrase ratings showed that the manipulation was more 
successful in Study 3 than in Study 2, but still not effective enough to allow conclusions about 
its effect, nor to produce effects powerful enough to reach statistical significance. This may 
explain the marginal effect of the priming on performance in the substitution task when 
controlling for covariates. 
In addition to effort, Study 3 also tested the effect of the RelComp goal on another 
indicator of motivation: action selection. Participants performed a lexical decision task in the 
absence of the experimenter, and were instructed to interrupt the task at the sound of an alarm 
left in the room by the experimenter. They were also told that the chances to win an attractive 
reward increased with their performance on the task. It was predicted that participants in the 
priming condition would be more motivated to achieve RelComp by following the 
instructions of the experimenter, even if that meant lower chances of winning the prize. On 
the other hand, participants in the control condition should be more motivated to win the prize 
by performing as good as possible, even if that meant ignoring the experimenter’s 
instructions. Therefore, participants in the priming condition should interrupt the task sooner 
after the sound of the alarm than participants in the control condition.  
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There were no effects of the manipulation on the number of trials after the alarm, nor on 
performance in the lexical decision. Worthy of notice is the fact that the same number of 
participants in the two conditions continued after the alarm sound, and that each participant 
performed only one trial after the alarm. Given that one trial could have been accidental, it 
can be said that participants did not cheat by disrespecting the instructions of the 
experimenter. Possibly, increasing participants’ chances of winning the lottery was not 
tempting enough to justify incurring the affective or social costs of non-complementarity, i.e., 
of not following the instructions of the experimenter. This explanation raises the possibility 
that the goal of RelComp was activated by the situation itself, regardless of the priming, and 
that participants across conditions were anyway motivated to fulfill the relational pattern with 
the experimenter and committed to the corresponding relational standards. This possibility 
will be discussed in detail in the general discussion of the chapter. 
3.8. Study 4 
In studies 2 and 3, participants in the priming condition clearly distinguished between 
the complementary and non-complementary sentences, even though the non-complementary 
sentences were not rated as extremely as expected. In the control condition, however, some 
participants depicted other features as distinguishing between the two categories, some of 
which were closely related to RelComp, as shown by control participants’ complementarity 
ratings in Study 2, and open-ended responses in Study 3.  
Thus, the goal of Study 4 was to replicate the priming effect of Study 1, by using a 
manipulation that did not describe RelComp as a norm and did not have the same limitations 
as the control conditions of studies 2 and 3. For that purpose, a version of the priming 
instructions was improved in order to make the Complementarity more salient as the 
difference between categories A and B, and a modified version of the verb count task of 
Study 1 was used in the control condition. 
3.8.1. Methods 
3.8.1.1. Participants 
Seventy-four participants took part in this study. Sixty-nine percent were female; 97.2% 
were Portuguese nationals; 70.3% were undergraduate students, 13.5% had a high school 
diploma, 8.1% had a bachelor degree and 8.1% had a master degree. Ages were between 18 
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and 51 (M = 23.38 SD = 6.76). Of the total sample, 48 students at a public university institute 
in Lisbon were recruited as part of a requirement for a psychology class and earned 0.5 credit 
for participating in an experiment for 30 minutes. The remaining participants were recruited 
by three students of the Master in Social and Organizational Psychology at ISCTE-IUL who 
had to run a study as part of a class on research methods. The recruitment was made by 
convenience both face-to-face on campus and by e-mail. These participants were assigned to a 
lottery where they had the chance of winning one out of three 100€ vouchers. 
3.8.1.2. Design, Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (priming vs. control). With 
the exception of the manipulation which was adapted, the exploratory items of the third task 
which were removed, and two new measures which were introduced after de substitution task, 
the procedures, materials and dependent measure were same as in Study 1. 
Priming task. In the priming condition the participants were presented with two 
categories of phrases: Category A and Category B. In order to reduce any possible confound 
of complementarity with particular kinds of interactions, both categories were illustrated with 
four phrases, each corresponding to one RM. The phrases in Category A described 
complementary interactions: “Manuel reached his hand out to José when he met him. José 
looked at Manuel’s hand, reached his hand out to Manuel and shook his hand” – CS; “The 
Professor informed Rita about the deadline to submit the final assignment. Rita submitted the 
assignment on the deadline established by the Professor” – AR; “Luís and Maria are 
roommates and decided to take turns in taking the garbage out. Yesterday Maria took the 
garbage out. Today the garbage was taken out by Luís” – EM; “Teresa works at a restaurant 
and served lunch to a customer. The customer asked for the bill and paid for the lunch” – 
MP). The phrases in Category B described the non-complementary version of the same four 
interactions in Category A: “Manuel reached his hand out to José when he met him. José 
looked at Manuel’s hand and kept his hand on his pocket”; “The Professor informed Rita 
about the deadline to submit the final assignment. Rita submitted the assignment ten days 
after the deadline established by the Professor”; “Luís and Maria are roommates and decided 
to take turns in taking the garbage out. Yesterday Maria took the garbage out. Today the 
garbage was not taken out”; “Teresa works at a restaurant and served lunch to a customer. 
The customer asked for the bill and left before Teresa returned with the payment value”). 
After reading the instruction, participants in the priming condition were asked in an open-
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ended format what the difference between the two categories was. Then they were asked to 
read the same 20 phrases used in Studies 2-3 (Appendix D)  and to rate on a 7-point Likert 
scale how much each of them fitted into category A or category B  (Category A = 1; Category 
B = 7). 
In the control condition the participants were instructed to “Read the following phrases 
and indicate the number of verbs in each phrase, using the scale below” (1 = 1 verb; 7 = 7 
verbs). As part of the instruction, participants were shown eight phrases, each with the 
corresponding number of verbs (e.g., “Manuel reached his hand out to José when he met him. 
José looked at Manuel’s hand, reached his hand out to Manuel and shook his hand”, number 
of verbs = 5). The eight phrases were exactly the same and presented in the same order as the 
phrases of categories A and B of the priming condition. After reading the instructions, 
participants counted the verbs in the same 20 phrases used in the priming condition. 
Measures. After the digit-letter substitution task participants filled in a paper-and-pencil 
version of two exploratory measures. The first was an item assessing the participants’ 
perception of their performance in the substitution task. The participants responded to the 
item “Use the following scale to evaluate your performance in the previous cognitive task, by 
comparing it to the performance you wish you had. Put a circle around the number 
corresponding to your answer. My actual performance was…” and they were presented a 7-
point Likert scale (1- much lower than my desired performance, 4 – exactly the same as my 
desired performance, 7 – much higher than my desired performance). The second exploratory 
measure was a measure of affect. Participants indicated how positive and how negative they 
felt about their performance in the previous task on an evaluative space grid (Larsen, Norris, 
McGraw, et al., 2009, see Appendix G).  
It is known that goal sates are associated with positive affect (Custer & Aarts, 2005; 
Veltkamp, et al., 2009) and, for that reason, people experience higher positive affect when 
they attain the goal than when they fail (Chartrand, 2007).  Hence, it was reasoned that 
participants who were more motivated to perform well at the substitution task should 
experience higher positive affect when they believed they performed well, and higher 
negative when they believed they performed badly, than participant who were less motivated. 
Therefore, assuming that participants in the priming condition would be more motivated to 
perform well in the substitution task than participants in the control condition, I predicted that 
high performance evaluation would be associated with low negative affect and high positive 
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affect, and that this relationship would be moderated by the manipulation, i.e., more 
pronounced in the priming condition. 
3.8.2. Results 
3.8.2.1. Validation of the Goal Priming 
Participants in the priming condition were expected to rate the complementary sentences 
close to the extreme point of the scale corresponding to Category A (=1) and the non-
complementary sentences close to the other extreme of the scale corresponding to Category B 
(=7). A Repeated Measures ANOVA following the same statistical procedure that was used in 
Study 1 showed that the ratings of complementary sentences, M = 2.40, SD = 0.81, were 
lower than the ratings of the non-complementary sentences, M = 5.74, SD = 0.56, and that this 
difference was significant, F(1, 35) = 258.61, p < .001, ηp2= .88.  
Moreover, according to the responses to the open-ended question, only four participants 
were unclear about whether the difference between the two categories was related to 
complementarity. Their responses were: “in A is a matter of sympathy and in B a matter of 
responsibility”; “knowledge”; “phrasal construction”; “in category B the actions are 
different”. The remaining participants responded, for example, “In category A people 
experience and follow the adequate social protocol, in category B they don’t”, “lack of 
reciprocity and disrespected rules”, “not fulfilling what they are supposed to, either through a 
commitment or through social norms”, “category A they acted in an ethically correct way”. 
3.8.2.2. Main analysis 
Given that 35% of the participants were rewarded with a voucher instead of 0.5 credit, 
and that the study was conducted by three experimenters, the effects of reward and 
experimenter were controlled in a 2 (manipulation) x 2 (reward) x 3 (experimenter) ANOVA.  
There was a statistically significant effect of the manipulation, F(1, 62) = 4.91, p = .030, 
ηp2 = .07, on performance, but in the opposite direction to the one predicted. On the other 
hand, the main effect of reward was not significant, F(1, 62) = 2.31, p = .133,  nor was the 
interaction between the manipulation and reward, F(1, 62) = 1.49, p = .227. Unexpectedly, 
there was a statistically significant effect of the experimenter, F(2, 62) = 12.38, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.29, qualified by an interaction with reward, F(2, 62) = 5.46, p = .007, ηp2 = .15, but not with 
the manipulation, F(2, 62) = 1.93, p = .153. The three-way interaction was marginally 
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significant, F(2, 62) = 2.61, p = .082, ηp2 = .08. Table 4 presents the means and standard 
deviations, as well as the significant differences (p < .05) for the main effect of the 
manipulation and the interaction between the experimenter and reward. 
Table 4 – Means and standard deviations in the substitution task 
  Priming  Control  Total 
  n M SD  n M SD  n M SD 
  Experimenter 1 
0.5 Credit  10 1 30.40 a x 5.13  11 1 29.27 a x 4.71  21 1 29.81 x 4.82 
Voucher  5 2 38.40 a x 5.77  3 2 38.33 a x 7.77  8 2 38.38 x 6.02 
  Experimenter 2 
0.5 Credit  4 1 41.50 a y 3.87  4 1 41.50 a y 4.44  8 1 41.50 y 3.85 
Voucher  2 1 33.50 a x 2.12  2 1 47.00 b x 1.41  4 1 40.25 x 7.93 
  Experimenter 3 
0.5 Credit  9 1 38.67 a y 3.71  10 1 44.20 b y 5.16  19 1 41.58 y 5.24 
Voucher  6 1 40.00 a x 5.87  8 1 41.75 a x 7.85  14 1 41.00 x 6.87 
             
Total  36 36.58 a 6.15  38 38.76 b 8.38     
Note: Means with different superscripts are significantly different, p < 05, and means with 
equal superscripts are non-significantly different, p < .05. Superscripts a and b identify 
comparisons between priming and control conditions; superscripts x and y identify 
comparisons between experimenters; and superscripts 1 and 2 identify comparisons between 
rewards. 
Participants rewarded with 0.5 credit performed significantly worse with experimenter 1 
than with experimenters 2 and 3. In addition, participants who interacted with experimenter 1 
performed better when they were rewarded with a voucher than with a course credit. These 
results, however, have to be interpreted with caution given the low sample size of some 
conditions.  
3.8.2.3. Analysis with covariates 
As in the previous experiments I ran an ANCOVA controlling for the main effects of sex 
and age on the substitution task as covariates. Non-significant interactions of the covariates 
with the manipulation [Sex, F(1, 59) = 0.05, p = .818, Age, F(1, 59) = 0.01, p = .919], reward 
[Sex, F(1, 59) = 1.01, p = .318, Age, F(1, 59) = 0.32, p = .573], and the experimenter [Sex, 
F(2, 59) = 2.06, p = .136, Age, F(2, 59) = 1.12, p = .332] showed that homogeneity of the 
regression slopes could be assumed. A statistical model including the main effects of the 
manipulation, reward and experimenter, the two- and three-way interactions, and the main 
effects of sex and age as covariates, showed statistically significant effects of reward, F(1, 60) 
= 5.65, p = .021, ηp2= .09, experimenter, F(2, 60) = 13.10, p < .001, ηp2= .30, and 
reward*experimenter interaction, F(2, 60) = 5.98, p = .004, ηp2 = .17. There was a marginally 
significant difference, F(1, 60) = 3.18, p = .080, ηp2 = .05, between the priming, n = 36, EMM 
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= 37.62, SE = 1.03, and the control condition, n = 38, EMM = 40.23, SE = 1.03. The 
interactions of the manipulation with reward (p = .576) and with the experimenter (p = .125), 
the three-way interaction (p = .063), and the effects of Sex (p = .170) and Age (p = .065) were 
not significant. 
3.8.2.4. Exploratory analyses 
In order to test whether performance evaluation would predict higher Positive affect and 
lower Negative Affect, and whether this effect would be moderated by the manipulation, 
Hayes’ PROCESS macro for SPSS was used to run two moderated regression models 
predicting either Positive or Negative Affect. As expected, performance evaluation 
significantly predicted positive affect in the first model, β = 0.70, SE = 0.17, t(68) = 4.08, p < 
.001, d = 0.48, and negative affect in the second model, β = -0.57, SE = 0.21, t(68) = -2.79, p 
= .007, d = 0.33. However, main effects of the manipulation and interactions between the 
manipulation and performance evaluation were not significant in the first, β = -0.12, SE = 
0.25, t(68) = -0.42, p > .25, nor in the second model, β = 0.39, SE = 0.30, t(68) = 1.32, p > 
.15. 
3.8.3. Discussion 
This study attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 by presenting different 
instructions to the manipulation task in the priming condition that did not confound the 
RelComp goal with normative behavior. Since the participants were asked to identify the 
differences between two categories of phrases, and to rate how much each of the following 
phrases belonged to one or another category, the concept of RelComp was not mentioned, nor 
were there any references to what people do when they relate. Hence, the confound of the 
RelComp goal with normative behavior was eliminated.  
In addition, the control condition used in this study attempted to eliminate the uncertainty 
about the participants’ ability to identify sex as the feature differentiating the two categories, 
and the possibility that they identified RelComp related features, instead. Differently from 
studies 2 and 3, and similarly to Study 1, participants in the control condition were asked to 
count the verbs on each phrases, in order to avoid uncertainty about their ability to identify 
sex as the feature differentiating the two categories. 
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Despite the attempted improvements of the priming task relatively to Study 1, and of the 
control task relatively to studies 2 and 3, control participants performed better in the 
substitution task than priming participants. The main hypothesis was not supported. 
 Unexpectedly, there were statistically significant effects of the experimenter and two-
way interaction between the experimenter and reward. This effect suggests that the script for 
the interaction with the participant was operationalized differently by each experimenter, 
which may explain the inconsistency of the results of Study 4 with those of studies 2 and 3. 
3.9. General Discussion 
I proposed that RelComp is intrinsically satisfying, and therefore is sufficient to energize 
and guide behavior on social interactions, regardless of ulterior motives. The four studies 
investigated this idea by testing whether participants pursuing the goal of RelComp would be 
more motivated, than those who did not, to perform their part of the relational pattern with the 
experimenter. The RelComp goal was manipulated through priming, and motivation was 
measured as effort, indicated by performance on a cognitive task. I assumed that, given the 
relational pattern that is naturally part of a laboratory setting where an experimenter interacts 
with a participant, RelComp would be achieved when the experimenter performed his part of 
giving instructions and rewarding the participant for taking part in the study, and when the 
participant performed his part of following the instructions and completing the tasks requested 
by the experimenter. I expected that participants primed with RelComp would have the goal 
to complement more accessible than those who did not, and, for that reason, would make 
more effort to follow the tasks requested by the experimenter.  
The hypothesis was supported by Study 1. Participants primed with RelComp performed 
better in the substitution task when compared to participants in the two control conditions 
together, and in the first control condition separately. Since the manipulation task contained 
the same social content (e.g., phrases describing social interactions) in the priming condition 
and first control condition, performance differences cannot be explained by reading about 
social interactions, but instead by the accessibility of RelComp. On the other hand, 
differences between the priming and the second control condition did not reach significance. 
Since some stimulus phrases were related to the concept of achievement, it is possible that in 
the second control condition the goal of achievement was activated, influencing subsequent 
performance. 
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Because the instructions to the manipulation in the priming condition explicitly described 
the concept of Relational Complementarity as something that people do to relate, two 
alternative explanations for these results pertained to whether RelComp was activated as a 
norm or as a semantic category, instead of a goal. Therefore, studies 2 and 3 attempted to 
replicate the results of Study 1 by using a manipulation that did not explicitly mention 
RelComp.  
On both studies the hypothesis was not supported. The participants in the priming 
condition did not perform significantly better in the substitution task than participants in the 
control condition. The results on the manipulation task suggest that the goal of RelComp was 
not differently activated between conditions.  
Even though the effects the manipulation were not significant in studies 2 and 3, there 
were differences in the predicted directions between the participants in the priming and 
control conditions. In Study 2, different rewards were offered to participants for taking part in 
the experiment. The two types of reward were 0.5 credit vs. voucher. After the manipulation 
and before the substitution test, participants were offered the voucher in hand, whereas in the 
other reward condition they were merely informed that they had earned the 0.5 credit. 
Reasoning that there might be a difference between being informed of earning a reward and 
getting the tangible reward in hand, the main effect of reward and the reward-manipulation 
interaction were controlled for in the data analysis. A main effect of reward was detected. 
Participants performed better in the voucher condition that in the 0.5 credit condition. In 
addition, reward interacted with the manipulation. Participants rewarded with a voucher 
performed unexpectedly better, but not significantly, in the control condition than in the 
priming condition, whereas participants rewarded with a 0.5 credit performed better, although 
not significantly, in the priming than in the control condition. 
In Study 3, likewise, participants in the priming condition performed better, but not 
significantly, than participants in the control condition. Since the differences between the 
priming and control conditions on performance, in Study 3, and in the 0.5 credit condition of 
Study 2 were in the predicted direction, it was reasoned that the manipulation might not have 
been effective enough to produce significant differences. In fact, the validation of the 
manipulation suggested that the task in the control condition in both studies might not have 
shielded participants against identifying RelComp in the stimulus phrases. This possibility 
encouraged Study 4 where a modified version of the manipulation was employed. 
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Furthermore, Study 3 tested the effect of priming the RelComp goal on an indicator of 
motivation other than effort: selecting one action over another. Participants were instructed to 
stop working on a task after an alarm sound. This task was performed in the absence of the 
experimenter, and task performance was an opportunity to increase their chances of winning a 
lottery prize. It was predicted that participants in the priming condition would be more 
motivated to follow the instructions of the experimenter and, therefore, would end the task 
earlier after the alarm than participants in the control condition. This hypothesis was also not 
supported: participants did not continue after the alarm sound in neither condition. 
Study 4 was conducted with a new version of the manipulation that did not have the same 
limitations of the priming task of Study 1 and of the control conditions of studies 2 and 3. 
Once, again the hypothesis was not supported. Differently from studies 1-3, three 
experimenters collected the data in Study 4. Unexpectedly, differences between experimenters 
were found, suggesting that the script for the interaction with the participant was 
operationalized differently by each experimenter. 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of support to the main hypothesis. 
The first possibility is that RelComp does not have motivational properties. More specifically, 
for any cognitive representation to generate motivated behavior is has to be associated to 
positive affect and/or to deprivation reduction (Custer & Aarts, 2005; Veltkamp, et al., 2009). 
I did not formalize RelComp as a deprivation based need, but I proposed that it is inherently 
satisfying, which implies an association to positive affect. However, it is possible that my 
claim is false and that the effect observed in Study 1 was a statistical artifact. An exact 
replication of Study 1 would be necessary to determine whether the effect observed was false. 
The second possible explanation is that RelComp is only motivating when it is perceived 
as a social norm. That is, people do what is complementary, not because RelComp is 
satisfying in itself, but because it is normative, and following norms is, for some reason, 
motivating (Bicchieri & Xiau, 2009; Cialdini, Demaine, Sagarin, et al., 2006; Sripada, & 
Stich, 2006). According to such an explanation, the only difference between the priming and 
control conditions was observed when RelComp was explicitly described as a norm, i.e., in 
Study 1. Given the fact that RelComp is usually achieved by doing what is normative within a 
social-cultural context, the theoretical relevance of such discussion is broader than the scope 
of the current experiments. For that reason it will be addressed at length in Chapter 5.  
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The third possibility, is that RelComp is motivating, but the manipulations used in studies 
2 and 3 were not effective in activating the RelComp goal. On the other hand, when a more 
effective manipulation was employed in Study 4 the script of the experimenter was not 
correctly followed by some of the experimenters, rendering the results uninterpretable. This 
hypothesis is supported by the effect of experimenter found in Study 4. 
The fourth, possibility is that RelComp does have motivational properties, but that the 
RelComp goal was more strongly activated by the perception of the relational pattern to be 
applied to the interaction than by the priming task. In other words, if perceiving the actions of 
the experimenter as part of a relational pattern in which one is involved activated the goal of 
RelComp, there was no room left for additional activation by the priming: the participant 
already wanted to complement (cf. Custer & Aarts, 2005 for a similar interpretation of goal-
priming effects). This possibility is consistent with the activation principles outline in the 
introduction of this chapter, namely that the RelComp goal is activated whenever a perceived 
action by the other is represented as part of a relational pattern in which one is involved as 
participant.  
Why, then, was the priming manipulation used? Studies manipulating goal-accessibility 
and goal-discrepancies separately showed that perceived goal-discrepant situations only 
motivate behavior when the corresponding goal representation is accessible (e.g., Custer & 
Aarts, 2007). In the current experiment, it was assumed that a discrepancy between a non-
complementary and a complementary state would be perceived when the experimenter 
performed his part of a relational pattern (e.g., giving instructions, rewarding the participant), 
leaving to the participant the part of reducing the discrepancy by completing the relational 
pattern (e.g., by performing the tasks according to the instructions). As suggested before, 
“when the desirability of a goal state is uniformly high [accessibility of the goal state] may be 
the crucial factor that determines whether people react to a goal discrepancy” (Custer & Aarts, 
2007, p. 631). Hence, given that the goal-discrepancy was uniform across conditions, it was 
reasoned that manipulating goal accessibility through priming would cause differences in 
effort to reduce the discrepancy. However, there are two conditions for accessibility: either 
the goal is temporarily activated by environmental stimuli (e.g., priming) or the goal is 
chronically accessible due to frequent pursuit (Custer & Aarts, 2007). Hence, assuming that a 
goal-discrepancy was perceived by participants in the priming and control conditions, and 
given the fact that there were no differences in performance between conditions, it is possible 
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that the RelComp goal was chronically accessible for all participants. If this were the case, 
then, the effect of the priming was redundant.  
This possibility speaks in favor of RelComp being an intrinsically satisfying and 
affectively charged goal-state which is frequently pursued, given the fundamental and 
prevalent role of social coordination in human life. However, further research is still 
necessary to demonstrate the motivational effects of RelComp. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Relational Complementarity is Affectively Charged and Enhances Belonging, Control 
and Trust. 
 
Human beings are heavily dependent on social relationships to satisfy not only material 
needs, but also psychological ones. Well-being, life satisfaction and health are associated with 
the fulfillment of core social needs (S. Fiske, 2004, 2008; Stevens & S. Fiske, 1995), for 
instance, to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Begen & Turner-Cobb, 2015; Hale, Hannum 
& Espelage, 2005; Mellor, Stokes, Firth, Hayashi & Cummins, 2008), to control (Heckhausen 
& Schulz, 1995; Quevedo & Abella, 2014; Schulz, 1976; Schulz, Heckhausen & O'Brien, 
1994; Seligman, 1975), and to trust other people (Poulin & Haase, 2015). Engaging in social 
relationships is one common way by means of which such needs are met. To illustrate, people 
fulfill their need to belong by establishing and maintaining positive and lasting bonds with 
others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995); and when they feel rejected they use apologies and 
accounts, and make compensations and sacrifices for others in order to restore their social 
acceptance (Leary & Allen, 2011). They enhance their sense of personal control by seeking 
power over others (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008) or by complying 
with powerful others (Fennis & Aarts, 2012). And individuals learn to trust based on previous 
encounters and interactions with other people in specific domains of their lives (Glanville & 
Paxton, 2007; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster & Agnew, 1999). 
What is the process by which social relationships effectively satiate core needs? The best 
answer available so far is: it depends on the core need, and on the kind of relationship being 
investigated. First, as will be illustrated, different theoretical and empirical approaches have 
been developed independently to investigate the role of particular needs or motives in social 
behavior. Consequently, approaches inspired by different core motives have presented distinct 
processes to describe the role of social relationships in motive fulfillment. Second, while 
relying on descriptions about the nature of human beings—what individuals need, these 
approaches neglect the defining properties that are intrinsic to all kinds of relationships—what 
relationships are. Therefore, the processes proposed successfully describe how particular 
motives are met in specific kinds of relationships, but can hardly be generalized to all kinds. 
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As an alternative, I rely on a conceptualization of social relating to present one single 
process by which the needs to belong, to control and to trust are fulfilled in virtually all kinds 
of social relationships. In Chapter 2, I suggested that to socially relate is, by definition, the 
pursuit of Relational Complementarity (RelComp), i.e., the quality of any interaction pattern 
that is constituted by actions of each participant that are mutually congruent and completing 
with reference to a shared relational model (RM). In this chapter, I propose that, if RelComp 
is the defining feature of all kinds of social relating, then, the core needs are often satiated 
whenever people achieve RelComp in their social interactions, as opposed to when they fail to 
do so. In other words, RelComp is sufficient condition for fulfilling the core needs to belong, 
to control, and to trust, regardless of the particular kind of relationship people engage in. 
Additionally, I also propose that, if RelComp simultaneously fulfills different core motives 
that are associated with well-being, life satisfaction and health, then, it is also an affectively 
charged state of affairs. As suggested in Chapter 3, RelComp is satisfying or enjoyable; either 
because it is pleasant—“feels good”—or because it is the right thing to do—“feels right”. On 
the other hand, non-complementarity is unpleasant, and “feels wrong”. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that individuals experience more positive affect, and a stronger sense of 
belonging, control, and trust in the partner when they participate in complementary 
interactions than in non-complementary interactions, independently of the kind of relationship 
they have with one another. 
4.1. RelComp Enhances Positive Affect and Decreases Negative Affect. 
Effort is one hallmark of goal-directed behavior (Martin & Tesser, 2009; Wright, 1996; 
Wright & Brehm, 1989). In chapter three I hypothesized that, if RelComp is a satisfying state 
of affairs, then, it should reflect on participants’ effort to perform their part of a relational 
pattern. The results did not support the hypothesis. However, another hallmark of goal-
directed behavior is its affective consequences (Martin & Tesser, 2009). It has been 
demonstrated that goals-states are desirable because they are associated with positive affect 
(Custer & Aarts, 2005; Veltkamp, et al., 2009). Therefore, people experience more positive 
affect when they succeed than when they fail to achieve the goal (Chartrand, 2007), and the 
faster they progress towards the goal (Lawrence, Carver, Scheier, 2002). Hence, an alternative 
way to show that RelComp is inherently satisfying is to test whether individuals experience 
more positive affect when the intended pattern of RelComp is achieved, than when it is not. In 
other words, I propose that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Participants’ positive affect is higher in complementary interactions than 
in non-complementary interactions.  
Consistently, if non-complementarity is unpleasant and “feels wrong”: 
Hypothesis 2: Participants experience lower negative affect24 in complementary 
interactions than in non-complementary interactions. 
4.3. RelComp Fulfills Core Social Motives 
4.3.1. The Control Motive 
Several psychological theories are based on control related constructs, such as sense of 
control, personal control, locus of control, effectance, self-efficacy, agency, mastery, self-
determination, helplessness, or causal attributions, among others (for review on constructs of 
control see Skinner, 1996). Most of these theories assume that people have a desire for 
behavior-events contingencies (Bandura, 1997; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Heckhausen & 
Schulz, 1995; Seligman, 1975), that give them a sense of personal effectiveness in producing 
the desired outcomes in the environment (Stevens & S. Fiske, 1995; Thompson & Schlehofer, 
2008; White, 1959), even if such contingencies are illusory (e.g., Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 
1982). Hence, the control motive is fulfilled when individuals either believe that they can 
control the environment (subjective control) or actually experience controlling the 
environment (experienced control; Skinner, 1996). Since the environment is filled with 
potentially controllable social and non-social (e.g., solving a math problem) events, control 
can be fulfilled without (for a review see Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008) or within social 
relationships.  
Within relationships, people can maintain control by exercising power over others. Some 
perspectives view “power relations as social structural forms of control deprivation and 
control maintenance” (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996, p. 32). In other words, power is motivated by 
a sense of control (Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008) or impact on others (McClelland, 1975), so 
that the powerful are motivated to maintain control, whereas the powerless are motivated to 
                                                 
24 Recent accounts on affect, have demonstrated that positive affect and negative affect can co-occur, as opposed 
to correlate (Larsen, Hershfield, Stastny & Hester, 2017). In other words, positive affect and negative affect can 
be simultaneously evoked by the same stimulus, along orthogonal dimensions (cf. Watson & Tellegen, 1985). 
Therefore, two separate hypotheses are formulated for Positive and Negative affect. 
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restore it (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996). If power is defined as the ability to control one’s and 
other’s resources (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), then one who is motivated to gain 
control over the environment should necessarily desire control over resources that are relevant 
for attaining one’s outcomes, even if that includes influencing others by controlling the 
resources they value (e.g., French & Raven, 1959). On the other hand, some authors suggest 
that when primary control, i.e., the perceived ability to “change the world” according to the 
desires of the individual, is weakened, people exert secondary control, by “[flowing] with the 
current” (p. 8), and by adjusting oneself to external constraints, including authorities, groups 
or deities (Rothbaum, et al., 1982). In other words, people imbue the social environment with 
increased control in order to restore their own personal sense of control. Hence, the less 
powerful can enhance their sense of control by attending to those who control their outcomes 
(S. Fiske, 1993), by cooperating with them or accommodating to their desires (Van Lange & 
Rusbult, 2011), or by complying with requests and obeying to authorities (Fennis & Aarts, 
2012). 
Presumably, cooperation, accommodation, compliance or obedience, allow individuals to 
experience a contingency between their own action, the action of the partner, and the desired 
outcome, which is in part under the partner’s control. I propose that such contingency exists 
because people apply RMs to coordinate their interactions. Relational models inform how 
individuals act in certain contexts and in reply to specific actions by others. Provided that the 
partners apply the same RM, in the same way, to their interaction, RMs allow each partner to 
anticipate the action of the other, and to select and perform the actions that are more likely to 
evoke the desired complementary action by the other. Therefore, individuals with a high 
desire for control, are likely to either complement a previous action by the other (possibly 
through compliance, obedience, cooperation, or accommodation), or to initiate a new 
relational pattern, by performing one’s part of the pattern, while expecting that the other will 
do his part. Hence, when RelComp is achieved by fulfilling the intended RM, participants’ 
sense of control should be higher than when they fail to achieve RelComp. More formally: 
Hypothesis 3: Participants’ sense of control is higher in complementary interactions than 
in non-complementary interactions. 
Notice that previous research about the role of the control motive on social behavior has 
emphasized power or hierarchical relationships (e.g., Fennis & Aarts, 2012; S. Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996; Galinsky, et al., 2003; McClelland, 1975), which are implementations of the 
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AR model. In contrast, Hypothesis 3 extends the relation between control and social behavior 
to any kind of relationship or social interaction that results from the implementation of any 
RM.  
4.3.2. The Need to Belong 
It is widely accepted that human beings are motivated to be members of groups and to 
maintain bonds with other people (e.g., Atkinson, et al., 1954; Maslow, 1943; McAdams, & 
Constantian, 1983) in order to feel protected and nurtured (Stevens & S. Fiske, 1995). 
Baumeister and Leary (1995) formally defined the need to belong as a “pervasive drive to 
form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive and significant 
interpersonal relationships” (p. 497). In support of the claim that belonging is a fundamental 
human need, the authors (Baumeister and Leary, 1995) reviewed evidence that people form 
social bonds very easily, without special eliciting circumstances; that they are reluctant to 
allow social bonds to dissolve even when relationships are destructive (e.g., with abusive 
partners) or lack functional value (e.g., with neighbors); that much of people’s cognitive 
processing is dedicated to interpersonal interactions; that people experience positive emotions 
(e.g., love and happiness) in conditions of high belongingness, and negative emotions (e.g., 
anxiety, depression, jealousy, guilt, loneliness) under conditions of deprivation; and that, 
when chronically deprived of belongingness, people suffer higher levels of physical and 
mental illness, and become more prone to crime and suicide. According to more recent 
research (for review see DeWall & Bushman, 2011), socially rejected people show impaired 
self-regulation (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005), reduced cognitive 
performance (Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002), lower state self-esteem (Williams, 
Cheung & Choi, 2000), increased attention to signs of social acceptance (DeWall, Maner & 
Rouby, 2009), and increased activation of brain regions associated to physical pain 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman & Williams, 2003). 
The need to belong motivates individuals to seek social acceptance (and to avoid social 
rejection) by promoting their relational value, that is, the “degree to which other people value 
interacting with and having relationships with him or her” (Leary & Allen, 2011, p. 37). In 
order to enhance their relational value people try to be likeable, physically attractive, 
competent, successful, supportive of the group norms (see Leary & Allen, 2011, for a review); 
and, when socially excluded, they behave more generously towards potential new partners 
(Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, Schaller, 2007). People feel accepted when their perceived 
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relational evaluation by others is high, but rejected when their perceived relational evaluation 
is low (Leary, 2001).  
It has been suggested that people have standards for assessing their relational value in 
order to feel included, and that these standards vary between individuals and relationships 
(Leary, 2001). However, it is not clearly specified what these standards consist of. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that individuals rely on the relational qualities of their partners—
i.e., on the RMs they apply to the relationship with their partners—rather than on individual 
attributes, to formulate social intentions about them (A. Fiske & Haslam, 1997), as well as to 
think and remember about them (A. Fiske, 1993; A. Fiske, 1995; A. Fiske, Haslam & S. 
Fiske, 1991). In light of these results, I propose that RMs are important standards for 
evaluating relational partners. For any positive bond to be established and maintained, it is 
necessary that relationship partners manage to apply the same RM in the same way to their 
interactions across time, i.e., to achieve RelComp as their interactions unfold. Hence, 
relational partners must evaluate one another regarding each other’s ability and willingness to 
apply the same RMs in order to determine whether it is possible and desirable to continue 
relating with each other. The experience of RelComp informs each participant that the partner 
is acting in a desirable way and, likewise, that the participant himself is acting in a way that 
the partner finds desirable. More specifically, when one participant complements a previous 
action by the partner according to a shared RM, he is assigned positive relational value by the 
partner. On the other hand, by complementing the action of the participant with a subsequent 
action, the partner validates the participant’s previous action and, thus, communicates his 
positive evaluation of the participant as relational partner. In other words, a complementary 
(or non-complementary) response by the participant is both a sign of his positive (or negative) 
relational value, and a sign of his positive (or negative) relational evaluation of the partner. In 
sum, people seek approval and belonging by complementing the actions of others, feel 
approved and included when others complement their actions, anticipate rejection when they 
fail to complement the actions of others, and feel rejected or devalued when others do not 
complement their actions. More formally:  
Hypothesis 4: Participant’s sense of belonging, i.e., perceived relational value, is higher 
in complementary interactions than in non-complementary interactions. 
Notice that Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) definition of the need to belong emphasizes 
lasting, positive and significant relationships, which are typically, although not exclusively, 
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CS relationships. Hypothesis 4, however, implies that the need to belong can be fulfilled in 
relationships that are structured according to any of the four RMs. 
4.3.3. The Trust Motive 
From a simple online purchase to a marriage, trust is an essential ingredient for initiating 
and sustaining well-functioning relationships both among lasting partners and strangers 
(Simpson, 2007). Perhaps due to its omnipresence in human social life, trust has been 
extensively studied from different perspectives and scientific disciplines (for overviews see 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998; Simpson, 2007; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). 
However, the motivational basis of trust is still object of debate. Most theoretical accounts in 
economics and psychology view trust as a means to obtain desired outcomes, once the trustee 
makes a response (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kramer 
& Carnevale, 2001; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster & 
Agnew, 1999). The underlying assumption is that people are rational actors who analyze the 
risk of betrayal and probabilities of reciprocation by the trustee, and weigh the costs of not 
trusting against the potential benefits of their trust being reciprocated (Dunning, Anderson, 
Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014; Malhotra, 2004). More recent perspectives, on 
the other hand, view trust as a core human motive, in that individuals are motivated not only 
to see other people as benevolent (S. Fiske, 2004, 2008; Stevens & S. Fiske, 1995), but also to 
engage in trusting behavior, even when they do not believe in the benevolence of the partner 
(Dunning, et al., 2014). 
Given the large number of conceptualizations of the construct, there is no universally 
accepted scholarly definition of trust (Rousseau, et al., 1998, p. 394; Thielmann & Hilbig, 
2015, p. 250). Some scholars view trust as a set of cognitions comprising implicit attitudes 
towards the partner (e.g., Murray, Pinkus, Holmes, et al., 2011), or conscious beliefs about the 
partner’s concern with the trustor’s welfare, willingness to support the trustor’s best interests, 
and commitment with the relationship (e.g., Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kramer & Carnevale, 
2001; Murray, et al, 2011; Rousseau, et al., 1998; Wieselquist, et al., 1999). These views 
emphasize evaluations of partner trustworthiness. Other proposals, on the other hand, 
emphasize trust behavior: “a decision about becoming vulnerable to another person’s 
exploitation to possibly achieve a benefit” (Dunning, et al., 2014, p. 123). In fact, the (a) 
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of the partner, and the underlying (b) 
beliefs or expectations about the partner’s benevolence are two components of trust that are 
Relational Complementarity 
102 
widely consensual in the literature (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; Mayer, Davis & 
Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, et al., 1998; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015).  
Vulnerability is a property of the situation in which each party depends on the actions of 
the partner to obtain better outcomes than what he could achieve alone, and the trustee will be 
better off if he betrays than if he reciprocates trust (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Kelley, 
Holmes, Kerr, et al., 2003; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). For example, in a version of the trust 
game (also called investment game, e.g., Berg, et al., 1995; Dunning, et al., 2014), 
participants must decide whether to keep or to give an amount of money (e.g., 5€) to a 
stranger. If they choose to give the money, it will be multiplied (e.g., 5€ x 4 = 20€), and the 
second player will be asked to choose whether to give 10€ back to the first player or to keep 
20€ to himself. Hence, to make oneself vulnerable means to engage in a course of action (e.g., 
giving the 5€ to the second player) that exposes the trustor to the risk of losing something 
valuable, in case of betrayal or exploitation by the trustee, and consequently, of obtaining 
outcomes that are worse than those one would have gained if he had not trusted.  
Decisions to become vulnerable by engaging in trust behavior are usually based on risk 
analysis and expectations about partner trustworthiness or benevolence (Dunning, et al., 
2014). The risks of trusting can be determined, for instance, by the amount of the potential 
loss if trust is betrayed. Hence, individuals are more likely to trust, when the potential loss is 
low rather than high (e.g., Malhotra, 2004). Trustworthiness expectations, on the other hand, 
are based on different sources of information about the partner’s intentions (for a review see 
Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). These sources include prior trust experiences with the same 
partner (e.g., Wieselquist, et al., 1999) or with different partners in similar situations (e.g., 
Bolton, Katok & Ockenfels, 2004), in which the trustor’s vulnerability was, or was not 
exploited by the partner. Other sources of information about the partner’s intentions are social 
cues, such as, facial features of the trustee (e.g., Stirrat, & Perrett, 2010; Todorov, Pakrashi & 
Oosterhof, 2009), group membership of the trustee (e.g., Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009), 
or intuitive moral judgments by the trustee (Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 2016). 
In line with the theoretical approach presented in this work, I propose that trust behavior, 
as defined above, is a particular case of pursuing RelComp in situations of vulnerability. To 
illustrate, in a trust game where both players cooperate a relational pattern is produced. This 
pattern is constituted by the part of the trustor—e.g., giving 5€ to the player 2, and the part of 
the trustee—e.g., giving 10€ back to player 1, and is an implementation of the relational 
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model EM—50:50 division of resources. The basis for the risky choice of performing one’s 
part in situations of vulnerability is based on the assumption that the other applies the same 
RM in the same way to the interaction, and consequently, the expectation that she will do her 
part of the intended pattern. Given that RMs are standards for generating action, taking the 
risk of doing one’s part is based on expectations that the other abides by the same relational 
standards as oneself.  
One implication of this conceptualization is that trustworthiness expectations are not 
conceptually different from expectations about the partner’s relational reliability, i.e., the 
partner’s willingness and ability to coordinate by complementing a previous action performed 
by oneself, according to a shared RM. Such kind of expectations is based, among other 
sources of information, on prior direct or observed interactions with that person. To the extent 
that any social interaction is an opportunity for participants to demonstrate their relational 
standards by implementing a RM, expectations about relational reliability, hence, 
trustworthiness, should be formed in interactions of all kinds, regardless of vulnerability. As 
common interactions unfold, the experience of RelComp (or lack thereof) informs each 
participant that the partner applies the same (or different) standards to their relationship, and 
is, therefore, a reliable relational partner. In other words, complementary actions are a sign of 
trustworthiness. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5: Participant’s trust in the partner, i.e., perceived trustworthiness of the 
partner, should be higher when the partner’s actions are complementary to the 
participant’s previous action, than when they are non-complementary. 
4.4. Overview of the Studies 
The following studies were designed to test the hypotheses that participants who engage 
in complementary interactions experience higher sense of Control, Belonging, and Trust in 
the partner, than those who participate in non-complementary interactions. Furthermore, I also 
hypothesized that complementary interactions are associated with more positive affect and 
less negative affect than non-complementary interactions. 
In the experimental paradigm employed, participants read scenarios describing 
interactions between two characters: one initiator and one respondent. In all studies the action 
of the respondent was either complementary or non-complementary to the action of the 
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initiator. Then, participants placed themselves in one of the character’s shoes and rated their 
positive and negative affect, perceived control, sense of belonging and trust in the partner. 
The scenarios varied according to the specific goals of each study. The goal of Study 1 
was to disentangle the effects of RelComp from the effects of doing what is expected. Studies 
2 and 3 aimed to rule out the effects of gaining the tangible benefits of coordination from the 
effects of RelComp. Since in studies 1 to 3 participants took the perspective to the initiator, 
their affect, sense of control, sense of belonging, and trust, were contingent on whether the 
partner’s action was complementary or non-complementary. Hence, Studies 4a and 4b 
investigated whether the predicted effects of RelComp would also be observed if participants’ 
affect, sense of control, sense of belonging and trust were contingent on whether their own 
action was complementary or non-complementary to a previous action by the partner. To this 
end, participants were asked to take the perspective of the respondent, instead of the initiator. 
Studies 4a and 4b also explored the effects of controllability attributions when responses are 
non-complementary.  
4.4.1. Dependent Variables  
Control, Belonging and Trust, are usually measured as stable individual dispositions, 
such as the desire for control (Burger & Cooper, 1979), need to belong (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell 
& Schreindorfer, 2013), or generalized trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In the current 
studies Control, Belonging and Trust were operationalized to reflect how the participant feels 
in the course of a particular social interaction. More specifically, Control was defined as 
participant’s sense of contingency between their actions and the actions by the partner or the 
outcomes of the interaction; Belonging meant participant’s sense of being approved, valued 
and included by the partner; and Trust meant actual trust in the partner. 
At this point, it is necessary to make a distinction between two types of trust that were 
measured in the five studies: (a) the trust of the participant (in the shoes of either the initiator 
or the respondent) in the partner, where the participant is the trustor; and (b) the participant’s 
perception of being trusted by the partner, where the participant is the trustee. I will address 
the first as Trust and the second as Meta-trust. Trust and Meta-trust relate differently with 
RelComp depending on whether the participant is the initiator or the respondent. I proposed 
that complementary actions are perceived as signs of trustworthiness. Hence, RelComp 
should only affect the perceived trustworthiness of the one who either succeeds or fails to 
complement, i.e., the respondent. In other words, in Studies 1 to 3, where the participant takes 
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the perspective of the initiator, RelComp should affect Trust in the partner (i.e., the 
respondent). In Studies 4a and 4b, where the participant takes the perspective of the 
respondent, RelComp should affect (the respondent’s) Meta-trust. On the other hand, the 
initiator’s Meta-trust (in Studies 1 to 3), and the respondent’s Trust (in Studies 4a and 4b) 
were measured as exploratory variables. 
Additional Dependent Variables. Two additional variables were measured in the five 
studies: Liking for the partner and coordination Maintenance. Specific predictions were made 
for Maintenance but not for Liking. Liking is a positive evaluation of an object, event, or 
person more than a mere affective response (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, et al., 2015). 
For that reason, it is possible that liking the other person is something stable, which is more 
dependent on past experiences, or on desirable traits, than on specific interactions with the 
person. One the other hand, is it also possible that RelComp has an impact on such 
evaluations.  
Maintenance is the degree of effort required for coordination (Finkel, Campbell, Brunell, 
et al., 2006). If all coordination requires RelComp, then, complementary interactions should 
demand lower maintenance that non-complementary interactions. Hence: 
Hypothesis 6: Participant’s experience lower maintenance in complementary social 
interactions than in non-complementary interactions. 
4.5. Study 1 
The goal of this study was to test the general hypotheses that during a social interaction 
the initiator will experience higher Positive Affect, lower Negative Affect, higher interaction-
specific sense of Control, higher interaction-specific sense of Belonging, higher Trust in the 
partner and lower Maintenance when the partner’s response is complementary, rather than 
non-complementary. 
In addition, in real life RelComp is usually confounded with doing what is expected, 
since the complementary response is usually the expected response, due to shared knowledge 
about relationships and social norms. Therefore, a second goal of the current study was to 
disentangle the effect of doing what is expected from the effect of RelComp. To this end, two 
versions of the CS and MP scenarios were developed. In one version the complementary 
response was expected by the initiator and the non-complementary response was unexpected. 
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In the second version, the complementary response was unexpected by the initiator while the 
non-complementary response was expected. 
I predicted that the initiator would experience higher Positive Affect, Control, Belonging 
and Trust in the respondent, and lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, when responses 
were complementary, rather than non-complementary, and both when expected or 
unexpected. Furthermore, I also explored the extent to which RelComp and Expectation 
affected the initiator’s Meta-trust (i.e., the imitator’s perception of being trusted by the 
respondent), and Liking of the respondent during the interaction. 
4.5.1 Methods 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
Portuguese speaking participants were recruited by convenience via social media and e-
mail, and were offered participation in a lottery awarding five 70€ vouchers for completing a 
15-minute online questionnaire. The questionnaire was initiated by 247 participants, and 
completed by 134, 97.8% of which were Portuguese, 69% female, with ages between 18 and 
70 years-old (Mage = 32.5, SD = 12.4). Forty-one percent (40.5%) had bachelor degree, 35.1% 
less than a bachelor degree, 18.3% a master degree, and 4.6% a doctoral degree.  
4.5.1.2. Design  
This was a 2(CS vs. MP) x 2(Complementary vs. Non-complementary) x 2(Expected 
RelComp vs. Unexpected RelComp) mixed factorial design. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to two out of eight scenarios describing an interaction between two characters: one 
initiator and one respondent. The eight scenarios resulted from the combination of three 
variables: the RM implemented by the initiator (RM: CS vs. MP), the complementary or non-
complementary reply of the respondent (RelComp: Complementary vs. Non-complementary), 
and whether the complementary response was expected or unexpected by the initiator 
(Expectation: ExpectedRelComp vs. UnexpectedRelComp). RelComp and Expectation were 
manipulated between subjects and RM was manipulated within-subjects, that is, each 
participant was exposed to one CS scenario and one MP scenario, in randomized order. 
Notice that, this way the levels of RelComp and Expectation were held constant within 
participants. 
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4.5.1.3. Materials and Procedure 
The online data collection software Qualtrics was used to design the questionnaire and 
collect the answers. Participants accessed the online questionnaire through a link distributed 
via e-mail and social media. The beginning of the questionnaire contained information about 
the goal of the study, the voluntary nature of the participation, the confidentiality and 
anonymity of their answers, and the contact of the main investigator for further questions. 
Participants were told that this was a study about interpersonal relationships, which 
investigated how other people’s responses to our actions influenced our perception of the 
relationship with those people.  
After giving informed consent, each participant was exposed to two scenarios describing 
an interaction between two male characters: one initiator and one respondent. Each scenario 
was designed according to the experimental conditions. After reading each scenario and 
before responding to the dependent measures, participants were asked to “put themselves in 
the first character’s shoes” and to write three ideas about how they would feel about the 
response of the second character if they were in that situation. This procedure had the purpose 
of increasing the likelihood and the strength of perspective taking by the participants. Next, 
participants were told that, according to research, people are capable of forming impressions 
and judgments about the relationships of other people, based on very little information. Then, 
they were asked to put themselves in main character’s shoes again, to recall how they would 
feel about the second character’s response, and to respond to the dependent measures and 
manipulation checks. The dependent measures were Liking for the respondent, Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect, Maintenance, Control, initiator’s Trust in the respondent, initiator’s 
Meta-trust, Belonging; and the manipulation checks were Perceived Relational 
Complementarity and Expectation about the partner’s response. 
A detailed debriefing about the goals of the study and the notification of the lottery 
winners to collect the prize were sent by e-mail. 
Scenarios. Two types of scenarios were presented to participants: one described an 
interaction about the painting of an apartment, and the other described an interaction about the 
payment of an apartment rent. All scenarios had the same structure: (a) a description of the 
context of the interaction, (b) the initiation of the interaction by the first character, (c) the 
response by the second character, and (c) a statement describing the actual actions taken by 
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the two characters after the interaction (see English description of all scenarios in appendix 
H). 
The description of the interaction context introduced the characters, their relationship, the 
aspect of the relationship that required coordination between the two, and the RM (CS vs. 
MP) to be implemented to achieve coordination. The aspects to be coordinated were: the 
painting of an apartment, in the CS scenario, and the payment of an apartment rent, in the MP 
scenario. RMs were specified according to the experimental condition by describing how each 
aspect was going to be coordinated among the characters. For instance, one friend would help 
the other paint the apartment, in the CS scenario, and the tenant would make a bank transfer, 
in the MP scenario. 
Furthermore, the interaction description also manipulated the Expectation of the first 
character about the respondent. This was achieved by introducing one sentence in the context 
description in the UnexpectedRelComp condition containing information about the past behavior 
of the respondent in similar contexts. For example, in the ExpectedRelComp MP scenario the 
two characters and their relationship were introduced: “Mr. António is the landlord of an 
apartment which is rented to Rodrigo. Since Mr. António changed his bank account recently, 
he asked Rodrigo to wait for his phone call with the new bank account number, before making 
the payment. This month’s rent is due today, and Mr. António calls Rodrigo to give him the 
new bank account number”. In the UnexpectedRelComp MP scenario the sentence underlined 
was added: “Mr. António is the landlord of an apartment which is rented to Rodrigo. Rodrigo 
did not pay the rent in the last three consecutive months. Since Mr. António changed his bank 
account recently [. . .]”. 
After the context description, the first character initiated the interaction by making a 
request implementing the relational model corresponding to the experimental condition of 
RM (e.g.: “- Hi Mr. Rodrigo. I am calling you to give you my new account number. I would 
like you to make the payment of the rent to that account from now on”). 
The response of the second character differed according to the RelComp condition. In the 
Complementary condition the response was cooperative (e.g., “Of course Mr. António. Just 
give me the number and I’ll do it right away!”). In the Non-complementary condition the 
response was uncooperative (e.g., “Mr António, I’m going to keep the new number, but can’t 
afford this month’s rent. Give me until next month…).  
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The final statement was used to eliminate ambiguity about the actions of the characters 
following the second character’s response, or any suspicion that the complementary response, 
when unexpected, could have been a lie. For example, in the Complementary MP condition 
the sentence was “Mr. António communicates the new account number to Rodrigo. By the end 
of the day he confirms that the payment is in the new account”, whereas in the Non-
complementary scenario it was “Mr. António communicates the new account number to 
Rodrigo. By the end of the day he confirms that Rodrigo did not make the payment”. 
Measures. Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with 42 items (see 
appendix I for a full description of the Portuguese version of the items) on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – partially disagree, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 
5 – partially agree, 6 – agree, 7 – strongly agree). Each measure is described next in the same 
order as they were presented to participants. 
Liking. Liking was measured with one item (e.g., “Overall I (Sr. António) like Rodrigo”; 
M = 5.66, SD = 1.22, Min. = 1, Max. = 7). 
Affect. Affect was measured with one item for positive affect (M = 4.23, SD = 2.18, Min. 
= 1, Max. = 7; e.g., “Rodrigo’s response to my action put me (Mr. António) in a positive 
mood”) and another item for negative affect (M = 3.47, SD = 2.22, Min. = 1, Max. = 7; e.g., 
“Rodrigo’s response to my action put me (Mr. António) in a negative mood”). The items were 
inspired in Larsen, Norris, McGraw and Cacioppo’s (2009) evaluative space grid for 
positivity and negativity. Larsen and colleague’s measure assumes that positive and negative 
affect are two orthogonal dimensions, that is, the same stimulus can evoke both positive and 
negative affective reactions simultaneously (cf. Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Therefore, they 
ask participants how positive and how negative they felt about a stimulus (Larsen, et al., 
2009).  
Maintenance. Finkel and colleagues’ (2006) developed four items to measure whether 
one particular interaction was high- (i.e., effortful and inefficient) or low- (i.e., efficient and 
effortless) in maintenance effort. The original items were translated from English to 
Portuguese by one researcher with expertise on both languages and with good knowledge of 
the research concepts. The translated items were adapted to the scenarios and used in this 
study (α first scenario = .84, α second scenario = .85, M = 2.99, SD = 1.45, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 6.50; 
e.g., “I (Mr. António) found our interaction frustrating”, or “It was easy for me (Mr. António) 
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and Rodrigo to coordinate our efforts”; the latter sentence was reverse-scored). A second 
translator performed the back-translation of the adapted items to English. The first translator 
did the comparative analysis between the back-translated and the original items. No content 
discrepancies between the two versions were detected. 
Control. My goal was to measure perceived personal control over the desired outcomes 
of a particular social interaction. Some scales available in the literature measure individual 
differences in the desire for control over events (e.g., Burger & Cooper, 1979), and the 
majority assesses beliefs about internal or external sources of control over events. Some of 
these instruments address one’s beliefs about the control ability of the average individual 
(e.g., Rotter, 1966; Mirels, 1970), others are more specifically about one’s perceived sense of 
personal control over events in general (Barrenberg, 1987; Levenson, 1973), or in specific 
domains, such as internal states (Pallant, 2000), health (e.g., Lau & Ware, 1981) or academic 
achievement (e.g., Trice, 1985). Although, some scales measure perceived control in 
interpersonal domains (e.g., Connell, 1985; Paulhus, 1983), they are about social relationships 
in general. To my knowledge there are no measures of perceived control in specific social 
interactions. For this reason, I developed a scale assessing control experienced in a social 
interaction. 
I defined social-interaction-specific control as the ability of individuals to evoke actions 
by the partner that are consistent with their own goals. Skinner (1996) distinguished between 
agents, ends, and means of control, and argued that different constructs of control usually 
focused either on agents-means relations, means-ends relations or agents-ends relations. 
Agent-means relations refer to the ability of the individual or group to produce one particular 
course of action (e.g., efficacy expectations, Bandura, 1977); means-ends relations refer to 
whether one course of action effectively produces the outcome desired (or avoids the outcome 
undesired) by the agent (e.g., outcome expectations, Bandura, 1977); and agent-means 
relations refer to the agent’s ability to produce a desired outcome or avoid and undesired one 
(e.g., subjective control, Skinner 1985). Hence, after testing initial versions of the present 
scale on two previous experiments, a six item measure addressing the three relations was 
developed (α first scenario = .92, α second scenario = .93, M = 4.34, SD = 1.82, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 
7.00): two items measuring agent-ends relations (e.g., “I (Mr. António) did not get the 
response that I wanted from Rodrigo”, reverse-scored); two items addressing agent-means 
relations (e.g., “I (Mr. António) managed to relate to Rodrigo in order to achieve the results 
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that I intended”); and two items assessing means-ends relations (e.g., “I (Mr. António) feel 
that my actions caused Rodrigo to respond the way I wished for”. The items were first 
developed in English and then translated to Portuguese by a researcher with good knowledge 
of the concept. The backtranslation and comparative analysis followed the procedure adopted 
for Maintenance. No content discrepancies between the two versions were detected. 
Trust. The most common trust measures assess general expectancies that other people 
can be relied upon (e.g., Rotter, 1967; Twenge, et al., 2007, Study 6; Yamagjshi, 1986; 
Yamagishi &Yamagishi, 1994), or current trust levels in ongoing close relationships (e.g., 
Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). A five-item measure, however, was used by Klapwijk and 
Van Lange (2009) to assess social-interaction-specific trust. This measure was adapted for the 
current study. The five items were first translated to Portuguese by one researcher with 
expertise on both languages and with good knowledge of the research concepts, and then, 
adapted to measure the initiator’s Trust on the respondent (α first scenario = .90, α second scenario = 
.91, M = 4.11, SD = 1.46, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00). The same items were then rephrased into 
a second version measuring the initiator’s Meta-Trust (i.e., initiator’s perception of being 
trusted by the respondent; α first scenario = .79, α second scenario = .79, M = 4.65, SD = 0.95, Min. = 
1.00, Max. = 7.00). The items focused on self-reported trust (e.g., “I (Sr. António) trust 
Rodrigo completely”) or meta-trust (e.g., “Rodrigo trusts me (Sr. António) completely); and 
dependability (e.g., “If push comes to shove, I (Sr. António), do not want to rely on Rodrigo”) 
or meta-dependability  (e.g., “If push comes to shove, Rodrigo does not want to rely on me 
(Sr. António)”; reverse-scored). The backtranslation and comparative analysis followed the 
procedure adopted for Maintenance and Control. No content discrepancies between the two 
versions were detected.  
Belonging. The literature offers scales assessing the individual differences in the need to 
belong (e.g., Hagerty, & Patusky, 1995; Lee & Robbins, 1995; Leary, Kelly, Cottrell & 
Schreindorfer, 2013; Nichols & Webster, 2013) or current general sense of belonging (e.g., 
Hagerty, & Patusky, 1995; Malone, Pillow & Osman. 2012). Although, to my knowledge, no 
measures of social-interaction-specific sense of belonging have been validated so far, some 
authors have used single items to measure participants’ sense of acceptance or rejection 
during experiments as manipulation checks (e.g., Bourgeois & Leary, 2001) or dependent 
variables (e.g., Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, et al., 2007; Williams, et al., 2000). Hence, I 
developed a five-item scale of social-interaction-specific sense of belonging, which focused 
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on different aspects of experienced belongingness that are addressed in other measures (α first 
scenario = .88, α second scenario = .92, M = 4.69, SD = 1.32, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00). One item 
measured sense of rejection by the other (“I (Sr. António) feel rejected by Rodrigo”, reverse-
scored; cf. Bourgeois & Leary, 2001, Malone et al., 2012). Another item assessed sense of 
closeness to the other (“I (Sr. António) feel close to Rodrigo”; cf. Malone et al., 2012, Lee & 
Robbins, 1995). Finally, three items addressed positive evaluation and approval of oneself by 
the others (e.g., “I (Sr. António) feel Rodrigo values me as a person”, cf. Hagersty & Patusky, 
1995, Williams et al., 2000). The items were first developed in English and then translated to 
Portuguese by a researcher with good knowledge of the concept. The backtranslation and 
comparative analysis followed the procedure adopted for Maintenance, Control and Trust. No 
content discrepancies between the two versions were detected. 
Perceived RelComp. As manipulation check, I developed 13 items assessing perceptions 
of RelComp (α first scenario = .94, α second scenario = .95, M = 4.37, SD = 1.38, Min. = 1.08, Max. = 
7.00). The scale included seven items (see items 29–35, Appendix I) measuring 
complementarity of the characters’ action (e.g., “My (Sr. António’s) action and Rodrigo's 
action meshed well”), and six items (see items 36–41, Appendix I) measuring 
complementarity of the characters’ cognitive perceptions of the relationship (e.g., “Rodrigo 
and I (Sr. António) have similar expectations about the kind of relationship we have with each 
other”). The items were first developed in English and reviewed by a native speaker with 
good knowledge of the concept. The English version was, then, translated to Portuguese by a 
native speaker with good knowledge of the concept. The backtranslation and comparative 
analysis followed the procedure adopted for Maintenance, Control, Trust and Belonging. No 
content discrepancies between the two versions were detected.  
Expectation. One items (e.g., “I (Mr. António) was expecting Rodrigo’s response” was 
used as manipulation check of Expectation (M = 4.39, SD = 1.67, Min. = 1, Max. = 7).  
A mean score of the items composing each scale, i.e., Maintenance, Control, initiator’s 
Trust, initiator’s Meta-trust, Belonging and Perceived RelComp, was computed and treated as 
dependent variable.  
4.5.2. Results 
Correlations between all measures are shown in Table 5. Perceived RelComp, Positive 
and Negative Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance correlated strongly with one 
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another (r ≥ |.50|). The Expectation manipulation check, Meta-trust and Liking did not 
correlate or correlated weakly (r < |.30|) to moderately (r < |.50|) with the other measures.  
Table 5 – Pearson correlations between all measures 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RelComp 1 1.00 .30** .80** -.76** .86** .78** .77** .37** -78** .33** 
Expectation 2 .21* 1.00 .19* -.20* .22** .18* .30** .32** -.12 -.06 
Pos. Affect 3 .79** .08 1.00 -.86** .87** .69** .68** .30** -.78** .36** 
Neg. Affect 4 -.84** -.06 -.86** 1.00 -.80** -.62** -.63** -.22** .75** -.25** 
Control 5 .90** .09 .88** -.87** 1.00 .70** .68** .31** -.78** .28** 
Belonging 6 .78** .17 .56** -.60** .63** 1.00 .79** .49** -75** .48** 
Trust 7 .74** .19* .59** -.61** .60** .84** 1.00 .50** -.67** .46** 
Meta-trust 8 .29** .18* .13 -.18* .19* .43** .49** 1.00 -.30** .27** 
Maintenance 9 -.84** -.12 -.79** .80** -.86** -.69** -.69** -.30** 1.00 -.43** 
Liking 10 .26** .15 .23** -.16 .18* .34** .49** .49** -.36** 1.00 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. Correlations for the first scenario of each participant are reported in the upper part 
of the table (n = 158). Correlations for the second scenario of each participant are reported in the lower part of 
the table (n = 134).  
Three cases that deviated more than 3.3 standard deviations from the mean were 
considered outliers (Tabachnick& Fidell, 2014) and removed from the analysis.  
A 2(RM: CS vs. MP) x 2(RelComp: Complementary vs. Non-complementary) x 
2(Expectation: ExpectedRelComp vs. UnexpectedRelComp) Multivariate Repeated Measures GLM 
was conducted on all manipulation checks and dependent variables using IBM SPSS 23, with 
RM as within-subjects factor and RelComp and Expectation as between-subjects factors. 
Significance tests were estimated with a 95% CI. 
4.5.2.1. Preliminary analyses 
Multivariate tests showed statistically significant main effects of RelComp, F(10, 118) = 
72.09, p < .001, ƞp2 = .86, Expectation, F(10, 118) = 3.95, p < .001, ƞp2 = .25, and RM, F(10, 
118) = 13.62, p < .001, ƞp2 = .54; significant interaction effects between RelComp and 
Expectation, F(10, 118) = 13.55, p < .001, ƞp2 = .54, RelComp and RM, F(10, 118) = 6.01, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = .34, RM and Expectation, F(10, 118) = 2.89, p = .003, ƞp2 = .20; and a 
marginally significant three-way interaction, F(10, 118) = 1.90, p = .052, ƞp2 = .14.  
The Univariate tests of the main effects, two- and three-way interactions on each 
manipulation check and dependent variable are presented in Table 6. Tables 7 and 8 display 
estimated marginal means, standard errors, significance tests and effect sizes for the main 
effects, two- and three-way interactions on each manipulation check and dependent variable. 
Post-hoc significance tests were estimated with Bonferroni correction.  
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Table 6 – Univariate tests of main effects and two- and three-way interactions on each manipulation check and dependent 
variable 
 df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2 
 RelComp  Expectation  RM      
RelComp 1 272.81 <.001 .68  1 18.67 <.001 .13  1 0.24 >.25 -      
Expectation 1 4.96 .028 .04  1 <.001 >.25 -  1 0.93 >.25 -      
Positive Affect 1 445.33 <.001 .78  1 5.24 .024 .04  1 4.84 .030 .04      
Negative Affect 1 486.09 <.001 .79  1 3.62 .059 .03  1 7.22 .008 .05      
Control 1 447.76 <.001 .78  1 10.95 <.001 .08  1 3.15 .078 .02      
Belonging 1 82.74 <.001 .40  1 25.37 <.001 .17  1 8.80 .004 .07      
Trust 1 73.90 <.001 .37  1 24.03 <.001 .16  1 42.23 <.001 .25      
Meta-trust 1 4.25 .041 .03  1 4.14 .044 .03  1 8.77 .004 .07      
Maintenance 1 188.41 <.001 .60  1 28.30 <.001 .18  1 1.78 .185 .01      
Liking 1 4.84 .030 .04  1 18.74 <.001 .13  1 90.16 <.001 .42      
Error 127     127     127         
 RelComp*Expectation  RelComp*RM  Expectation*RM  RelComp*Expectation*RM 
RelComp 1 8.06 .005 .06  1 1.13 >.25 -  1 0.78 >.25 -  1 2.98 .087 .02 
Expectation 1 104.00 <.001 .45  1 1.17 >.25 -  1 0.83 >.25 -  1 8.77 .004 .07 
Positive Affect 1 0.77 >.25 -  1 12.66 .001 .09  1 0.81 >.25 -  1 0.60 >.25 - 
Negative Affect 1 2.32 .130 .02  1 3.75 .055 .03  1 0.03 >.25 -  1 2.10 .150 .07 
Control 1 1.78 .185 .01  1 8.96 .003 .07  1 5.00 .027 .04  1 0.05 >.25 - 
Belonging 1 0.72 >.25 -  1 28.90 <.001 .19  1 0.24 >.25 -  1 0.20 >.25 - 
Trust 1 6.42 .012 .05  1 1.69 .196 .01  1 0.53 >.25 -  1 0.03 >.25 - 
Meta-trust 1 0.29 >.25 -  1 8.36 .005 .06  1 0.90 >.25 -  1 0.39 >.25 - 
Maintenance 1 0.89 >.25 -  1 6.47 .012 .05  1 6.12 .015 .05  1 1.08 >.25 - 
Liking 1 0.33 >.25 -  1 0.05 >.25 -  1 7.76 .006 .06  1 0.51 >.25 - 
Error 127     127     127     127    
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Table 7 – Estimated marginal means and standard errors for the main effects and the RelComp*Expectation interaction, and effect sizes of post-hoc tests 
on the RelComp*Expectation interaction. 
 Comp Non-comp 
 Expected 
RelComp 
Unexpected 
RelComp 
 Communal 
Sharing 
Market 
Pricing 
 Expected RelComp  Unexpected RelComp   
Non-
Comp 
vs. 
Non-
Comp 
   Comp Non-comp Comp 
vs. 
Non-
Comp 
 Comp Non-comp Comp 
vs. 
Non-
Comp 
Comp 
vs. 
Comp  (n = 66) (n = 65) 
 
(n = 66) (n = 65) 
 
(n = 131) (n = 131) 
 
(n = 34) (n = 32) 
 
(n = 32) (n = 33) 
 M SE M SE  M SE M SE  M SE M SE  M SE M SE ƞp2  M SE M SE ƞp2 ƞp2 ƞp2 
RelComp 5.40a 0.09 3.31b 0.09  4.63a 0.09 4.08b 0.09  4.37a 0.07 4.34a 0.07  5.85a 0.12 3.40b 0.13 .60  4.94c 0.13 3.22b 0.13 .42 .17 - 
Expectation 4.55a 0.13 4.12b 0.14  4.34a 0.13 4.34a 0.13  4.40a 0.11 4.27a 0.12  5.52a 0.19 3.16b 0.19 .38  3.58c 0.19 5.09d 0.19 .20 .29 .29 
Pos. Affect 6.02a 0.12 2.39b 0.12  4.41a 0.12 4.01b 0.12  4.32a 0.09 4.10b 0.11  6.29a 0.17 2.52b 0.17 .66  5.75c 0.17 2.27b 0.17 .62 .04 - 
Neg. Affect 1.65a 0.12 5.41b 0.12  3.36a 0.12 3.69a 0.12  3.38a 0.10 3.67b 0.11  1.35a 0.17 5.38b 0.17 .69  1.94c 0.17 5.44b 0.17 .62 .04 - 
Control 5.84a 0.10 2.80b 0.10  4.56a 0.10 4.08b 0.10  4.24a 0.08 4.40a 0.09  6.17a 0.14 2.94b 0.15 .67  5.50c 0.15 2.66b 0.14 .61 .08 - 
Belonging 5.32a 0.10 4.00b 0.10  5.03a 0.10 4.29b 0.10  4.81a 0.09 4.51b 0.09  5.75a 0.14 4.30b 0.15 .28  4.89c 0.15 3.69d 0.15 .21 .12 .06 
Trust 4.77a 0.12 3.37b 0.12  4.47a 0.12 3.67b 0.12  4.44a 0.10 3.70b 0.10  5.38a 0.16 3.56b 0.17 .33  4.16c 0.17 3.17b 0.16 .13 .18 - 
Meta-trust 4.77a 0.08 4.53b 0.08  4.77a 0.08 4.53b 0.08  4.79a 0.07 4.51b 0.08  4.92a 0.12 4.62a 0.12 -  4.62a 0.12 4.44a 0.12 - - - 
Maintenance 2.01a 0.10 3.96b 0.10  2.61a 0.10 3.36b 0.10  2.92a 0.08 3.05a 0.09  1.57a 0.14 3.65b 0.14 .46  2.46c 0.14 4.27d 0.14 .39 .14 .07 
Liking 5.81a 0.09 5.52b 0.09  5.95a 0.09 5.38b 0.09  6.16a 0.07 5.17b 0.10  6.06a 0.13 5.84a 0.13 -  5.56b 0.13 5.20b 0.13 - .05 .09 
Note: Simple mean comparisons between conditions are identified with superscripts a, b, c, and d. Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal 
superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. See effect sizes of main effects in Table 6. 
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Table 8 – Estimated marginal means, standard errors and effect sizes for the two- and three-way interactions. 
 
Comp Non-comp 
  Expected 
RelComp 
Unexpected 
RelComp 
  Expected RelComp  Unexpected RelComp 
     Comp Non-comp   Comp Non-comp  
 (n = 66) (n = 65)   (n = 66) (n = 65)   (n = 34) (n = 32)   (n = 32) (n = 33)  
 M SE M SE ƞp2  M SE M SE ƞp2  M SE M SE ƞp2  M SE M SE ƞp2 
 Communal Sharing   Communal Sharing   Communal Sharing 
RelComp x 5.45a 0.10 x 3.29b 0.10 .64  x 4.61a 0.10 x 4.13b 0.10 .08  x 5.93a 0.14 x 3.29b 0.14 .58  x 4.97c 0.14 x 3.29b 0.14 .35 
Expectation x 4.54a 0.16 x 4.26a 0.16 .01  x 4.46a 0.16 x 4.34a 0.16 -  x 5.76a 0.22 x 3.16b 0.23 .34  x 3.31c 0.23 x 5.36d 0.23 .24 
Positive Affect x 6.31a 0.13 x 2.33b 0.13 .79  x 4.56a 0.13 x 4.08b 0.13 .05  x 6.59a 0.18 x 2.53b 0.18 .67  x 6.03c 0.18 x 2.12b 0.18 .65 
Negative Affect x 1.40a 0.13 x 5.37b 0.14 .77  x 3.21a 0.13 x 3.56a 0.14 -  x 1.18a 0.19 x 5.25b 0.19 .65  x 1.63a 0.19 x 5.48b 0.19 .62 
Control x 5.89a 0.11 x 2.58b 0.11 .77  x 4.37a 0.11 x 4.10a 0.11 -  x 6.13a 0.16 x 2.61b 0.16 .66  x 5.65c 0.16 x 2.55b 0.16 .60 
Belonging x 5.75a 0.12 x 3.87b 0.13 .47  x 5.15a 0.12 x 4.47b 0.13 .11  x 6.18a 0.17 x 4.13b 0.18 .35  x 5.33c 0.18 x 3.62d 0.18 .27 
Trust x 5.21a 0.14 x 3.66b 0.15 .31  x 4.88a 0.14 x 4.00b 0.15 .13  x 5.85a 0.20 x 3.91b 0.21 .26  x 4.58c 0.21 x 3.42b 0.20 .11 
Meta-trust x 5.05a 0.10 x 4.53b 0.10 .09  x 4.96a 0.10 x 4.63b 0.10 .04  x 5.28a 0.14 x 4.64b 0.15 .07  x 4.83b 0.15 x 4.43b 0.15 - 
Maintenance x 1.82a 0.11 x 4.02b 0.11 .60  x 2.67a 0.11 x 3.17b 0.11 .07  x 1.55a 0.16 x 3.78b 0.16 .44  x 2.09c 0.16 x 4.26d 0.16 .42 
Liking x 6.32a 0.10 x 6.00b 0.10 .04  x 6.30a 0.10 x 6.02b 0.10 .03  x 6.38a 0.14 x 6.22a 0.14 -  x 6.25a 0.14 x 5.79b 0.14 .04 
 Market Pricing   Market Pricing   Market Pricing 
RelComp x 5.34a 0.10 x 3.33b 0.10 .60  x 4.64a 0.10 x 4.03b 0.10 .12  x 5.76a 0.14 x 3.52b 0.15 .48 - x 4.92c 0.15 x 3.14b 0.15 .36 
Expectation x 4.55a 0.17 x 3.99b 0.17 .04  x 4.21a 0.17 x 4.33a 0.17 -  x 5.27a 0.23 x 3.16b 0.24 .24 - x 3.84c 0.24 y 4.82d 0.24 .06 
Positive Affect y 5.73a 0.15 x 2.46b 0.15 .65  y 4.25a 0.15 x 3.95a 0.15 -  y 6.00a 0.21 x 2.50b 0.22 .51  y 5.47a 0.22 x 2.42b 0.21 .44 
Negative Affect y 1.89a 0.15 x 5.45b 0.15 .69  y 3.52a 0.15 x 3.82a 0.15 -  x 1.53a 0.21 x 5.50b 0.21 .59 - y 2.25c 0.21 x 5.39b 0.21 .47 
Control x 5.78a 0.13 y 3.02b 0.13 .65  y 4.74a 0.13 x 4.06b 0.13 .10  x 6.21a 0.18 y 3.27b 0.18 .51 - x 5.35c 0.18 x 2.76d 0.18 .45 
Belonging y 4.89a 0.13 x 4.12b 0.13 .13  x 4.90a 0.13 y 4.12b 0.13 .13  y 5.32a 0.18 x 4.48b 0.18 .08  y 4.46c 0.18 x 3.77d 0.18 .06 
Trust y 4.33a 0.14 y 3.07b 0.14 .25  y 4.06a 0.14 y 3.34b 0.14 .10  y 4.90a 0.19 y 3.21b 0.20 .23  y 3.75c 0.20 y 2.93b 0.19 .07 
Meta-trust y 4.49a 0.11 x 4.53a 0.11 -  y 4.59a 0.11 x 4.44a 0.11 -  y 4.57a 0.15 x 4.60a 0.16 -  y 4.42a 0.16 x 4.45a 0.15 - 
Maintenance y 2.21a 0.13 x 3.90b 0.13 .39  x 2.55a 0.13 y 3.55b 0.13 .18  x 1.59a 0.18 y 3.52b 0.19 .30 - x 2.83c 0.19 x 4.28d 0.19 .19 
Liking y 5.31a 0.13 y 5.04a 0.14 -  y 5.60a 0.13 y 4.74b 0.14 .14  y 5.74a 0.19 y 5.47a 0.19 -  y 4.88b 0.19 y 4.61b 0.19 - 
Note: Superscripts a, b, c, and d identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp and Expectation. Superscripts x and y identify simple mean 
comparisons between conditions of RM. Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts a means with non-
significant differences, p > .05. Effects sizes are reported for RelComp and Expectation in the two-way interactions, and for Expectation in the three-way interaction. 
Relational Complementarity 
117 
4.5.2.2. Manipulation Checks 
Significant main effects of RelComp and Expectation on Perceived RelComp were 
qualified by an interaction between the two predictors (Table 6). As expected Perceived 
RelComp was higher in the Complementary than in the Non-complementary conditions 
(Table 7), even though such difference was larger in the ExpectedRelComp condition than in the 
UnexpectedRelComp condition (Table 7). This interaction also showed that Perceived RelComp 
was higher in the Complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition, than in the Complementary/ 
UnexpectedRelComp condition (Table 7). Table 8 also shows that differences between 
Complementary and Non-complementary conditions on Perceived RelComp were significant 
and in the predicted direction in the CS and MP scenarios. 
The success of the manipulation of Expectation would be supported by an interaction 
between RelComp and Expectation, showing higher ratings on the Expectation manipulation 
check in the conditions in which responses were expected by the initiator (i.e., the 
Complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition and the Non-complementary/ UnexpectedRelComp 
conditions) than in the conditions in which responses were unexpected (i.e., the Non-
complementary/ ExpectedRelComp and the Complementary/ UnexpectedRelComp conditions). A 
main effect of RelComp on the Expectation manipulation check was qualified by an 
interaction with Expectation and by a three-way interaction (Table 6). As predicted, responses 
were rated as more expected in the Complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition than in the 
Non-complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition, and in the Non-complementary/ 
UnexpectedRelComp condition than in the Complementary/ UnexpectedRelComp condition (Table 
7). These differences were significant in both CS and MP scenarios, but smaller in the 
UnexpectedRelComp condition of the MP scenario (Table 8). 
4.5.2.3. Effects of RelComp on the Dependent Variables 
I predicted higher ratings on Perceived RelComp, Positive Affect, Belonging, Control 
and Trust, and lower ratings on Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-complementary condition, in all levels of Expectation and RM. 
Such hypotheses would be supported by main effects of RelComp on the dependent variables, 
showing that the predicted differences were constant across conditions of Expectation and 
RM, or by interactions of RelComp with Expectation and RM, showing that the predicted 
differences were weakened or enlarged across conditions of Expectation and RM.  
Relational Complementarity 
118 
The main effect of RelComp was significant on all dependent variables (Table 6). As 
predicted, participants experienced higher Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, and 
lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary condition (Table 7).  
Although the effect of RelComp on Trust was qualified by a two-way interaction with 
Expectation (Table 6), and even though RM interacted with RelComp on Positive Affect, 
Control, Belonging, and Maintenance (Table 6), differences between the Complementary 
condition and the Non-complementary condition were significant and in the predicted 
directions at all levels of Expectation (Table 7) and RM (Table 8). The interaction of 
RelComp with Expectation on Trust showed that the differences between the Complementary 
condition and the Non-complementary condition were larger in the ExpectedRelComp condition, 
than in the UnexpectedRelComp condition (Table 7). And the interaction of RelComp with RM 
on Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, and Maintenance, showed that the differences 
between the Complementary and Non-complementary conditions were larger in the CS 
scenario than in the MP scenario (Table 8).  
4.5.2.5. Exploratory Analyses 
Effects of RelComp on Liking and Meta-trust. There was a main effect of RelComp on 
Liking (Table 6), showing that participants liked the respondent more in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-complementary condition (Table 7). The main effect of RelComp 
on Meta-trust was qualified by an interaction with RM (Table 6), revealing that participants 
felt more trusted by the respondent in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary condition, but only in the CS scenario (Table 8). 
Differences between conditions of Expectation. With the exceptions of the 
manipulation check of Expectation and of Negative Affect, the main effect of Expectation 
was significant on all dependent variables. However, since Expectation confounded acting as 
expected with complementarity, in the ExpectedRelComp condition, and with non-
complementarity, in the UnexpectedRelComp condition, main effects of Expectation do not have 
theoretical meaning, and are hard to interpret in the absence of interactions with RelComp. 
The interaction between Expectation and RelComp was only significant on Trust. Trust was 
higher in the Complementary/ExpectedRelComp condition than in the Complementary/ 
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UnexpectedRelComp condition, meaning that participants trusted more when the complementary 
action by the partner was expected than unexpected. 
Differences between RMs. There were significant main effects of RM on Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect, Belonging Trust, Meta-trust, and Liking (Table 6). The effects of 
RM were qualified by interactions with RelComp on Positive Affect, Belonging, and Meta-
trust. The interaction of RM with RelComp was also significant on Control and Maintenance. 
Negative Affect was lower, whereas Trust and Liking were higher, in the CS scenario than in 
the MP scenario (Table 7). Positive Affect, Belonging and Meta-trust were higher, and 
Maintenance was lower, in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario, but only in the 
Complementary condition (Table 8). Control was higher in the MP scenario than in the CS 
scenario, but only in the Non-complementary condition (Table 8). 
4.5.3. Discussion 
This study tested the hypotheses that participants would experience higher Positive 
Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, and lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, in 
complementary than in non-complementary interactions. Since complementary actions in real 
life are usually expected by others, a second goal of the study was to rule out the effect of 
Expectation from the effect of RelComp. This was achieved by manipulating whether the 
complementary action by the respondent was expected or unexpected by the initiator.  
The hypotheses were supported with effects of RelComp on Positive and Negative 
Affect, on Control, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance, in the predicted directions, and across 
all levels of RM and Expectation. 
In addition, RelComp also increased Liking, and participants in the CS scenarios felt 
more trusted by the other in complementary than in non-complementary interactions, as 
shown by results on Meta-trust.  
A theory of expectations would predict significant interactions between Expectation and 
RelComp on the dependent variables, revealing higher Positive Affect, Belonging, Control 
and Trust, and lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, when responses were expected (i.e., 
in the Complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition and in the Non-complementary/ 
UnexpectedRelComp condition) than when responses were unexpected (i.e., in the Non-
complementary/ ExpectedRelComp condition and in the Complementary/ UnexpectedRelComp 
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condition). However, an expectation hypothesis was falsified with the lack of statistically 
significant interactions between RelComp and Expectation on all dependent variables, with 
the exception of Trust. Still, unlike the predictions of an expectation hypothesis, the two-way 
interaction showed that Trust was higher in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary condition, both when complementarity was expected and unexpected, but that 
these differences were more pronounced when the complementary response was expected. 
 Interestingly, the interaction between RelComp and Expectation on Perceived RelComp, 
showed that complementary actions were perceived as more complementary when they were 
expected than when they were unexpected. These results suggest that Expectation is one 
important, but not necessary aspect of perceived RelComp. Furthermore, they help explaining 
the effect of the interaction of RelComp with Expectation on Trust in a way that is consistent 
with a theory of RelComp: Trust is higher the more complementary interactions are perceived 
to be. 
The effects of RM showed that the type of relationship influenced affect and motive 
fulfillment, although less consistently than RelComp. Noteworthy, Positive Affect, 
Belonging, and Meta-trust were higher in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario, but only in 
the Complementary condition. On the other hand, Trust and Liking were higher, and Negative 
Affect was lower, in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario, regardless of whether responses 
were complementary or non-complementary.  
It is interesting to notice the commonalities between the measures of Liking and Trust, 
and between Belonging and Meta-trust. Liking and Trust were about how the initiator 
evaluated the respondent, whereas, Belonging, and Meta-trust were about how the initiator 
perceived himself to be evaluated by the respondent. Hence, one interpretation of the former 
results is that one’s evaluation of the partner is more favorable in CS than in MP interactions, 
and that this difference is not contingent on the partner’s response to one’s action. In other 
words, it does not matter how the other responds to our actions; we like and trust the partner 
more in CS than in MP interactions. This suggests that liking and trustworthiness are more 
strongly associated with CS than with other RMs or kinds of relationships.  
On the other hand, one’s perceptions of the partner’s evaluation of oneself—
corresponding to ratings on Belonging and Meta-trust—are also more favorable in CS than in 
MP interactions, but this depends on whether the partner’s response is complementary. The 
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RM of the interaction only makes a difference when responses are complementary. It is 
possible that non-complementary responses by others communicate a less favorable 
evaluation of oneself which is independent of the kind of RM that was not complemented. 
One additional remark about the effect of RMs on motivational states is concerned with 
the difference between a social interaction and a social relationship. Partners in the same 
relationship usually apply different RMs to specific interactions (e.g., taking turns on picking 
up the children at the kindergarten, EM; and sharing a bank account, CS), although there may 
be one RM that is more frequently applied (e.g., Communal Sharing), and which defines the 
nature of the relationship (e.g., marriage). Even though the scenarios used in this experiment 
described interactions according to one particular RM, they imply that the overall relationship 
between the characters (e.g., friends or business) was defined by the same RM. Therefore, it is 
not possible to know whether the effects of RMs observed in this study were caused by the 
participants’ understanding of the RM applied to the interaction or by their understanding of 
the RM defining the relationship. Future studies can rule out the confound between the RM 
applied to the interaction and the RM defining the relationship by manipulating interactions 
that are regulated by one RM that is different from the RM defining the relationship (e.g., two 
friends – CS relationship – engaging in a business transaction with one another – MP 
interaction).  
Finally, one limitation of the study was that the experience of RelComp, from the 
perspective of the initiator, was confounded with getting a benefit from the respondent. Since 
participants were asked to take the perspective of the person who initiated an interaction by 
requesting something tangible from the partner (e.g., help to paint the apartment, or the rent 
payment), the complementary response by the partner consisted of following through with the 
request by giving the respective benefit to the initiator (e.g., helping, or paying the rent). 
Therefore, one alternative explanation of the effects observed it that the differences observed 
on affect and need fulfillment were not caused by RelComp, but instead by the tangible 
benefits of the partner’s the response to initiator, relative to the costs of the non-
complementary response. If, on the other hand, a theory of RelComp is true, then the effects 
presented should be also be observed when the complementary responses by the partner are 
costly to the initiator and the non-complementary responses are beneficial. Such problem was 
addressed in Study 2.  
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4.6. Study 2 
The main goal of this Study 2 was to test the theoretical hypotheses that individuals 
experience higher Positive Affect, interaction-specific Control, Belonging and Trust, and 
lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, in complementary interactions than in non-
complementary interactions. Following the same experimental paradigm as Study 1, RelComp 
was manipulated with the partner performing either a complementary or non-complementary 
response towards the initiator. The differences from Study 1 are described in what follows. 
In daily life, RelComp is usually the means by which people exchange benefits, for 
instance, through helping, reciprocating favors or business transactions. For that reason, the 
effects of RelComp are usually confounded with the effects of getting tangible benefits from 
social interactions, as illustrated by the scenarios in Study 1. Thus, a second goal of Study 2 
was to rule out the effects of Benefit from the effects of RelComp. To that end, two 
conditions were developed in which the complementary response by the partner was either 
more beneficial or more costly to the initiator than the non-complementary response.  
In one condition, the BeneficialRelComp condition, similarly to Study 1, participants took 
the perspective of someone who requested or expected a benefit from to the partner. Here, the 
complementary response consisted of giving the benefit to the initiator. The non-
complementary response, on the other hand, consisted of either not giving the benefit to the 
initiator, or giving the benefit while demanding something in return, according to an 
alternative RM. Hence, the complementary response was more beneficial to the initiator than 
the non-complementary responses, meaning that RelComp and Benefit were manipulated in 
the same direction. 
Conversely, in the second condition, the CostlyRelComp condition, participants took the 
perspective of someone who offered a benefit to the partner. The complementary response by 
the partner consisted of accepting the benefit from the initiator. The non-complementary 
response, on the other hand, consisted of either refusing the benefit or offering something in 
return, according to an alternative RM. This way, the complementary response was more 
costly to the initiator that the non-complementary response, meaning that RelComp and 
Benefit were manipulated in competing directions. For this reason, this condition allowed 
disentangling the effects of the two variables. 
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Since in the CostlyRelComp condition the effects of RelComp ran against the effects of 
Benefit three possible results were anticipated: a) significant differences between conditions 
of RelComp in the predicted direction, meaning that RelComp overrode the effects of Benefit; 
b) significant differences between conditions of RelComp in the opposite direction to the one 
predicted, meaning that Benefit overrode the effects of RelComp; and c) no significant 
differences between conditions of RelComp, meaning that RelComp and Benefit cancelled 
each other. A theory of RelComp would be supported by a), and a theory of Benefit would be 
supported by b); and c) would support neither of the theories, suggesting, however, that 
RelComp and Benefit may be two distinct and competing effects. 
An additional difference from Study 1 was the form of the responses. In Study 1 
respondents either implemented the complementary RM or did not implement a RM at all (at 
least not an obvious one). Not implementing a RM is equivalent to not relating, i.e., to not 
pursuing a pattern of RelComp. However, social interactions are usually more nuanced. A less 
extreme non-complementary alternative to not relating is to implement a different RM from 
the one applied by the partner. For example, instead of refusing to help a friend painting his 
apartment, one accepts to join him in the task for $40 or for a favor in return. Should the 
alternative RM be recognized by the initiator as an acceptable relational pattern and a new 
kind of RelComp replaces the previous one in the interaction. Such dynamics makes social 
interactions highly flexible, negotiable and harder to predict. Hence, Study 2 manipulated 
non-complementarity by exposing participants to responses that implemented different RMs 
from the ones implemented by the initiator. The goal was to test whether the effects of 
RelComp on affect and need fulfillment are robust when the respondent, despite his 
motivation to relate, fails to perform the complementary action.  
Furthermore, it was assumed that the differences between complementary and non-
complementary responses may vary depending on the RM of the non-complementary 
response. For instance, when initiating a CS based interaction (e.g., “I’m planning to paint my 
apartment myself soon. Would you give me a hand?”), a non-complementary EM response 
(e.g., “Of course I’ll give you a hand! You fixed my car last week… That is the least I can 
do!”) may be a more acceptable alternative to the complementary CS response (e.g., “Sure 
buddy, I’m happy to help!”) than a non-complementary MP response (e.g., “Sure! I’ll take 
about $40 for the work.”). In order to control for such differences, for each complementary 
response two non-complementary responses were manipulated according to different RMs.  
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It was also anticipated that some non-complementary responses could be perceived by 
participants as highly acceptable alternatives to the complementary response to the point that 
differences between the complementary and the non-complementary response on the 
dependent variables would not reach statistical significance. Therefore, I hypothesized that, 
even if the complementary condition did not differ significantly from one particular non-
complementary condition, Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust on the respondent, 
would be significantly higher, whereas Negative Affect and Maintenance would be 
significantly lower, on the complementary condition when compared with the two non-
complementary conditions together, and that these differences would be significant both when 
RelComp was beneficial and costly to the initiator. 
Theoretically, Trust, among the dependent variables, should be especially sensitive to 
benefits. Trust has been defined as beliefs about the partner’s concern with the trustor’s 
welfare and willingness to support the trustor’s best interests (e.g., Holmes & Rempel, 1989; 
Kramer & Carnevale, 2001; Murray, et al, 2011; Rousseau, et al., 1998; Wieselquist, et al., 
1999). Consistently with this definition, previous research has shown that trust grows as 
relational partners demonstrate care and responsiveness, by sacrificing their own interests on 
behalf of the partner’s needs (e.g., Shallcross & Simpson, 2012; Wieselquist, et al., 1999). 
These findings are consistent with a RelComp hypothesis, in that accommodation is one way 
to complement the partner’s actions. However, if the partner’s concern and willingness to 
sacrifice and accommodate to one’s immediate interests is a necessary condition for trust, 
more than RelComp itself, then Trust should be higher when responses are beneficial rather 
than costly to the initiator (i.e., higher in the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition than 
in the Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition, and higher in the Non-
complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition than in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition). 
On the other hand, if RelComp, more than having one’s immediate interests addressed by the 
partner, is a necessary condition for trust, then Trust should be higher in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-Complementary condition, regardless of benefits. The theoretical 
implication of such hypothesis is that other kinds of interpersonal strategies, other than 
accommodation, are available to enhance trust among partners. 
Finally, as in Study 1, I explored whether RelComp and Benefit affected the initiator’s 
Meta-trust (i.e., the imitator’s perception of being trusted by the respondent), and Liking of 
the respondent during the interaction.  
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4.6.1 Methods 
4.6.1.1 Participants 
Three-hundred and sixty-five residents in the U.S.A. (95.5% U.S. nationals; 55.3% 
females; with ages between 18 and 71; Mage = 34.64, SD = 11.75) completed a 15-minute 
online questionnaire. They were recruited through the online crowdsourcing marketplace 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, and paid $1 for completing the questionnaire. Forty-four percent 
(44.1%) had a bachelor degree, 33.8% had a high-school diploma or equivalent, 10.3% had a 
master or PhD degree, 5.2% had a post-secondary non-degree award, and two participants had 
less than high school. 
4.6.1.2 Design  
This was a 4 (CS vs. AR vs. EM vs. MP) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-complementary 
RM1 vs. Non-complementary RM2) x 2 (BeneficialRelComp vs. CostlyRelComp) mixed factorial 
design. Each participant was randomly assigned to two of twenty-four scenarios describing an 
interaction between two characters: one initiator and one respondent. The twenty-four 
scenarios resulted from the combination of three variables: the RM implemented by the 
initiator (RM: CS vs. AR vs. EM vs. MP); whether the respondent replied with a 
complementary RM or with one of two possible non-complementary RMs (RelComp: 
Complementary vs. Non-complementary RM1 vs. Non-complementary RM2); and whether 
the complementary response was beneficial (while the non-complementary response was 
costly) or costly (while the non-complementary was beneficial) to the initiator (Benefit: 
BeneficialRelComp vs. CostlyRelComp). RelComp and Benefit were manipulated between subjects, 
and RM was manipulated within subjects by assigning each participant to two of the four 
RMs randomly combined. As in Study 1, the levels of RelComp and Benefit were held 
constant within participants. 
4.6.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The online questionnaire was built in Qualtrics. The procedures for informing 
participants about the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of their participation, the 
confidentiality and anonymity of their answers, the contact of the main investigator for further 
information, as well as for administering the manipulations and the dependent measures, and 
for debriefing the participants were the same as in Study 1. The dependent variables were 
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Liking of the respondent, Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Maintenance, Control, initiator’s 
Trust, initiator’s Meta-trust, Belonging, and the manipulation check was Perceived RelComp. 
The measures were administered in the same order as in Study 1. 
Scenarios. Four types of scenarios were presented to participants describing interactions 
about the painting of an apartment, the writing of a report, carpooling to work, and the fixing 
of a dishwasher, respectively. The scenarios had the following structure: (a) a description of 
the context of the interaction, (b) the initiation by the first character, (c) the response by the 
second character (see full description of all scenarios in Appendix J).  
The description of the interaction context introduced the two male characters, their 
relationship, the aspect of the relationship that required coordination between the two, and the 
RM (CS vs. AR vs. EM vs. MP) to be implemented to achieve coordination. 
The aspects to be coordinated were: the painting of an apartment, in the CS scenario, the 
writing of a report, in the AR scenario; carpooling to work, in the EM scenario; and the fixing 
of a dishwasher, in the MP scenario. RMs were specified according to the experimental 
condition by describing how each aspect was going to be coordinated among the characters. 
Specifically, one of the characters would: help the other paint an apartment, in the CS 
scenario; follow an order to write the report or teach the other how write it, in the AR 
scenario; take his turn in driving the other to work, in the EM scenario; and fix an equipment 
for the other in return for payment, in the MP scenario. 
In order to manipulate Benefit, helping the other, writing or teaching how to write a 
report, driving the other to work or paying for the job were conceived as tangible benefits that 
were transferred from one character to the other, should RelComp be achieved. On the 
BeneficialRelComp condition the initiator expected a benefit from the respondent (e.g., “Peter 
just moved in to a new apartment. It looked a bit dingy, so he decided to paint it himself. Since 
Peter didn’t want to do it alone, he called his old friend John to ask for help: - Hey John, 
how’s it going? I’m planning to paint my apartment myself soon. Would you give me a 
hand?”). On the CostlyRelComp condition the initiator offered a benefit to the respondent (e.g., 
“Peter’s old friend John just moved in to a new apartment. It looked a bit dingy, so John 
decided to paint it himself. When Peter figured out that John was planning to paint it all alone 
he called John to offer his help: - Hey John, how’s it going? You’ll probably need a hand to 
paint the apartment. Do you want me to help you?”). As in Study 1, the first character 
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initiated the interaction by making a request (in the BeneficialRelComp condition) or an offer (in 
the CostlyRelComp condition) according to the relational model corresponding to the 
experimental condition of RM.  
The response of the second character differed according to the RelComp condition. In the 
Complementary condition the response was cooperative. In the BeneficialRelComp condition the 
Complementary response consisted in giving the benefit to the initiator, and hence, was 
beneficial to the initiator (e.g., “- Sure buddy, I’m happy to help”). In the CostlyRelComp 
condition the Complementary response consisted in accepting the benefit from the initiator, 
and hence, was costly to the initiator (e.g., “- Yes, buddy, I could use some help, thanks a 
lot!”).  
The Non-complementary conditions were operationalized as responses implementing 
relational models alternative to the relational model applied by the initiator25. For example in 
the CS scenario the Non-complementary responses were either implementations of AR or 
MP. In addition, the Non-complementary responses in the BeneficialRelComp condition were 
created to be more tangibly costly to the initiator than the Complementary response, either by 
not giving the benefit to the initiator or by demanding something in return from the initiator 
(e.g., MP response to CS: “Sure. I'll take about 40$ for the work”; AR response to CS: “Ok. 
We start at 7:00 am. Please have all the tools ready and pick me up at my place by 6:30. 
Don’t be late”). Conversely, in the CostlyRelComp condition, the Non-complementary responses 
were created to be more tangibly beneficial to the initiator than the Complementary response, 
either by not accepting the offer or by offering something in return (e.g., AR response to CS: 
“Yes, Peter. For the moment it seems I don’t need you because I have another assistant. But I 
want you to be on standby, just in case. Please, don’t make any plans for that day without 
talking to me first”; MP response to CS: “- Sure, Peter. Great! In that case I’ll pay you 40$ 
for half-day work”). 
Measures. The items measuring Liking (M = 5.23, SD = 1.46, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), 
Positive Affect (M = 4.72, SD = 1.88, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Negative Affect (M = 3.42, SD = 
                                                 
25 Initial versions of each scenario were pre-tested online with 206 U.S. residents via Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Thirty-two scenarios operationalizing a 4 (CS vs. AR vs. EM vs. MP by the initiator) x 4 (CS vs. AR vs. EM vs. 
MP by the respondent) x 2 (BeneficialRelComp vs. CostlyRelComp) design were evaluated on the scale of Perceived 
RelComp. Each participant was randomly assigned to four scenarios corresponding to each RM. The two Non-
complementary conditions that were rated lower on the Perceived RelComp scale for each RM scenario were 
selected for the main study. The pretested versions, however, were modified for the main study based on 
participants’ qualitative comments to each interaction. 
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2.05, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Maintenance (α first scenario = .91, α second scenario = .92, M = 3.11, SD = 
1.60, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), Control (α first scenario = .86, α second scenario = .90, M = 4.37, SD 
= 1.40, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), initiator’s Trust (α first scenario = .90, α second scenario = .92, M = 
4.35, SD = 1.46, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), initiator’s Meta-trust (α first scenario = .84, α second 
scenario = .87, M = 4.74, SD = 1.15, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), Belonging (α first scenario = .92, α 
second scenario = .94, M = 4.67, SD = 1.52, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00) and Perceived RelComp (α 
first scenario = .97, α second scenario = .98, M = 4.48, SD = 1.60, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00) were the 
same and presented in the same order as in Study 1. The original English versions of the items 
for Positive and Negative Affect (Larsen, et al., 2009), Maintenance (Finkel, et al., 2006), 
Trust and Meta-trust (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009), were adapted to the purpose of the 
study. Control, Belonging, and Perceived RelComp, were measured with the English version, 
from which the items in Study 1 were translated to Portuguese. The item of Liking was 
translated directly to English. As in Study 1 a mean score of the items composing each scale 
was computed and treated as dependent variable. 
4.6.2 Results 
Correlations between all measures are shown in Table 9. Perceived RelComp, Positive 
and Negative Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, Maintenance and Liking correlated strongly 
with one another (r ≥ |.50|). Meta-trust correlated moderately (r > |.30|) to strongly (r ≥ |.50|) 
with the other measures. 
Table 9 – Pearson correlations between all measures 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RelComp 1 1.00 .85** -.80** .86** .84** .80** .51** -.88** .66** 
Pos. Affect 2 .88** 1.00 -.84** .78** .84** .76** .50** -.84** .74** 
Neg. Affect 3 -.79** -.81** 1.00 -.72** -.76** -.69** -.46** .82** -.62** 
Control 4 .88** .82** -.71** 1.00 .76** .75** .53** -.80** .60** 
Belonging 5 .85** .85** -.73** .76** 1.00 .86** .69** -.82** .73** 
Trust 6 .83** .81** -.71** .78** .88** 1.00 .69** -.79** .72** 
Meta-trust 7 .54** .52** -.43** .49** .64** .69** 1.00 -.55** .55** 
Maintenance 8 -.91** -.88** .81** -.83** -.84** -.81** -.55** 1.00 -.73** 
Liking 9 .65** .75** -.58** .60** .74** .71** .56** -.70** 1.00 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. Correlations for the first scenario of each participant (n = 365) are reported 
in the upper part of the table. Correlations for the second scenario of each participant (n = 329) are 
reported in the lower part of the table.  
 
The data were analyzed with Multivariate Multilevel Modeling (MLM), because it does 
not meet Repeated Measures GLM’s assumption that all response measures are available for 
all individuals (Heck, Thomas & Tabata, 2014; Hox, 2010). Notice that since each participant 
was randomly assigned to two of four conditions of the within-subjects predictor—RM, they 
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had systematic missing values on at least two of the four measurement points of RM. For this 
reason, they would be excluded from Repeated Measures GLM through listwise deletion. 
The Multivariate MLM was conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics 23 MIXED procedure 
(Heck, et al., 2014). In order to control for interdependence of the data within participants a 
three-level model was tested. The three levels were specified as follows (see full syntax in 
Appendix K). 
Level 1 was defined by within-scenario variation, namely, (a) the variance and 
covariance of the residuals of each dependent measure, and (b) one separate intercept for each 
dependent measure. The variance and covariance of the residuals of each dependent measure, 
within scenario for each participant, formulated the multivariate model. To that end, 
participants’ scores on each dependent variable were organized vertically in the data file and 
represented by one single variable, DV, which was defined as the dependent variable in 
multilevel the model (Heck, et al., 2014). The scores on Negative Affect and Maintenance 
were coded in the same direction as the other variables. For each scenario within participants, 
each score was identified by a second categorical predictor (Heck, et al., 2014), IndexDV, 
coding each dependent measure from 1 = Liking, to 9 = Perceived RelComp. The multivariate 
model was formulated by specifying IndexDV as repeated variable, nested within scenario, 
with a heterogeneous first-order autoregressive variance-covariance structure (ARH1) of the 
residuals (Heck, et al., 2014; see REPEATED formulation in syntax, Appendix K). The 
ARH1 structure assumes that the residuals have heterogeneous variance among measurement 
occasions (i.e., each level of IndexDV), and that the correlations are homogenous between 
equally distant measurement occasions, but become weaker with longer time distance 
between them (Heck, et al., 2014). Finally, in order to obtain the average for each dependent 
measure within scenario, a separate intercept for each level of IndexDV was added to the 
model. This was achieved by defining IndexDV as Level 1 categorical predictor, and by 
excluding the intercept of IndexDV from the model (Heck, et al., 2014; Hox, 2010; see 
NOINT formulation on FIXED effects in syntax, Appendix K). 
Level 2 was defined by variation between scenarios, nested within participants. 
Specifically, the slope of each level of RM was added to the model, by defining RM as 
categorical predictor (see FIXED effects in syntax, Appendix K). 
Level 3 was defined by between-participants variation, namely, (a) the random effect of 
the combinations between the RM of the first scenario and the RM of the second scenario; 
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and (b) the effects of RelComp, Benefit, RelComp*Benefit interaction, and the cross-level 
interactions between RelComp, Benefit and RM. Since each participant was assigned to one 
of twelve possible combinations between the RM of the first scenario and the RM of the 
second scenario, a categorical predictor, RMComb, coding the twelve combinations was 
created. In order to control for the effect of the order (first vs. second) in which each RM was 
presented to the participant, and for the effect of the RM of the first scenario on responses to 
the second scenario, within a particular combination, the interaction RMComb*RM was 
introduced as random effect, i.e., it was allowed to vary randomly across participants. The 
random effect was estimated with a Scaled Identity variance-covariance structure, which 
assumes homogeneous variance across and no covariance between conditions (see RANDOM 
formulation in syntax, Appendix K). Notice that a model assuming a Diagonal variance-
covariance structure of the random slope—heterogeneous variance across and no covariance 
between conditions—presented non-positive definite covariance matrix errors and could not 
be estimated. The multivariate model with the random effect of the RMComb*RM interaction 
was tested and compared with the multivariate model without random effects, using -2 Log 
Likelihood criterion, with lower values meaning better fit (see M0 and M1 in Table A1, 
Appendix K). Both models included the separate intercepts of each level of Index DV at 
Level 1, but not the slope of RM at Level 2, nor the slopes of RelComp and Benefit at Level 
3. The models were estimated with Maximum Likelihood. The random-effects model (M1) 
showed significantly better fit, Δχ2(1) = 1222.34, p < .001, than the no-random-effects model 
(M0). The RMComb*RM interaction was significant, p < .001, and explained 22% of the 
residual variance, as indicated by the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC = 0.22, M1, Table 
A1, Appendix K).  
Finally, RelComp and Benefit were added as Level 3 predictors. Specifically, one slope 
was specified for each level of RelComp, Benefit, RelComp*Benefit interaction, and cross-
level two- and three-way interactions between RelComp and Benefit (at Level 3) with RM (at 
Level 2). Additionally, in order to obtain a separate slope for each dependent measure, each 
predictor was added as interaction with IndexDV (Heck, et al., 2014). The interaction with 
IndexDV applied to the main effects, as well as to the two- and three-way interactions 
between RM, RelComp, and Benefit (see FIXED formulation in syntax, Appendix K). 
In sum, the final model specified: the variance and covariance of residuals for each level 
of IndexDV; a separate intercept for each level of IndexDV; the random effect of 
RMComb*RM; and one slope for each level of the categorical predictors, RelComp, Benefit, 
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and RM, including main effects, two- and three-interactions, at each level of IndexDV. The 
final model was estimated with Maximum Likelihood and a 95% confidence interval (see full 
syntax in Appendix K).  
Table A1 in Appendix K shows the estimates of residual variance and covariance, 
corresponding to the repeated and random effects, and the -2 Log Likelihood value for the 
final model (column M8). The variance explained by each predictor from models M2 to M8, 
indicated by Proportional Reduction in Variance26, is also shown in Table A1 in appendix K. 
The means and standard errors of each dependent measure at each level of the RelComp, 
Benefit and RM are presented in Tables 10 and 11. 
4.6.2.1 Preliminary analyses 
The hypotheses predicted significant differences between conditions of RelComp on the 
dependent measures. These differences would be revealed by a significant 
RelComp*IndexDV interaction, if the predicted effect of RelComp was constant across 
conditions of Benefit and RM, or by significant IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit, 
IndexDV*RelComp*RM, and IndexDV*RelComp* Benefit*RM interactions, if the predicted 
effect of RelComp varied across conditions of Benefit and RM. 
As expected, the omnibus tests of the fixed effects showed statistically significant 
interactions between IndexDV and RelComp, F(18, 1169.66) = 39.78, p < .001; between 
IndexDV, RelComp and Benefit, F(18, 1169.66) = 15.02, p < .001; between IndexDV, 
RelComp and RM, F(54, 1169.66) = 3.82, p < .001; and between IndexDV, RelComp, Benefit 
and RM, F(54, 1169.66) = 6.95, p < .001. There was also a main effect of IndexDV, F(9, 
1169.66) = 1691.31, p < .001; two-way interactions of IndexDV with Benefit, F(9, 1169.66) = 
9.54, p < .001, and of IndexDV with RM, F(27, 1169.66) = 7.18, p < .001; and a significant 
three-way interaction of IndexDV with Benefit and RM, F(27, 1169.66) = 7.05, p < .001. 
In the following sections the four-way interaction is described (Tables 10 and 11). First, 
the hypotheses were tested by comparing each complementary condition with the two non-
                                                 
26 Proportional reduction in variance (PRV = (varianceNoPredictor – variancePredictor) / varianceNoPredictor; Peugh, 
2010) is a measure of effect size that compares the residual variance of a model (e.g., M2) without a predictor 
(e.g., Benefit) and the residual variance of a model with the predictor (e.g., M3), thus, showing the amount of 
residual variance that is reduced on the dependent variable by adding the fixed effect of the predictor (Heck, et 
al., 2014) 
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complementary conditions together with planned contrasts (1, -0.5, -0.5) on each dependent 
variable, at each level of Benefit and RM. The planned contrasts were defined with the /TEST 
subcommand (see example on syntax, Appendix K). Second, differences between the 
Complementary condition and each Non-complementary condition separately, at each level of 
Benefit and RM, were examined with Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests. Mean differences 
between conditions of Benefit and RM at each level of the other predictors were also explored 
with post-hoc tests. 
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Table 10 – Estimated marginal means, standard errors, planned contrasts and post-hoc tests for Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking 
 Communal Sharing  Authority Ranking 
 Comp Non-comp AR Non-comp MP  
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 Comp Non-comp EM Non-comp MP  
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p  M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p 
  RelComp Beneficial  RelComp Beneficial 
RelComp 1 x 6.06a 0.19 1 x 4.99b 0.22 12 x 3.07c 0.22  2.04 0.24 <.001  12 x 5.59a 0.18 2 x 3.11b 0.23 1 x 3.58b 0.21  2.24 0.24 <.001 
Positive Affect 1 x 6.57a 0.21 1 x 5.65b 0.24 12 x 2.92c 0.24  2.28 0.27 <.001  12 x 5.86a 0.21 2 x 2.79b 0.25 1 x 3.59b 0.24  2.67 0.27 <.001 
Negative Affect-rev 1 x 6.17a 0.25 1 x 5.00b 0.29 1 x 2.69c 0.29  2.32 0.32 <.001  1 x 5.69a 0.24 1 x 2.29b 0.30 1 x 3.19b 0.28  2.96 0.32 <.001 
Control 12 x 5.41a 0.20 1 x 4.79a 0.23 12 x 3.10b 0.23  1.47 0.26 <.001  1 x 5.81a 0.20 2 x 3.26b 0.24 1 x 3.77b 0.23  2.30 0.26 <.001 
Belonging 1 x 6.27a 0.19 1 x 5.25b 0.22 12 x 3.25c 0.22  2.02 0.24 <.001  2 x 5.24a 0.19 2 x 3.28b 0.23 1 x 3.91b 0.21  1.65 0.24 <.001 
Trust 1 x 5.64a 0.19 1 x 5.11a 0.22 12 x 3.35b 0.22  1.41 0.25 <.001  1 x 5.30a 0.19 2 x 3.14b 0.23 1 x 3.94c 0.22  1.76 0.25 <.001 
Meta-trust 1 x 5.47a 0.22 1 x 4.54b 0.25 1 x 4.02b 0.25  1.19 0.28 <.001  1 x 5.11a 0.22 1 x 3.99b 0.26 1 x 4.10b 0.25  1.07 0.28 <.001 
Maintenance-rev 1 x 6.31a 0.19 1 x 5.24b 0.22 12 x 3.54c 0.22  1.92 0.25 <.001  12 x 5.77a 0.19 2 x 3.58b 0.23 1 x 3.91b 0.22  2.03 0.25 <.001 
Liking 1 x 6.49a 0.22 1 x 5.81a 0.25 1 x 4.77b 0.25  1.20 0.28 <.001  2 x 5.33a 0.22 2 x 4.08b 0.27 1 x 4.52b 0.25  1.03 0.28 <.001 
 n = 35 n = 26 n = 26      n = 36 n = 24 n = 27     
  RelComp Costly  RelComp Costly 
RelComp 1 x 6.12a 0.19 1 y 2.82b 0.21 1 y 4.30c 0.21  2.56 0.24 <.001  12 x 5.70a 0.19 2 y 4.72b 0.22 1 y 4.41b 0.22  1.14 0.25 <.001 
Positive Affect 1 x 6.21a 0.21 1 y 2.79b 0.23 1 y 4.79c 0.23  2.42 0.27 <.001  1 x 5.88a 0.21 2 y 4.96b 0.25 1 y 4.64b 0.25  1.08 0.27 <.001 
Negative Affect-rev 1 x 6.27a 0.25 1 y 2.75b 0.28 1 y 4.79c 0.28  2.50 0.32 <.001  1 x 6.00a 0.25 2 y 4.60b 0.29 1 y 4.40b 0.29  1.50 0.32 <.001 
Control 1 x 5.32a 0.21 1 y 2.88b 0.22 1 y 4.27c 0.22  1.75 0.26 <.001  1 x 5.65a 0.21 2 y 4.76b 0.24 12 y 4.61b 0.24  0.97 0.26 <.001 
Belonging 1 x 6.07a 0.19 1 y 3.06b 0.21 12 y 5.06c 0.21  2.01 0.24 <.001  12 x 5.58a 0.19 2 y 5.18a 0.22 2 y 4.67b 0.22  0.65 0.25 .008 
Trust 1 x 5.62a 0.20 1 y 3.15b 0.22 12 y 5.01a 0.22  1.54 0.25 <.001  12 x 5.22a 0.20 2 y 4.85ab 0.23 1 x 4.42b 0.23  0.59 0.25 .020 
Meta-trust 1 x 5.66a 0.22 1 x 4.71b 0.24 1 y 5.05ab 0.24  0.78 0.28 .006  1 x 5.31a 0.22 1  y 5.21a 0.26 1 y 4.93a 0.26  0.24 0.29 >.250 
Maintenance-rev 1 x 6.32a 0.20 1 y 3.26b 0.22  1 y 4.91c 0.22  2.23 0.25 <.001  1 x 5.99a 0.20 2 y 4.99b 0.23 1 y 4.99b 0.23  1.00 0.25 <.001 
Liking 1 x 6.24a 0.22 12 y 4.79b 0.25 1 y 6.04a 0.25  0.82 0.28 .004  1 y 6.00a 0.22 1 y 5.40a 0.26 1 y5.44a 0.26  0.58 0.29 .045 
 n = 34 n = 28 n = 28      n = 34 n = 25 n = 25     
Note: Comp = Complementary, Non-comp = Non-complementary. Superscripts a, b and c identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp. Superscripts x and 
y identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of Benefit. Superscripts 1, 2 and 3 identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RM across Tables 10 and 11. 
Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. 
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Table 11 – Estimated marginal means, standard errors, planned contrasts and post-hoc test for Equality Matching and Market Pricing 
  Equality Matching  Market Pricing 
 Comp Non-comp  AR Non-comp MP  
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 Comp Non-comp CS Non-comp AR  
Contrast  
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p  M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p 
  RelComp Beneficial  RelComp Beneficial 
RelComp 1 x 5.77a 0.19 2 x 3.68b 0.22 12 x 2.83c 0.22  2.51 0.24 <.001  2 x 4.99a 0.19 2 x 3.30b 0.23 1 x 2.62b 0.21  2.03 0.24 <.001 
Positive Affect 12 x 6.00a 0.21 3 x 3.89b 0.24 2 x 2.56c 0.25  2.78 0.27 <.001  2 x 5.29a 0.21 23 x 3.74b 0.26 2 x 2.46c 0.23  2.18 0.27 <.001 
Negative Affect-rev 1 x 6.03a 0.25 3 x 3.65b 0.29 1 x 2.12c 0.29  3.14 0.32 <.001  1 x 5.60a 0.25 13 x 4.17b 0.30 1 x 2.43c 0.28  2.30 0.32 <.001 
Control 12 x 5.19a 0.20 2 x 3.60b 0.23 12 x 2.95b 0.24  1.91 0.26 <.001  2 x 4.96a 0.20 2 x 3.57b 0.25 2 x 2.80b 0.22  1.77 0.26 <.001 
Belonging 12 x 5.60a 0.19 3 x 4.19b 0.22 2 x 2.98c 0.22  2.01 0.25 <.001  2 x 5.13a 0.19 3 x 4.33b 0.23 2 x 2.48c 0.21  1.72 0.24 <.001 
Trust 12 x 4.99a 0.20 2 x 3.64b 0.22 23 x 2.86c 0.23  1.74 0.25 <.001  2 x 4.43a 0.19 2 x 3.21b 0.24 3 x 2.19c 0.22  1.74 0.25 <.001 
Meta-trust 1 x 5.11a 0.22 1 x 4.85ab 0.25 1 x 4.10b 0.26  0.64 0.29 .026  1 x 4.79a 0.22 1 x 4.61a 0.27 1 x 3.58b 0.24  0.70 0.28 .014 
Maintenance-rev 12 x 6.06a 0.20 2 x 4.19b 0.22 12 x 3.32c 0.23  2.20 0.25 <.001  2 x 5.39a 0.19 2 x 3.87b 0.24 2 x 2.82c 0.22  2.05 0.25 <.001 
Liking 12 x 5.88a 0.22 12 x 4.96b 0.25 12 x 3.84c 0.26  1.48 0.29 <.001  2 x 5.29a 0.22 2 x 4.04b 0.27 2 x 3.21b 0.25  1.66 0.29 <.001 
 n = 34 n = 26 n = 25      n = 35 n = 23 n = 28     
  RelComp Costly  RelComp Costly 
RelComp 3 y 4.76a 0.20 1 x 3.31b 0.21 2 y 5.47c 0.21  0.37 0.25 .132  23 x 5.00a 0.20 2 y 4.32a 0.21 1 y 4.45a 0.21  0.62 0.24 .012 
Positive Affect 2 y 5.03a 0.22 1 x 3.37b 0.24 2 y 6.11c 0.24  0.29 0.27 >.250  2 y 4.56a 0.22 2 y 5.46b 0.23 12 y 5.41b 0.23  -0.89 0.27 .001 
Negative Affect-rev 2 y 5.03a 0.26 1 x 3.00b 0.28 2 y 6.04c 0.28  0.51 0.33 .116  2 y 4.75a 0.26 2 x 4.93a 0.28 12 y 5.31a 0.27  -0.37 0.32 >.250 
Control 2 y 4.48a 0.21 13 x 3.61b 0.23 2 y 5.32c 0.23  0.02 0.26 >.250  2 x 4.51a 0.21 23 x 4.00a 0.22 1 y 4.32a 0.22  0.35 0.26 .178 
Belonging 2 x 5.11a 0.20 1 y 3.42b 0.21 1 y 5.82c 0.21  0.49 0.25 .050  3 y 4.08a 0.20 2 y 5.26b 0.21 12 y 5.10b 0.21  -1.10 0.25 <.001 
Trust 2 x 4.68a 0.20 1 x 3.27b 0.22 2 y 5.50c 0.22  0.29 0.25 .247  3 y 3.72a 0.20 2 y 4.69b 0.22 12 y 4.79b 0.21  -1.02 0.25 <.001 
Meta-trust 1 x 5.07a 0.23 1 x 4.62a 0.25 1 y 5.42a 0.25  0.05 0.29 >.250  2 y 3.54a 0.23 1 x 4.61b 0.24 y 4.61b 0.24  -1.07 0.29 <.001 
Maintenance-rev 2 y 5.20a 0.20 1 x 3.69b 0.22 2 y 5.92c 0.22  0.39 0.25 .125  2 x 5.24a 0.20 2 y 5.24a 0.22 12 y 5.39a 0.21  -0.07 0.25 >.250 
Liking 1 x 5.75a 0.23 2 x 4.37b 0.25 1 y 6.22a 0.25  0.45 0.29 .117  2 y 4.44a 0.23 1 y 5.68b 0.25 1 y 5.66b 0.24  -1.22 0.29 <.001 
 n = 32 n = 27 n = 27      n = 32 n = 28 n = 29     
Note: Comp = Complementary, Non-comp = Non-complementary. Superscripts a, b and c identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp. Superscripts x and 
y identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of Benefit. Superscripts 1, 2 and 3 identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RM across Tables 10 and 11. 
Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. 
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4.6.2.2 Manipulation Check 
I predicted that Perceived RelComp would be higher in the Complementary condition 
than the in two the Non-complementary conditions together at each level of Benefit and RM. 
As expected, planned contrasts showed that Perceived RelComp was higher in the 
Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary conditions, in the BeneficialRelComp 
condition and in the CostlyRelComp condition of the CS, AR (Table 10) and MP (Table 11) 
scenarios. Perceived RelComp was also higher in the Complementary condition than in the 
Non-complementary conditions in the EM (Table 11) scenario, but only in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition.  
Post-hoc tests showed that Perceived RelComp was higher in the Complementary 
condition when compared with each Non-complementary condition separately, in both the 
BeneficialRelComp condition and the CostlyRelComp condition of the CS and AR scenarios (Table 
10). In the BeneficialRelComp condition of the EM and MP (Table 11) scenarios, Perceived 
RelComp was higher in the Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary 
condition. However, in the CostlyRelComp condition of the EM scenario (Table 11) Perceived 
RelComp was significantly higher in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary AR condition, as expected, but significantly lower in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-complementary MP condition. In the CostlyRelComp condition of the 
MP scenario (Table 11), the Complementary condition was not significantly different from 
neither of the two Non-complementary conditions, when analyzed separately. 
4.6.2.3 Effects of RelComp on the Dependent Variables 
The predicted effects of RelComp on Positive and Negative Affect, Control, Belonging 
and Trust would be described by the four-way interaction provided that the differences 
between the Complementary condition and the two Non-complementary conditions were in 
the predicted direction across all conditions of Benefit and RM. More specifically I 
hypothesized that Positive Affect, Negative Affect reversed (Negative Affect-rev), Control, 
Belonging, Trust and Maintenance reversed (Maintenance-rev) would be higher, in the 
Complementary condition when compared with the two the Non-complementary conditions 
together, at each level of Benefit and RM.  
As expected, in the BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS, AR, EM and MP scenarios, and 
in the CostlyRelComp condition of the CS and AR scenarios, planned contrasts showed that 
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Positive Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Control, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev were 
higher in the Complementary than in the Non-complementary conditions (Tables 10 and 11). 
However, in the CostlyRelComp condition of the EM scenario, planned contrasts showed no 
significant differences between Complementary and Non-complementary conditions on each 
dependent measure (Table 11). Unexpectedly, in the CostlyRelComp condition of the MP 
scenario, planned contrasts showed that Positive Affect, Belonging and Trust were lower in 
the Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary conditions, and that there were 
no differences between conditions on Negative Affect-rev, Control and Maintenance-rev 
(Table 11). 
A more conservative version of the hypotheses would predict higher ratings of Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Control, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev in the 
Complementary conditions when compared with each Non-complementary condition 
separately, with post-hoc tests, at each level of Benefit and RM. As expected, in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS, AR, EM and MP scenarios post-hoc tests showed that 
differences on Positive and Negative Affect-rev, Control, Belonging, Trust, and Maintenance-
rev, were significant and in the predicted direction when the Complementary condition was 
compared with each Non-complementary condition (Tables 10 and 11). Exceptionally, in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS scenario, Control and Trust were only statistically higher 
in the Complementary condition when compared with the Non-complementary MP condition 
(Table 10).  
Likewise, in the CostlyRelComp condition of the CS and AR scenarios (Table 10), post-hoc 
tests showed that differences between the Complementary condition and each Non-
complementary condition on Positive Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Control, and Maintenance-
rev were statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Belonging was also 
significantly higher in the Complementary condition when compared with each Non-
complementary condition, with the exception of the Non-complementary EM condition of the 
AR scenario. Trust, on the other hand, was only significantly higher in the Complementary 
condition when compared with the Non-complementary AR condition of the CS scenario, and 
with the Non-complementary MP condition of the AR scenario. 
In the EM CostlyRelComp condition, post-hoc tests (Table 11) showed that Positive Affect, 
Negative Affect-rev, Control, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev were higher in the 
Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary AR condition, as predicted, but 
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unexpectedly lower in the Complementary condition, than in the Non-complementary MP 
condition. 
Finally, in the MP CostlyRelComp condition (Table 11), post-hoc tests corroborated the 
results of the planned contrasts. Positive affect, Belonging and Trust were lower in the 
Complementary than in each Non-complementary condition separately, and there were no 
differences between conditions on Negative Affect-rev, Control and Maintenance-rev. 
4.6.2.4 Exploratory Analyses 
Effects of RelComp on Liking and Meta-trust. According to planned contrasts (Tables 
10 and 11), Liking was higher in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary conditions, in the BeneficialRelComp condition of CS, AR, EM and MP 
scenarios, and in the CostlyRelComp condition of the CS and AR scenarios. On the other hand, 
in the CostlyRelComp condition of the MP scenario, Liking was lower in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-complementary conditions. Consistently, post-hoc tests (Tables 10 
and 11) showed that, in the BeneficialRelComp condition, Liking was higher in the 
Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary condition separately, but only in 
the AR, EM and MP scenarios. In the BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS scenario, Liking 
was only higher in the Complementary condition when compared with the MP Non-
complementary condition. In the CostlyRelComp condition, post-hoc tests revealed that Liking 
was higher in the Complementary condition of the CS and EM scenarios when compared with 
the AR Non-complementary condition; and lower in the Complementary condition of the MP 
scenario when compared with each non-complementary condition, and of the EM scenario 
when compared with the AR Non-complementary condition. In the CostlyRelComp condition of 
the AR scenario, post-hoc tests showed no differences between conditions. 
Likewise, planned contrasts (Tables 10 and 11) showed that Meta-trust was higher in the 
Complementary condition when compared with the two Non-complementary conditions 
together, in the BeneficialRelComp condition of CS, AR, EM and MP scenarios. In the 
CostlyRelComp condition, planned contrasts revealed that Meta-trust did not differ between 
conditions of RelComp, in the AR and EM scenarios, but was higher in the Complementary 
condition of the CS scenario, and lower in the Complementary condition of the MP scenario, 
than in the Non-complementary conditions. In the BeneficialRelComp condition, post-hoc tests 
showed that Meta-trust was higher in the Complementary condition than in each Non-
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complementary condition, but only in the CS and AR scenarios (Table 10). In the EM and MP 
scenarios (Table 11), Meta-trust was only higher when the Complementary condition was 
compared with the Non-complementary MP condition in the EM scenario, and with the Non-
complementary AR condition in the MP scenario. In the CostlyRelComp condition, post-hoc 
tests corroborated the results of planned contrasts for the MP scenario (Table 11). However, 
in the CS scenario (Table 10) post-hoc tests showed that Meta-trust was higher in the 
Complementary condition, but only when compared with the AR Non-complementary 
condition. There were no differences in the AR and EM scenarios. 
Differences between conditions of Benefit. The effects of Benefit were explored by 
comparing the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition with the Complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp condition, and the Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition with the 
Non-complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition on the dependent measures, in each RM (see 
post-hoc tests in Table 10 and 11). A theory of Benefit would predict higher ratings of 
Positive Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Control, Belonging, Trust, Meta-trust, Maintenance-rev 
and Liking in the conditions that were beneficial to the initiator (i.e., Complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp and Non-complementary CostlyRelComp condition) than in the conditions that 
were costly to the initiator (i.e., Complementary/ CostlyRelComp and Non-complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp).  
Differently from a Benefit hypothesis, in the CS and AR scenarios there were no 
differences between the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition and the Complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp condition on the dependent variables, with the exception of Liking in the AR 
scenario. However, Liking was higher in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition, i.e., 
when the complementary response was costly to the initiator.  
In the EM and MP scenarios there were differences between the Complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp condition and the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition on some 
dependent measures. As predicted by a theory of Benefit, Positive Affect, Negative Affect-
rev, Control and Maintenance-rev in the EM scenario, and Positive Affect, Negative Affect-
rev, Belonging, Trust, Meta-trust and Liking in the MP scenario were higher in the 
Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition (i.e., when the complementary response was 
beneficial to the initiator), than in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition (i.e., when the 
complementary response was costly to the initiator). Notice, that Perceived RelComp, was 
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also higher in the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition, than in the Complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp condition of the EM scenario. 
Regarding the Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp and Non-complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp conditions, in the Non-complementary MP condition of the CS scenario, in the 
Non-complementary EM  and Non-complementary MP conditions of the AR scenario, in the 
Non-complementary MP condition of the EM scenario, and in the Non-complementary CS 
and Non-complementary AR conditions of the MP scenario, all dependent measures—except 
Trust in Non-complementary MP condition of the AR scenario, and Negative Affect-rev, 
Control and Meta-trust in the Non-complementary CS condition of the MP scenario—were 
higher in the CostlyRelComp condition (i.e., when the non-complementary conditions were 
beneficial) than in the BeneficialRelComp condition (i.e., when the non-complementary 
conditions were costly), as would be predicted by a theory of Benefit. Notice, however, that 
Perceived RelComp was also higher in the CostlyRelComp condition than in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition of each aforementioned scenario. 
On the other hand, contrary to a Benefit hypothesis, all dependent measures in the Non-
complementary AR condition of the CS scenario—except Meta-trust—and Belonging in the 
Non-complementary AR condition of the EM scenario were lower in the CostlyRelComp 
condition (i.e., when the non-complementary conditions were beneficial) than in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition (i.e., when the non-complementary conditions were costly). 
Perceived RelComp was also lower in the CostlyRelComp condition than in the BeneficialRelComp 
condition of the Non-complementary AR condition of the CS scenario. 
Differences between Non-complementary conditions. As anticipated, the effect of the 
Non-complementary conditions on the dependent measures varied according to the RM of the 
Non-complementary response. Post-hoc tests showed that Perceived RelComp differed 
between the Non-complementary conditions, in both conditions of Benefit of the CS and EM 
scenarios (Tables 10 and 11). More specifically, in the BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS 
and EM scenarios, Perceived RelComp was higher in the AR Non-complementary condition 
than in the MP Non-complementary condition. In the CostlyRelComp condition of both 
scenarios, however, it was the other way around: Perceived RelComp was lower in the AR 
Non-complementary condition than in the MP Non-complementary condition. Interestingly, 
the significant differences between the Non-complementary conditions on the dependent 
variables followed the manipulation check, as illustrated next. 
Relational Complementarity 
140 
In the BeneficialRelComp condition of the CS and EM scenarios, Positive Affect, Negative 
Affect-rev, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev were higher in the AR Non-
complementary condition than in the MP Non-complementary condition. In the CostlyRelComp 
condition of the CS and EM scenarios, Positive Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Control, 
Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev, were lower in the AR Non-complementary condition 
than in the MP Non-complementary condition (see Tables 10 and 11). 
In the BeneficialRelComp condition of the MP scenario, Perceived RelComp was marginally 
higher (p = .083) in the CS condition than in the AR Non-complementary condition. 
Likewise, Positive Affect, Negative Affect-rev, Belonging, Trust and Maintenance-rev were 
higher in Non-complementary CS condition than in the AR Non-complementary condition.  
Furthermore, although there were no significant differences between the Non-
complementary conditions of the AR scenario on Perceived RelComp, the differences on 
Trust, in the BeneficialRelComp condition, and on Belonging, in the CostlyRelComp condition, 
followed the tendency of the manipulation check (Table 10). 
Differences between RMs. Differences between RMs were explored by comparing RMs 
within the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition, the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp 
condition, each Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition, and each Non-
complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition on the dependent measures. In general, differences on 
the dependent variables followed differences on the manipulation check (see post-hoc tests in 
Tables 10 and 11), as described next. 
In the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition, Perceived RelComp was higher in the 
CS and AR scenarios than in the EM and MP scenarios. With the exception of Control which 
was higher in AR, the dependent variables were higher in the CS scenario, followed by the 
AR scenario, and lower in either the EM or MP scenarios. In the Complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp condition, Perceived RelComp was higher in the CS scenario and lower in the 
EM and MP scenario. With the exception of Control which was higher in AR, of Meta-trust 
and Negative Affect-rev which did not differ between RMs, the dependent variables were 
higher in the CS scenario, and lower in either the EM or MP scenarios.  
In the first Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition (see Non-comp AR in CS 
scenario, Non-comp EM in AR scenario, Non-comp AR in EM scenario, Non-comp CS in 
MP scenario, in Tables 10 and 11), Perceived RelComp was higher in the AR and MP 
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scenarios than in the EM and CS scenarios. Likewise, with the exception of Meta-trust which 
did not differ between RMs, all dependent variables were higher in either the AR or MP 
scenarios, and lower in either the EM or CS scenarios. In the first Non-complementary/ 
CostlyRelComp condition, Perceived RelComp was higher in the CS than in the EM, MP and AR 
scenarios. Similarly, with the exception of Meta-trust which did not differ between RMs, all 
dependent variables were higher the CS scenario, and lower in either the AR or MP scenario.  
In the second Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition (see Non-comp MP in CS 
scenario, Non-comp MP in AR scenario, Non-comp MP in EM scenario, Non-comp AR in 
MP scenario, in Tables 10 and 11), Perceived RelComp was higher in the EM scenario than in 
the MP, AR, and CS scenarios. Likewise, with the exception of Meta-trust and Liking which 
did not differ between RMs, all dependent variables were higher in the EM, scenario. In the 
second Non-complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition, Perceived RelComp was higher in the 
AR scenario and lower in the MP scenario. Similarly, with the exception of Liking which was 
higher in CS, and of Negative Affect-rev and Meta-trust which did not differ between RMs, 
all dependent variables were higher the CS scenario, and lower in either the AR or MP 
scenario. 
4.6.3 Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to test the hypotheses that participants would 
experience higher Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, and lower Negative Affect and 
Maintenance, in complementary interactions than in non-complementary interactions.  
In addition, since experiencing RelComp from the initiator’s perspective is usually 
confounded with getting a benefit from the respondent—as in the social interactions described 
in Study 1 scenarios—a second goal of this study was to rule out the effects of Benefit from 
the effects of RelComp, and show that the effects observed in Study 1 are better explained by 
RelComp than by Benefit. This was achieved by manipulating two conditions of Benefit. In 
the first condition, the BeneficialRelComp condition, the complementary responses were more 
beneficial to the initiator than the non-complementary responses. In the second condition, the 
CostlyRelComp condition, the complementary responses were more costly to the initiator than 
the non-complementary responses. This way, whereas in the BeneficialRelComp condition 
RelComp and Benefit were manipulated in the same direction, in the CostlyRelComp condition 
they were manipulated in opposite directions, i.e., against each other. 
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Finally, in Study 1 the respondent either implemented the complementary RM—in the 
Complementary condition—or did not implement a RM at all—in the Non-complementary 
condition. In Study 2, however, Non-complementarity was operationalized with the 
respondent implementing one of two possible RMs that were different from the RM applied 
by the initiator. The goal was to test whether the effects observed in Study 1 were robust 
when the respondent, instead of not implementing a RM, implemented an alternative one. 
The effects observed in Study 1 were successfully replicated. When RelComp was 
beneficial to the initiator (BeneficialRelComp condition), participants in CS, AR, EM and MP 
scenarios experienced higher Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, and lower Negative 
Affect and Maintenance, in complementary interactions than in non-complementary 
interactions. When analyzing each Non-complementary condition separately, all differences 
were statistically significant with two exceptions: when the Complementary condition was 
compared with the Non-complementary AR condition of the CS scenario the differences on 
Control and Trust were not significant. 
When RelComp was costly to the initiator (CostlyRelComp condition), however, the 
hypotheses were only partially supported. Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust were 
higher, and Negative Affect and Maintenance were lower, in the Complementary condition 
when compared with the Non-complementary conditions of the CS and AR scenarios, and 
with the Non-complementary AR condition of the EM scenario. When each Non-
complementary condition was analyzed separately in the CS and AR scenarios, all differences 
were statistically significant with three exceptions: when the Complementary condition was 
compared with the Non-complementary EM condition of the AR scenario differences on 
Belonging and Trust were not significant; and when the Complementary condition was 
compared with the Non-complementary MP condition of the CS scenario differences on Trust 
were also not significant. With these exceptions, the hypotheses were supported, even though 
complementarity was more costly to the initiator than non-complementarity. 
On the other hand, when the costly Complementary condition (in the CostlyRelComp 
condition) was compared with the Non-complementary MP condition of the EM scenario, and 
with the two Non-complementary conditions of the MP scenario, the differences on the 
dependent variables were either not significant or significant but in the opposite direction to 
the one predicted. 
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Put differently, the hypotheses on most dependent variables were supported by the 
majority of the available comparisons between Complementary and Non-complementary 
responses across conditions of Benefit and RM. For each dependent variable, on each 
condition of Benefit, there were eight comparisons available to test the hypotheses: 
Complementary vs. Non-complementary RM1 and Complementary vs. Non-complementary 
RM2, for each of the four RM scenarios. In the BeneficialRelComp condition, eight comparisons 
supported the hypotheses for Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Belonging and Maintenance; 
and seven comparisons supported the hypotheses for Control and Belonging. In the 
CostlyRelComp condition, five among the eight comparisons available supported the hypotheses 
for Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Control and Maintenance; four comparisons supported 
the hypotheses for Belonging, and three comparisons supported the hypothesis for Trust. 
Since in the CostlyRelComp condition the effects of RelComp ran against the effects of Benefit, 
the results showed that, in these conditions, the effects of RelComp on the dependent 
variables were sufficiently robust to override the effects of Benefit. 
In contrast, a theory of Benefit would be supported, in the CostlyRelComp condition, by 
significant differences between conditions of RelComp in the opposite direction to the one 
predicted. Indeed, in the EM scenario, Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust were 
lower, and Negative Affect and Maintenance were higher, in the Complementary condition 
than in the Non-complementary MP condition. Similarly, in the MP scenario, Positive Affect, 
Belonging and Trust were lower in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary conditions. Hence, the Benefit hypothesis was supported for Negative Affect, 
Control, and Maintenance by only two of the eight available comparisons, and for Positive 
Affect, Belonging and Trust by three comparisons.  
In sum, even though Benefit did have an effect on some dependent variables in some RM 
scenarios, these effects were less consistent than the overall effects of RelComp. On most 
dependent variables, the RelComp hypothesis was supported by a larger number of 
comparisons than the Benefit hypothesis. Hence, the results show that the effects observed in 
Study 1 and in the BeneficialRelComp condition of Study 2 can be better explained by RelComp 
than by Benefit. The conditions in which the hypotheses were not supported are discussed in 
what follows. Crucially, the results that did not support the experimental hypotheses were still 
consistent with the theoretical predictions, insofar as variations on the manipulation check are 
taken into account. 
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First, in the CS scenario, when RelComp was beneficial (BeneficialRelComp condition), 
despite being significantly higher in the Complementary condition, Perceived RelComp was 
still high (≈ 5) in the Non-complementary AR condition. Hence, the lack of statistically 
significant differences between the two conditions on Control and Trust can, to some extent, 
be explained by the high levels of Perceived RelComp in the two conditions.  
Likewise, when RelComp was costly (CostlyRelComp condition), Perceived RelComp was 
also high in the Non-complementary MP condition of the CS scenario (= 4.30) and in the 
Non-complementary EM condition of the AR scenario (= 4.72), even though it was 
significantly higher in the Complementary condition. Therefore, the lack of differences on 
Belonging, in the AR scenario, and on Trust, in the CS and AR scenarios, relative to the 
Complementary condition can be also explained by the high levels of Perceived RelComp in 
these conditions. 
Second, in the EM scenario, when RelComp was costly (CostlyRelComp condition) and the 
Complementary condition was compared with the Non-complementary MP condition, the 
results were in a direction opposite to what was predicted. Positive Affect, Control, Belonging 
and Trust were higher, whereas Negative Affect and Maintenance were lower, in the Non-
complementary MP condition than in the Complementary condition. Still, consistently with 
the theory, the Non-complementary MP response was perceived as more complementary than 
the Complementary response, as shown by the results on the manipulation check. Therefore, 
one explanation for these results is that Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust were 
higher, whereas Negative Affect and Maintenance were lower, in the conditions that were 
perceived as more complementary than in those perceived as less complementary. These 
results are correlational evidence in support of the theory, which alone do not allow ruling out 
the effect of Benefit, since the response perceived as the most complementary was also the 
most beneficial to the initiator. However, since Benefit cannot explain the differences 
between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementary AR condition, these 
results altogether suggest that RelComp is a more satisfactory explanation. 
Third, in the MP scenario, when RelComp was costly (CostlyRelComp condition), there 
were no differences between conditions on Negative Affect, Control and Maintenance, and 
the effects of RelComp on Positive Affect, Belonging, and Trust were in the opposite 
direction to what was expected. One interpretation of these results is that, in MP interactions, 
need fulfillment and affective states are more strongly affected by benefits than by RelComp, 
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or, at least, are equally affected by both. However, once again, the results on the manipulation 
check suggest an alternative explanation. Perceived RelComp was equally high (> 4) in all 
conditions of RelComp, which shows that the manipulation of RelComp was unsuccessful. 
Therefore, when RelComp was costly in the MP scenario—meaning that the non-
complementary responses were beneficial—the lack of differences between conditions of 
RelComp on Negative Affect, Control and Maintenance can be better explained by the lack of 
differences in Perceived RelComp than by the higher benefits of the Non-complementary 
responses. On the other hand, the negative differences between Complementary and Non-
complementary conditions on Positive Affect, Belonging, and Trust cannot be interpreted as 
an overriding effect of Benefit over RelComp, but instead, as reflecting either effects of 
Benefit, or effects of the RM of the response (i.e., MP in complementary condition, CS and 
AR in the non-complementary conditions), when Perceived RelComp is constant. 
In addition to effects of RelComp, differences between conditions of Benefit when 
RelComp was constant were also explored, by comparing beneficial Complementary 
conditions (BeneficialRelComp condition) with costly Complementary conditions (CostlyRelComp 
condition), and beneficial Non-complementary conditions (CostlyRelComp condition) with 
costly Non-complementary conditions (BeneficialRelComp condition). When the beneficial 
Complementary conditions were compared with the costly Complementary conditions, affect 
and need fulfillment were only significantly improved with benefits in the EM and MP 
scenarios, whereas in the complementary conditions of the CS and AR scenarios benefits did 
not make a difference. On the other hand, benefits improved affect and need fulfillment 
among the Non-complementary conditions, but only in each Non-complementary condition of 
the AR and MP scenarios, and in the Non-complementary MP conditions of the CS and EM 
scenarios. In the Non-complementary AR condition of the EM scenario differences were not 
significant, and in the Non-complementary AR condition of the CS scenario affect and need 
fulfillment were actually improved in the costly condition (i.e., BeneficialRelComp condition). 
These results suggest that, although Benefit alone cannot fully explain the effects observed, 
benefits do matter to affect and need fulfillment, at least in some kinds of interactions or 
relationships, and especially when interactions are non-complementary. 
Once again, however, most comparisons between beneficial and costly conditions were 
followed by the results on the manipulation check. The beneficial responses were perceived as 
more complementary than the costly responses in most conditions of RelComp in which 
affect and need fulfillment were improved by benefit, namely the Complementary condition 
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of the EM scenario, the two Non-complementary conditions of the AR and MP scenarios, and 
the Non-complementary MP condition of the CS and EM scenarios. On the other hand, in the 
Non-complementary AR condition of the CS scenario, in which affect and need fulfillment 
were improved in the costly conditions, the costly response was perceived as more 
complementary than the beneficial response. These results are consistent with the idea that 
need fulfillment and affect are improved in interactions that are perceived as more 
complementary, and, hence, reinforce the argument that Benefit alone cannot fully explain the 
effects observed. 
The previous paragraph illustrates that some beneficial Complementary and Non-
complementary responses were rated higher on Perceived RelComp than the costly 
counterparts. Why was that so? One explanation is that Benefit is one aspect of perceived 
RelComp. This means that responses by the partner should be perceived as more 
complementary the more beneficial they are to the initiator. However, the fact that this was 
not true of all conditions or RelComp across RMs suggests that Benefit—like Expectation in 
Study 1—is not necessary for experiencing RelComp.  
A more subtle explanation is that the perceived intentions of the respondent to benefit the 
initiator, rather than actual tangible benefits, are one aspect of RelComp. This means that 
responses by the partner should be perceived as more complementary the stronger the 
underlying perceived intentions to benefit the initiator, regardless of the benefits actually 
obtained. For example, in the CS scenario, the Non-complementary AR response 
communicated a stronger intention to benefit the initiator, and was perceived as more 
complementary in the BeneficialRelComp condition, when the respondent accepted to help the 
initiator paint his apartment (“Ok. We start at 7:00 am. Please have all the tools ready and 
pick me up at my place by 6:30. Don’t be late”), than in the CostlyRelComp condition, when the 
respondent refused the initiator’s offer to help him paint the apartment (“Yes, Peter. For the 
moment it seems I don’t need you because I have another assistant. But I want you to be on 
standby, just in case. Please, don’t make any plans for that day without talking to me first”), 
even though the later was objectively less costly to the initiator than the former relatively to 
the Complementary condition. Likewise, the Non-complementary MP response of the CS 
scenario communicated a stronger intention to benefit the initiator, was perceived as more 
complementary, and was actually more beneficial relatively to the complementary condition, 
in the CostlyRelComp condition (“Sure, Peter. Great! In that case I’ll pay you 40$ for half-day 
work”) than in the BeneficialRelComp condition (“Sure. I'll take about 40$ for the work”). 
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However, the fact the Complementary responses did not differ in perceived RelComp 
between BeneficialRelComp and CostlyRelComp conditions in the CS and AR scenarios, suggests 
that perceived intentions of the partner to benefit oneself may be especially relevant for 
Perceived RelComp when responses are Non-complementary. 
Another goal of this study was to explore whether differences between complementary 
and non-complementary responses could vary depending on the RM of the non-
complementary response. The fact that the hypotheses were not supported in some conditions 
when the two Non-complementary responses were analyzed separately showed that the RM of 
the non-complementary response did make a difference on some dependent variables. In 
addition, the role of the RM of the non-complementary responses was also supported by 
differences between Non-complementary conditions. First, the results on the manipulation 
check showed that, in both CS and EM scenarios, Perceived RelComp was higher in the Non-
complementary AR conditions than in the Non-complementary MP conditions, when 
RelComp was beneficial (BeneficialRelComp condition), and higher in the Non-complementary 
MP conditions than in the Non-complementary AR conditions, when RelComp was costly 
(CostlyRelComp condition). Second, and consistently with the theoretical proposal, Perceived 
RelComp was associated to differences on need fulfillment and affective states between the 
Non-complementary conditions. 
The differences between Non-complementary responses on the manipulation check, in 
the CS and EM scenarios, were consistent with the view that perceived intentions of the 
respondent to benefit the initiator played a role on Perceived RelComp. In the 
BeneficialRelComp condition, the Non-complementary AR responses of the CS (“Ok. We start 
at 7:00 am. Please have all the tools ready and pick me up at my place by 6:30. Don’t be 
late”) and EM scenarios (“You’re a great driver, Paul. I am going to the office tomorrow and 
I want to be there one hour earlier, so I’ll pick you up at 6:30. Note that you have to get up 
earlier, so please be on time”), which were rated as more complementary, were also more 
beneficial to the initiator than the Non-complementary MP responses (“Sure. I'll take about 
40$ for the work”; “Thanks’ for the ride Paul. We go in my car tomorrow. I have to take the 
Jeep, which consumes a lot. So I would like to ask you to bring $15 for gas and the ride.”). 
Likewise, in the CostlyRelComp condition, the Non-complementary MP responses of the CS 
(“Sure, Peter. Great! In that case I’ll pay you 40$ for half-day work”) and EM scenarios 
(“Ok, Paul. Here’s 15$ for gas and the ride, before I forget…”) were also more beneficial to 
the initiator and perceived as more complementary than the Non-complementary AR 
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responses (“Yes, Peter. For the moment it seems I don’t need you because I have another 
assistant. But I want you to be on standby, just in case. Please, don’t make any plans for that 
day without talking to me first”; “Ok, Paul. But we’re going later tomorrow. I want you to 
pick me up at 9:00 instead of 7:00, but no later than that. Please be on time.”).  
In sum, it is possible that the differences between Non-complementary responses on the 
manipulation check and, consequently, on the dependent variables, both within and across 
conditions of Benefit, were caused by differences in perceived intentions by the respondent to 
benefit the initiator. This possibility has some relevant implications. First, it supports the 
theoretical proposal presented in the Chapter 2 that RelComp can be experienced in different 
degrees, depending on whether actions, psychological states (e.g., intentions, emotions), or 
actions and psychological states of both participants are perceived as fitting together. In this 
case, the Non-complementary responses should be perceived as reflecting non-
complementary intentions, i.e., intentions by each participant to apply different RMs. 
However, a non-complementary intention by the respondent to benefit the initiator can be 
perceived as fitting the initiator’s intentions better, than any non-complementary intention that 
disregards the initiators interests. This is plausible because when the respondent applies an 
alternative RM—instead of no RM—he or she is communicating an intention to continue 
relating with the initiator, but in a different way. The more beneficial the alternative RM is to 
the initiator, the more likely it is to be perceived as an acceptable alternative to the RM 
initially applied. Therefore, the second implication is that benefits or, more precisely, 
beneficial intentions do matter for RelComp, affect and need fulfillment, especially when 
interactions are non-complementary. Finally, the third implication is that the process of 
relating can very flexible and dynamic, because in the same social context there may be more 
than one relational pattern sanctioned by cultural standards and individual motivations. 
Hence, even when participants fail to apply a common RM, coordination is still possible to 
achieve to the extent that the alternative RMs are perceived as acceptable enough to structure 
the interaction. If the relational pattern corresponding to the new RM is evaluated by the 
partner as acceptable it becomes shared by both participants as a collective goal-state guiding 
the actions of each. Once the alternative relational pattern is fulfilled by means of each 
participant doing one’s part, the effects of RelComp are experienced in the same way. 
One of the reasons why this study failed to rule out the effects of Benefit on the EM and 
MP scenarios was the unsuccessful manipulation of RelComp in the CostlyRelComp condition. 
The results on the manipulation check showed that the Non-complementary MP condition of 
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the EM scenario was perceived as more complementary than the Complementary condition, 
and that the Non-complementary conditions of the MP scenario were perceived as 
complementary as the Complementary condition. So far, I have discussed the differences 
between conditions of Benefit, and differences between Non-complementary conditions on 
the manipulation check and dependent variables. I suggested that such differences on affect 
and need fulfillment can be explained by differences on the manipulation check, which, in 
turn, can be explained by benefits or perceived intentions of the respondent to benefit the 
initiator. Likewise, it is possible that perceived beneficial intentions by the respondent 
increased Perceived RelComp, and improved affect and need fulfilment in the Non-
complementary MP condition of the EM scenario, and in the two Non-complementary 
conditions of the MP scenario. However, neither benefits nor perceived beneficial intentions 
by the partner can explain the effects of RelComp, in the CostlyRelComp condition, in the CS 
and AR scenarios, and in the EM scenario, when the Complementary condition was compared 
with the Non-complementary AR condition. Therefore, it is possible that other processes took 
place. In what follows, I suggest that the descriptions presented to participants in the EM and 
MP scenarios were unclear about specific aspects of the social interaction, and that this might 
have led participants to interpret the scenarios differently from what was intended by the 
experimenter. 
In the EM scenario, participants read the description “Exceptionally, Paul does not have 
to be at the office before 10:00 tomorrow, but he does not mention that to Michael. In fact, 
Paul is still willing to wake up earlier and give Michael a ride.” However, it is possible that 
the description was not clear about whether the respondent knew that the initiator had to be at 
the office later. It has been empirically demonstrated that unexpected non-contingent benefits 
elicit the emotion of gratitude towards the benefactor (Simão & Seibt, 2014, 2015). Hence, if 
the respondent knew that the initiator would experience the personal unexpected cost of going 
to the office earlier than necessary in order to give him a ride, then, he should show 
appreciation for that effort in some way. Consistently, some comments by participants in the 
open-ended questions suggest that the Complementary response did not express enough 
gratitude for the initiator’s gesture. For example, participants in the Complementary condition 
wrote: “I would have liked Michael to thank me for being generous with my time and 
volunteering to leave earlier than I need to”; “He should be more happy I am giving him a 
ride even though I do not have to be at the office at the same time”; “I wish he was more 
grateful”. This explains why the Complementary condition of the EM scenario on the 
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CostlyRelComp condition was rated the lowest on Perceived RelComp among the 
Complementary conditions of all RM scenarios. Additionally, the Non-complementary MP 
condition (Ok, Paul. Here’s 15$ for gas and the ride, before I forget…”) could have been 
interpreted as a sign of appreciation for that effort. In fact, participants in this condition wrote: 
“Delighted because you get compensated by going to the office too early”; “He’s showing 
appreciation for the effort put into getting him to work on time”. This would explain why this 
condition was rated as more complementary than the Complementary condition of the EM 
scenario (“Oh, you’re right, It is your turn. See you tomorrow”).  
Similarly, the MP scenario was unclear about whether the repair was within the warranty 
period of the equipment. Consistently, participants in the three conditions of RelComp wrote 
in the open-ended questions: “I would wonder if the work has any guarantee or warranty”, 
“Am I under warranty still?”, “It must still be under warranty”. If participants thought that the 
repair could be covered by the warranty period, then, they could have interpreted the Non-
complementary response (i.e., refusing payment) as part of an alternative relational pattern (a 
service covered by the warranty), which was evaluated as valid and equally acceptable as the 
relational pattern intended initially (paying for a service). This would explain the high levels 
of Perceived RelComp in the Non-complementary conditions. The issue of the warranty 
period will be addressed in Study 3. 
In addition to the hypothesized effects, the effects of RM on the dependent variables, and 
the effects of RelComp on Meta-trust and Liking were also explored. The differences between 
RMs on the dependent variables were not consistent across conditions of RelComp and 
Benefit. Moreover, similarly to RelComp and Benefit, the effects of RM on the dependent 
variables were followed by the manipulation check on each condition of RelComp, suggesting 
that most of the effects observed can be explained by perceived RelComp.  
Regarding Liking and Meta-trust, when RelComp was beneficial (BeneficialRelComp 
condition), participants liked the respondent better and felt more trusted by the partner in 
complementary interactions, in all RM scenarios. However, when RelComp was costly 
(CostlyRelComp condition), Liking and Meta-trust were also generally higher in the 
Complementary condition but less consistently than the other dependent variables. 
Consistently with Study 1, these results suggest RelComp increases liking for the partner, and 
makes the initiator feel more trusted by the responded. However, the two variables seem to be 
more sensitive to benefits than the remaining. 
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Even though a theory of RelComp seems to be a more satisfactory explanation of the 
results than a theory of Benefits, there is a third alternative explanation to the predicted effects 
of RelComp that were observed. It is possible that responses in the Complementary condition 
were phrased in a more positive or agreeable way than responses in the Non-complementary 
conditions. Hence, differences on the manipulation check and dependent variables reflected 
the positive or negative tone of the responses, and not RelComp itself. A theoretical argument 
against this explanation is that evaluations about the positivity or agreeableness of the 
partner’s responses to our action result from the perceived complementarity of his or her 
responses, and not the other way around. Hence, complementary responses should, in general, 
be evaluated as more positive and agreeable than non-complementary responses. A technical 
argument is that this explanation does not apply to all comparisons that supported the 
hypotheses. For example, in the CostlyRelComp condition, the Non-complementary MP 
response of the CS scenario (“Sure, Peter. Great! In that case I’ll pay you 40$ for half-day 
work”) was not necessarily less positive or agreeable than the Complementary response (“Yes, 
buddy, I could use some help, thanks a lot!”). Nevertheless, Perceived RelComp and ratings 
on the dependent variables, although moderately high (> 4), were still lower in the Non-
complementary condition than in the Complementary condition.   
4.7. Study 3 
Since in Study 2 the effect of Benefit was not ruled out from the effect of RelComp in the 
MP interaction, this study is a follow-up on Study 2 with a modified version of the MP 
scenario. One limitation of the MP scenario in the CostlyRelComp condition of Study 2 was that 
the Complementary and Non-complementary conditions were rated as equally complementary 
in the manipulation check. I suggested that this lack of differences might be due to the fact 
that the scenario was unclear about whether the repair was within the warranty period of the 
equipment. If participants assumed that the repair was part of the warranty, then the Non-
complementary condition, which consisted of refusing payment for the job, were theoretically 
more complementary than the Complementary condition, which consisted of accepting the 
payment. In order to avoid such problem, the scenario in Study 3 introduced information 
about the warranty period.  
In addition, in open ended comments to the MP scenario in Study 2, some participants 
reported uncertainty about $80 being a fair price for the repair. Therefore, information about 
the market price range for repairs was also presented in the scenario. 
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4.7.1 Methods 
4.7.1.1 Participants 
Two-hundred and three residents in the U.S.A. (99.5% U.S. nationals; 53.2% males, ages 
between 18 and 73; Mage = 36.25, SD = 12.13) were recruited through the online 
crowdsourcing marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk and completed a 10-minute online 
questionnaire for $1. Forty-three percent had a high-school diploma or equivalent, 38.4% had 
bachelor degree, 12.4% had a master or PhD degree, 5.4% had a post-secondary non-degree 
award, and one participant had less than high school. 
4.7.1.2 Design  
This was a 3(Complementary vs. CS Non-complementary vs. AR Non-complementary) x 
2(BeneficialRelComp vs. CostlyRelComp) factorial design. Each participant was randomly assigned 
to one of six scenarios describing an MP interaction between one initiator and one respondent. 
4.7.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
The procedures for informing participants about purpose of the study, the voluntary 
nature of their participation, confidentiality and anonymity of their answers, the contact of the 
main investigator for further information, as well as for administering the manipulations and 
the dependent measures, and for debriefing the participants were the same as in Study 2. The 
dependent variables and manipulation check were also the same as in Study 2. 
Scenarios. The MP scenario was the same used in Study 2, except new information was 
added to the context description, namely, information about the warranty period on both 
BeneficialRelComp (“The company sent him to visit a costumer, Jack, to fix his broken 
dishwasher, which is out of the warranty for about a year”) and CostlyRelComp scenarios 
(“Phillip has a broken dishwasher which is out of the warranty for about a year”), and about 
the market price range for a repair in the CostlyRelComp scenario (“He called a few repair 
companies and did some homework about the average cost of such service. Phillip estimated 
the repair cost should range between $80 and $150 and made an appointment with the 
company that seemed most reliable at a competitive price”). Information that the equipment 
was successfully repaired was also given on both scenarios. Complementary and Non-
complementary responses in both scenarios were the same as in Study 2 (see full description 
of the scenarios in Appendix L). 
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Measures. The items were the same used in Study 2 to measure Liking (M = 5.00, SD = 
1.45, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Positive Affect (M = 4.95, SD = 1.69, Min. = 1, Max. = 7) and 
Negative Affect (M = 3.14, SD = 1.80, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Maintenance (α = .91, M = 2.93, 
SD = 1.47, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 6.75), Control (α = .79, M = 4.21, SD = 1.15, Min. = 1.67, 
Max. = 7.00), initiator’s Trust (α = .86, M = 4.07, SD = 1.28, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), 
initiator’s Meta-trust (α = .85, M = 4.30, SD = 1.06, Min. = 1.60, Max. = 7.00), Belonging (α 
= .88, M = 4.67, SD = 1.28, Min. = 1.20, Max. = 7.00), and Perceived RelComp (α = .97, M = 
4.27, SD = 1.47, Min. = 1.15, Max. = 7.00). A mean score between the items of each scale 
was computed and treated as dependent variable as in the previous studies. 
4.7.2 Results 
Correlations between all measures are shown in Table 12. Perceived RelComp, Positive 
and Negative Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, Maintenance and Liking correlated strongly 
with one another (r ≥ |.50|). Meta-trust correlated moderately (r > |.30|) to strongly (r ≥ |.50|) 
with the other measures.  
Table 12 – Pearson correlations between all measures 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RelComp 1 1.00 .79** -.74** .77** .63** .64** .31** -.79** .64** 
Pos. Affect 2  1.00 -.83** .65** .76** .72** .34** -.78** 82** 
Neg. Affect 3   1.00 -.59** -.66** -.61** -.29** .72** -.67** 
Control 4    1.00 .57** .58** .32** -.73** .56** 
Belonging 5     1.00 .79** .59** -.72** .74** 
Trust 6      1.00 .62** -.65** .71** 
Meta-trust 7       1.00 -.32** .40** 
Maintenance 8        1.00 -.70** 
Liking 9         1.00 
* p < .05; ** p < .01.  
A 3(Complementary vs. CS Non-complementary vs. AR Non-complementary) x 
2(BeneficialRelComp vs. CostlyRelComp) Multivariate GLM was conducted on all dependent 
variables and manipulation check using IBM SPSS 23. As in Study 2, the hypotheses were 
tested by comparing each complementary condition with the two non-complementary 
conditions together with planned contrasts (1, -0.5, -0.5) on each dependent variable, at each 
level of Benefit. The planned contrasts were defined with the /LMATRIX subcommand. 
Second, differences between the Complementary condition and each Non-complementary 
condition separately, at each level of Benefit, were examined with Bonferroni adjusted post-
hoc tests. Mean differences between conditions of Benefit at each level of RelComp were also 
explored with post-hoc tests. Significance tests were estimated with a 95% CI. 
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4.7.2.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Multivariate tests showed that the effects of RelComp, F(18, 378) = 7.44, p < .001, ƞp2 = 
.26, Benefit, F(9, 189) = 14.41, p < .001, ƞp2 = .41, the two-way interaction, F(18, 378) = 
3.80, p < .001, ƞp2 = .15, were statistically significant, as well as the planned contrasts on the 
BeneficialRelComp, F(9, 189) = 2.40, p = .013, ƞp2 = .10, and CostlyRelComp scenarios, F(9, 189) 
= 11.36, p < .001, ƞp2 = .35. The Univariate tests of the main effects and two-way interaction 
on each dependent variable and manipulation check are presented in Table 13. Estimated 
marginal means, standard errors, significance tests and effect sizes are displayed in Table 14, 
for the main effects, and in Table 15 for the two- way interaction. 
Table 13 – Univariate tests of main effects and two- and three-way interactions on each 
manipulation check and dependent variable 
 
 df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  
 RelComp  Benefit  RelComp*Benefit  
RelComp 2 21.88 <.001 .18  1 35.21 <.001 .15  2 0.42 >.250 -  
Positive Affect 2 13.93 <.001 .12  1 47.17 <.001 .19  2 3.18 .044 .03  
Negative Affect 2 9.55 <.001 .09  1 23.54 <.001 .11  2 4.28 .015 .04  
Control 2 16.96 <.001 .15  1 11.71 .001 .06  2 1.69 .186 .02  
Belonging 2 14.27 <.001 .13  1 43.66 <.001 .18  2 14.10 <.001 .13  
Trust 2 2.66 .073 .03  1 61.57 <.001 .24  2 5.41 .005 .05  
Meta-trust 2 3.29 .039 .03  1 0.36 >.250 -  2 6.53 .002 .06  
Maintenance 2 16.00 <.001 .14  1 53.88 <.001 .22  2 2.84 .061 .03  
Liking 2 6.89 .001 .07  1 54.97 <.001 .22  2 8.14 <.001 .08  
Error 197     197     197     
4.7.2.2 Manipulation Check 
There was a significant main effect of RelComp on the manipulation check which was 
not qualified by an interaction with Benefit (Table 13). As expected, Perceived RelComp was 
higher in the Complementary condition than on each Non-complementary condition (Table 
14). Furthermore, as expected, planned contrasts and post-hoc comparisons for the two-way 
interaction (Table 15) showed that these differences were robust in each condition of Benefit. 
Post-hoc tests also showed that the CS and AR Non-complementary conditions were 
rated as equally non-complementary (< 4), in the BeneficialRelComp scenario, and as equally 
complementary (> 4) in the CostlyRelComp scenario. 
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Table 14 - Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors for the main 
effects. 
 Comp 
Non-comp 
CS 
Non-comp 
AR 
 RelComp 
Beneficial 
RelComp 
Costly 
 
  
 M SE M SE M SE  M SE M SE  
RelComp 5.11a 0.15 3.97b 0.15 3.79b 0.15  3.77a 0.12 4.81b 0.13  
Positive Affect 5.57a 0.17 5.05a 0.18 4.28b 0.17  4.28a 0.14 5.66b 0.15  
Negative Affect 2.58a 0.20 3.02a 0.20 3.78b 0.20  3.68a 0.16 2.57b 0.16  
Control 4.79a 0.13 4.08b 0.13 3.78b 0.13  3.96a 0.10 4.46b 0.11  
Belonging 4.73a 0.13 5.15a 0.13 4.19b 0.13  4.20a 0.10 5.18b 0.11  
Trust 4.18a 0.13 4.24a 0.13 3.84a 0.13  3.48a 0.11 4.69b 0.11  
Meta-trust 4.22ab 0.12 4.56a 0.12 4.13b 0.12  4.26a 0.10 4.35a 0.10  
Maintenance 2.37a 0.15 2.81a 0.15 3.55b 0.15  3.54a 0.12 2.27b 0.12  
Liking 5.25a 0.15 5.26b 0.15 4.58a 0.15  4.39a 0.12 5.66b 0.12  
 n = 68 n = 67 n = 68  n = 105 n = 98  
Note: Simple mean comparisons between conditions are identified with superscripts a 
and b. Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. 
Equal superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. See effect 
sizes in Table 13. 
4.7.2.3 Effects of RelComp on the Dependent Variables 
I predicted higher ratings on Positive Affect, Belonging, Control and Trust, and lower 
ratings on Negative Affect and Maintenance in the Complementary condition than in the two 
Non-complementary conditions together, in both conditions of Benefit. As expected, planned 
contrasts showed that in the BeneficialRelComp condition the dependent variables differed 
significantly, and in the predicted direction, between the Complementary condition and the 
two Non-complementary conditions (Table 15).  
In the CostlyRelComp condition, Positive Affect and Control were also significantly higher 
in the Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary conditions. Unexpectedly, 
Belonging was lower, and Maintenance was higher, in the Complementary than in the Non-
complementary conditions, whereas Trust and Negative Affect did not significantly differ 
between conditions (Table 15).  
The more conservative version of the hypotheses would predict higher ratings of Positive 
Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust, and lower ratings of Negative Affect and Maintenance, 
in the Complementary conditions when compared with each Non-complementary condition 
separately with post-hoc tests, at each level of Benefit. These hypotheses would be supported 
by main effects of RelComp on the dependent variables, showing that the predicted 
differences were constant across conditions of Benefit, or by two-way interactions showing 
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that the predicted differences were weakened or enlarged across conditions of Benefit. The 
main effect of RelComp was significant on the dependent variables, with the exception of 
Trust, and the two-way interaction was significant on the dependent variables with the 
exception of Control and Maintenance.  
Table 15 - Estimated marginal means, standard errors, planned contrasts and post-hoc 
tests, and effect sizes for the two-way interaction. 
 Comp Non-comp CS Non-comp AR 
 
 
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 M SE M SE M SE ƞp2  Est. SE p ƞp2 
  RelComp Beneficial  
RelComp x 4.53a 0.21 x 3.56b 0.21 x 3.21b 0.21 .10  1.14 0.26 < .001 .09 
Positive Affect x 5.06a 0.24 x 4.54a 0.24 x 3.23b 0.24 .13  1.17 0.30 < .001 .07 
Negative Affect x 2.89a 0.27 x 3.34a 0.27 x 4.80b 0.27 .12  -1.19 0.34 .001 .06 
Control x 4.54a 0.18 x 3.99a 0.18 x 3.36b 0.18 .10  0.87 0.22 < .001 .08 
Belonging x 4.65a 0.18 x 4.79a 0.18 x 3.17b 0.18 .21  0.67 0.22 .003 .05 
Trust x 3.90a 0.19 x 3.60a 0.19 x 2.94b 0.19 .07  0.63 0.23 .006 .04 
Meta-trust x 4.47a 0.17 x 4.56a 0.17 x 3.75b 0.17 .06  0.31 0.21 .140 .01 
Maintenance x 2.98a 0.21 x 3.20a 0.21 x 4.44b 0.21 .13  -0.84 0.25 .001 .05 
Liking x 4.91a 0.21 x 4.80a 0.21 x 3.46b 0.21 .14  0.79 0.25 .002 .05 
 n = 35 n = 35 n = 35       
  RelComp Costly  
RelComp y 5.69a  0.22 y 4.38b 0.22 y 4.38b 0.22 .11  1.31 0.27 < .001 .11 
Positive Affect y 6.09a 0.25 y 5.56a 0.25 y 5.33a 0.25 -  0.64 0.31 .038 .02 
Negative Affect x 2.27a 0.28 x 2.69a 0.29 y 2.76a 0.28 -  -0.45 0.35 .195 .01 
Control x 5.03a 0.18 x 4.17b 0.18 y 4.19b 0.18 .07  0.85 0.22 < .001 .07 
Belonging x 4.81a 0.18 y 5.52b 0.19 y 5.21ab 0.18 .04  -0.55 0.23 .016 .03 
Trust y 4.46a 0.19 y 4.88a 0.19 y 4.73a 0.19 -  -0.35 0.24 .141 .01 
Meta-trust y 3.97a 0.18 x 4.56a 0.18 y 4.51a 0.18 -  -0.56 0.22 .011 .03 
Maintenance y 1.76a 0.21 y 2.41ab 0.22 y 2.65b 0.21 .05  -0.78 0.26 .004 .04 
Liking y 5.58a 0.21 y 5.72a 0.22 y 5.70a 0.21 -  -0.13 0.26 >.250 - 
 n = 33 n = 32 n = 33       
Note: Superscripts a and b identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp. 
Superscripts x and y identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of Benefit. Different 
superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts are used for 
means with non-significant differences, p > .05. 
Post-hoc tests for the two-way interaction (Table 15) showed that, in the BeneficialRelComp 
condition, Positive Affect, Belonging and Trust were significantly higher, whereas Negative 
Affect was significantly lower, in the Complementary condition, but only when compared 
with the Non-complementary AR condition. In the CostlyRelComp condition, Positive Affect, 
Negative Affect, and Trust did not differ significantly between conditions of RelComp; and 
Belonging was lower in the Complementary condition when compared with the Non-
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complementary CS condition, but not when compared with the Non-complementary AR 
condition. 
Post-hoc tests for the main effects (Table 14) showed that Control was higher in the 
Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary condition, but that Maintenance 
was only significantly lower in the Complementary condition when compared with the Non-
complementary AR condition. 
4.7.2.4. Exploratory Analyses 
Effects of RelComp on Liking and Meta-trust. The significant main effect of RelComp 
on Liking and Meta-trust was qualified by an interaction with Benefit (Table 13). According 
to planned contrasts, Liking was higher in the Complementary condition of the 
BeneficialRelComp condition, whereas Meta-trust was lower in the Complementary condition of 
the CostlyRelComp condition. On the other hand, post-hoc tests showed that in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition Liking and Meta-trust were higher in the complementary 
condition, but only when compared with the Non-complementary AR condition (Table 15). In 
the CostlyRelComp condition, Liking and Meta-trust did not differ between conditions of 
RelComp (Table 15). 
Differences between conditions of Benefit. The main effect of Benefit on Perceived 
RelComp was not qualified by a two-way interaction (Table 13). Perceived RelComp was 
higher in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition than in the Complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp condition, and higher in the Non-complementary/ CostlyRelComp conditions 
than in the Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp conditions (Tables 14 and 15). 
As in Study 2, the effects of Benefit were explored by comparing the Complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp condition with the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition, and the Non-
complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition with the Non-complementary/ CostlyRelComp 
condition on the dependent measures (see post-hoc tests in Table 15). A theory of Benefit 
would predict higher ratings of Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, Trust, Meta-trust, and 
Liking, and lower ratings of Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the conditions that were 
beneficial to the initiator (i.e., Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp and Non-complementary 
CostlyRelComp condition) than in the conditions that were costly to the initiator (i.e., 
Complementary/ CostlyRelComp and Non-complementary/ BeneficialRelComp). These hypotheses 
would be supported by an interaction between RelComp and Benefit.  
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Significant two-way interactions were observed on Positive Affect, Negative Affect, 
Belonging, Trust, Meta-trust and Liking (Table 13). Consistently with a theory of Benefit, in 
the Non-complementary CS condition and in the Non-complementary AR condition, the 
dependent variables—except Meta-trust and Negative Affect in the Non-complementary CS 
condition—were rated higher in the CostlyRelComp condition than in the BeneficialRelComp 
condition (Table 15). These differences were more pronounced in the Non-complementary 
AR condition than in the Non-complementary CS condition on Positive Affect, Belonging, 
Trust, and Liking. Additionally, Meta-trust was higher in the Complementary/ 
BeneficialRelComp condition than in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition (Table 15). 
On the other hand, opposite to a theory of Benefit, differences between the 
Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition and the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition 
on Negative Affect and Belonging were not significant (Table 15). Furthermore, Positive 
Affect, Trust, and Liking were actually higher in the Complementary/ CostlyRelComp condition 
than in the Complementary/ BeneficialRelComp condition (Table 15). 
Finally, the two-way interaction was not significant on Control, and Maintenance (Table 
13). Main effects of Benefit showed that Control was higher, and Maintenance was lower, in 
the CostlyRelComp condition than in the BeneficialRelComp condition.  
Differences between Non-complementary conditions. As in Study 2, the effect of the 
Non-complementary conditions on the dependent variables varied according to the RM of the 
Non-complementary response, but only in the BeneficialRelComp condition. All dependent 
variables, but not the manipulation check, differed between the Non-complementary CS 
condition and the Non-complementary AR condition (Table 15). Positive Affect, Control, 
Belonging, Trust, Meta-Trust and Liking were higher, and Negative Affect and Maintenance 
were lower in the Non-complementary CS condition. 
4.7.3 Discussion 
In Study 2, the manipulation of RelComp in the MP scenario was not effective. The 
results on the manipulation check showed that the Complementary and Non-complementary 
conditions were perceived as equally complementary in the MP scenario. Hence, Study 3 
employed a modified version of the MP scenario to rule out the effects of Benefit from the 
effects of RelComp on affect and need fulfillment. As expected, the new version of the MP 
scenario successfully manipulated RelComp. Perceived RelComp was higher in the 
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Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary condition, as shown by results on 
the manipulation check. 
Consistently with the RelComp hypothesis, it was predicted that Positive Affect, Control, 
Belonging and Trust would be higher, and that Negative Affect and Maintenance would be 
lower, in complementary interactions than in non-complementary interactions; and that these 
effects would be robust regardless of whether RelComp was beneficial (in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition) or costly (in the CostlyRelComp condition) to the initiator, relative 
to Non-complementarity.  
A theory of Benefit, on the other hand, would be supported by effects on the dependent 
variables in same direction as those predicted by a theory of RelComp, but only when 
complementarity was more beneficial to the initiator than non-complementarity (i.e., in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition). On the other hand, when complementarity was more costly than 
non-complementarity (in the CostlyRelComp condition), a theory of Benefit would predict 
effects in the opposite direction: lower Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust, and 
higher Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementary condition. 
The RelComp hypothesis was fully supported by planned contrasts for Positive Affect, 
Control, and Maintenance, and partially supported for Negative Affect, Belonging, and Trust. 
Positive Affect and Control were higher, and Maintenance was lower, in the Complementary 
condition than in the Non-complementary condition, both when RelComp was beneficial (in 
the BeneficialRelComp condition) and costly (CostlyRelComp condition) to the initiator. The lack 
of statistically significant interactions showed that Control and Maintenance were not affected 
by Benefit. However, the two-way interaction on Positive Affect revealed that the effects of 
RelComp were stronger when it was beneficial rather than costly. In other words, when 
RelComp and Benefit were manipulated in competing directions, the effects of RelComp on 
Positive Affect were weakened but not cancelled by Benefit. 
On the other hand, Negative Affect was lower, and Belonging and Trust were higher in 
the Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary condition, but only when 
RelComp was beneficial to the initiator (in the BeneficialRelComp condition). When RelComp 
was costly (in the CostlyRelComp condition), there were no differences on Trust and on 
Negative Affect between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementary 
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condition. The same pattern of results was observed on Liking and Meta-trust. Unexpectedly, 
Belonging was higher in the Non-complementary condition than in the Complementary 
condition. Put differently, Benefit canceled the effects of RelComp on Negative Affect, Trust, 
Meta-trust and Liking, and overrode the effects of RelComp on Belonging. 
In sum, in the BeneficialRelComp condition, when the effects of RelComp and Benefit were 
mutually reinforcing, both theories were supported. On the other hand, in the CostlyRelComp 
condition, when the effects of RelComp and Benefit were mutually competing, the RelComp 
hypothesis was supported for Positive Affect, Control and Maintenance, the Benefit 
hypothesis was supported for Belonging, and none of the two hypotheses were supported for 
Negative Affect and Trust.  
Noteworthy, when the Non-complementary conditions were analyzed separately in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition, affect and need fulfillment were only improved when the 
Complementary condition was compared with the Non-complementary AR condition. Unlike 
the results in Study 2, the lack of differences from the Non-complementary CS condition 
cannot be explained by the manipulation check. A possible explanation for these results is that 
the CS Non-complementary response in the BeneficialRelComp scenario (Jack (not noticing the 
bill): - Oh, I can’t thank you enough buddy! It’s so annoying to do the dishes by hand! Hey, 
why don’t you come over for a beer sometime?) was ambiguous about whether the respondent 
intended to pay for the job. Such response could have been perceived as a combination of CS 
and MP, that is, as a friendly invitation which would be followed by payment. An alternative 
operationalization of the CS response to rule out such explanation would have to be more 
explicit about the lack of intention to pay for the job. 
As in Study 2, in addition to effects of RelComp, differences between conditions of 
Benefit when RelComp was constant were also explored, by comparing the beneficial 
Complementary condition (in the BeneficialRelComp condition) with the costly Complementary 
condition (in the CostlyRelComp condition), and the beneficial Non-complementary conditions 
(in the CostlyRelComp condition) with the costly Non-complementary conditions (in the 
BeneficialRelComp condition). The Benefit hypothesis was supported by comparisons among 
Non-complementary conditions. Need fulfillment and Affect were improved with benefits 
when responses by the partner were non-complementary. However, the Benefit hypothesis 
was falsified by comparisons among Complementary conditions. When responses by the 
partner were complementary, benefits did not make a difference on Negative Affect, Control, 
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and Belonging; and, crucially, Positive Affect and Trust were actually higher, when the 
complementary responses were costly. Additionally, as in Study 2, the previous effects were 
theoretically consistent with the manipulation check. The non-complementary conditions 
were perceived are more complementary when they were beneficial to the initiator (i.e., in the 
CostlyRelComp condition), whereas the complementary conditions were perceived as more 
complementary when they were costly to the initiator (i.e., in the CostlyRelComp condition). 
Therefore, it can be said that affective states and need fulfillment were improved in the 
interactions that were perceived as more complementary. Thus, differences between 
conditions of Benefit when RelComp was constant can be more easily explained with a theory 
of RelComp than with a theory of Benefit, especially when Perceived RelComp is taken into 
account. 
In the discussion of Study 2, I raised the hypothesis that tangible benefits or perceived 
intentions by the partner to benefit the initiator are aspects of perceived RelComp. In the 
current study, however, the fact that the costly Complementary condition was perceived as 
more complementary than the beneficial Complementary condition casts doubt on this 
possibility. 
Altogether, the results discussed above suggest that the effects of RelComp on affect and 
need fulfillment, when benefits are accounted for, are less robust in MP interactions than in 
interactions based in other RMs, as shown in Study 2. Apparently, benefits do matter for 
affect and need fulfillment in MP interactions, but only when interactions are non-
complementary. When MP interactions are complementary, however, benefits and costs seem 
to play a trivial role. 
The goal of Studies 2 and 3 was to show that the effects of RelComp that were observed 
in Study 1 were not caused by the fact that the Complementary interactions were manipulated 
as more beneficial than the Non-complementary ones. This was attempted by testing the 
experimental hypotheses that that Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Trust would be 
higher, whereas Negative Affect would be lower, in the Complementary condition than in the 
Non-complementary conditions, both when complementarity was more costly and more 
beneficial to the participant than non-complementarity. However, this is a conservative 
hypothesis that is based on the oversimplified assumption that RelComp is a predictor strong 
enough to override the effects of Benefit. The effects discussed so far suggest that such 
assumption is true for some dependent variables but not for others. On the other hand, 
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RelComp may still be associated to affective states and need fulfillment without such an 
assumption being true. Even if Benefit has an effect on affect and need fulfillment in MP 
interactions, this does not invalidate that RelComp has a predictive role which is distinct from 
the role of Benefit. In fact, some results suggest that the two effects are independent even 
though the experimental hypotheses were not fully supported. First, in the CostlyRelComp 
condition, the RelComp hypothesis was supported for three dependent variables, whereas the 
Benefit hypothesis was supported for only one. Second, when the beneficial Complementary 
condition (BeneficialRelComp condition) was compared with the costly Complementary 
condition (CostlyRelComp condition), benefits did not make a difference on the dependent 
variables, suggesting that RelComp is sufficient condition for need fulfillment and positive 
affective experiences. 
Finally, the results in the CostlyRelComp condition suggest that Belonging, Trust and Meta-
Trust are more sensitive to benefits than Control. Possibly, it is not benefits per se that have 
an influence on the three variables, but rather how the participants perceived the respondent’s 
intentions towards themselves, and how they perceived themselves to be evaluated by the 
respondent. 
First, Control, like Maintenance, is conceptually agnostic about the content of 
respondent’s intentions to benefit oneself, as long as his or her actions are predictable enough 
to ensure ease of coordination and success in obtaining the desired results from the 
interaction. In fact, there are plenty of situations where participants are able to control the 
course of their interactions and achieve coordination with relative ease, by anticipating non-
complementary actions and selfish intentions by the partner, and by strategically planning 
their own actions accordingly. On the other hand, Trust involves beliefs about the benevolent 
intentions of the partner (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kramer & Carnevale, 2001; Rousseau, et 
al., 1998). Therefore, trust grows as relational partners sacrifice their own interests and 
accommodate to the partner’s needs (e.g., Shallcross & Simpson, 2012; Wieselquist, et al., 
1999). Hence, it is not surprising that, in the CostlyRelComp condition, Trust in the respondent 
was high when the respondent’s non-complementary actions were beneficial to the initiator. 
As in Study 1, Liking followed the same pattern as Trust, which suggests that Liking may be 
based on beliefs about the partner’s intentions.  
Notice, however, that if benefiting the partner by accommodating to his needs was the 
only way to increase interpersonal trust, then, in the CostlyRelComp condition, Trust should 
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have been lower in Complementarity condition than in the Non-complementarity condition. 
The fact that there were no differences between conditions of RelComp in the CostlyRelComp 
condition implies that accommodating to the trustor’s needs is not the only, nor the most 
important way to signal trustworthiness. Instead, showing relational reliability, by performing 
the complementary action is, as I proposed, an alternative way to enhance trustworthiness. 
Hence, Benefits and RelComp are each sufficient conditions for the development of 
interpersonal trust. In other words, in order to earn the partner’s trust one must either apply 
the same relational standards as the partner, or show concern with the partner’s welfare by 
offering him some kind of benefit. 
Second, Control, like Maintenance, is also agnostic about how others evaluate oneself, as 
long as one is aware of such evaluations in order to enable smooth coordination and efficacy 
during the interaction. On the contrary, Belonging is, in part, about feeling valued, needed and 
accepted by the other (Hagerty & Patusky, 1995). Therefore, one possible explanation for the 
fact that Belonging was higher in the Non-complementary conditions than in the 
Complementary condition of the CostlyRelComp scenario is that responses that offered an 
unexpected benefit to the initiator, were interpreted by participants as a stronger indicator of 
the respondent’s positive evaluation of the initiator than complementary responses. 
Trust involves the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to exploitation by the other 
person based upon expectations of reciprocity (Rosseau, et al., 1998). Along these lines, it is 
possible that participants in the CostlyRelComp condition interpreted Non-complementary 
responses that were beneficial to the initiator, but costly to the respondent, as signs of the 
respondent’s willingness to make himself vulnerable to exploitation, by engaging in trust 
behavior towards the initiator (Dunning, et al., 2014). On the other hand, the Complementary 
response did not allow for vulnerability attributions because it was beneficial to the 
respondent and costly to the initiator. Such possibility explains why Meta-trust, in the 
CostlyRelComp condition, was higher when responses were Non-complementary. 
4.8. Study 4a 
Studies 1 to 3 showed how one’s affective states and need fulfillment are affected when 
the partner either fails or succeeds to complement a previous action by oneself. It could be, 
however, that the results observed were caused by whether the partner acted according to 
one’s own wants, rather than by the experience of jointly fulfilling (or not) a relational 
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pattern. Studies 4a and 4b were designed to rule out this explanation by investigating how 
one’s affective states and needs fulfillment are affected when one either fails or succeeds to 
complement a previous action by the partner. Thus, whereas in studies 1 to 3 participants 
were asked to take the perspective of the initiator and indicated how they felt about the 
complementary or non-complementary response of the partner, in studies 4a and 4b they were 
asked to take the perspective of the respondent and indicated how they felt about their own 
complementary or non-complementary response to the partner’s action. I predicted that affect 
and needs fulfillment would differ between complementary and non-complementary 
conditions in the same direction as in studies 1 to 3. These effects were tested with AR and 
EM interactions, in Study 4a, and with CS and MP interactions, in Study 4b. 
Notice that, since performing a complementary action is conceptualized as a sign of 
trustworthiness, in the current paradigm, RelComp should affect the perceived trustworthiness 
of the character who either performs the complementary or non-complementary action—i.e., 
the respondent—but not necessarily the perceived trustworthiness of the character whose 
actions do not vary in terms of complementarity—i.e., the initiator. Therefore, in studies 1 to 
3, when participants took the perspective of the initiator, I predicted effects of RelComp on 
Trust (i.e., partner’s trustworthiness), but not necessarily on Meta-trust (i.e., perceived 
partner’s trust in oneself). In studies 4a and 4b, however, since participants took the 
perspective of the respondent, I predicted effects of RelComp on Meta-trust, but not 
necessarily on Trust. Thus, while in the previous studies I made predictions for Trust and 
treated Meta-trust as exploratory, in the current studies I made predictions for Meta-trust and 
treated Trust as exploratory.  
Additionally, performing a complementary action is not only a sign communicating that 
one accepts and values the other, but also a condition for being socially accepted and valued 
by others. Hence, in studies 1 to 3, since participants took the perspective of the initiator, the 
scale of Belonging measured how much the respondent’s action made them feel accepted and 
valued. However, in the studies 4a and 4b, since participants took the perspective of the 
respondent, the scale of Belonging measured how much participants’ own complementary or 
non-complementary action made them anticipate feeling valued and accepted by the partner. 
As in the previous studies, I also explored the effect of RelComp on the respondent’s 
Liking of the initiator during the interaction. 
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4.8.1 Causal Attributions to Non-complementary Actions 
I anticipated that asking participants to take the perspective of someone who fails to 
perform the complementary action might cause them to experience psychological reactance 
(e.g., Brehm, 1966), which, in turn, might affect the quality of their answers. Reactance is the 
motivation to reestablish threatened or eliminated freedom (Brehm, 1966, p. 15), often by 
adopting a position opposite to the one advocated in the threatening message (Worchel & 
Brehm, 1970). Perceiving that their freedom to identify with their most preferred response 
(i.e., the complementary response, since it is the most rewarding) was threatened, could make 
participants interpret the non-complementary responses as implausible and, therefore, resist 
taking such perspective. To avoid this problem, participants in the non-complementary 
conditions were given plausible reasons for performing the non-complementary action. 
One of the causal dimensions for action proposed by attribution theory (Weiner, 2010) 
describes whether causes are controllable (e.g., effort) or uncontrollable (e.g., aptitude, luck) 
by the person. Research, shows that people are judged as more responsible when their failure 
or poor performance is attributed to controllable (e.g., lack of effort), than uncontrollable 
(e.g., lack of ability) causes (Struthers, Miller, Boudens & Briggs, 2001; Struthers, Weiner & 
Allred, 1998). Presumably because they are held more responsible, others tend to feel more 
anger and less sympathy towards them (Struthers, et al., 2001; Struthers, et al., 1998). 
Therefore, when breaking a social contract (e.g., arriving late at an appointment), people tend 
excuse themselves with uncontrollable causes (Fraser, 2000; Weiner, Figueroa-Muñoz & 
Kakihara, 1991). People who present uncontrollable excuses (e.g., teacher interference) not 
only mitigate the partner’s anger, but are also perceived as more dependable, responsible and 
considerate, than those who do not present excuses, or present controllable excuses (e.g., 
forgetting; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). 
In other to control perceived responsibility, two causes for non-complementarity were 
manipulated, in addition to the complementary response. In one condition—Non-
complementary Uncontrollable―the cause was uncontrollable, i.e., bad luck. In the other 
condition―Non-complementary Controllable―the cause was controllable, i.e., lack of effort 
or negligence. I predicted that Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, and Meta-trust would be 
higher, and Negative Affect and Maintenance would be lower, in the Complementary 
condition than in the two Non-complementary conditions together. 
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Additionally, I explored the extent to which affect and need fulfillment were affected by 
the controllability of the non-complementary action. First, since controllability is presumably 
associated to responsibility, people should evaluate failure to complement more favorably 
when it is attributed to uncontrollable than to controllable causes. If this is the case, then one 
should expect (i) Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, and Meta-trust to be higher, and 
Negative Affect and Maintenance to be lower, in the Non-complementary Uncontrollable 
condition than in the Non-complementary Controllable condition. Second, if making an effort 
is sufficient condition, then (ii) differences in the dependent variables should be trivial and 
considerably smaller between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementary 
Uncontrollable condition (i.e., when participants made an effort but failed due to cause 
beyond their control) than between the Complementary condition and the Non-
complementary Controllable condition (i.e., when participants did not make an effort). 
Finally, if successfully performing the complementary action is necessary condition, then (iii) 
Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, and Meta-trust should be higher, and Negative Affect 
and Maintenance should be lower, in the Complementary condition when compared with each 
Non-complementary condition separately. This is a more conservative version of the main 
hypothesis. 
4.8.2 Action Complementarity and Cognitive Complementarity 
Although this manipulation was created for technical reasons, its effects have important 
theoretical implications for understanding the phenomenology of RelComp. I established in 
Chapter 2 that RelComp requires the fitting of participants’ overt behavior and psychological 
states, to the extent that such psychological states are represented as part of the relational 
pattern to be fulfilled. I also argued that different degrees of RelComp should be experienced 
depending on whether: both actions and psychological states are congruent between 
participants; psychological states are congruent but actions are not; actions are congruent but 
psychological states are not; and neither actions nor psychological states are congruent. In 
studies 4a and 4b, psychological states can be inferred from the manipulation. Specifically, 
attributing non-complementarity to controllable causes, such as lack of effort or negligence 
implies that the respondent was not strongly committed to performing his or her part of the 
relational pattern. Hence, in the Non-complementary Controllable condition neither actions 
nor psychological states are congruent with those of the partner; it is thus, an 
operationalization of the lowest degree of RelComp. On the other hand, attributing non-
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complementarity to uncontrollable causes, such as bad luck, protects the authenticity of the 
respondent’s intention and commitment to complement, despite his actual failure to do so. 
Thus, the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition is a manipulation of congruent 
psychological states but incongruent actions, corresponding to an intermediate level of 
RelComp. Finally, in the Complementary condition both actions and psychological states are 
congruent, representing the highest level of RelComp. From here on I will refer to both types 
of congruence as action complementarity and cognitive complementarity. 
If the theoretical distinction between degrees of RelComp has some parallel with the 
psychological experience of RelComp, then Perceived RelComp, Positive Affect, Belonging, 
Control and Meta-trust should increase, whereas Negative Affect, and Maintenance should 
decrease, linearly from the Non-complementary Controllable condition (the lowest degree of 
RelComp), to the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition (the intermediate degree of 
RelComp), to the Complementary condition (the highest degree of RelComp). Moreover, 
differences between conditions should inform whether action complementarity and/or 
cognitive complementarity explain variance on each dependent variable. First, the effect of 
cognitive complementarity, when action complementarity is constant (and absent), can be 
determined by differences between the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition and the 
Non-complementary Controllable condition. If cognitive complementarity alone is relevant 
for affect and need fulfillment, then one should expect Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, 
and Meta-trust to be higher, and Negative Affect and Maintenance to be lower, in the Non-
complementary Uncontrollable condition than in the Non-complementary Controllable 
condition (cf. i, previous section). Second, the effect of action complementarity, when 
cognitive complementarity is constant (and present), can be determined by differences 
between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition. 
If action complementarity is necessary condition, then Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, 
and Meta-trust should be higher, and Negative Affect and Maintenance should be lower, in 
the Complementary condition than in the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition (cf. 
iii, previous section). On the other hand, if action complementarity is unnecessary and 
cognitive complementarity is sufficient condition, then differences between the 
Complementary condition and the Non-complementary Uncontrollable condition should be 
trivial and smaller than differences between the Complementary condition and the Non-
complementary Controllable condition (cf. ii, previous section). Third, the effect of both 
action and cognitive complementarity on each dependent variable can be determined by 
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differences between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementary Controllable 
condition. Since the two conditions correspond to the highest and lowest degree of RelComp, 
respectively, Positive Affect, Control, Belonging, and Meta-trust should be higher, and 
Negative Affect and Maintenance should be lower, in the Complementary condition than in 
the Non-complementary Controllable condition (cf. iii, previous section).  
Finally, since the manipulation check included two subscales assessing complementarity 
of the characters’ action and complementarity of the characters’ cognitive perceptions of the 
relationship, I also explored whether participants evaluated the action and cognitive aspects of 
the manipulation differently. If they did, then, the cognitive complementarity subscale should 
be rated equally higher in the Complementary condition and in the Non-complementary 
Uncontrollable condition when compared with the Non-complementary Controllable 
condition, meaning that participants in the two former conditions felt that their partners 
perceived the relationship more similarly to them than participants in the latter condition. On 
the other hand, the action complementarity subscale should be rated higher in the 
Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary condition, meaning that 
participants in the former condition felt that their actions fitted the actions of the partner better 
than participants in the other two conditions. 
4.8.3 Methods 
4.8.3.1 Participants 
A 15-minute online questionnaire was initiated by 335 participants and completed, by 
109 Portuguese nationals, 57.8% female, with ages between 16 and 54 years-old (Mage = 
25.89, SD = 7.45). Thirty-eight percent had a bachelor degree, 28.4% had an incomplete 
bachelor degree, 21.1% had a high-school diploma, and 11.9% had a master’s degree. 
4.8.3.2 Design  
This was a 2 (AR vs. EM) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-complementary Uncontrollable 
vs. Non-complementary Controllable) mixed factorial design. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to two of six scenarios describing an interaction between two characters: one 
initiator and one respondent. The six scenarios resulted from the combination of two 
variables: the RM implemented by the initiator (AR vs. EM), and the reply by the respondent. 
The reply was either complementary, non-complementary due to causes not controllable by 
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the respondent, or non-complementary due to causes controllable by the respondent 
(RelComp: Complementary vs. Non-compUncontrollable vs. Non-compControllable). Similarly to the 
previous studies, RelComp was manipulated between subjects and RM was manipulated 
within-subjects. Hence, each participant was exposed to one AR scenario and one EM 
scenario, in randomized order while the levels of RelComp were held constant within 
participants. 
4.8.3.3 Materials and Procedure 
Portuguese speaking participants were recruited by one student of the Master in Social 
and Organizational Psychology at a public university in Lisbon who had to run an experiment 
as requirement for a class on research methods. Participants were recruited by convenience 
via social networks and e-mail, and were offered participation in a lottery awarding three 
100€ vouchers.  
The online questionnaire was built in Qualtrics and accessed through a link distributed 
via e-mail and social media. The procedures for informing participants about purpose of the 
study, the voluntary nature of their participation, confidentiality and anonymity of their 
answers, the contact of the main investigator for further information, as well as for debriefing 
the participants and notifying the winners to collect the prize were the same as in Study 1. The 
manipulations and measures were also administered as in the previous studies, with the 
exception that after reading each scenario and before responding to the dependent measures, 
participants were asked to take the perspective of the respondent, instead of the initiator. The 
dependent variables and manipulation check were the same and measured in the same order as 
in the previous studies. 
Scenarios. Two types of scenarios were presented to participants describing interactions 
about the writing of a report, and the distribution of food. The scenarios had following 
structure: (a) a description of the context of the interaction, (b) the initiation by the first 
character, (c) expressed commitment to comply by the second characters, and (d) the actual 
response by the second character (see English description of the scenarios in Appendix M). 
The description of the interaction context introduced the two characters, their 
relationship, the aspect of the relationship that required coordination between the two, and the 
RM (AR vs. EM) to be implemented to achieve coordination. RMs were specified according 
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to the experimental condition by describing how each aspect was going to be coordinated 
among the characters. On AR interactions the respondent was assigned the task of writing a 
report to her boss; whereas on EM interactions, the respondent had to return some yogurts he 
borrowed from his roommate. 
The interaction was initiated by the first character making a request to the second (e.g., “– 
Mrs. Sara, I’d like you to write this report and send it to me tonight, so that I can revise it and 
send it in the morning”). On all conditions the respondent replied by expressing his or her 
commitment to cooperate with the request (e.g., “Mrs. Sara feels perfectly capable of writing 
it and she is free tonight. Hence, she took the task: - Yes, sir. I’ll do it!”). 
Next, there was a description of the respondent’s actual action which was the 
manipulation of RelComp. The actual action by the respondent was described as being 
performed in the absence of the initiator. In the Complementary condition the respondent did 
what he/she committed him/herself to do (e.g., “That night, Mrs. Sara finished the report and 
sent it by e-mail to Mr. Manuel”). In the Non-compUncontrollable condition the respondent failed 
to do what he/she committed him/herself for reasons beyond his/her control (e.g., “That night, 
when the report was almost complete, some virus crashed Mrs. Sara’s computer, preventing 
her from finishing. After several unsuccessful trials she gave up and decided to send an e-mail 
to Mr. Manuel explaining the situation”). In the Non-compControllable condition the respondent 
failed for reasons within his/her control (e.g., “That night, when Sara was having dinner, she 
started watching one of her favorite movies on TV. Sara fell asleep on the couch. In the 
morning she noticed she hadn’t done the report”). 
Measures. The items were similar to the Portuguese items used in Study 1 to measure 
Liking (M = 5.50, SD = 1.17, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Positive Affect (M = 3.54, SD = 2.10, Min. 
= 1, Max. = 7), Negative Affect (M = 4.45, SD = 2.07, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Maintenance (α 
first scenario = .84, α second scenario = .86, M = 3.31, SD = 1.36, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 6.50), Control 
(α first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .87, M = 4.17, SD = 1.26, Min. = 1.33, Max. = 7.00), Trust 
(α first scenario = .77, α second scenario = .83, M = 4.67, SD = 0.94, Min. = 1.60, Max. = 7.00), Meta-
trust (α first scenario = .91, α second scenario = .94, M = 4.59, SD = 1.39, Min. = 1.20, Max. = 7.00), 
Belonging (α first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .91, M = 4.66, SD = 1.22, Min. = 1.20, Max. = 
7.00), and Perceived RelComp (α first scenario = .92, α second scenario = .91, M = 4.17, SD = 1.16, 
Min. = 1.62, Max. = 6.92), except they were phrased differently, to be coherent with the 
respondent’s perspective, instead of the initiator’s. For instance, instead of reading “Mr. 
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Manuel’s action put me (Mrs. Sara) in a positive mood” they read “My action (Mrs. Sara’s) 
towards Mr. Manuel put me in a positive mood”. 
In addition, the measures of Maintenance, Control, Belonging, Trust and Meta-trust, used 
in the previous studies made reference to past interactions and previous actions by the other 
towards oneself. In this experiment, however, the Complementary or Non-complementary 
response took place in the absence of the other, and hence, would only affect their interaction, 
and consequent need fulfillment in the future, when the other became aware of it. For this 
reason the measures of Control, Belonging, Trust, Meta-trust and Maintenance were also 
rephrased in order to refer to the characters’ next interaction. More specifically, the items of 
Control were changed to make reference to one’s perceived control over future actions by the 
other (e.g., “I (Mrs. Sara) am easily controlling the outcomes of my next interaction with Mr. 
Manuel”); Belonging, Trust and Meta-trust items were modified to be contingent on the 
other’s future perception of one’s action (e.g., I (Mrs. Sara) I will continue to feel valued as a 
person by Mr. Manuel; Mr. Manuel will continue to trust me completely); and the items of 
Maintenance were rephrased to refer to the next time the characters interacted (e.g., Mr. 
Manuel and I (Mrs. Sara) will have a difficult time communicating).  
A mean score between the items of each scale was computed and treated as dependent 
variable as in the previous studies. 
4.8.4 Results 
Correlations between all measures are shown in Table 16. Perceived RelComp, Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect Control, Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance correlated 
moderately (r < |.50|) to strongly (r ≥ |.50|) with one another. 
Table 16 – Pearson correlations between all measures 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RelComp 1 1.00 .65** -.67** .76** .68** .35** .74** -.73** .26** 
Pos. Affect 2 .67** 1.00 -.86** .67** .43** .12 .48** -.61** .14 
Neg. Affect 3 -.59** -.81** 1.00 -.66** -.43** -.12** -.49** .66** -.11 
Control 4 .83** .74** -.63** 1.00 .71** .42** .73** -.82** .34** 
Belonging 5 .71** .46** -.42** .73** 1.00 .61** .86** -.72** .49** 
Trust 6 .36** .06 -.03 .31** .61** 1.00 .59** -.43** .56** 
Meta-trust 7 .71** .53** -.47** .72** .82** .48** 1.00 -.73** .43** 
Maintenance 8 -.67** -.55** .58** -.78** -.76** -.46** -.72** 1.00 -.35** 
Liking 9 .15 .03 .05 .17 .43** .54** .37** -.37** 1.00 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. Correlations for the first scenario of each participant are reported in the upper part 
of the table (n = 147). Correlations for the second scenario of each participant are reported in the lower 
part of the table (n = 109).  
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One case with Mahalanobis distance larger than critical chi-square value (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2014) for 9 degrees of freedom, ꭓ2 (9) = 27.88, p < .001, was considered a multivariate 
outlier and removed from the analyses.  
I conducted a 2 (AR vs. EM) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-complementary 
Uncontrollable vs. Non-complementary Controllable) Multivariate Repeated Measures GLM 
on all dependent variables and manipulation check using IBM SPSS 23. Since the 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices could not be ascertained given the different 
sample sizes across groups, Pillai’s criterion was used to evaluate multivariate significance 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  
As in Study 3, the hypotheses were tested by comparing each complementary condition 
with the two non-complementary conditions together with planned contrasts (1, -0.5, -0.5) on 
each dependent variable, at each level of RM. The planned contrasts were defined with the 
/LMATRIX and /MMATRIX subcommands. Furthermore, the role of action and cognitive 
complementarity, and the role of RMs were explored with Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests 
comparing between conditions of RelComp and RM, respectively. Significance tests were 
estimated with a 95% CI. 
4.8.4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Multivariate tests showed that the effects of RelComp, F(18, 196) = 7.79, p < .001, ƞp2 = 
.42, RM, F(9, 97) = 10.37, p < .001, ƞp2 = .49, the two-way interaction, F(18, 196) = 2.93, p < 
.001, ƞp2 = .22, and the planned contrasts, F(18, 88) = 9.34, p < .001, ƞp2 = .66, were 
statistically significant. The Univariate tests of the main effects and two-way interaction on 
Table 17 – Univariate tests of main effects and two- and three-way interactions on each 
manipulation check and dependent variable 
 df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  
 RelComp  RM  RelComp*RM  
RelComp 2 44.29 <.001 .46  1 31.35 <.001 .23  2 5.07 .008 .09  
Positive Affect 2 80.29 <.001 .61  1 7.84 .006 .07  2 0.39 >.250 -  
Negative Affect 2 68.09 <.001 .56  1 6.81 .010 .06  2 0.48 >.250 -  
Control 2 48.39 <.001 .48  1 55.94 <.001 .35  2 4.49 .014 .08  
Belonging 2 13.95 <.001 .21  1 43.08 <.001 .29  2 8.47 <.001 .14  
Trust 2 0.50 >.250 -  1 62.01 <.001 .37  2 1.72 .184 .03  
Meta-trust 2 19.72 <.001 .27  1 31.81 <.001 .23  2 10.42 <.001 .17  
Maintenance 2 39.76 <.001 .43  1 60.76 <.001 .37  2 9.97 <.001 .16  
Liking 2 0.32 >.250 -  1 20.50 <.001 .16  2 0.18 >.250 -  
Error 105     105     105     
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each dependent variable and manipulation check are presented in Table 17. Estimated 
marginal means, standard errors, significance tests and effect sizes are displayed in Table 18, 
for the main effects, and in Table 19 for the two-way interaction. 
4.8.4.1 Manipulation Check 
The main effect of RelComp on the manipulation check was qualified by a two-way 
interaction. As expected, in both RMs, Perceived RelComp was higher in the Complementary 
condition when compared with the Non-complementary conditions either separately or 
together (Table 19). Interestingly, whereas in the AR scenario the responses were perceived as 
equally not complementary (< 4) in the Non-compUncontrollable condition and in the Non-
compControllable condition, in the EM scenario responses were perceived as more 
complementary in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-compControllable 
condition. 
Table 18 - Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors for the main effects 
 Comp 
Non-comp 
Uncontrollable 
Non-comp 
Controllable 
 Authority 
Ranking 
Equality 
Matching 
 
  
 M SE M SE M SE  M SE M SE  
RelComp 5.14a 0.14 4.09b 0.14 3.42c 0.12  3.98a  0.08 4.45b 0.09  
Positive Affect 5.58a 0.21 3.11b 0.21 2.14c 0.18  3.34a 0.14 3.89b 0.15  
Negative Affect 2.66a 0.22 4.50b 0.21 5.97c 0.19  4.60a 0.15 4.15b 0.14  
Control 5.29a 0.15 3.90b 0.15 3.41c 0.13  3.87a 0.09 4.54b 0.09  
Belonging 5.33a 0.17 4.60b 0.16 4.18b 0.14  4.37a 0.10 5.04b 0.11  
Trust 4.63a 0.12 4.78a 0.12 4.64a 0.11  4.29a 0.08 5.09b 0.09  
Meta-trust 5.47a 0.19 4.67b 0.19 3.91c 0.16  4.38a 0.11 4.99b 0.12  
Maintenance 2.34a 0.16 3.33b 0.15 4.16c 0.13  3.71a 0.11 2.83b 0.10  
Liking 5.44a 0.17 5.61a 0.16 5.47a 0.14  5.22a 0.12 5.78b 0.10  
 n = 32 n = 33 n = 43  n = 108 n = 108  
Note: Simple mean comparisons between conditions are identified with superscripts a, b and 
c. Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal 
superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. See effect sizes in 
Table 17. 
 
4.8.4.2 Effects of RelComp on the Dependent Variables 
I predicted higher ratings on Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust, and 
lower ratings on Negative Affect and Maintenance in the Complementary condition than in 
the two Non-complementary conditions together, in both conditions of RM. As hypothesized, 
planned contrasts showed that participants in the AR and EM scenarios experienced higher 
Positive Affect, Belonging, Control, Meta-trust, and lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, 
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in the Complementary conditions when compared with the two Non-complementary 
responses together. 
Table 19 - Estimated marginal means, standard errors, planned contrasts and post-hoc 
tests, and effect sizes for the two-way interaction. 
 Comp 
Non-comp 
Uncontrollable 
Non-comp 
Controllable 
 
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 n = 32 n = 33 n = 43      
 M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p ƞp2 
 Authority Ranking 
RelComp x 4.88a 0.15 x 3.71b 0.14 x 3.36b 0.13  1.35 0.18 < .001 .36 
Positive Affect x 5.41a 0.26 x 2.85b 0.26 x 1.77c 0.23  3.10 0.31 < .001 .48 
Negative Affect x 2.84a 0.27 x 4.85b 0.27 x 6.12c 0.24  -2.64 0.33 < .001 .38 
Control x 5.10a 0.17 x 3.38b 0.17 x 3.12b 0.15  1.86 0.21 < .001 .44 
Belonging x 5.18a 0.18 x 3.96b 0.18 x 3.96b 0.16  1.22 0.22 < .001 .23 
Trust x 4.23a 0.15 x 4.27a 0.15 x 4.35a 0.13  -0.82 0.18 >.250 - 
Meta-trust x 5.44a 0.21 x 4.02b 0.21 x 3.67b 0.18  1.59 0.25 < .001 .28 
Maintenance x 2.55a 0.19 x 4.13b 0.19 x 4.47b 0.17  -1.75 0.23 < .001 .36 
Liking x 5.19a 0.22 x 5.27a 0.21 x 5.21a 0.19  -0.54 0.26 .>.250 - 
 Equality Matching 
RelComp y 5.40a 0.17 y 4.47b 0.17 x 3.49c  0.15  1.42 0.20 < .001 .32 
Positive Affect x 5.75a 0.28 x 3.36b  0.28 y 2.51b  0.24  2.81 0.34 < .001 .40 
Negative Affect  x 2.47a  0.26 y 4.15b  0.26 x 5.81c 0.23  -2.52 0.31 < .001 .38 
Control y 5.48a  0.17 y 4.42b 0.16 y 3.70c 0.14  1.42 0.20 < .001 .33 
Belonging x 5.49a  0.20 y 5.25a  0.20 y 4.40b  0.17  0.66 0.24 .006 .07 
Trust y 5.04a 0.16 y 5.29a 0.15 y 4.93a 0.14  -0.71 0.19 >.250 - 
Meta-trust x 5.49a 0.22 y 5.32a 0.21 y 4.15b 0.19  0.76 0.26 .004 .08 
Maintenance y 2.13a  0.18 y 2.52a  0.18 y 3.85b 0.15  -1.06 0.21 < .001 .19 
Liking y 5.69a 0.18 y 5.94a  0.18 y 5.72a 0.16  -0.14 0.22 >.250 - 
Note: Superscripts a, b and c identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp. 
Superscripts x and y identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RM. Different 
superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts are used for 
means with non-significant differences, p > .05. 
A more conservative version of the hypotheses would predict higher ratings of Positive 
Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust, and lower ratings of Negative Affect and 
Maintenance, in the Complementary conditions when compared with each Non-
complementary condition separately with post-hoc tests, at each level of RM. These 
hypotheses would be supported by main effects of RelComp on the dependent variables 
showing that the predicted differences were constant across RM scenarios, or by two-way 
interactions showing that the predicted differences were weakened or enlarged across RM 
scenarios.  
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The main effect of RelComp was significant on the dependent variables, with the 
exception of Trust and Liking, and the two-way interaction was significant on Control, 
Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance. Table 18 shows that Positive Affect and Control 
were higher, whereas Negative Affect was lower in the Complementary condition than in 
each Non-complementary condition. These differences were robust across RMs (Table 19), 
although, but more pronounced in the AR scenario in the case of Control. Regarding the other 
dependent variables, in the AR scenario, Belonging and Meta-trust were higher, whereas 
Maintenance was lower, in the Complementary condition than in each Non-complementary 
condition (Table 19). In the EM scenario, Belonging and Meta-trust were higher, whereas 
Maintenance was lower, in the Complementary condition when compared with the Non-
compControllable condition, but not when compared with the Non-compUncontrollable condition 
(Table 19).  
Differences between Non-complementary conditions. The main effects of RelComp 
showed that Positive Affect was higher, and Negative Affect was lower in the Non-
compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-compControllable condition (Table 18). The two-way 
interactions, on the other hand, showed that Control, Belonging and Meta-Trust were higher, 
and Maintenance was lower, in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-
compControllable condition, but only in the EM scenario (Table 19). 
4.8.4.3 Exploratory Analyses 
Effects of RelComp on Liking and Trust. The main effect of RelComp and the two-
way interaction on two variables was not significant (Table 17). 
Differences between RMs. Significant main effects of RM (Table 17) showed that 
Positive Affect, Trust and Liking were lower, and Negative Affect was higher, in the AR 
scenario than in the EM scenario. The mains effects of RM on the manipulation check, 
Control, Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance were qualified by an interaction with 
RelComp. Perceived RelComp was higher in the EM than in the AR scenario, but only among 
the Complementary condition and the Non-compUncontrollable condition. Control was higher, and 
Maintenance was lower, in the EM than in the AR scenario across all conditions of RelComp, 
but these differences were larger (Mdiff > 1) in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the 
other two conditions. Belonging and Meta-trust were also higher in the EM than in the AR 
scenario, but only significantly among the two Non-complementary conditions.  
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Subscales of Perceived RelComp. In order to explore whether participants in different 
conditions of RelComp differed in their ratings on the two subscales of the manipulation 
check assessing action complementarity and cognitive complementarity, one mean score of 
the items of each subscale was computed. A 2 (AR vs. EM) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-
complementary Uncontrollable vs. Non-complementary Controllable) Multivariate Repeated 
Measures GLM was conducted on all dependent variables and manipulation check subscales. 
Multivariate tests showed statistically significant main effects of RelComp, F(20, 194) = 7.16, 
p < .001, ƞp2 = .43, and RM, F(10, 96) = 9.25, p = .000, ƞp2 = .49, and interaction effect, F(20, 
194) = 2.63, p < .001, ƞp2 = .21. The results on the dependent variables were the same as in 
the first GLM. Estimated marginal means were compared Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests. 
Action complementarity subscale. The main effect of RelComp on the action 
complementarity subscale, F(2, 105) = 61.78, p < .001, ƞp2 = .54, was not qualified by an 
interaction with RM, F(2, 105) = 2.12, p < .125. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction, 
showed that Action complementarity was higher in the Complementary condition, EMM = 
5.41, SE = 0.17, than in the Non-compUncontrollable condition, EMM = 3.89, SE = 0.16, p < .001, 
and in the Non-compControllable condition, EMM = 3.00, SE = 0.14, p < .001; and higher in the 
Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-compControllable condition, p < .001. 
 Cognitive complementarity subscale. The main effect of RelComp on the cognitive 
subscale, F(2, 105) = 12.20, p < .001, ƞp2 = .19, was qualified by an interaction with RM, F(2, 
105) = 5.48, p = .005, ƞp2 = .09. In the AR scenario, cognitive complementarity was higher in 
the Complementary condition, EMM = 4.52, SE = 0.16, than in the Non-compUncontrollable 
condition, EMM = 3.83, SE = 0.15, p = .007, and in the Non-compControllable condition, EMM = 
3.83, SE = 0.13, p = .004. There were no differences between Non-complementary conditions 
(p = 1). On the other hand, in the EM scenario, cognitive complementarity was higher in the 
Complementary condition, EMM = 5.13, SE = 0.18, p < .001, and in the Non-compUncontrollable 
condition, EMM = 4.82, SE = 0.18, p = .002, when compared with the Non-compControllable 
condition, EMM = 4.01, SE = 0.15. There were no differences between the Complementary 
condition and the Non-compUncontrollable conditions (p < .250) 
4.9. Study 4b 
The goal of Study 4b was to replicate the findings of Study 4a in CS and MP interactions.  
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4.9.1 Methods 
4.9.1.1 Participants 
An 15-minute online questionnaire was initiated by 337 participants and completed, by 
123 Portuguese speaking participants, 96.8% Portuguese nationals, 69.9% female, with ages 
between 15 and 73 years-old (Mage = 28.16, SD = 12.03). Forty-one percent (40.7%) had a 
bachelor degree, 21.1% had an incomplete bachelor degree, 17.1% had a high-school 
diploma, and 19.5% had a master’s degree. 
4.9.1.2 Design  
This was a 2 (CS vs. MP) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-compUncontrollable vs. Non-
compControllable) mixed factorial design, with RelComp manipulated between subjects and RM 
manipulated within-subjects, as in Study 4a. 
4.9.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
Portuguese speaking participants were recruited by two students of the Master in Social 
and Organizational Psychology at a public university in Lisbon who had to run an experiment 
as requirement for a class on research methods. Procedures for recruiting and rewarding 
participants; for building and disseminating the online questionnaire; for informing 
participants about the voluntary nature of their participation, confidentiality and anonymity of 
their answers, the contact of the main investigator for further information, as well as for 
debriefing the participants and notifying the winners to collect the prize were the same as in 
Study 4a. The manipulations and measures were also administered as in Study 4a. 
Scenarios. The only difference between scenarios on Study 4a and Study 4b were the 
RMs that were manipulated: CS and MP. In the CS scenario the respondent was asked by her 
brother to help him paint his apartment; whereas in the MP scenario, the respondent had to 
leave the rent payment on his mailbox on a certain time of the day for the landlord to collect it 
(see English description of the scenarios in Appendix N). 
Measures. The measures of Liking (α first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .87, M = 5.77, SD = 
1.23, Min. = 2, Max. = 7),  Positive Affect (α first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .87, M = 3.32, 
SD = 2.13, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Negative Affect (α first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .87, M = 
4.54, SD = 2.14, Min. = 1, Max. = 7), Maintenance (α first scenario = .80, α second scenario = .81, M = 
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3.08, SD = 1.29, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00),  Control (α first scenario = .80, α second scenario = .80, M 
= 4.30, SD = 1.20, Min. = 1.17, Max. = 7.00), respondent’s Trust (α first scenario = .74, α second 
scenario = .84, M = 4.91, SD = 1.06, Min. = 2.40, Max. = 7.00), respondent’s Meta-trust (α first 
scenario = .91, α second scenario = .94, M = 4.83, SD = 1.46, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), Belonging (α 
first scenario = .87, α second scenario = .90, M = 5.02, SD = 1.29, Min. = 1.00, Max. = 7.00), and 
Perceived RelComp (α first scenario = .91, α second scenario = .92, M = 4.17, SD = 1.26, Min. = 1.38, 
Max. = 7.00) were the same as in Study 4a.  
4.9.2 Results  
Correlations between all measures are shown in Table 20. Perceived RelComp, Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect, Control, Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance correlated 
moderately (r < |.50|) to strongly (r ≥ |.50|) with one another. 
Table 20 – Pearson correlations between all measures 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RelComp 1 1.00 .68** -.66** .71** .56** .25** .64** -.68** .19* 
Pos. Affect 2 .64** 1.00 -.88** .62** .35** .05 .34** -.49** .16 
Neg. Affect 3 -.63** -.83** 1.00 -.61** -.32** -.03 -.37** .52** -.14 
Control 4 .74** .52** -.52** 1.00 .55** .25** .52** -.73** .23** 
Belonging 5 .64** .32** -.38** .68** 1.00 .63** .82** -.68** .41** 
Trust 6 .37** .10 -.07 .39** .67** 1.00 .61** -.41** .49** 
Meta-trust 7 .62** .33** -.34** .64** .81** .63** 1.00 -.64** .41** 
Maintenance 8 -.64** -.37** .46** -.75** -.79** -.47** -.75** 1.00 -.34** 
Liking 9 .17 .03 .02 .27** .50** .59** .38** -.38** 1.00 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. Correlations for the first scenario of each participant are reported in the upper part 
of the table (n = 154). Correlations for the second scenario of each participant are reported in the lower 
part of the table (n = 123).  
Three cases that deviated more than 3.3 standard deviations from the mean were 
considered univariate outliers (Tabachnick& Fidell, 2014), and two cases with Mahalanobis 
distance larger than critical chi-square value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014) for 9 degrees of 
freedom , ꭓ2 (9) = 27.88, p < .001, were considered multivariate outliers. The five cases were 
removed from the analysis.  
I conducted a 2 (CS vs. MP) x 3 (Complementary vs. Non-complementary 
Uncontrollable vs. Non-complementary Controllable) Multivariate Repeated Measures GLM 
on all dependent variables and manipulation check using IBM SPSS 23. Data analyzes 
followed the same statistical procedures as Study 4a. Subsequent analyses followed the same 
procedures as for planned contrasts and post-hoc tests as Study 4a. Significance tests were 
estimated with a 95% CI. 
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4.9.2.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Multivariate tests showed that the effects of RelComp, F(18, 214) = 15.37, p < .001, ƞp2 = 
.56, RM, F(9, 107) = 22.06, p < .001, ƞp2 = .65, the two-way interaction, F(18, 214) = 3.09, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = .21, and the planned contrasts, F(18, 98) = 17.88, p < .001, ƞp2 = .77, were 
statistically significant. The Univariate tests of the main effects, and two-way interaction on 
each dependent variable and manipulation check are presented in Table 21. Estimated 
marginal means, standard errors, significance tests and effect sizes are displayed in Table 22, 
for the main effects, and in Table 23 for the two-way interaction. 
Table 21 – Univariate tests of main effects and two- and three-way interactions on each 
manipulation check and dependent variable 
 df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  df F p ƞp2  
 RelComp  RM  RelComp*RM  
RelComp 2 56.91 <.001 .50  1 8.60 .004 .07  2 8.92 <.001 .13  
Positive Affect 2 117.48 <.001 .67  1 10.96 .001 .09  2 12.96 <.001 .18  
Negative Affect 2 100.17 <.001 .64  1 12.14 .001 .10  2 6.51 .002 .10  
Control 2 26.19 <.001 .31  1 8.19 .005 .07  2 4.82 .010 .08  
Belonging 2 17.20 <.001 .23  1 103.47 <.001 .47  2 3.91 .023 .06  
Trust 2 3.60 .030 .06  1 142.00 <.001 .55  2 1.92 .152 .03  
Meta-trust 2 31.87 <.001 .36  1 79.67 <.001 .41  2 7.11 .001 .11  
Maintenance 2 20.50 <.001 .26  1 31.53 <.001 .22  2 3.78 .026 .06  
Liking 2 0.43 >.250 -  1 89.24 <.001 .44  2 0.30 >.250 -  
Error 115     115     115     
Table 22 - Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors for the main effects   
 Comp 
Non-comp 
Uncontrollable 
Non-comp 
Controllable 
 Communal 
Sharing 
Market 
Pricing  
 M SE M SE M SE  M SE M SE 
RelComp 5.26a 0.14 4.11b 0.14 3.21c 0.13  4.31a 0.09 4.08b  0.08 
Positive Affect 5.55a 0.19 2.59b 0.19 1.81c 0.18  3.56a 0.13 3.08b 0.13 
Negative Affect 2.43a 0.19 5.37b 0.19 5.93b 0.18  4.30a 0.13 4.85b 0.14 
Control 5.02a 0.15 4.37b 0.15 3.54c 0.14  4.45a 0.10 4.17b 0.09 
Belonging 5.49a 0.16 5.37a 0.16 4.31b 0.15  5.54a 0.10 4.58b 0.10 
Trust 4.93ab 0.12 5.20a 0.12 4.74b 0.12  5.51a 0.09 4.40b 0.08 
Meta-trust 5.51a 0.17 5.26a 0.17 3.82b 0.16  5.36a 0.12 4.37b 0.10 
Maintenance 2.45a 0.16 2.83a 0.16 3.83b 0.15  2.76a 0.11 3.31b 0.10 
Liking 5.75a 0.13 5.90a 0.13 5.75a 0.12  6.38a 0.09 5.21b 0.11 
 n = 38 n = 38 n = 42  n = 118 n = 118 
Note: Simple mean comparisons between conditions are identified with superscripts a, b and c. 
Different superscripts are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal 
superscripts are used for means with non-significant differences, p > .05. See effect sizes in 
Table 21. 
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4.9.2.2 Manipulation Check 
The main effect of RelComp on the manipulation check was qualified by a two-way 
interaction. As expected, in both RMs, Perceived RelComp was higher in the Complementary 
condition when compared with the Non-complementary conditions either separately or 
together (Table 23). These differences were more pronounced in the CS scenario. Also in both 
RMs, Perceived RelComp was higher in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-
compControllable condition. 
Table 23 - Estimated marginal means, standard errors, planned contrasts and post-hoc 
tests, and effect sizes for the two-way interaction. 
 Comp 
Non-comp 
Uncontrollable 
Non-comp 
Controllable 
 
Contrast 
Comp vs. Non-Comp 
 n = 38 n = 38 n = 42      
 M SE M SE M SE  Est. SE p ƞp2 
 Communal Sharing 
RelComp x 5.49a 0.16 x 4.33b 0.16 x 3.10c 0.15  1.78 0.20 <.001 .41 
Positive Affect x 6.29a 0.22 x 2.68b 0.22 x 1.69c 0.21  4.10 0.27 <.001 .66 
Negative Affect x 1.76a 0.23 x 5.21b 0.23 x 5.93b 0.22  -3.81 0.28 <.001 .61 
Control x 5.23a 0.18 x 4.64a 0.18 x 3.47b 0.17  1.17 0.22 <.001 .20 
Belonging x 5.82a 0.18 x 6.03a 0.18 x 4.77b 0.17  0.42 0.22 .062 .03 
Trust x 5.37a 0.15 x 5.87a 0.15 x 5.28a 0.15  -0.20 0.19 >.250 - 
Meta-trust x 5.81a 0.21 x 6.04a 0.21 x 4.21b 0.20  0.68 0.25 .008 .06 
Maintenance x 2.20a 0.19 x 2.38a 0.19 x 3.70b 0.18  -0.84 0.23 <.001 .10 
Liking x 6.40a 0.15 x 6.42a 0.15 x 6.33a 0.14  0.02 0.18 >.250 - 
 Market Pricing 
RelComp y 5.03a 0.15 y 3.89b 0.15 x 3.33c 0.14  1.43 0.18 < .001 .36 
Positive Affect y 4.82a 0.22 x 2.50b 0.22 x 1.93b 0.21  2.60 0.27 < .001 .44 
Negative Affect  y 3.11a 0.24 x 5.53b 0.24 x 5.93b 0.23  -2.62 0.29 < .001 .42 
Control y 4.81a 0.16 y 4.10b 0.16 x 3.60b 0.15  0.96 0.20 < .001 .17 
Belonging y 5.16a 0.18 y 4.72a 0.18 y 3.86b 0.17  0.87 0.22 < .001 .12 
Trust y 4.48a 0.14 y 4.53a 0.14 y 4.21a 0.14  0.11 0.17 >.250 - 
Meta-trust y 5.21a 0.18 y 4.47b 0.18 y 3.43c 0.17  1.26 0.22 < .001 .23 
Maintenance y 2.70a 0.18 y 3.28a 0.18 x 3.96b 0.17  -0.92 0.22 < .001 .14 
Liking y 5.11a 0.19 y 5.37a 0.19 y 5.17a 0.18  -0.16 0.23 >.250 - 
Note: Superscripts a, b and c identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RelComp. 
Superscripts x and y identify simple mean comparisons between conditions of RM. Different superscripts 
are used for means with significant differences, p < .05. Equal superscripts are used for means with non-
significant differences, p > .05. 
4.9.2.3 Effects of RelComp on the Dependent Variables 
I predicted higher ratings on Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust, and 
lower ratings on Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the Complementary condition than in 
the two Non-complementary conditions together, in both conditions of RM. As hypothesized, 
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planned contrasts showed that participants in the CS and MP scenarios experienced higher 
Positive Affect, Control, Meta-trust, and lower Negative Affect and Maintenance, in the 
Complementary condition when compared with the two Non-complementary responses 
together. The difference between the Complementary condition and the two Non-
complementary conditions on Belonging was also significant in the MP scenarios, but 
marginal in the CS scenario (Table 23). 
The conservative version of the hypotheses would predict higher ratings of Positive 
Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust, and lower ratings of Negative Affect and 
Maintenance, in the Complementary condition when compared with each Non-
complementary condition separately with post-hoc tests, at each level of RM. These 
hypotheses would be supported by main effects of RelComp on the dependent variables, 
showing that the predicted differences were constant across RM scenarios, or by two-way 
interactions, showing that the predicted differences were weakened or enlarged across RM 
scenarios.  
Post-hoc tests showed that the main effects of RelComp on Positive Affect, Negative 
Affect, Control, Belonging, Meta-trust, and Maintenance, were significant and qualified by an 
interaction with RM (Table 21). In both RM scenarios (Table 23), Positive Affect was higher, 
and Negative Affect was lower, in the Complementary condition when compared with each 
Non-complementary condition separately; but Belonging was higher, and Maintenance was 
lower, in the Complementary condition, when compared with the Non-compControllable 
condition, but not when compared with the Non-compUncontrollable condition. In the CS scenario 
(Table 23), Control and Meta-trust were higher in the Complementary condition, when 
compared with the Non-compControllable condition, but not when compared with the Non-
compUncontrollable condition. In the MP scenario, Control and Meta-trust were higher in the 
Complementary condition when compared with each Non-complementary condition 
separately.  
Differences between Non-complementary conditions. The two-way interactions 
showed that, in both RMs, Belonging and Meta-Trust were higher, and Maintenance was 
lower, in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-compControllable condition (Table 
23). In the CS scenario, but not in the MP scenario, Positive Affect and Control were higher 
in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the Non-compControllable condition. There were no 
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differences between the Non-complementary conditions on Negative Affect in either the CS 
or the MP scenario.  
4.9.2.4 Exploratory Analyses 
Effects of RelComp on Liking and Trust. There was a main effect of RelComp on 
Trust, but not on Liking. The two-way interaction was not significant on neither of the 
variables (Table 21). Trust was only lower in the Non-compControllable condition when 
compared with the Non-compUncontrollable condition. 
Differences between RMs. The main effect of RM on the manipulation check, Positive 
Affect, Negative Affect, Control, Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance was qualified by an 
interaction with RelComp. Perceived RelComp and Control were higher, and Maintenance 
was lower, in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario, but only among the Complementary 
condition and the Non-compUncontrollable condition. Positive Affect was higher, and Negative 
Affect was lower, in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario, but only among participants in 
the Complementary condition. Belonging and Meta-trust were higher in the CS than in the 
MP scenario across the three conditions of RelComp, but these differences were larger (Mdiff 
> 1) in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in the other two conditions. The main effect of 
RM on Trust and Liking was not qualified by and interaction with RelComp. Trust and Liking 
were higher in the CS scenario than in the MP scenario.  
Subscales of Perceived RelComp. The statistical procedures to explore whether 
participants in different conditions of RelComp differed in their ratings on the two subscales 
of the manipulation check were the same as in Study 4a. A 2 (CS vs. MP) x 3 
(Complementary vs. Non-complementary Uncontrollable vs. Non-complementary 
Controllable) Multivariate Repeated Measures GLM was conducted on all dependent 
variables and manipulation check subscales. Multivariate tests showed statistically significant 
main effects of RelComp, F(16, 216) = 16.57, p < .001, ƞp2 = .55, and RM, F(8, 108) = 15.61, 
p < .001, ƞp2 = .54, and interaction effect, F(16, 216) = 3.31, p < .001, ƞp2 = .20. The results 
on the dependent variables were the same as in the first GLM. Estimated marginal means 
were compared Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests. 
Action complementarity subscale. The main effect of RelComp on the action 
complementarity subscale, F(2, 115) = 71.41, p < .001, ƞp2 = .55, was qualified by an 
interaction with RM, F(2, 115) = 8.75, p < .001, ƞp2 = .13. In both conditions of RM, action 
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complementarity was higher in the Complementary condition, EMMCS = 5.64, SE = 0.19, 
EMMMP = 5.29, SE = 0.18, than in the Non-compUncontrollable condition, EMMCS = 3.73, SE = 
0.19, p < .001, EMMMP = 3.50, SE = 0.18, p < .001, and in the Non-compControllable condition, 
EMMCS = 2.49 SE = 0.18, p < .001, EMMMP = 2.97, SE = 0.18, p < .001. Action 
complementarity was also significantly higher in the Non-compUncontrollable condition than in 
the Non-compControllable condition, in the CS scenario, p < .001, but not in the MP scenario, p = 
.112. 
Cognitive complementarity subscale. The main effect of RelComp on the cognitive 
subscale, F(2, 115) = 18.65, p < .001, ƞp2 = .25, was qualified by an interaction with RM, F(2, 
115) = 4.04, p = .020, ƞp2 = .07. In both conditions of RM, cognitive complementarity was 
higher in the Complementary condition, EMMCS = 5.32, SE = 0.20, p < .001, EMMMP = 4.74, 
SE = 0.16, p < .001, and in the Non-compUncontrollable condition, EMMCS = 5.04, SE = 0.20, p < 
.001, EMMMP = 4.34, SE = 0.16, p = .022, when compared with the Non-compControllable 
condition, EMMCS = 3.81, SE = 0.19, EMMMP = 3.75, SE = 0.15. In both conditions of RM, 
there were no differences between the Complementary condition and the Non-compUncontrollable 
conditions (p < .200). 
4.9.3 Discussion of Studies 4a and 4b 
In Studies 1 to 3 the participants took the perspective of the initiator of the interaction. 
Therefore, these studies tested the effects of RelComp on the initiator’s affect and need 
fulfillment, as the result of the partner’s complementary or non-complementary response to a 
previous action by the initiator. Instead, in Studies 4a and 4b the participants took the 
perspective of the respondent in order to test whether affect and need fulfillment were 
enhanced by participant’s own complementary or non-complementary response to a previous 
action by the partner. In addition, it was explored how effects of RelComp would depend on 
whether non-complementary actions were attributed to controllable (e.g., lack of effort or 
negligence; Non-complementaryControllable condition) or uncontrollable (e.g., bad luck; Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition) causes. 
The two studies showed that, in the four RM scenarios, Positive Affect, Control, 
Belonging and Meta-trust were higher, whereas Negative Affect and Maintenance were lower, 
in the Complementary condition than in the two Non-complementary conditions together. 
This was true in all RM scenarios, with the exception of Belonging, which was marginally 
higher in the Complementary condition of the CS scenario. Thus, the predicted effects of 
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RelComp on participant’s affective states and need fulfillment are not only experienced when 
the partner complements a previous action by oneself, but also when one complements a 
previous action by the partner. In other words, as far as affect and needs fulfillment are 
concerned, it is not relevant who initiates the relational pattern and who completes it by doing 
his part, insofar as the pattern is fulfilled. 
When the two Non-complementary conditions were separately compared with the 
Complementary condition and with one another, the results showed, as anticipated, that causal 
attributions for Non-complementarity matter for Perceived RelComp, for Affect and for the 
fulfillment of needs to belong, to control and to feel trusted by the partner. First, Perceived 
RelComp, Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust were higher, whereas Negative 
Affect and Maintenance were lower, in the Complementary condition than in the Non-
complementaryControllable condition, in all RM scenarios. These results show that failure to 
complement due to lack of effort or negligence (in the Non-complementaryControllable 
condition) consistently undermines affect, threatens the three needs in all kinds of 
relationships, and makes social interactions more effortful. 
Second, comparisons between the two Non-complementary conditions revealed 
significant differences: on Perceived RelComp, Belonging, Meta-trust and Maintenance, in 
the CS, EM and MP scenarios; on Positive Affect, in the CS and AR scenarios; on Negative 
Affect, in the AR and EM scenarios; and on Control, in the CS and EM scenarios. In these 
conditions, Perceived RelComp, Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and Meta-trust were 
higher, whereas Negative Affect and Maintenance were lower in the Uncontrollable than in 
the Controllable condition. These results show that, in some relationships or situations, the 
negative effects of non-complementarity may be attenuated, and the experience of RelComp 
may be enhanced, if failure to perform one’s part is attributed to causes beyond one’s control, 
i.e., if one is perceived has having, at least, made an effort to do one’s part. 
Third, comparisons between the Complementary condition and the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable conditions showed significant differences: on Perceived RelComp, 
Positive Affect and Negative Affect in the four RM scenarios; on Control in the AR, EM and 
MP scenarios; on Belonging and Maintenance in the AR scenario; and on Meta-trust in the 
AR and MP scenarios. On the one hand, these results suggest that, even though perceived 
intentions or efforts in favor of the relational pattern attenuate the negative effects of failure to 
complement on Perceived RelComp and Affect, actually performing one’s part may 
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significantly improve affect and Perceived RelComp. In other words, action, in addition to 
intentions, is a necessary condition for a complete experience of RelComp and its affective 
consequences. On the other hand, in some relationships or situations, making an effort or 
showing intentions in favor of the relational pattern may be a sufficient condition to fully 
predict the partner’s action, to feel included and accepted, to feel trusted by the partner, and to 
experience a smooth interaction. In other words, Non-complementarity may not necessarily 
threaten basic needs as long as the partner who failed to perform his part is perceived, at least, 
to have made an effort or to be committed to doing his part. 
Furthermore, the two studies also demonstrated that it is possible to experience different 
degrees of RelComp, depending on whether both actions and psychological states are 
complementary (as in the Complementary condition), only psychological states are 
complementary (as in the Non-complementaryUncontrollable condition), or neither actions nor 
psychological states are complementary (as in the Non-complementaryControllable condition). 
This was evident in the CS, EM and MP scenarios where Perceived RelComp decreased 
linearly from the Complementary condition to the Non-complementaryUncontrollable condition 
and from this to the Non-complementaryControllable condition.  
Interestingly, when the cognitive complementarity subscale of the manipulation check 
was analyzed separately, cognitive complementarity in the Non-complementaryUncontrollable 
condition of the CS, EM and MP scenarios, was higher than in the Non-
complementaryControllable condition, but not lower than in the Complementary condition. On 
the other hand, in the AR scenario, Perceived RelComp and cognitive complementarity in the 
Non-complementaryUncontrollable condition were lower than the in Complementary condition, 
but not higher than in the Non-complementaryControllable condition. These results demonstrate 
that individuals can, indeed, experience complementarity of psychological states and 
complementarity of actions independently of one another; and that the combination of the two 
contributes to experiencing different degrees of overall RelComp.  
Finally, the results showed that action complementarity and cognitive complementarity 
are not equally important for affect and need fulfillment. In all RM scenarios, high Positive 
Affect (i.e., above the midpoint of the scale) and low Negative Affect (i.e., below the mind 
point of the scale) were elicited by action complementarity (as shown by the Complementary 
condition), rather than by cognitive complementarity (as shown by the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition). In other words, cognitive complementarity is not 
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sufficient for experiencing high Positive Affect and low Negative Affect on social 
interactions: action complementarity is a necessary condition. This is relevant from a 
theoretical point of view because goal attainment is associated with positive affect and failure 
to attain a goal is associated to negative affect (Martin & Tesser, 2009). If the goal is the 
relational pattern, then, high positive affect and low negative affect should be experienced 
when the goal is fully attained, i.e., when the actions of each participant are complementary, 
in addition to their psychological states. 
Control was enhanced by action complementarity in the AR, EM, and MP scenarios—as 
shown by the significant differences between the Complementary condition and the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition—and by cognitive complementarity in the CS and EM 
scenarios—as shown by the significant differences between the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition and the Non-complementaryControllable condition. On AR, 
EM and MP interactions, the sense of Control over the partner’s actions seems to be 
contingent on participants actually performing their parts, in addition to only intending to do 
so. On the other hand, in CS interactions, intentions seem to be sufficient for experiencing 
Control. Possibly, this is due to the fact that in CS relationships people do not keep track of 
each other’s contributions (A. Fiske, 1991, 1992). They give what they can and take what 
they need, as long as they share the same essence or belong to the same group. Hence, in CS 
interactions, people are more responsive to intentions, commitments, and efforts to contribute, 
than to how much each one actually contributes. Therefore, the experience of Control over the 
partner’s actions on a CS relationship may be contingent on perceived commitments to 
perform one’s part the best one can, rather than on how much one can actually do. 
Belonging was only enhanced by action complementarity in the AR scenario—as shown 
by differences between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementaryUncontrollable 
condition. However, since in the AR scenario cognitive complementarity was only 
experienced in the Complementary condition it is not possible to take conclusions about 
cognitive complementarity when action complementarity was absent, i.e., in the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition. In the CS, EM and MP scenarios, Belonging was only 
enhanced by cognitive complementarity—as shown by differences between the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition and the Non-complementaryControllable condition. Similarly, 
Meta-trust was more affected by cognitive complementarity than by action complementarity, 
in the CS, EM, and MP scenarios, since differences were lager between the Non-
complementaryUncontrollable condition and the Non-complementaryControllable condition than 
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between the Complementary condition and the Non-complementaryUncontrollable condition. 
These results suggest that, being committed to doing one’s part may be sufficient condition 
for anticipating feeling accepted, valued and trusted by the partner. 
Such findings on Belonging and Meta-trust also show that one’s perceptions about the 
partner’s evaluations of oneself are not only affected by the partner’s actions, but also by 
one’s own actions. This has implications for the understanding of impression management 
strategies, since it implies that people anticipate that one way to earn the partner’s respect, 
acceptance, approval and trust is to act in complementarity, or at least to appear to others that 
they have made an effort to do so. 
The fact that cognitive complementarity was more important for Belonging and Meta-
trust than action complementarity has important implications for understanding the use of 
excuses in social relationships. One way people who have failed to complement may 
communicate that they made an effort (even when they have not) is by excusing themselves 
with uncontrollable causes. Excuses are a common strategy people use to preserve a favorable 
self-image, and to protect from rejection by others, after engaging in unacceptable behavior 
(Leary, 2010); and uncontrollable reasons are especially good excuses (Weiner, et al., 1987). 
The current results suggest that the reason why uncontrollable excuses mitigate the negative 
effects of non-complementary behavior is that by minimizing one’s responsibility it preserves 
cognitive complementarity. 
Finally, Trust and Liking were better predicted by RMs than RelComp. Not surprisingly, 
liking and trusting the partner are not affected by one’s actions towards the partner. One the 
other hand, people like and trust the partner more on CS than MP interaction and on EM than 
AR interactions. It is however possible that, there was a confound between the RM 
implemented on the interaction and RM that prevails on the overall relationship. On CS and 
EM interactions, the characters were family and roommates, respectively. These bonds are 
associated with more intimacy and closeness, than the business bonds on AR and MP 
scenarios. An EM interaction with a stranger or an MP interaction with a friend, for instance, 
might have produced different results. 
4.10 General Discussion 
Engaging in social relationship is crucial for the fulfillment of core social needs to 
Belong, to Control and to Trust. The processes proposed so far to describe how relationships 
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satiate the three needs are bounded by different and disconnected research traditions, which 
emphasize particular needs of the individual, but neglect the nature of social relationships as 
such. Therefore, these processes can explain how certain needs are met in specific kinds of 
relationships, but can hardly be generalized to other types of relationships and needs. Building 
on the notion that to relate is to pursue RelComp, I proposed that RelComp is sufficient 
condition for fulfilling the core needs to Belong, to Control, and to Trust, regardless of the 
particular kind of relationship people engage in. Additionally, I also proposed that RelComp 
is an affectively charged state of affairs, in that individuals experience Positive Affect 
whenever they achieve complementarity.  
In five online experiments, participants read descriptions of complementary or non-
complementary interactions between two characters—one initiator and one respondent—and 
reported how they would feel if they were in one of the character’s shoes. The interaction 
descriptions also manipulated different RMs. It was predicted that participants in 
complementary interactions would experience more Positive Affect, Control, Belonging and 
Trust, and less Negative Affect than participants in non-complementary interactions.  
In addition to testing these hypotheses, each study was designed to address specific 
aspects of social interactions. Study 1 ruled out the confound between RelComp and 
expectations about the partner’s action in CS and MP interactions. Studies 2 and 3 dealt with 
the confound between RelComp and gaining tangible benefits from the partner in interactions 
based on the four RMs. Moreover, studies 1 to 3 addressed how affect and needs of the 
initiator were affected by the partner’s complementary or non-complementary response to the 
initiator’s own previous action. Conversely, Studies 4a and 4b addressed how affect and 
needs of the respondent were affected by the initiator’s own complementary or non-
complementary response to a previous action by the partner. Furthermore, Studies 4a and 4b 
also explored how affect and need fulfillment, in CS, AR, EM and MP interactions, were 
affected by attributions of non-complementarity to controllable (e.g., lack of effort or 
negligence) and uncontrollable causes (e.g., bad luck), and by action complementarity (when 
cognitive complementarity was constant, and present) and cognitive complementarity (when 
action complementarity was constant, and absent). The hypotheses were generally supported 
by the five studies. 
Relational Complementarity 
189 
4.10.1. RelComp Satiates the Need for Control 
Previous research about the role of the control motive on social relationships suggest that 
people typically gain control by having power over others (S. Fiske & Dépret, 1996; 
Galinsky, et al., 2003; McClelland, 1975) or by attending to and complying with powerful 
others (e.g., Fennis & Aarts, 2012). Hence, these approaches emphasize a connection between 
the control motive and hierarchical or power relationships. Instead, I proposed that control 
can be satiated in all kinds of relationships insofar as people experience RelComp with their 
partners. 
The five studies supported the hypothesis that Control is higher in complementary than in 
non-complementary interactions. Apparently, this effect is robust in interactions according to 
the four RMs, and both when the complementary or non-complementary action is performed 
by the partner (Studies 1 to 3) or by the participant (Studies 4a and 4b). The results also 
suggest that the effects of RelComp on Control do not depend on whether the complementary 
or non-complementary action by the partner is expected or unexpected by the participant 
(Study 1). Control also seems to be more consistently enhanced by RelComp than by benefits 
(Studies 2 and 3). Even when the complementary response by the partner is less beneficial 
than the non-complementary response, Control is generally higher in complementary 
interactions than in non-complementary interactions. Among complementary responses, 
benefits and costs do not make a difference in perceived Control. However, when responses 
are non-complementary, the negative effects of the lack of complementarity on Control can be 
attenuated by benefits, especially in AR (Study 2) and MP interactions (Study 3), although not 
enough to match the levels of Control experienced in complementary interactions. 
Control is also consistently enhanced when the complementary action is performed by the 
participant itself (Studies 4a and 4b). Regardless of whether causes for failure to perform 
one’s part are controllable or uncontrollable, Control is higher in complementary interactions, 
at least in AR, EM and MP relationships. On the other hand, in CS relationships, it is possible 
that a sense of Control can be preserved despite participants’ failure to perform the 
complementary action, insofar as failure is attributed to uncontrollable causes. Apparently, in 
CS interactions, making an effort or showing intentions in favor of the relational pattern is 
sufficient for experiencing Control. In CS relationships people do not keep track of each 
other’s contributions, as long as participants give what they can and take what they need (A. 
Fiske, 1991, 1992). Therefore, it is possible that, in CS interactions, experienced Control over 
Relational Complementarity 
190 
the partner’s action is more contingent on perceived commitments to contribute the best one 
can, rather than on how much one can actually do. This means that even though participants’ 
overt behaviors do not have to be complementary for experiencing Control in CS interactions, 
their psychological states do. 
4.10.2. RelComp Satiates the Need to Belong 
By definition, the need to belong requires that people engage in lasting, positive and 
significant relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) in order to be fulfilled. Since these 
features are typical of CS relationships, it is not clear whether and how people experience a 
sense of belonging in other types of relationships in which bonds are not expected to last, and 
which lack the emotional significance of marriage, parenthood or friendships (e.g., business 
relationships, or relationships with strangers). It has also been proposed that people feel 
included when their perceived relational evaluation by others is high, and rejected when their 
perceived relational evaluation is low (Leary, 2001; Leary & Allen, 2011). However, the 
standards that people use for assessing their relational value are not clearly defined in the 
literature. 
Consistently with previous research on social cognition (A. Fiske, 1993; A. Fiske, 1995; 
A. Fiske & Haslam, 1997; A. Fiske, Haslam & S. Fiske, 1991), I propose that people use RMs 
as standards for evaluating their relational partners. In order to determine whether it is 
possible and desirable to continue relating with each other, relational partners evaluate one 
another regarding each other’s ability and willingness to apply the same RMs to their 
relationship. Hence, the experience of RelComp is evidence that both parties are willing and 
able to relate by the same relational standards, and hence, a signal of each other’s positive 
relational value. On the other hand, a complementary response to a previous action by the 
partner is also a practical validation of the partner’s action and, thereby, a signal of one’s 
positive relational evaluation of the partner.  
The five studies supported the hypothesis that the sense of Belonging is higher in 
complementary than in non-complementary interactions, in the four kinds of relationships. 
Moreover, this effect was robust both when the complementary or non-complementary 
responses were performed by the partner—communicating the partner’s relational evaluation 
of the participant (Studies 1 to 3), and by the participant—communicating the participant’s 
relational value to the partner (Studies 4a and 4b). The results also suggest that the effect of 
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RelComp on Belonging is not dependent on whether the partner’s action is expected or 
unexpected (Study 1). Furthermore, Belonging, like Control, seems to be more consistently 
enhanced by RelComp than by benefits (Studies 2 and 3). Belonging is generally higher in 
complementary interactions, even when complementarity is less beneficial than non-
complementarity. When responses are complementary, benefits do not enhance Belonging. 
Complementarity is sufficient to signal positive relational evaluation. One the other hand, 
when responses are non-complementary, benefits may attenuate or reverse the negative 
effects of non-complementarity, particularly in AR (Study 2) and MP interactions (Study 3), 
respectively. Possibly, in some interactions or relationships when complementarity is absent, 
offering unexpected benefits can be an alternative way to communicate one’s positive 
relational evaluation of the partner. 
Belonging is also consistently enhanced when the complementary action is performed by 
the participant itself (Studies 4a and 4b). This, however, may vary depending on whether non-
complementarity is attributed to controllable or uncontrollable causes. It seems that having 
intentions or commitment in favor of the relational pattern despite one’s failure to perform the 
complementary part (as in the uncontrollable conditions), can make a difference on one’s 
relational value. In some relationships (e.g., AR in Study 4a) it is not sufficient to make an 
effort and to show intentions to complement: actually performing the complementary 
behavior is necessary to enhance relational value and sense of Belonging. In other 
relationships (e.g., EM in Study 4a, CS and MP in Study 4b), however, intentions in favor of 
the relational pattern may suffice to allow participants to experience as much Belonging as 
they do in complementary interactions. In other words “willing to” implement the relational 
pattern, can be more important for one’s relational value than “being able to” do so. This 
means that insofar as participants’ psychological states (i.e., intentions, commitments) are 
complementary, their overt behaviors may not need to be complementary in order to ensure 
relational value and Belonging. 
It has been proposed that, in order to preserve relational value, and to avoid rejection after 
engaging in unacceptable behavior, people present excuses or accounts for their actions 
(Leary, 2010). Excuses are particularly effective when they present uncontrollable reasons for 
behavior (Weiner, et al., 1987). Consistently with these proposals and with the hypothesis 
tested here, when they fail to perform their part of the relational pattern, people can 
successfully protect their relational value by excusing failure with uncontrollable reasons 
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(e.g., “I got stuck in traffic”; “the computer crashed”). This way they simulate intentions and 
commitments in favor of the relational pattern, and, thereby, preserve complementarity of 
psychological states. 
4.10.3. RelComp Increases Trustworthiness 
Trust behavior has been defined as a decision to become vulnerable to another person’s 
exploitation to possibly achieve a benefit (Dunning, et al, 2014). Such decisions are based, in 
part, on trustworthiness expectations, i.e., beliefs about trustee’s benevolent intentions 
towards the trustor (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). It has been proposed that such beliefs are 
developed in trust experiences, with the same partner (e.g., Wieselquist, et al., 1999) or with 
different partners in similar situations (e.g., Bolton, Katok & Ockenfels, 2004), in which the 
partner does not exploit the trustor’s vulnerability, and, instead accommodates to the trustor’s 
needs. This proposal, however, does not explain how people accept vulnerability by trusting a 
partner for the first time, i.e., in the absence of previous experiences. Some alternatives are 
available, that do not require previous vulnerability experiences with a partner. Some 
examples are facial features of the trustee (e.g., Stirrat, & Perrett, 2010; Todorov, Pakrashi & 
Oosterhof, 2009), group membership of the trustee (e.g., Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009), 
or intuitive moral judgments by the trustee (Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 2016). 
Instead, I propose that trust behavior is a particular case of pursuing RelComp in 
situations of vulnerability, and that trustworthiness expectations are the same as expectations 
about the partner’s relational reliability. Therefore, expectations about trustworthiness can be 
developed in any kind of social interaction regardless of vulnerability. The experience of 
RelComp (or lack thereof) in ordinary interactions informs each participant that the partner 
applies the same (or different) standards to their relationship, and is, therefore, a reliable 
relational partner. Hence, complementary actions are a sign of trustworthiness. 
Studies 1 to 3 supported the hypothesis that Trust in the partner is higher when the 
partner’s response to a previous action by the trustor is complementary than non-
complementary, in the four kinds of relationships, and in situations that do not necessarily 
involve vulnerability. Study 1 suggested that the effects of RelComp on Trust is robust both 
when the partner’s response is expected and unexpected. Studies 2 and 3 suggest that Trust is 
more strongly affected by benefits than the other variables, but that RelComp enhances Trust 
even when benefits are absent. In some relationships (e.g., CS, AR, EM in Study 2) Trust can 
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be higher in complementary interactions, even when complementarity is less beneficial than 
non-complementarity. Crucially, when responses are complementary, benefits do not enhance 
Trust. Complementary behavior is sufficient to signal trustworthiness. However, it can also 
happen that depending on the RM of the non-complementary response (e.g., CS, EM in Study 
2), benefits can cancel the negative effects of non-complementarity on Trust. In other words, 
the respondent’s trustworthiness can be preserved if the non-complementary response is 
beneficial to the partner. 
Consistently with previous proposals, these results show that accommodating to the 
trustor’s needs by doing something beneficial, is, indeed, one important sign of 
trustworthiness (e.g., Shallcross & Simpson, 2012; Wieselquist, et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, benefiting the partner by accommodating to his needs is not the only, nor the most 
important way to signal trustworthiness. Showing relational reliability by engaging in 
complementary behavior is an alternative way to earn the partner’s trust. Hence, benefits and 
RelComp are two foundations of interpersonal trust. This explains why people try to 
compensate their partners with gifts or sacrifices of many kinds when they fail to follow 
through with previous implicit commitments or explicit promises. It also explains why, when 
their actions are costly to the partner, people appeal to relational standards. For example, they 
may discuss each other’s obligations and duties within the relationship (for an account of 
RMs as moral motives see Rai & A. Fiske, 2011). 
Studies 4a and 4b also showed that people anticipate more Trust by the partner after they 
have engaged in complementary behavior. However, as with Belonging, this may depend on 
whether the lack of complementarity is due to controllable or uncontrollable causes. In some 
relationships (e.g., AR in study 4a, and MP in study 4b) actually performing the 
complementary action is necessary to ensure one’s relational reliability and trustworthiness, 
while in other relationships (e.g., EM in study 4a, and CS in study 4b) showing one’s 
commitment, or intention to doing so (as in uncontrollable conditions) is sufficient. In other 
words “willing to” act according to a given relational standard can be more important for 
one’s trustworthiness than “being able to” do so. This means that participants’ behaviors may 
not need to be complementary in order to ensure Trust, insofar as their psychological states 
(i.e., intentions, commitments) are complementary. 
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4.10.4. RelComp is Affectively Charged 
It has been established that motivated behavior is associated to positive affect the closer it 
gets to its goal, and to negative affect, the farther its gets from its goal (Martin & Tesser, 
2009). Hence, if RelComp is a motivating state of affairs, then individuals should experience 
high positive affect and low negative affect when the pursued relational pattern is fulfilled. 
The five studies consistently showed that participants in complementary interactions 
experienced higher positive affect and lower negative affect than those in non-complementary 
interactions, both when the complementary action was performed by the participant (Studies 
4a and 4b) or by the partner (Studies 1 to 3). The results also suggest that the effects of 
RelComp on Affect do not depend on whether the complementary or non-complementary 
action by the partner is expected or unexpected by the participant (Study 1). Affect also seems 
to be more consistently enhanced by RelComp than by benefits. In most relationships Affect 
generally improves in complementary interactions, even whenthe complementary response by 
the partner is less beneficial than the non-complementary response. When responses are 
complementary the effects of benefits on Affect are not consistent. In some cases, benefits 
enhance Affect (e.g., EM and MP in Study 2), while other cases benefits do not make a 
difference (CS and AR in Study 2), or even decrease Affect (MP in Study 3). When responses 
are non-complementary, benefits may attenuate (Study 2) or even cancel (Study 3) their 
negative effects on Affect. 
Affect is also consistently enhanced when the complementary action is performed by the 
participant itself (Studies 4a and 4b). Regardless of whether causes for failure to perform 
one’s part are controllable or uncontrollable, Positive Affect is higher and Negative Affect is 
lower in complementary interactions, in the four kinds of relationships. 
These results support the idea that RelComp is an affectively charged states of affairs, 
and hence, a motivating goal-state. It could, however, be argued that, differences in affect 
were not cause by RelComp itself, but instead by changes in need fulfillment. If Belonging, 
Control, and Trust are motivating, then experiencing (or anticipating) a sense of Control, 
Belonging and Trust, should be associated to positive affect and absence of negative affect. In 
fact, on studies 1 to 3 positive and negative affect, differed between conditions quite similarly 
to Belonging, Control and Trust. On the other hand, on studies 4a and 4b Affect varied across 
conditions differently from need fulfillment. In the Non-compUncontrollable condition, 
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experienced (on a scale from 1 to 7) Control was moderate on CS, EM and MP (> 4), and 
anticipated Belonging and Meta-trust were high on CS (> 6) and EM (> 5), and moderate on 
MP (> 4). However, experienced Positive Affect was low on CS (< 3), EM (< 4) and MP (< 
3), and Negative Affect was high on CS and MP (> 5), and moderate on EM (> 4). These 
patterns show that Positive Affect was low and Negative Affect was high in non-
complementary conditions despite Control, Belonging and Trust were actually experienced or 
anticipated. These patterns are better explained by the manipulation of RelComp than by a 
correlation with need fulfillment, and suggest that RelComp is associated with positive affect, 
independently of whether other needs are satisfied. 
4.10.5. Ruling out Benefit from RelComp 
The goal of Studies 2 and 3 was to show that the effects of RelComp that were observed 
in Study 1 were not caused by the fact that the Complementary interactions were manipulated 
as more beneficial than the Non-complementary ones. The two studies showed that the effects 
of RelComp on affect and need fulfillment were distinct of the effects of benefits, but that 
benefits can attenuate or cancel the negative effects of non-complementarity. Additional 
evidence in favor or the distinction between RelComp and benefits was offered by Studies 4a 
and 4b, even though this was not the purpose of these studies. On Studies 4a and 4b the 
participant took the perspective of the respondent, which either replied in a complementary 
way by giving a benefit to the partner, or in a non-complementary way by not giving the 
requested benefit. Following the rationale of Studies 2 and 3, the complementary response 
was more costly to the respondent than the non-complementary response. If the effects on the 
dependent variables were due to receiving benefits from a complementary response, then, 
Negative Affect and Maintenance should have been lower, while Positive Affect, Control, 
Belonging and Meta-trust should have been higher in the non-complementary than in the 
complementary condition. However, the opposite was observed, supporting the idea that 
RelComp affects affect and need fulfillment independently of whether benefits are received or 
offered. 
4.10.6. Challenges for Future Studies 
The current experiments used scenarios or vignettes to manipulate complementary and 
non-complementary social interactions. Scenarios enable controlling for processes that often 
go on in social interactions, which would otherwise be difficult to rule out through 
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observation of real life interactions. In addition, they allow the manipulation of a wide variety 
of social contexts and interactions that are virtually impossible to recreate in the laboratory. 
However, reading social interactions and imagining psychological sates is not the same as 
engaging in a real interaction and experiencing its psychological consequences. Hence, future 
studies should test the effects of RelComp in affect and need fulfillment by manipulating 
complementarity in real interactions. This raises one difficult challenge. As I pointed out 
previously, relating is a flexible and dynamic process. In the same context, there can be more 
than one relational pattern sanctioned by cultural standards and individual motivations. 
Hence, when participants apply different RMs to their interaction, RelComp is still possible to 
achieve to the extent that the RM of one party is perceived by the partner as acceptable 
enough an alternative to structure the interaction. When the alternative RM is evaluated as 
acceptable it, then, becomes shared by both participants as a collective goal-state guiding the 
actions of each. In other words, in real life interactions where more than one RM is culturally 
acceptable, people deal with non-complementarity by spontaneously adjusting their actions to 
the RM suggested by the partner. This implicit negotiation of the relationship is especially 
evident in new, unknown and, hence, ambiguous interaction contexts, such as artificial 
experimental settings. 
4.10.7. RelComp is a Fundamental Motive 
The association of several human needs to one single process is not new. It has been 
shown that ostracism thwarts basic needs for belonging, control, self-esteem and meaningful 
existence (Williams, 2007). The five studies show that processes other than ostracism may 
also thwart fundamental needs. One interesting possibility is that ostracism is one particular 
and extreme case of lack of RelComp. Leary (2001) proposed that people exclude others to 
different degrees: not caring whether the individual is included or excluded, ignoring the 
individual, avoiding the individual, and physically ostracizing or abandoning the individual. 
Consequently, basic needs should be thwarted to different degrees depending on the degree of 
exclusion experienced. Similarly, the results on the manipulation check showed that people 
can experience RelComp to different degrees depending on whether the non-complementary 
behavior is due to uncontrollable or controllable causes (Studies 4a and 4b). In other words, 
Perceived RelComp decreased from its highest level, when the partners’ overt behaviors and 
psychological states were complementary (as in the Complementary conditions), to an 
intermediate level, when only psychological states were complementary (as in the Non-
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complementaryUncontrollable conditions), to the lowest level, when neither behaviors nor 
psychological states were complementary (as in the Non-complementaryControllable conditions). 
Crucially, variations in Perceived RelComp were correlated with variations in need 
fulfillment and affect, even between non-complementary interactions (Studies 2, 3, 4a and 
4b). The counterpart of this idea is that people can complement each other’s actions to 
different degrees. Hence, ostracism can be seen as one case of non-complementarity where, in 
addition to lacking complementary actions and psychological states in favor of the relational 
pattern, people have psychological states that are actually against realizing the relational 
pattern with that person, and engage in actions in order to avoid any interaction with that 
person. For instance, one typical method for studying the effects of ostracism is an online 
ball-toss game. In this game the players toss the ball to each other. At some point, the 
confederates stop tossing the ball to the participant, thus, excluding him from the activity (cf. 
Williams, 2007). This game can be conceived as an implementation of EM, implying that 
each participant should toss the ball an equal amount of times to the each player, and expect 
to be tossed the ball an equal amount of times as the other players. A mild form of exclusion 
and non-complementarity would be to toss the ball a smaller amount of times to the 
participant than to the other players, whereas an extreme form of exclusion and non-
complementarity would be to stop tossing the ball to the participant. If ostracism is an 
extreme form of non-complementarity, then, it is not surprising that similar effects were 
observed when other forms of non-complementarity were manipulated. One advantage of the 
current proposal is that it conceptualizes the conditions for social inclusion and belonging that 
permeate virtually all kinds of human interactions, where ostracism and intimacy are absent, 
and tackles into the subtleties that characterize intermediate levels of inclusion and belonging. 
It is possible that RelComp also enhances other motives that were not addressed in the 
five studies, such as self-esteem. Although self-esteem was not measured directly, some items 
of the belonging scale measuring relational value (e.g., “Mr. António really values me as a 
person”; “I feel appreciated by Mr. António”), were very similar in content to the items used 
by Zadro, Williams & Zadro (2005) to measure self-esteem after ostracism (e.g., “I felt that 
the other participants failed to perceive me as a worthy and likeable person”). In addition, it 
has been claimed that self-esteem is one indicator of whether one is included or excluded by 
others, in a way that high self-esteem signals inclusion and low self-esteem signals exclusion 
(Leary, Tambor, Terdal & Downs, 1995). Therefore, it is possible that, if belonging was 
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enhanced by RelComp, participants also experienced higher self-esteem in complementary 
interactions than in non-complementary interactions.  
The fact that RelComp fulfills the three core social needs, suggests that it has a 
fundamental role in human well-being and health, at least to the extent that well-being 
depends on the fulfillment of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), control (Seligman, 
1975), and trust (Poulin & Haase, 2015) motives. On the other hand, the fact that RelComp 
fulfills fundamental human needs also shows that the present theory is in any way a 
competitor with other theories. Instead, it sheds light on the processes that lead to an effective 
need fulfillment in social interactions. Moreover, it also shows that RelComp is not the only 
motive driving people to coordinate. People can have several alternative motives and pursue 
RelComp for ulterior reasons. They can be motivated to gain control over other people and 
resources, or they can seek other people’s approval and trust in order to enjoy benefits of all 
kinds. The point here is that, be it the proximal or ultimate goal, RelComp is the goal 
directing individual’s actions when relating to other people. Without attaining RelComp, the 
other needs will hardly be fulfilled in social interactions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Final Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The common approaches to social motivation do not address motivation for social 
relating as such. Setting-based approaches describe social behavior in particular contexts by 
assuming that people want a particular incentive (e.g., Batson, Ahmad & Stocks, 2011; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Schachter, 1959; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For that reason, these 
approaches can hardly be generalized to contexts and social behaviors other than those they 
were meant to explain in the first place. Need-based approaches, on the other hand, describe 
the basic human needs that motivate behavior in general (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Deci & Ryan, 2000; Maslow, 1943; Pyszcsynski, et al., 1997). Therefore, they cannot explain 
particular kinds of social behavior in the absence of context-specific assumptions. At the same 
time, some theories within both setting- and need-based approaches emphasize the 
instrumental role of social relationships in fulfilling human desires (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
Festinger, 1954; Hogg, 2000; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Oakes & Turner, 1980; Schachter, 
1959), while others point up preferences for specific kinds of relationships (e.g., Atkinson, 
Heyns & Veroff, 1954; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; McAdams & Constantian, 1983; 
McClelland, 1975). Finally, all these proposals share in common the fact that they disregard 
the features that are common to all kinds of social relating. Instead, they focus on qualities of 
human individuals, such as needs, drives or overall motivational preferences that are usually 
fulfilled by means of engaging in social interactions. Some examples include needs for 
autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000), self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), certainty (Hogg, 2000), 
belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), power (McClelland, 1975), or intimacy (McAdams, 
1980), that explain some kinds of social relating, but not all kinds. 
In contrast, I proposed that all kinds of relationships share a common motivational form. 
All social coordinated interactions are structured according to four universal but culturally 
informed relational models (RM, A. Fiske, 1991, 1992). These models are standards people 
use to learn and detect particular kinds of relationships, to anticipate, understand and evaluate 
the actions of others, as well as to plan, generate and evaluate their own actions. Each model 
is cognitively represented in the form of knowledge about when and with whom certain 
aspects of the interaction should be coordinated, and how each participant should proceed. In 
other words, they inform what the parts of each participant are in a specific situation. When 
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relating in coordinated ways, each participant seeks to implement one of these models in 
conjunction with the partners, by performing his part while assuming or expecting that the 
partner seeks to implement the same relational model by performing her part. In other words, 
when relating, each individual seeks Relational Complementarity (RelComp) by fulfilling an 
interaction pattern that is constituted by mutually congruent actions by each participant. 
Virtually all kinds of social relationships are initiated and sustained to the extent the partners 
are able and willing to jointly create patterns of RelComp; and when they stop creating such 
patterns, relationships end. Hence, RelComp is by definition the goal of social relating; a 
unique kind of goal, in the sense that it represents a collective state of affairs involving the 
actions of two or more participants, and which each participant assumes to be owned by the 
others. 
5.1. The General Motive of Social Relationships 
The first theoretical hypothesis posited that RelComp is intrinsically satisfying. People 
like RelComp, either because it feels good, in the hedonic sense, or feels right, in the moral 
sense; and dislike non-complementarity, because it is unpleasant and feels wrong. For that 
reason, RelComp should be sufficient to energize and direct social behavior in the absence of 
other motives. Assuming that effort is one hallmark of motivated behavior, the first line of 
studies tested whether individuals pursuing the RelComp goal would spend more effort in 
performing their part of the relational pattern than those who did not. In four experiments, the 
RelComp goal was manipulated with a priming task. A goal-discrepancy was created for all 
conditions when the experimenter initiated a relational pattern by performing his part of 
giving instructions and rewarding the participant for taking part in this study. It was assumed 
that the discrepancy would be reduced by participants performing their part of the relational 
pattern – following the instructions and completing the tasks. It was expected that primed 
participants would be more motivated to perform their part and that this would reflect on their 
performance in the tasks assigned by the experimenter. Only one study found support for this 
hypothesis.  
A second line of studies tested the effects of RelComp on another hallmark of motivated 
behavior: affect. Specifically, it was reasoned that, if RelComp is intrinsically satisfying, then, 
individuals participating in complementary interactions should experience more positive 
affect than those in non-complementary interactions. Five online experiments manipulating 
complementary and non-complementary interactions, in different kinds of relationships, 
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consistently showed that RelComp is an affectively charged state of affairs: participants 
reported more positive affect and less negative affect in complementary interactions. The 
studies also showed that the effects of RelComp on Affect were not due to receiving benefits 
by means of RelComp, nor to the partner’s acting according to one’s expectations. Finally, 
affect was enhanced by RelComp both when the complementary action was performed by the 
participant and by the partner. 
These results are initial evidence in favor of the hypothesis that RelComp is intrinsically 
satisfying in relationships that are structured according to any of the four universal RMs. In 
other words RelComp has goal properties that do not depend on particular contexts or 
relationships. This means that in any social interaction where a pattern of RelComp (i.e., a 
cultural implementation of a RM) is activated as a collective-state goal, the individual will 
have an incentive to socially relate by performing her part of that pattern, while desiring or 
whishing that the partner performs his part, until the pattern is complete. I conceptualized 
patterns of RelComp as systems of knowledge about the when, what, with whom and how of 
the cultural implementations of RMs. In other words, the representation of each relational 
pattern includes information about the context (when) in which certain aspects of the 
interaction (what) are coordinated, with whom they are coordinated, and how each party 
should proceed. According to principles of goal representation and activation, if relational 
patterns are knowledge structures, then, the perception of an element of the pattern in the 
environment is sufficient for the relational pattern to become activated. Hence, by defining the 
goal state that is intrinsic to all forms of social relationships, and by describing the process by 
means of which that goal is activated in specific contexts, the concept of RelComp overcomes 
the limitations of setting-based approaches to social motivation.  
The second theoretical hypothesis proposed that if RelComp is the defining feature of all 
kinds of social relating, then all human needs that are fulfilled by means of relationships can 
be fulfilled by complementary interactions. Specifically, I predicted that RelComp is 
sufficient condition for fulfilling the core needs to belong, to control, and to trust, regardless 
of the particular kind of relationship people engage in. The five online experiments showed 
that complementary interactions enhance participant’s sense of Control, Belonging and Trust, 
regardless of the type of relationship, and of whether the complementary action is expected or 
unexpected, beneficial or costly and performed by the participant or the partner.  
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Hence, RelComp overcomes the limitation of need-based approaches. These results 
illustrate how basic human needs are fulfilled in specific contexts without resorting to 
context-specific assumptions. Instead, the main critical variable to look at is the particular 
cultural implementation of a RM that each participant uses to cognitively represent and to 
behaviorally construe their social interaction; or, in other words, the pattern of RelComp that 
each participant is pursuing as a goal. 
5.2. What Kind of Intrinsic Motivation is RelComp? 
I proposed that RelComp is intrinsically motivating and showed that states of RelComp 
are associated with positive affect. However, the term intrinsic motivation can be misleading 
depending on the definition of “intrinsic” that is adopted. Although it is clear that intrinsic 
means “inherent, essential, immanent, belonging to, from within” and extrinsic means 
“extraneous, not belonging to, from without”, the term ‘intrinsic motivation’ has been used 
with different meanings by psychologists (Rheinberg, 2008, p. 325). Two definitions of 
intrinsic motivation have deserved special attention in research: a self-base definition and an 
activity-based one (Rheinberg, 2008). For Deci and Ryan (1980) “intrinsically motivated 
behaviors are those behaviors that are motivated by the underlying needs for competence and 
self-determination” (p. 42). The authors assume that in addition to tissue-based needs, humans 
need to experience the self as being the cause of behavior, as opposed to being controlled by 
external events. Hence, whether behavior is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated is a matter 
of whether the locus of causality of the action is perceived to be internal or external to the 
individual. Intrinsic motivation originates from within and extrinsic motivation from outside 
the person (e.g., social pressure, rewards and punishments).  
On the other hand, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have also been conceptualized in 
terms of where the desired outcomes or incentives for the activity are located (Rheinberg, 
2008). Motivation is extrinsic when incentives reside outside the activity, i.e., they are 
consequent to it (e.g., studying to gain parent’s approval), and intrinsic when the incentives 
are located within the activity, i.e., the activity is autotelic (e.g., studying for the pleasure of 
learning; Csikszentmihalyi, & Nakamura, 1989). In summary, self-based definitions 
emphasize the locus of causality (within vs. without the persons), and activity-based 
definitions emphasize the locus of the incentive (within vs. without the activity). 
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Whether within/without refers to locus of control or locus of incentive may seem a trivial 
distinction, but it is not. First, engaging in a pleasant activity is different from doing 
something on one’s own initiative, in the absence of external rewards or punishments. One 
can feel competent and freely choose to do something that is uninteresting in itself (e.g., 
finding orthographic errors in a dissertation). As acknowledged later by Deci & Ryan (2000), 
 [. . .] experiences of competence and autonomy are essential for intrinsic motivation and 
interest, but the needs for competence and autonomy do not provide a sufficient 
definition of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated activities are not necessarily 
directed at satisfaction of these needs per se, and behaviors that are directed at 
satisfaction of these needs are not necessarily intrinsically motivated (p. 233). 
Second, and most importantly, thinking of intrinsic in self-based terms often encourages 
the misconception that social relationships are extrinsically motivated. More concretely, 
Ryan, Deci and colleagues (e.g., La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman & Deci, 2000) proposed that 
caring and nurturing relationships may be necessary to promote self-determination and 
competence, and consequently, intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, relationships can also 
be sources of external pressure, motivating individuals to act in order to avoid social 
punishments (e.g., social rejection) or to attain social rewards (e.g., social approval), hence, 
undermining intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). The implication of this 
reasoning is that relationships have a peripheral role, either as facilitators or obstructers of 
intrinsic motivation, but are not intrinsically motivating. Often, they are thought of as 
extrinsically motivating in the sense that they often motivate people to engage in activities 
that they do not like. 
On the other hand, adopting the activity-based definition of intrinsic motivation leads to 
different conclusions about the motivating role of social relationships. “Intrinsic” and 
“extrinsic” motivation are usually applied to activities like studying, painting, sports, etcetera, 
which do not, necessarily involve social relating. However, I approach social relationships as 
one kind of “activity”, a joint-activity or relational pattern, the goal of which is shared with 
other people. Thus, I propose that RelComp is intrinsically motivating in the sense that it 
contains incentives of its own. In support of this assertion, studies in Chapter 4 showed that 
participants experienced more positive affect in complementary interactions than in non-
complementary interactions, regardless of who completed the relational pattern and of the 
benefits and cost of RelComp to oneself. 
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Crucially, to the extent that RelComp involves mutually congruent and presupposing 
actions by two or more participants, the seeking of RelComp is rarely fully self-determined. 
Often, there are external pressures in the form of social obligations and commitments that 
motivate individuals to complement. The point here is that such commitments and 
obligations, insofar as they lead to RelComp, are also intrinsically motivating, regardless of 
self-determination. 
At this point, a distinction must be made between two phenomenological levels of any 
activity performed in the context of social coordination: a concrete level and a symbolic-
relational level. The concrete level is about the object or aspect of the interaction that requires 
coordination between individuals (e.g., writing a report, painting an apartment, changing 
dippers), and the objective actions, movements, tasks, that individuals perform in order to 
coordinate. The symbolic-relational level is about the subjective perception of the activity as 
part of a relational pattern (e.g., following the orders of the boss in an AR pattern; helping a 
friend or nursing one’s baby in CS patterns), and has been neglected in the literature of 
intrinsic motivation. Each level has its own distinct motivational aspects. First, the goal of 
coordination is defined differently at the two levels. If one friend asks another to help him 
paint an apartment, the goal ‘to paint the apartment’ is different from the goal ‘to help my 
friend or to painting together’. Second, each level offers different incentives for action. One 
may find the concrete activity fun or interesting in its own right (e.g., dancing), while at the 
same time find it aversive to perform that activity in particular relational contexts (e.g., at a 
work meeting, or in front of one’s subordinates). One the other hand, one may dislike the 
concrete activity (e.g., washing the dishes, painting an apartment) but find it appealing to 
perform that activity on behalf of a relationship (e.g., inviting friends over for dinner; helping 
a friend remodeling his apartment). Similarly, one student may create an art painting with the 
goal of producing an interesting work, whereas the other student creates the art painting with 
the goal of pleasing her parents. Usually intrinsic motivation is used to describe motivation in 
the first case, because the student pursues the incentives that are intrinsic to the activity itself. 
However, if we distinguish the concrete level of the activity from the symbolic level of the 
relationship, we can say that there are intrinsic motivations in both cases. In the first case, the 
incentives are intrinsic to the activity, but are extrinsic to the relationship. In the second case, 
however, the incentives are intrinsic to the relational pattern of AR between the student and 
her parents, and, hence, extrinsic to the activity. 
Relational Complementarity 
205 
In sum, an activity may not be motivating in its concrete nature (the experience of 
painting) and still be motivating in its relational nature (helping a friend). Therefore, saying 
that RelComp is intrinsically motivating does not mean that people enjoy the concrete 
activities for their own sake. Instead, it means that RelComp is so attractive that people often 
commit themselves to perform unpleasant activities in order to fulfill the corresponding 
relational pattern. 
The distinction between concrete and symbolic-relational levels has additional 
implications, namely that the incentives of activities “feel” differently than the incentives of 
relationships. Intrinsically motivating activities, that is, activities that are performed for their 
own sake, are usually experienced as “challenging”, “interesting”, “enjoyable” or “absorbing” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh & Nakamura, 2005). However, relational patterns are 
experienced with specific social relational emotions, not only associated to each specific 
RM—such has gratitude (Simão & Seibt, 2014, 2015), or Kama Muta (Sanskrit for “moved 
by love”; Seibt, Schubert, Zickfeld, & A. Fiske, 2017; Schubert, Zickfeld, Seibt, & A. Fiske, 
2016) in CS relationships—but also associated to attending to one’s duties and moral 
obligations, i.e., to “doing the right thing”.  
On the other hand, failure to achieve complementarity is usually associated with aversive 
emotional states, such as, embarrassment, guilt, shame, dishonor, anger, etc. (A. Fiske, 2002). 
This thesis presented evidence that complementary interactions are associated to positive 
affect, but further research is required to arrive at more fine-tuned descriptions of the 
emotions experienced in different RMs or kinds of RelComp. 
5.3. Relational Complementarity vs. Social Norms 
Only one study showed that participants primed with the RelComp made more effort in a 
task required by the experimenter. However, the priming task in this study differed from the 
other studies on one important respect. The concept of RelComp was introduced as something 
that people do when they relate. Thus, it is possible that RelComp was presented as something 
normative. The implication of this possibility is that the RelComp goal was not motivating for 
its intrinsic affective rewards, but instead, for corresponding to what people usually do. 
This objection raises one crucial discussion. Most relational patterns are indeed 
normative within a given social-cultural context. They reflect knowledge about relationships 
that is shared by individuals within that context. In this sense most forms of RelComp are 
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normative in the descriptive and prescriptive sense, i.e., they correspond to what people most 
frequently do and should do (e.g., Cialdini, et al., 2006). Such confound hides two possible 
explanations. Either RelComp patterns are motivating insofar as they are normative, or certain 
norms are motivating because they describe and prescribe RelComp. 
If the first possibility is true, then an additional explanation is needed for why norms are 
motivating. One common explanation is based on a motive to understand (Stevens & S. Fiske, 
1995). In order to gain accuracy about the world and reduce uncertainty on ambiguous 
situations, people seek information about what others frequently do and adopt the most 
common behavior (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1954). Norms describing what 
others usually do are called descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). A second 
explanation is based on a motive to gain social approval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955). People seek approval by conforming to what others think they should do. 
Norms describing what others think is the appropriate behavior are called injunctive norms 
(Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). These explanations imply that there is nothing 
intrinsically motivating about social norms. Individuals follow norms to the extent that they 
need accuracy or approval. 
The motivations behind descriptive and injunctive norms can be easily ruled out 
experimentally. If RelComp is a descriptive norm, then, individuals should perform the 
complementary behavior only when they believe the complementary action is what others 
usually do (Anderson & Dunning, 2014). On the other hand, seeking complementarity in the 
absence of information about the common action in that situation should demonstrate that 
RelComp is not a descriptive norm. Likewise, if RelComp is an injunctive norm, then, people 
should only pursue it in conditions were their action will be approved by others, i.e., in public 
(Anderson & Dunning, 2014). Hence, performing the complementary action in private, in a 
way that is unknown to the partner, should demonstrate that RelComp is not an injunctive 
norm. Supporting the idea that RelComp is not an injunctive norm, two studies have shown 
that people reciprocate favors regardless of whether the partner will find out that they 
reciprocated (Burger, et al., 2009; Whatley, Webster, Smith, & Rhodes, 1999). These results 
have, however, been interpreted with a third explanation claiming that norms can be 
internalized and motivate behavior even in the absence of social rewards. 
The internalization hypothesis posits that people adopt social norms as internal standards 
and feel good about themselves when they correspond to those standards (Burger, Sanchez, 
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Imberi & Grande, 2009). The internalization explanation, however, is still problematic. First, 
it demands assumptions about what can be internalized and how. Since these assumptions are 
often not explicated, the internalization process remains a vague concept to describe things 
that people do in the absence of external demands. Second, to say that people are motivated to 
do something because it is a personal standard, is equivalent to saying that people do 
whatever they think is right. This is not only uninformative, but also tautological. A useful 
explanation has to describe what makes certain behaviors more likely to be adopted as 
standards, and how these behaviors differ from the rest. If any behavior can be adopted as a 
personal standard (e.g., brushing our teeth everyday) then an internalization hypothesis may 
elegantly offer post-hoc explanations for behavior, but is not a useful tool to make 
predictions. 
The second possibility is that social norms are usually shared knowledge about patterns 
of RelComp. In other words, the behaviors that are most likely to become normative and 
internalized as personal standards are those that reflect particular forms of RelComp, i.e., 
particular implementations of RMs. This means that some social norms are motivating and 
adopted as standards because they correspond to patterns of RelComp, as is the case of the 
reciprocity norm (Burger, et al., 2009; Perugini, et al., 2003; Whatley, et al., 1999).  
This hypothesis is consistent with the most common descriptions of universal norms that 
are presented by norm theorists (e.g., Stripada & Stich, 2006). Norms in favor of helping, 
reciprocity, sharing, and norms against theft, killing, and rape describe particular 
implementations of or transgressions to RMs. Sharing and reproducing knowledge about how 
to attain a desired goal-state in specific contexts is advantageous because it allows individuals 
to more efficiently combine their actions to attain it. This hypothesis is more informative than 
the alternative because it describes where norms and personal standards come from, which 
kinds of social patterns are likely to become normative and internalized, and it allows making 
predictions about which norms are likely to motivate behavior in specific situations. 
5.4. Conditions for Pursuing an Activated Relational Pattern 
In addition to being accessible and desirable, states of affairs also need to be attainable 
(Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Golwitzer, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996; Tolman. 1955; 
Vroom, 1964) in order to be adopted as a goal. Attainability requires beliefs that (a) one is 
capable of performing the action necessary to produce the outcome (e.g., self-efficacy beliefs, 
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Bandura, 1977), and (b) that the performed behavior will lead to the desired outcome 
(Gollwitzer, 1990). Two hypotheses can be raised about conditions for attainability of a 
relational pattern. 
First: Regarding beliefs about one’s capacity, the agent is motivated to pursue an 
activated pattern to the extent that he perceives himself to have the social skill necessary to 
perform his part. For instance, leading a team, teaching, negotiating a sale, seducing a 
potential sex partner, dancing, cuddling, talking to strangers, all require a certain amount of 
socio-emotional skill that some people lack. People who believe they lack the skill to do their 
part will anticipate failure in proper implementation of the pattern, will have low attainment 
expectancies, and are less likely to feel motivated to pursue it (even if they wished they could 
do it).  
Some individual traits, such as shyness, may interfere in the kinds of patterns that 
individuals more easily learn and feel comfortable with. A shy individual may never fully 
develop the skill to approach strangers in social events. Therefore, he will have low 
attainment expectancies for participating in such patterns. 
Second: Regarding beliefs that one’s own behavior will lead to the desired outcome, the 
agent is motivated to pursue an activated pattern to the extent that he expects (presupposes, 
whishes or hopes) that the partner will likely do his part . Low expectations that the other will 
do his part will reduce motivation to implement the pattern by doing one’s part. For example, 
a man is less likely to buy a drink to a woman at a bar if he anticipates that she will not accept 
it, and a manager is less motivated to offer guidance to a collaborator who systematically 
neglects advice. 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
Classical theories of social behavior assume that human beings are selfish, and that 
cooperation is motivating insofar as it allows individuals to fulfill their selfish needs. 
Relational Models Theory, on the other hand, states that people are inherently sociable, in the 
sense that they are motivated to constitute each of the four RMs for its own sake. The theory 
presented in this thesis builds on that statement. I conceptualized the psychological process of 
relating, and proposed that the constitution of the four RMs consist of participants pursuing 
Relational Complementarity. Furthermore, I proposed that Relational Complementarity is 
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intrinsically motivating, described how Relational Complementarity can be activated as a 
goal, and showed that it is affectively charged. 
To be sure, individuals do have ulterior motives that often conflict and override the 
motivation for RelComp. The point is that despite such motives people do find satisfaction in 
acting together, in cooperating, and in fulfilling their obligations towards each other.  
 On the other hand, Relational Models Theory also hypothesized that particular motives 
were associated to specific RMs. Indeed, recent studies supported that hypothesis. Strasser 
(2013) showed not only that motives for affiliation and power predict individual’s preferences 
for CS and AR relationships, respectively, but also that recognizing a CS or AR relationships 
arouses individuals’ affiliation and power motives, respectively. However, I proposed and 
showed that this is not the whole story about motivations for constituting each RM. In 
addition to individual preferences for certain types of relationships, there is one motive that is 
ubiquitous in all RMs, and cultural implementations thereof. Furthermore, I showed how this 
unique motive satiates core social needs that have been shown to motivate social behavior in a 
way or another. 
This thesis was an attempt to develop theory and methods that allow studying motivation 
for relating, and found initial support to the claim that social relationships are intrinsically 
motivating, and that human beings may, in fact, be inherently sociable creatures.  
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Appendix A 
Portuguese sentences rated by participants on the priming condition and first control 
condition (Study 1, Chapter 3). An English translation follows each sentence. 
1. A Ana pediu à professora orientação para a preparação do exame. A professora olhou para 
a Ana e saiu da sala. / Ana asked the teacher for guidance in studying for the exam. The teacher looked at 
her and left the room. 
2. Era a vez do Nuno de dar boleia ao João do trabalho para casa. O João apanhou o autocarro. 
/ It was Nuno’s turn to give João a ride home from work. João took the bus. 
3. O Pedro foi apanhado a roubar numa loja. Para compensar, aceitou fazer 10 dias de 
trabalho comunitário voluntário. / Pedro was caught stealing in a shop. As compensation, he agreed to do 
10 days of voluntary community work.  
4. O João pediu à empresa seguradora que pagasse os custos de reparação. A seguradora 
nunca lhe respondeu. / João asked the insurance to cover for the repair costs. The insurance company never 
replied. 
5. Perto da hora de saída o chefe do Mário disse-lhe que ele teria que ficar até mais tarde para 
terminar uma tarefa urgente. O Mário saiu à hora de saída. / Close to exit hour Mario’s boss told him 
to stay after hours to complete an urgent task. Mario left the office at the usual time. 
6. O pai do José, velho e doente, urinou as calças e pediu-lhe ajuda. O José estava noutro 
quarto e continuou a ver o jogo de futebol. / José’s old and sick father urinated in his trousers and 
called José for help. José was in the other room and continued watching the football game. 
7. Como ninguém gosta de tarefas administrativas, o grupo decidiu sortear quem ficaria 
responsável por essa tarefa este ano. O Ricardo foi sorteado e aceitou a tarefa. / Since nobody 
likes boring paperwork, the group decided to draw lots to appoint the responsible for such task. Ricardo was 
sorted and took the job. 
8. Os três livros que a Carla encomendou online chegaram a tempo. A livraria virtual apenas 
lhe cobrou um livro no cartão de crédito. / The three books Carla ordered online arrived on time. The 
online bookshop charged her credit card for one book only. 
9. O Miguel já fez dois turnos noturnos na vez do Paulo, mas até agora o Paulo nunca aceitou 
fazer os turnos noturnos do Miguel. / Miguel already worked two night shifts in Paulo’s place, but so far 
Paulo has never agreed to do Miguel’s night shifts. 
10. A Joana sentiu-se mal e ligou ao seu marido. O marido interrompeu imediatamente o seu 
trabalho e levou a Joana ao hospital. / Joana felt ill and called her husband. The husband immediately 
interrupted his work and took Joana to the hospital. 
11. Um dos empregados do Luís cometeu um erro altamente prejudicial para a empresa. Na 
reunião seguinte o Luís repreendeu o seu empregado. / One of Luis’s employees made a mistake 
extremely damaging to the company. In the next meeting Luis publicly rebuked the employee. 
12. O chefe do João pediu-lhe um relatório com urgência. O João prometeu concluí-lo antes 
do final da semana. / João’s boss asked him to do a report urgently. João promised to finish it before the end 
of the week. 
13. A criança pediu à sua mãe ajuda com os trabalhos de casa. A mãe ignorou o pedido. / The 
child asked her mother to help her with the homework. Her mother ignored this request. 
14. O polícia viu o António falar ao telemóvel enquanto conduzia e ordenou-lhe que parasse o 
carro. O António parou o carro na berma imediatamente. / The police officer saw António using the 
cellphone while driving and ordered him to stop the car. António stopped the car immediately at the roadside. 
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15. O empregado deixou a conta na mesa. O cliente pagou a conta e deixou uma gorjeta ao 
empregado pelo excelente serviço. / The waiter came and left the bill on the table. The customer paid the 
bill and tipped the waiter for the good service. 
16. A Sofia ofereceu-se para ajudar a Rita a pintar o seu apartamento. A Rita pintou o 
apartamento sozinha. / Sofia volunteered to help Rita paint the apartment, but Rita painted her apartment 
alone. 
17. O professor pediu ao aluno que parasse de trocar sms durante a aula. O aluno voltou-se 
para o outro lado e continuou a mexer no telemóvel. / The teacher told the student to stop texting 
during the class. The student turned around and continued texting. 
18. O José convidou a Lisa para um encontro e ela aceitou. / José invited Lisa for a date and she 
accepted. 
19. A Ana emprestou €20 à Maria. Passada uma semana a Maria pagou à Ana o que lhe devia. 
/ Ana lent €20 to Maria. A week later Maria paid Ana what she owed.   
20. A filha pediu o carro emprestado ao seu pai. Ele fez-lhe algumas perguntas e entregou-lhe 
as chaves do carro. / The daughter asked her father’s permission to borrow his car. He asked her some 
questions and gave her the car keys. 
  
Relational Complementarity 
243 
Appendix B 
Portuguese sentences rated by participants on the second control condition (Study 1, 
Chapter 3). An English translation follows each sentence. 
1. Sempre que a Ana tem tempo livre entretém-se a resolver problemas de matemática e de 
lógica. Whenever she has free time, Ana likes to solving problems of mathematics and logic. 
2. O João não quis esperar. Apanhou o primeiro autocarro que apareceu. / João did not want to 
wait. He caught the first bus. 
3. O Pedro deixou uma torneira aberta em sua casa. A casa está cheia de água por todo o lado 
e agora ele tem que limpar tudo. / Pedro left the tap open at his place. There is water everywhere and he 
needs to clean it. 
4. A lâmpada fundiu-se e como o João não tinha mais nenhuma para a substituir teve que 
acender uma vela. / The light bulb went out, and since João did not have another one to replace it he had to 
light up a candle. 
5. Hoje o Mário foi treinar ao ginásio e tentou otimizar o tempo do treino. Depois de muito 
esforço e pouco descanso terminou o treino à hora planeada. / Today Mário went to the gym and 
tried to optimize his practice time. After much effort and short breaks he finished his practice at the intended 
time. 
6. O José é idoso e sofre de incontinência urinária. Na noite passada esqueceu-se de ir à casa 
de banho e de repente urinou as calças. / José is an elderly man and suffers from urinary incontinence. 
Last night he forgot to go to the toilet and suddenly urinated his trousers. 
7. O Ricardo detesta tarefas administrativas, mas o seu escritório de casa estava tão 
desarrumado que decidiu tirar o sábado para organizar a papelada. / Ricardo hates paperwork, but 
his office was so messy that he decided to take the Saturday to organize it. 
8. A Carla tem três livros novos. Ela procurou estes exemplares durante muito tempo e está 
ansiosa por começar a lê-los. / Carla has three new book. She search for these book for a long time and is 
eager to start reading them. 
9. O Paulo é segurança e tem que fazer turnos noturnos com frequência. Ele não se importa, 
mas por vezes fica realmente cansado. / Paulo is a security guard and has to do night shifts frequently. 
He does not mind, but sometimes he gets really tired.  
10. A Joana não tinha guarda-chuva quando começou a chover. Molhou-se, ficou doente e 
passou uma semana inteira na cama. / Joana did not have an umbrella. She got wet, got sick and spent the 
whole week in bed. 
11. O Luís é muito curioso, gosta de estudar e aprender coisas. É uma pena que ele não tenha 
continuado os seus estudos. / Luis is very curious and loves to study and learn new things. It is waste that 
he did not follow through with his education.  
12. O João passou a noite inteira na sua oficina a construir uma mesa para a sua sala. Pela 
manhã, a mesa estava concluída. / João spent the whole night in his workshop building a table for his 
dining room. In the morning the table was finished. 
13. A Maria está aborrecida porque não consegue encontrar o seu casaco de inverno. / Maria is 
upset because she cannot find her winter coat. 
14. Depois de várias horas a conduzir o António sentiu-se com sono. Ainda tentou resistir, 
mas acabou por parar o carro na berma para descansar. / After several hours driving, António felt 
tired. He tried to resist, but ended up parking the car in the roadside to rest. 
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15. Ele saiu para experimentar um restaurante novo na cidade. Achou a comida e a decoração 
absolutamente maravilhosas. / He went out to try a new restaurant in town. He found the food and the 
decoration absolutely marvelous.  
16. A Rita mudou-se recentemente de casa. Como o apartamento estava com um ar velho 
decidiu pintá-lo. / Rita moved out recently. Since the new apartment looked dingy she decided to paint it. 
17. O Pedro adora tecnologia e eletrónica. Ontem abriu o computador e não pensou em mais 
nada até conseguir concertá-lo. / Pedro loves technology and electronics. Yesterday, he opened the 
computer and did not think about anything else until he fixed it. 
18. Ontem o José calçou um par de sapatos novinho em folha. / Yesterday José wore a brand new 
pair of shoes. 
19. A Ana ouve muita música clássica. Mozart relaxa-a quando se sente ansiosa e preocupada. 
/ Ana listens a lot to classical music. Mozart relaxes her when she feels anxious and concerned. 
20. A arrecadação da Maria estava cheia de caixas antigas. Como estavam em boas condições 
decidiu limpá-las e utilizá-las para arrumação. / Maria’s basement was full of old boxes. Since they 
were in good condition, she decided to clean and use them. 
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Appendix C 
Lexical decision task (Studies 1-4, Chapter 3) 
Utilize a chave apresentada, para substituir cada letra pelo número correspondente o mais 
rápido possível. Tem 60 segundos. 
Nº do Participante______ 
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Appendix D 
Portuguese sentences rated by participants (Study 2, Chapter 3). An English translation 
follows each sentence. 
1. O professor pediu ao aluno que parasse de trocar sms durante a aula. O aluno voltou-se 
para o outro lado e continuou a mexer no telemóvel. / The teacher told the student to stop texting 
during the class. The student turned around and continued texting. 
2. A Sofia ofereceu-se para ajudar a Rita a pintar o seu apartamento. A Rita pintou o 
apartamento sozinha. / Sofia volunteered to help Rita paint the apartment, but Rita painted her apartment 
alone. 
3. Como ninguém gosta de tarefas administrativas aborrecidas, o grupo decidiu sortear quem 
ficaria responsável por essa tarefa este ano. A Paula foi sorteada e aceitou a tarefa. / Since 
nobody likes boring paperwork, the group decided to draw lots to appoint the responsible for such task. Paula 
was sorted and took the job. 
4. O João pediu à empresa seguradora que pagasse os custos de reparação. A seguradora 
nunca lhe respondeu. / João asked the insurance to cover for the repair costs. The insurance company never 
replied. 
5. À hora marcada o Ricardo bateu à porta do Diretor do Colégio para cumprir o seu castigo 
por ter copiado no exame. Ninguém atendeu. / At the appointed time Ricardo knocked at the Head 
Teacher’s door to complete his detention for cheating in the exam. Nobody answered. 
6. O chefe do Alfredo pediu-lhe um relatório com urgência. O Alfredo prometeu concluí-lo 
antes do final do dia. / Alfredo’s boss asked him to do a report urgently. Alfredo promised to finish it before 
the end of the day. 
7. A Patrícia repreendeu publicamente um empregado por ter cometido um erro altamente 
prejudicial para a empresa. Em público, o empregado reconheceu o seu erro. / Patrícia publicly 
rebuked an employee for making a mistake extremely damaging to the company. The employee publicly 
acknowledged his fault. 
8. A Ana emprestou €20 à Maria. Passados três dias a Maria pagou à Ana o que lhe devia. / 
Ana lent €20 to Maria. Three days later Maria paid Ana what she owed. 
9. Era a vez de o Nuno dar boleia ao João do trabalho para casa, mas o João apanhou o 
autocarro. / It was Nuno’s turn to give João a ride home from work, but João took the bus. 
10. O Tenente Costa pediu ao Capitão Ribeiro que lhe desse uma folga no dia seguinte. O 
Capitão Ribeiro atribuiu uma tarefa ao Tenente Costa para ser concluída no dia seguinte. / 
Lieutenant Costa asked Captain Ribeiro to give him the next day off. Captain Ribeiro assigned Lieutenant Costa 
to a task to be completed in the next day. 
11. O José convidou a Lisa para um encontro e ela aceitou. / José invited Lisa for a date and she 
accepted. 
12. Perto da hora de saída o chefe do Mário disse-lhe que ele teria que ficar até mais tarde 
para terminar uma tarefa urgente. O Mário saiu à hora de saída. / Close to exit hour Mario’s boss 
told him to stay after hours to complete an urgent task. Mario left the office at the usual time. 
13. A Luísa foi apanhada a roubar numa loja. Para compensar, aceitou fazer 10 dias de 
trabalho comunitário voluntário. / Luísa was caught stealing in a shop. As compensation, she agreed to do 
10 days of voluntary community work. 
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14. O empregado deixou a conta na mesa. O cliente pagou a conta e deixou uma gorjeta ao 
empregado pelo excelente serviço. / The waiter came and left the bill on the table. The customer paid the 
bill and tipped the waiter for the good service. 
15. A Joana sentiu-se mal e ligou ao seu marido. O marido interrompeu imediatamente o seu 
trabalho e levou a Joana ao hospital. / Joana felt ill and called her husband. The husband immediately 
interrupted his work and took Joana to the hospital. 
16. A Margarida já fez dois turnos noturnos na vez da Cristina, mas até agora a Cristina nunca 
aceitou fazer os turnos noturnos da Margarida. / Margarida already worked two night shifts in 
Cristina’s place, but so far Cristina has never agreed to do Margarida’s night shifts. 
17. Os três livros que a Carla encomendou online chegaram a tempo. A livraria virtual apenas 
lhe cobrou um livro no cartão de crédito. / The three books Carla ordered online arrived on time. The 
online bookshop charged her credit card for one book only. 
18. O polícia viu o António falar ao telemóvel enquanto conduzia e ordenou-lhe que parasse o 
carro. O António parou o carro na berma imediatamente. / The police officer saw António using the 
cellphone while driving and ordered him to stop the car. António stopped the car immediately at the roadside. 
19. A filha pediu o carro emprestado ao seu pai. Ele fez-lhe algumas perguntas e entregou-lhe 
as chaves do carro. / The daughter asked her father’s permission to borrow his car. He asked her some 
questions and gave her the car keys. 
20. O pai do Bruno, velho e doente, urinou as calças e pediu-lhe ajuda. O Bruno estava noutro 
quarto e continuou a ver o jogo de futebol. / Bruno’s old and sick father urinated in his trouser and 
asked Bruno for help. Bruno was in the other room continued watching the football game. 
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Appendix E 
Exploratory items measuring perceived effort and causes of effort (Studies 2 and 3, 
Chapter 3) 
 
Como quantifica o seu nível de esforço na tarefa anterior?  
How do you quantify you effort in the previous task? 
(1- Nenhum; 4 – Moderado; 7 – Máximo)  
(1 – no effort, 4 – moderate effort; 7 – maximum effort)  
 
Em que medida cada um dos seguintes factores influenciaram o se esforço na tarefa anterior? 
How much each of the following factors influenced your effort in the previous task? 
(1 - Não influenciou; 4 – Influenciou moderadamente; 7 – Influenciou completamente)  
(1 – did not influence, 4 – influenced moderately, 7 – influenced completely) 
 
1. Receber uma boa avaliação do experimentador / To get a positive evaluation from the 
experimenter 
2. Vontade de testar as minhas capacidades cognitivas / The desire to test my cognitive skills 
3. Desejar ir ao encontro das expectativas do experimentador / The desire to meet the 
expectations of the experimenter 
4. Tratar-se de uma tarefa desafiante / The fact that it was a challenging task 
5. Querer cumprir o meu dever para com o experimentador / Wanting to do my duty to the 
experimenter 
6. Merecer os créditos que me foram atribuídos pelo experimentador / Earning the credits 
that were given to me by the experimenter 
7. Evitar sentir-me mal por ter um baixo desempenho / To avoid feeling bad for having a bad 
performance 
8. Receber os 100 € do sorteio (only in Study 3) / To get the 100 € from the lottery 
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Appendix F 
Exploratory items measuring Liking and Trust in the experimenter, sense of Belonging 
and Control in the interaction with the experimenter (Studies 2 and 3, Chapter 3) 
 
Liking 
1. No geral eu gostei do experimentador/ In general I liked the experimenter. 
Trust  
2. Eu confio totalmente no experimentador/ I trust the experimenter completely. 
3. Numa situação difícil e decisiva eu não gostaria de depender do experimentador/ In a difficult 
situation I do not want to rely on the experimenter. 
4. O experimentador teve em conta os meus interesses/ The experimenter considered my interests  
5. O experimentador mostrou preocupação com o meu bem-estar/ The experimenter showed 
concern with my well-being 
6. Eu posso apoiar-me no Experimentador/ I can rely on the experimenter.  
Control 
7. Eu tive controlo sobre as ações do experimentador/ I had control over the actions of the 
experimenter.  
8. Eu tive dificuldade em antecipar o que o experimentador ia fazer a seguir/ I had difficulty in 
anticipating what the experimenter was going to do next.  
9. Eu tive controlo sobre os resultados da nossa interação/ I had control over the results of our 
interaction.  
10. Eu tive controlo sobre a forma como eu e o experimentador nos relacionámos/ I had control 
over the way we related with one another.  
11. Eu tive dificuldade em saber como responder às ações do Experimentador/ I had difficulty in 
knowing how to respond to the actions of the experimenter.  
Belonging 
12. O experimentador respeita-me enquanto pessoa/ The experimenter respects me as a person.  
13. Eu sinto-me reconhecido pelo experimentador/ I feel recognized by the experimenter.  
14. O experimentador valoriza-me enquanto pessoa/ The experimenter values me as a person.  
15. Eu sinto-me rejeitado pelo experimentador/ I feel rejected by the experimenter.  
16. Eu sinto-me próximo do experimentador/ I feel close to the experimenter. 
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Appendix G 
Evaluative space grid (Larsen, Norris, McGraw, et al., 2009; Study 4, Chapter 3) 
 
Por favor, indique como se sente em relação ao seu desempenho na tarefa anterior. 
Assinale com uma cruz a célula que corresponde à sua resposta. 
 
  
  Quão bem se sente com o seu desempenho na tarefa anterior? 
  
Nada Bem  
Ligeiramente 
Bem 
Moderadamente 
Bem 
Bastante Bem 
Extremamente 
Bem 
Quão mal se 
sente com o 
seu 
desempenho 
na tarefa 
anterior? 
Nada Mal      
Ligeiramente Mal      
Moderadamente 
Mal 
     
Bastante Mal      
Extremamente 
Mal 
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Appendix H 
Scenarios (Study 1, Chapter 4) 
The following scenarios are translated from the Portuguese version. 
Market pricing 
Expected RelComp 
Mr. António is the landlord of an apartment which is rented to Rodrigo. Since Mr. António changed 
bank account recently, he asked Rodrigo to wait for his phone call with the new bank account number, 
before making the payment. This month’s rent is due today, and Mr. António calls Rodrigo to give 
him the new bank account number. 
- Hi Mr. Rodrigo. I am calling you to give you my new account number. I would like you to make the 
payment of the rent to that account from now on. 
Complementary  Rodrigo: - Of course Mr. António. Just give me the number and I’ll do it 
right away!” 
Mr. António communicates the new account number to Rodrigo. By the end 
of the day he confirms that the payment is on his new account”. 
Non-complementary Rodrigo: - Mr. António, I’m going to keep the new number, but can’t afford 
this month’s rent. Give me until next month… 
Mr. António communicates the new account number to Rodrigo. By the end 
of the day he confirms that Rodrigo did not make the payment”. 
 
Unexpected RelComp 
Mr. António is the landlord of an apartment which is rented to Rodrigo. Rodrigo did not pay the rent 
in the last three consecutive months. Since Mr. António changed bank account recently, he asked 
Rodrigo to wait for his phone call with the new bank account number, before making the payment. 
This month’s rent is due today, and Mr. António calls Rodrigo to give him the new bank account 
number. (Highlight not used in the original version) 
- Hi Mr. Rodrigo. I am calling you to give you my new account number. I would like you to make the 
payment of the rent to that account from now on. 
Complementary  Rodrigo: - “Of course Mr. António. Just give me the number and I’ll do it 
right away!” 
Mr. António communicates the new account number to Rodrigo. By the 
end of the day he checks that the payment has been made”.  
Non-complementary Rodrigo: - Mr. António, I’m going to keep the new number, but can’t 
afford this month’s rent. Give me until next month… 
Mr. António communicates the new account number to Rodrigo. By the 
end of the day he checks that the payment has not been made”.  
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Communal sharing 
Expected RelComp 
Samuel just moved in to a new apartment. However, the apartment It looked a bit dingy, so Samuel 
decided to paint it himself. Since Samuel didn’t want to do it alone, he called his brother Tiago to ask 
for help. 
Samuel: - Hey Tiago, how’s it going? I’m planning to paint my apartment myself next month. Would 
you give me a hand?” 
Complementary  Tiago: - Of course! I will help you with pleasure. Which day? 
Samuel tells Tiago the date and in the set day Tiago shows up to help. 
Non-complementary Rodrigo: - Humm… Next month is complicated. Sorry, bro… 
In the day of the painting Samuel did the job alone. 
 
Unexpected RelComp 
Samuel just moved in to a new apartment. However, the apartment It looked a bit dingy, so Samuel 
decided to paint it himself. His brother Tiago is not an available person. He is always busy when 
Samuel needs him. However, Since Samuel didn’t want paint the apartment alone, he called Tiago to 
ask for help. (Highlight not used in the original version) 
Samuel: - Hey Tiago, how’s it going? I’m planning to paint my apartment myself next month. Would 
you give me a hand?” 
Complementary  Tiago: - Of course! I will help you with pleasure. Which day? 
Samuel tells Tiago the date and in the set day Tiago shows up to help.  
Non-complementary Rodrigo: - Humm… Next month is complicated. Sorry, bro… 
In the day of the painting Samuel did the job alone. 
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Appendix I 
Dependent Measures (Studies 1 and 2, Chapters 4) 
Items used in Study 1 are in Portuguese and items used on Study 2 are in English. Unlike Study 1, Study 2 
described an ongoing interaction during a conversation. The items on each study were phrased in a way that best 
suited the interaction description. Therefore, the Portuguese and English items are not a direct translations of one 
another.  
 
Liking 
1. No geral eu (_ nome do iniciador) gosto do _ (nome do respondente). 
In genelar I (_name of the initiator) like_ (name of the respondent). 
 
Positive Affect 
2. A resposta do _ (nome do respondente) deixou-me (ao _ nome do iniciador) num estado emocional positivo. 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel positive about _ ’s (name of the respondent)  response to my action. 
 
Negative Affect 
3. A resposta do _ (nome do respondente) deixou-me (ao _ nome do iniciador) num estado emocional negativo. 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel negative about _’s (name of the respondent) response to my action. 
 
Maintenance 
4. As coisas correram de um modo tranquilo entre mim (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente). 
(reversed) 
Things are going very smoothly between _ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator). 
(reversed) 
 
5. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) tivemos dificuldades na comunicação.  
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) are having a difficult time communicating. 
 
6. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) achei a nossa interação frustrante.  
I (_ name of the initiator) am finding our interaction frustrating. 
 
7. Foi fácil para mim (_ nome do iniciador) e para o _ (nome do respondente) coordenar os nossos esforços. 
(reversed) 
It has been easy for us (_ names of the initiator and respondent) to coordinate our actions. (reversed) 
 
Control 
8. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) tive facilidade em controlar o resultado da minha interação com o _ (nome do 
respondente).  
I (_ name of the initiator) am easily controlling the outcomes of my interaction with _ (name of the 
respondent).  
 
9. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto que não consegui obter do _ (nome do respondente) a resposta que eu 
desejava. (reversed) 
I (_ name of the initiator) did not get the response that I wanted from _ (name of the respondent). (reversed) 
 
10. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) consegui relacionar-me com o _ (nome do respondente) de forma a alcançar os 
resultados que eu pretendia. 
I (_ name of the initiator) am managing to relate to _ (name of the respondent) in order to achieve the 
outcomes that I desire. 
 
11. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto que escolhi uma ação eficaz para obter do _ (nome do respondente) a 
resposta que eu queria. 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel that I chose an action that was effective to get the response that I wanted from 
_ (name of the respondent). 
 
12. As minhas ações (do _ nome do iniciador) não provocaram os resultados que pretendia, na interação com o 
_ (nome do respondente). (reversed) 
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My (_ name of the initiator) actions are not leading to the outcomes that I desire, in my interaction with _ 
(name of the respondent). (reversed) 
 
13. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto que as minhas ações causaram no _ (nome do respondente) a reação que eu 
desejava. 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel that my actions are causing _ (name of the respondent) to respond the way I 
wish for. 
 
Trust 
14. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) confio totalmente no _ (nome do respondente). 
I (_ name of the initiator) trust _ (name of the respondent) completely 
 
15. Numa situação difícil e decisiva eu (_ nome do iniciador) não gostaria de depender do _ (nome do 
respondente). (reversed) 
If push comes to shove, I (_ name of the initiator) do not want to rely on (name of the respondent) (reversed) 
 
16. O _ (nome do respondente) tem em conta os meus (do _ nome do iniciador) interesses. 
_ (name of the respondent) considers my (_’s name of the initiator) interests at all times.  
 
17. O _ (nome do respondente) preocupa-se com o meu (do _ nome do iniciador) bem-estar. 
_ (name of the respondent) is concerned with my (_’s name of the initiator) well-being. 
 
18. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) posso apoiar-me no _ (nome do respondente). 
I (_ name of the initiator) can build upon _(name of the respondent). 
 
Meta-trust 
19. O _ (nome do respondente) confia totalmente em mim (_ nome do iniciador). 
_ (name of the respondent) trusts me (_ name of the initiator) completely. 
 
20. Numa situação difícil o _ (nome do respondente) não gostaria de depender de mim (_ nome do iniciador). 
(reversed) 
If push comes to shove, _ (name of the respondent) does not want to rely on me (_ name of the initiator). 
(reversed) 
 
21. O _ (nome do respondente) acredita que eu (_ nome do iniciador) tenho em conta os seus interesses. 
_ (name of the respondent) believes I (_ name of the initiator) consider his interests at all times. 
 
22. O _ (nome do respondente) sente que eu (_ nome do iniciador) me preocupo com o seu bem-estar. 
_ (name of the respondent) feels I (_ name of the initiator) am concerned with his well-being. 
 
23. O _ (nome do respondente) sabe que pode apoiar-se em mim (_ nome do iniciador). 
_ (name of the respondent) knows he can build upon me (_ name of the initiator). 
 
Belonging 
24. O _ (nome do respondente) respeita-me (ao _ nome do iniciador) enquanto pessoa. 
_ (name of the respondent) respects me (_ name of the initiator) as a person. 
 
25. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto-me reconhecido pelo _ (nome do respondente). 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel appreciated by _ (name of the respondent). 
 
26. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto que o _ (nome do respondente) me valoriza enquanto pessoa. 
_ (name of the respondent) really values me (_ name of the initiator) as a person. 
 
27. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto-me rejeitado pelo _ (nome do respondente). (reversed) 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel rejected by _ (name of the respondent). (reversed) 
 
28. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) sinto-me próximo do _ (nome do respondente). 
I (_ name of the initiator) feel close to _ (name of the respondent). 
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Perceived RelComp 
Action complementarity 
29. A minha acção (do _ nome do iniciador) e a ação do _ (nome do respondente) combinaram bem uma com a 
outra. 
My (_ name of the initiator) action and _'s (name of the respondent) action meshed well. 
 
30. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) e a ação do _ (nome do respondente) não encaixaram bem uma na 
outra. (reversed) 
My (_ name of the initiator) action and _'s (name of the respondent) action did not fit together. 
 
31. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) completou bem a ação do _ (nome do respondente). 
_’s (name of the respondent) action completed my (_ name of the initiator) action well.  
 
32. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) não foi consistente com a ação do _ (nome do respondente). 
(reversed) 
_’s (name of the respondent) action was not consistent with my (_ name of the initiator) action. 
 
33. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) e a ação do _ (nome do respondente) foram complementares. 
My (_ name of the initiator) action and _'s (name of the respondent) action were complementary. 
 
34. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) e a ação do _ (nome do respondente) foram congruentes entre si. 
My (_ name of the initiator) action and _'s (name of the respondent) action were mutually congruent. 
 
35. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) chocou com a ação do _ (nome do respondente). (reversed) 
_’s (name of the respondent) action clashed with my (_ name of the initiator) action. 
 
Cognitive complementarity 
36. A minha ação (do _ nome do iniciador) e a ação do _ (nome do respondente) foram ao encontro das 
expectativas de cada um. 
My (_ name of the initiator) action and _'s (name of the respondent) action successfully met each other’s 
expectations. 
 
37. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) vemos a nossa relação da mesma forma. 
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) see our relationship in the same way. 
 
38. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) temos expectativas idênticas sobre o tipo de relação 
que temos um com o outro. 
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) have similar expectations about the kind of 
relationship we have with each other. 
 
39. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) estamos a relacionar-nos um com o outro de forma 
diferente. (reversed) 
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) related with each other differently. 
 
40. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) estamos na “mesma onda” sobre o modo de nos 
relacionarmos um com o outro. 
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) are on the same page about how to relate to each 
other. 
 
41. Eu (_ nome do iniciador) e o _ (nome do respondente) fazemos diferentes suposições sobre o modo de nos 
relacionarmos um com o outro. (reversed) 
_ (name of the respondent) and I (_ name of the initiator) made different assumptions about how to relate to 
each other. 
 
 
 
  
Relational Complementarity 
256 
Appendix J 
Scenarios (Study 2, Chapter 4) 
Communal Sharing 
Beneficial RelComp 
Peter just moved in to a new apartment. It looked a bit dingy, so he decided to paint it himself. Since 
Peter didn’t want to do it alone, he called his old friend John to ask for help. 
Peter: - Hey John, how’s it going? I’m planning to paint my apartment myself soon. Would you give 
me a hand? 
 Complementary  John: - Sure buddy, I’m happy to help!  
Non-complementary 
AR 
John: - Ok. We start at 7:00 am. Please have all the tools ready and pick 
me up at my place by 6:30. Don’t be late. 
Non-complementary 
MP 
John: - Sure. I'll take about 40$ for the work. 
Costly RelComp 
Peter’s old friend John just moved in to a new apartment. It looked a bit dingy, so John decided to 
paint it himself. When Peter figured out that John was planning to paint it all alone he called John to 
offer his help. 
Peter: - Hey John, how’s it going? You’ll probably need a hand to paint the apartment. Do you want 
me to help you? 
Complementary  John: - Yes, buddy, I could use some help, thanks a lot!  
Non-complementary 
AR 
John: - Yes, Peter. For the moment it seems I don’t need you because I have 
another assistant. But I want you to be on standby, just in case. Please, don’t 
make any plans for that day without talking to me first.  
Non-complementary 
MP 
John: - Sure, Peter. Great! In that case I’ll pay you 40$ for half-day work.  
Authority Ranking 
Beneficial RelComp 
Captain Miller has to deliver a routine report to the Major by tomorrow. Usually he is the one who 
writes that report but Lieutenant Smith, his First Lieutenant, has occasionally written it in the past. 
Therefore, since Captain Miller will be busy with other tasks, he decides to delegate the report to 
Lieutenant Smith. 
Captain Miller: - Lieutenant Smith, there is something I need from you. This report is due tomorrow. 
Write it and send it to me as soon as possible. 
Complementary  Lieutenant Smith: - Yes, Sir, I’ll do that right away. 
Non-complementary 
EM 
Lieutenant Smith: - Ok, Sir. In that case I assume you will give me half a 
day off this week and then we’re good… 
Non-complementary 
MP 
Lieutenant Smith: - Ok, Sir. In that case I assume I'll get paid overtime for 
working 3 to 4 extra hours... 
 Costly RelComp 
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Captain Miller has decided to delegate an important report to Lieutenant Smith, his First Lieutenant. 
Such responsibility will help Lieutenant Smith getting promoted. Since Lieutenant Smith is not 
familiar with this type of reports, Captain Miller is going to give him advice on where to get the 
critical information and how to present it.   
Captain Miller: - Lieutenant Smith, I want you to start writing this report. It’ll add significantly to 
your résumé. I’ll start by showing you how to write such reports. We begin tomorrow. Meet me in my 
office by 9 am.  
Complementary  Lieutenant Smith: - Yes, Sir. I’ll be there. 
Non-complementary EM Lieutenant Smith: - Ok, Sir. In that case, I can show you how to use 
the new tracking software and we’re good.  
Non-complementary MP Lieutenant Smith:  - Ok, Sir. In that case, I can mention your support in 
the annual leadership-quality survey. It should be worth at least 2 
points…  
Equality Matching 
Beneficial RelComp 
Paul works in the HR department of a company and sometimes carpools with Michael from the Sales 
department, since they live in the same area. Michael is a salesman and is not always at the office. 
Whenever Michael goes to the office, he and Paul take turns driving each other. Today Michael went 
to the office and it was Paul’s turn to drive. Therefore, next time Michael goes to the office it will be 
his turn to drive. 
 At the end of the day Paul drops Michael off at his place. 
 Paul: - Here we are, Michael!  
Complementary  Michael – Thank’s for the ride, Paul. I am going to the office 
tomorrow, so we go in my car. Shall I pick you up at the usual time? 
Non-complementary AR Michael – You’re a great driver, Paul. I am going to the office 
tomorrow and I want to be there one hour earlier, so I’ll pick you up 
at 6:30. Note that you have to get up earlier, so please be on time. 
Non-complementary MP Michael – Thank’s for the ride Paul. We go in my car tomorrow. I 
have to take the Jeep, which consumes a lot. So I would like to ask 
you to bring $15 for gas and the ride. See you tomorrow. 
Costly RelComp 
 Paul works in the HR department of a company and sometimes carpools with Michael from the Sales 
department, since they live in the same area. Michael is a salesman and is not always at the office. 
Whenever Michael goes to the office, he and Paul take turns driving each other. Today Michael went 
to the office and it was his turn to drive. 
At the end of the day Michael drops Paul off at his place. During the trip Paul learns Michael is going 
to be at the office tomorrow, therefore, it will be Paul’s turn to drive.  Exceptionally, Paul does not 
have to be at the office before 10:00 tomorrow, but he does not mention that to Michael. In fact, Paul 
is still willing to wake up earlier and give Michael a ride. 
Paul: - Thank's for the ride, Michael. We’re going in my car tomorrow. I’ll pick you up at the usual 
time. 
Complementary  Michael – Oh, you’re right, It is your turn. See you tomorrow 
Non-complementary AR Michael – Ok, Paul. But we’re going later tomorrow. I want you to 
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pick me up at 9:00 instead of 7:00, but no later than that. Please be 
on time. 
Non-complementary MP Michael – Ok, Paul. Here’s 15$ for gas and the ride, before I 
forget… 
Market Pricing 
Beneficial RelComp 
Phillip works at a company that fixes electrical household appliances and he went to visit a new 
customer, Jack, to fix his broken dishwasher. When Phillip finishes the job he prepares the bill for $80 
and calls Jack. 
 Phillip: - Jack, I’m done here. It’s working perfectly now. 
Complementary  Jack (not noticing the bill): - Ok, Phillip. That’s great! How much 
do I owe you? 
Non-complementary CS Jack (not noticing the bill): - Oh, I can’t thank you enough buddy! 
It’s so annoying to do the dishes by hand! Hey, why don’t you come 
over for a beer sometime? 
Non-complementary AR Jack (not noticing the bill): - Good job, Phillip. You should feel 
proud of yourself. I’ll call you if it’s not working properly. You can 
leave now; I’m very busy here. 
Costly RelComp 
Phillip has a broken dishwasher and called a company to fix it. The company sent a technician named 
Jack. When Jack tells Phillip the job is done, Phillip gets the money to pay Jack. 
 Phillip: - Ok, Jack. How much do I owe you? 
Complementary  Jack: - It’s $80. 
Non-complementary CS Jack: - Forget about it, buddy! You know, people should do what 
they can to help each other out.  
Non-complementary AR Jack: - It’s nothing. Just doing my duty, sir. I hope you are pleased 
with the work. What should I do next, sir? 
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Appendix K 
Syntax for the MLM (Study 2, Chapter 4) 
MIXED DV BY IndexDV RMComb RM RelComp Benefit 
/CRITERIA=CIN(95) MXITER(100) MXSTEP(10) SCORING(1) SINGULAR(0.000000000001)  
HCONVERGE(0, ABSOLUTE) LCONVERGE(0, ABSOLUTE) PCONVERGE(0.000001, ABSOLUTE) 
/FIXED= IndexDV IndexDV*RM IndexDV*RelComp IndexDV*Benefit IndexDV*RM*RelComp IndexDV*RM*Benefit  
IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit  IndexDV*RM*RelComp*Benefit| NOINT SSTYPE(3) 
/METHOD=ML 
/PRINT=COVB G SOLUTION TESTCOV 
/RANDOM= RMComb*RM | SUBJECT(Participant) COVTYPE(ID) 
/REPEATED= IndexDV | SUBJECT(Participant*Scenario) COVTYPE(ARH1) 
 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp) COMPARE(RelComp) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*Benefit) COMPARE(Benefit) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RM_Index) COMPARE(RM) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit) COMPARE(RelComp) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit) COMPARE(Benefit) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*RM) COMPARE(RelComp) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*RM) COMPARE(RM) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*Benefit*RM) COMPARE(Benefit) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*Benefit*RM) COMPARE(RM) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit*RM) COMPARE(RelComp) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit*RM) COMPARE(Benefit) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit*RM) COMPARE(RM) ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
 
/TEST = "Contrast at Liking at CS at CostlyComp"  
IndexDV*RelComp  1 -0.5 -0.5   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
IndexDV*RelComp*Benefit 1 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 0    0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0    
0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   
IndexDV*RM*RelComp 1 -0.5 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0                           
 IndexDV*RM*RelComp*Benefit   1 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0        
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 
              0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0     
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0      
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0       
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0     
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0     
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   
 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 
(…) 
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Table A1 – Comparison between models without (M0) and with (M1-M8) random effects, and between models without (M0, M1) and with (M2-M8) predictors 
Model M 0 M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 
Fixed Effects IndexDV IndexDV 
IndexDV* 
RelComp 
M2 + IndexDV 
*Benefit 
M3 + IndexDV 
*RM 
M4 + IndexDV* 
RelComp*Benefit 
M5 + IndexDV 
*RelComp*RM 
M6 + IndexDV 
*Benefit*RM 
M7 + IndexDV* 
RelComp*Benefit* RM 
Variance and Covariance of Residuals 
Repeated Effects 
RelComp 2.46 (.12)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.32 (.02)*** 0.31 (.02)*** 
Positive Affect 3.35 (.15)*** 0.72 (.04)*** 0.69 (.04)*** 0.69 (.04)*** 0.69 (.04)*** 0.66 (.04)*** 0.64 (.04)*** 0.63 (.04)*** 0.60 (.03)*** 
Negative Affect (rev) 3.73 (.17)*** 1.38 (.07)*** 1.31 (.07)*** 1.30 (.07)*** 1.28 (.07)*** 1.25 (.07)*** 1.24 (.07)*** 1.23 (.07)*** 1.22 (.07)*** 
Control 1.92 (.09)*** 0.57 (.04)*** 0.55 (.03)*** 0.55 (.03)*** 0.51 (.03)*** 0.50 (.03)*** 0.48 (.03)*** 0.48 (.03)*** 0.47 (.03)*** 
Belonging 2.48 (.12)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.35 (.02)*** 0.35 (.02)*** 0.33 (.02)*** 
Trust 2.40 (.12)*** 0.45 (.03)*** 0.43 (.03)*** 0.43 (.03)*** 0.40 (.03)*** 0.40 (.03)*** 0.40 (.03)*** 0.39 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 
Meta-trust 1.62 (.08)*** 1.19 (.07)*** 1.02 (.06)*** 1.01 (.06)*** 0.99 (.05)*** 0.93 (.05)*** 0.92 (.05)*** 0.84 (.05)*** 0.76 (.04)*** 
Maintenance (rev) 2.31 (.11)*** 0.39 (.03)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.37 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 
Liking 2.16 (.10)*** 0.98 (.06)*** 0.89 (.05)*** 0.89 (.05)*** 0.84 (.05)*** 0.83 (.05)*** 0.81 (.05)*** 0.81 (.05)*** 0.77 (.04)*** 
Covariance (ARH1 rho) 0.78 (.01)*** 0.18 (.02)*** 0.17 (.02)*** 0.17 (.02)*** 0.17 (.02)*** 0.17 (.02)*** 0.17 (.02)*** 0.18 (.02)*** 0.19 (.02)*** 
Random Effects 
RMComb*RM - 1.92 (.11)*** 1.50 (.09)*** 1.44 (.08)*** 1.39 (.08)*** 1.19 (.07)*** 1.12 (.06)*** 1.07 (.06)*** 0.91 (.05)*** 
ICC - 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 
Parameters 19 20 38 47 74 92 146 173 227 
-2 Log Likelihood 18,133.03 16,910.69 16,403.33 16,350.84 16,182.22 15,967.22 15,778.89 15,625.44 15,267.49 
Proportional Reduction in Variance 
RelComp - 84.27% 17.20% 0.07% -0.38% -0.90% 2.04% -0.61% 3.02% 
Positive Affect - 78.62% 3.81% 0.02% 0.38% 4.06% 3.04% 1.74% 3.61% 
Negative Affect (rev) - 63.02% 4.93% 0.52% 1.96% 2.40% 0.83% 0.27% 1.15% 
Control - 70.03% 3.61% 1.59% 6.96% 0.57% 4.44% 0.93% 1.98% 
Belonging - 84.22% -0.43% -0.18% 1.21% 3.14% 8.15% 0.14% 5.79% 
Trust - 81.46% 3.36% 0.33% 6.13% 0.64% 0.74% 1.47% 3.55% 
Meta-trust - 26.67% 14.06% 0.76% 2.79% 5.23% 1.38% 9.11% 9.56% 
Maintenance (rev) - 83.05% 3.27% 0.28% 0.56% -0.79% -0.78% 2.09% -1.89% 
Liking - 54.71% 8.76% 0.53% 5.44% 0.97% 1.94% 0.15% 4.97% 
RMComb*RM - - 22.04% 3.97% 3.09% 15.00% 5.80% 4.08% 14.98% 
Parameter estimate standard errors listed in parentheses. *** p < .001.  
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Appendix L 
Scenarios (Study 3, Chapter 4) 
Market Pricing 
Beneficial RelComp 
Phillip is an authorized appliance service technician working at a repair company. The 
company sent him to visit a costumer, Jack, to fix his broken dishwasher, which is out of the 
warranty for about a year.  
Phillip finds the problem with expertise and repairs it. When he finishes, he tries the 
equipment to make sure it works – and it does. He prepares the bill for $100, according to the 
pricing standards of his company, and informs Jack, who is in the next room making some 
calls. 
Phillip: - Jack, I’m done here. It’s working now. 
Complementary  Jack (not noticing the bill): - Ok, Phillip. That’s great! How much do I 
owe you? 
Non-
complementary CS 
Jack (not noticing the bill): - Oh, I can’t thank you enough buddy! It’s so 
annoying to do the dishes by hand! Hey, why don’t you come over for a 
beer sometime? 
Non-
complementary AR 
Jack (not noticing the bill): - Good job, Phillip. You should feel proud of 
yourself. I’ll call you if it’s not working properly. You can leave now; I’m 
very busy here. 
Costly RelComp 
Phillip has a broken dishwasher which is out of the warranty for about a year. He called a few 
repair companies and did some homework about the average cost of such service. Phillip 
estimated the repair cost should range between $80 and $150 and made an appointment with 
the company that seemed most reliable at a competitive price. The company sent an 
authorized technician named Jack.  
Jack finds the problem with expertise and repairs it. When Jack tells Phillip the job is done, 
Phillip gets the money to pay Jack. 
Phillip: - Ok, Jack. How much do I owe you? 
Complementary  Jack: - It’s $80. 
Non-
complementary CS 
Jack: - Forget about it, buddy! You know, people should do what they can 
to help each other out.  
Non-
complementary AR 
Jack: - It’s nothing. Just doing my duty, sir. I hope you are pleased with 
the work. What should I do next, sir? 
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Appendix M 
Scenarios (Study 4a, Chapter 4) 
The following scenarios are translated from the Portuguese version. 
Authority Ranking 
Sara is Manuel’s assistant. Manuel is the Sales Manager of a retail company and he has to deliver a routine 
report to the CEO every two weeks. Sara knows such report very well. 
As Manuel is too busy with the inauguration of two new shops he asked Sara to write the report. 
Manuel: - Sara, I’d like you to write this report and send it to me tonight, so that I can read it and send it in the 
morning. 
Sara feels perfectly capable of writing it and she is free tonight. Hence, she took the task. 
Sara: Yes, sir. I’ll do it.” 
Complementary  That night Sara finished the report and sent it by e-mail to Manuel. 
Non-
complementary 
Uncontrollable 
That night, when the report was almost complete, some virus crashed Sara’s computer and 
stopped her from finishing. After several unsuccessful trials she gave up and decided to 
send an e-mail to Manuel explaining the situation. 
Non-
complementary 
Controllable 
That night, when Sara was having dinner, she started watching one of her favorite movie on 
TV. Sara fell asleep on the couch. In the morning she noticed she hadn’t done the report. 
 
Equality Matching 
Rui lives with a roommate called Pedro. Rui and Pedro usually take turns to buy food, especially the most 
common things, such as, milk, butter, bread, eggs. However, when it comes to more specific products, such as, 
yogurts or cookies, each one buys and consumes his own food. For that reason, Rui and Pedro have the rule 
that in case one of them eats the other’s cookies or yogurts, he should replace it within one or two days.  
Rui has run out of food and since Pedro always has yogurts in the fridge to take to college, he decided to ask 
permission to eat a yogurt. 
Rui: – Pedro, can I eat one of your yogurts? 
Pedro: – Yes, but I have my yogurts counted for the week; since they are the last ones I have and I am not 
going to have time to go shopping, meanwhile, I need you to buy me more tomorrow, ok? Otherwise, I’ll be 
without yogurts to take to college… 
Rui: - OK, deal! 
Complementary  The next day, as soon as he left his classes, Rui went to the grocery store and bought 
yogurts. When he arrived home he put the yogurt he owed to Pedro, in the fridge, in 
Pedro’s shelf. 
Non-
complementary 
Uncontrollable 
The next day, as soon as he left classes, Rui went to the campus gym, has usual; except this 
time he tried a new workout and hurt his foot very seriously. He had to go to the nearest 
hospital immediately. Since he returned home late and with his foot immobilized, Rui was 
not able to buy Pedro’s yogurt. 
Non-
complementary 
Controllable 
The next day, as soon as he left classes, Rui went to the campus gym, has usual; except this 
time he tried a new workout and stayed until later. When he arrived home, Rui noticed he 
had forgotten to buy Pedro’s yogurt.  
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Appendix N 
Scenarios (Study 4b, Chapter 4) 
The following scenarios are translated from the Portuguese version. 
Communal Sharing 
Sara’s brother, Manuel just moved in to a new apartment. However, since the apartment looked a bit dingy, 
Manuel decided to paint it herself. Since Manuel didn’t want to do it alone, he called his sister Sara Tiago to ask 
for help. 
Manuel: - Hey Sara, how’s it going? I’m planning to paint my apartment myself next month, in the 25 th. It’s 
Saturday and the idea is to start around 9h30. Would you give me a hand?” 
Sara: - Of course! I will help you with pleasure. I’ll be there. 
 
Complementary  The day before the painting Sara went to bed early. The next day by 9h30 she was at 
Manuel’s place to help him. 
Non-
complementary 
Uncontrollable 
The day before the painting Sara felt ill and started vomiting. She went to the hospital 
emergency suspecting food poisoning. She went back home by 5h am. Feeling week 
and advice by the doctor to rest she could not help Manuel. 
Non-
complementary 
Controllable 
The night before the painting Sara went for a drink with some friends. She drank too 
much and got distracted with the time. She went back home by 5 am feeling tired and 
with a hangover. Dizzy and vomiting she could not help Manuel. 
 
Market Pricing 
Rui is the tenant of an apartment that belongs to Mr. Pedro. The rent is usually paid through bank transfer. Mr. 
Pedro is in the process of changing to a new bank and he is going through unexpected bureaucratic hurdles. In 
order not to wait for the new operational bank account, Mr. Pedro asked Rui to make the payment in cash, 
exceptionally, this month.  
  
Today is due another rent and Mr. Pedro calls Rui to settle the payment details. 
  
Pedro: - Good morning Mr. Rui. I want to remind you to pay this month’s rent in cash as we talked before, and 
to ask you to leave the money in the mail box until 20h today. I’ll stop by at that time, ok? 
  
Rui: – Of course, Mr. Pedro. Agreed. 
  
Complementary  During the day, after visiting a client, Rui headed to the closest bank by his office to 
withdraw the cash. When he arrived home he left the money in his mail box inside an 
envelope, as agreed. 
Non-
complementary 
Uncontrollable 
During the day, after visiting a client, Rui headed to the closest bank by his office to 
withdraw the cash. On his way home, there was a car accident and he got stuck in 
traffic for more that one hour. When he arrived at the bank, it was already closed and 
there was no other way to get the cash that day. 
Non-
complementary 
Controllable 
During the day, after visiting a client, Rui headed to the closest bank by his office to 
withdraw the cash. On his way home he stopped by Fnac to buy tickets to a concert 
next day and got distracted with the novelties. When he arrived at the bank, it was 
already closed and there was no other way to get the cash that day. 
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